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SUMMARY
This is a study of the organisational change to self-managed team working in UK-based
manufacturing organisations. There are few models to guide research into the organisational
change to team working and this study focuses on the under-researched area of the
implementation process. Descriptions of team development models imply a smooth, linear
change process. Yet this strategic change involves major restructuring at an operational level
and in reality is a complex and political transition process that unfolds in unpredictable
directions. This research proposes a processual framework to explore team development
and to increase understanding of the ways in which this transition is shaped at critical
junctures.
This research was based on case study data collected over periods of up to five years in four
brownfield, manufacturing organisations. This data provided detailed iUustrations of the
major challenges facing organisations in the transition to self-management. Specifically, the
research findings indicated that the change to self-managed team working was an unfolding,
non-linear process and that its success was shaped not only by the congruence between team
design and production setting, but also by the congruence between new work structures and
supporting organisational arrangements. Senior management commitment was pivotal to the
success of the change process, as were clear definitions of operational roles and required
actions and behaviours. Finally, the research indicated the importance of key players
adopting appropriate change-driver roles and of paying attention to political tensions and
perceived threats associated with changes to traditional role demarcations.
This research increases understanding of the implementation and development of self-
managed work teams at an operational level and the results may be of considerable practical
use for organisations in determining their strategies for organisational change and
development.
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CHAPTER ONE
Team-Working: Background Factors and Contemporary Issues
"The road to success is a/ways under construction."
(Jim Miller, economist and politician, cited in Williams, /998)
1.1 Introduction
The focus of this research is the implementation and development of self-managing teams in
brownfield manufacturing settings with particular emphasis on the process of the
organisational change to team working. At a broad level, researchers (e.g. Parker and
Jackson, 1994) have noted that there seems to be a general lack of research attention given
to forms of high-involvement management in brownfield sites. This research has been
designed as a detailed and practical investigation of the transition to team working in four
organisations with a view to increasing our understanding of some of the key issues in this
context.
To provide a firm foundation for this applied research and to identify some of the key
research and methodological issues, this chapter addresses some of the theoretical and
conceptual ideas underpinning the implementation and development of teams in UK-based
manufacturing settings. In most organisations, there does not appear to be one single factor
driving the interest in team working in manufacturing industries. Rather, most organisations
seem to be developing team working for a number of reasons.
As well as the focus on why organisations are developing and implementing team-working in
the current climate and the factors driving this change, this chapter also considers how
widely team working is employed in organisations and the benefits and problems attributed
to this work design. The link between team working and performance is also considered,
and reference made to theoretical inputs in this area.
In an effort to provide a structure to the wealth of information available on the background
and key contemporary issues in team working, the contents of this chapter will be organised
around the following framework.
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Figure 1.1 Background factors and contemporary issues in the development of team working
initiatives
Key Job Design Initiatives
(Historical)
Contextual Features
(Environmental)
Manufacturing Strategy
Types of Work Teams
• WorkGroups
• QUality Circles Impact onorganisational• Higb Performance Work performanceTeams
• Lean Performance Teams
• Semi-Autonomous Work
Groups
• Self-Managing Teams
• Self-Designing Teams
• Economic Perspective
• Technology
• Conventional Assembly
Line
• Sociotechnical Systems
• Lean Production
Contemporary Perspectives
in Team Working
1.2 Job Design Initiatives (Historical)
1.2.1 Job Characteristics Model
In the past thirty years there has been a substantial increase in interest in the area of job
design. Work in the late 1960s and early 1970s (e.g. Hackman and Lawler, 1971)
influenced the development of a conceptual framework proposed by Hackman and Oldham
(1980) which has served as the impetus for much of this research.
Essentially, their Job Characteristics Model argues that enriched or complex jobs are
associated with increased job satisfaction, motivation and work performance. More
specifically, they proposed that five core job characteristics (i.e. skill variety, task identity,
task significance, autonomy and feedback from job) influence three critical psychological
states (i.e. experienced meaningfulness ofthe work, experienced responsibility for outcomes
of the work and knowledge of the actual results of the work activities). In tum, these affect
work outcomes (i.e. internal work motivation, growth satisfaction, overall job satisfaction,
work effectiveness and absenteeism). Additionally, they proposed three factors (i.e.
knowledge and skill growth, need strength and context satisfaction) as moderators of both
the job characteristics-critical psychological states relationship and the critical psychological
states-work outcomes relationship. This model is shown below in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2 Hackman and Oldham's (1976) Job Characteristics Model
Core Job
Characteristics
Critical Psychological
States
Outcomes
Task
Sismificance
Experienced High
Meaningfulness ... Intrinsic
of Work -... Motivation
Experienced
High JobResponsibilities ~" Satisfactionfor Work Action
Knowledge of Results
of Work Actions -.. High Work
Effectiveness
Skill Variety
Task Identity
Autonomy
Feedback
from the Job ...
This model has been discussed widely in the literature and there have been both criticisms
(e.g. Roberts and Glick, 1981) and also support for the model. For example, Fried and
Ferris (1987) carried out a meta-analysis of76 studies in this area and concluded that there
is a meaningful and consistent relationship between job characteristics and both
psychological and behavioural outcomes. Their study also implied that different
organisational goals could be operationalised through the development of specific task
dimensions.
In order to improve work performance the organisation might choose to allocate resources
for the development of task identity and job feedback. Absenteeism may be reduced
through the development of skill variety, autonomy and job feedback. Attitudinal or
psychological outcomes could be improved by focusing primarily on skill variety, task
significance, autonomy and job feedback. Furthermore, because job feedback is associated
with all of the psychological and behavioural measures investigated, the development of this
task dimension potentially could benefit the organisation more than the development of any
one of the remaining task dimensions.
Fried and Ferris' (1987) findings also indicated that organisational decisions to enrich jobs
should be contingent upon whether contextual factors, such as the reward system or
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management policy, support such an intervention. Internal contextual factors such as these
will be considered in the next chapter.
Hackman (1977) suggests several specific strategies for increasing the levels ofthe five core
dimensions: combining tasks, forming natural work units, establishing client relationships,
vertical loading, and opening feedback channels. Vertical loading is one ofthe implementing
concepts that typically plays a critical role in any job redesign project and is of particular
interest in the context of the development of team working. The essence of vertical loading
is to increase the potential for employee self-regulation. For example, Hackman (1977)
considers that vertical loading involves giving employees, as part of their jobs,
responsibilities which formerly belonged to managers. Several specific procedures are
typically used with a vertical loading strategy including: deciding on work methods, freedom
in time management, training less experienced workers, assignment of work priorities,
handling crises, and material scheduling.
Although the original ideas behind the Job Characteristics Model were very much focused
on the job at the individual level, there are clear parallels in group working and implications
for the development ofteams. For example, Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al (1994) comment that
sociotechnical systems interventions have tended to emphasise one primary social system
that centres on autonomous work teams as the primary vehicle to address what are assumed
to be core needs for influence and autonomy. Indeed, the five core factors of the Job
Characteristics Model have resurfaced, albeit in the group context, as team working has
gained momentum in the UK in response to the economic and technological changes ofthe
I990s.
1.3 Contextual Features of Team-Working (Environmental)
1.3.1 The Economic Perspective
The recent resurgence of interest injob design initiatives may in part be related to changes in
the world economic climate and the focus on competitive advantage. In the past, increasing
competitiveness in industrial capitalism meant driving down the cost of production by
increasing volume and velocity of production for a standardised product and a given market.
The organisation of this production manifested itself in the principles of Taylorism. In
recent decades, industrial competitors have sought advantage through leadership in product
differentiation and market segmentation. This evolution from standardisation to what is
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known as the new competition (Best, 1990) represents a strategic change in both the
process and organisation of industrial capitalism. In the latter case, emphasis is less on
absolute advantage of minimum costs and more on relative advantage of the right product
for the right market.
At a theoretical level, the organisational paradigm of the new competition replaced first,
profit maximisation with the pursuit of competitive advantage as a motivating force to
explain enterprise and organisational behaviour, second, competition as an equilibrium
resting point with competition as a historical process and, third, firms that compete with
unidentified rivals over prices of a standardised product to those firms that compete against
strategically reflexive rivals that are also capable of developing a range of non-price
competitive strategies.
Whereas in the economic textbook world firms are basically passive to an external market,
actions offirms in the new competition affect the notions of competitors and thereby shape
the environment and the constitution of the market itself(Piore and Sabel, 1984). Because
of this dynamic interaction between an enterprise's action and other enterprises in the sector,
an organisation's structure and the processes which inform it are never final. Instead, firms
must adapt and re-adapt organisational processes to an evolving and shapeable environment.
1.3.2 Technology
Increasingly, manufacturing companies are introducing organisation-wide changes in order
to compete in terms of cost, quality, responsiveness to customers and lead-time (e.g.
Lawler, 1992). The focus has been on both the introduction of new programmable
technology (e.g. Advanced Manufacturing Technology) to manufacture customised products
at close to mass production cost and the introduction of new production practices, such as
just-in-time and total quality management, associated with the visibly-successful Japanese
companies (Dean and Snell, 1991). These practices allow more flexible production. They
also promote and require changes in shop-floor work organisation and it is argued that this
new manufacturing environment requires high-performing shop-floor employees (e.g.
Buchanan and McCalman, 1989).
Indeed, it is increasingly being recognised that the competitiveness of manufacturing
organisations can be enhanced by, and is perhaps dependent on, a higher level of human
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performance (Wall et al., 1990). As such, it makes sense to arrange production on a team
work basis. Individual problems become group problems since each operation is
interdependent, and a high degree of worker flexibility is essential to function effectively
(Lawler, 1992). In this new manufacturing environment, complex problems occur and the
need for a co-ordinated effort means a more skilled and integrated workforce is required.
Essentially, operators need to do more than the standard job whilst relying less on direction
from supervisors. Narrowly defined jobs based on Tayloristic principles are inappropriate in
such an environment; there is a need for more complex jobs with greater autonomy which
enable employees to cope directly with the increased information processing demands and
variability that integrated manufacturing entails (Lawler, 1992).
The emphasis is on a culture based on commitment or high- invo lvement in which employees
are encouraged to work in a more self-managed way. The key to the success of initiatives,
such as advanced manufacturing technology, just-in-time and total quality management, is
likely to lie in an organisation's orientation to its human resources. According to Lawler
(1992), shortcomings do not lie with the technology itselfbut with the choices made about
the associated work organisation.
These changes in the economic, market and technological conditions have led to a
resurgence of interest in team working. The popularity of work teams stems from the idea
that by identifying and solving work-related problems teams can contribute to improved
performance. Indeed, in recent years, more companies have been moving from individuals to
teams as the organisational units accountable for performance (see figures later in the
chapter). The traditional approaches of work specialisation and centralised decision-making
have resulted in unskilled, repetitive work with low employee involvement and little job
satisfaction and have been considered to be counter-productive in the current industrial
environment. Research (e.g. Buchanan, 1994) indicates that the traditional approach has not
only led to problems of high absenteeism and turnover, but also to lack of flexibility in
people and machine utilisation, poor quality, high work in progress and low productivity.
The switch in emphasis to work teams reflects a change in operating philosophy with flatter
organisational structures, a multi-skilled workforce and increased responsibility at shop-floor
level (Grey and Corlett, 1989). Words like "self-management" and employee
"empowerment" are key, reflecting the shift in emphasis from a focus on management
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control of employees to a decentralisation of power and the provision of opportunity for
workers at all levels to exercise increasing influence over their work environment.
In attempting to use their human resources more fully, many organisations have moved
beyond the mentality that managers make decisions and employees simply do what they are
told. The ideas behind team working and self-management imply an increasing reliance on
workers' creative, intellectual and interpersonal skills and capabilities, not just their physical
labour (Grey and Corlett, 1989).
These contextual variables are key to an understanding of the current focus on team working
settings. Another factor important to this understanding is the manufacturing strategy, and
this is a key determinant of the nature of the team design and team development.
1.4 Work Teams and Manufacturing Strategy
As noted in the previous section, changes in manufacturing technology and production
practices promote and require changes in shop-floor organisation. Different manufacturing
systems are concerned with many different aspects of the firm and encompass many facets
e.g. techniques and methods like simultaneous engineering, kanban, just-in-time, total
quality control, total productivity maintenance and statistical process control.
In this section, the focus is on the role of the worker and the role of the team in three
different types of manufacturing environment: the conventional assembly line, the
sociotechnical systems production environment and the lean production setting. EUegardet
a1 (1992) propose the following figure to show the impact of different production forms.
Fig 1.3 The impact oftraditional mass production, lean production and reflective production
Humaa
Beaefits
Ecoaomical Beaeflts
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These authors believe that these different forms are based "on a particular mode of
exploitation of human potential and technical facilities" (p. 132). If these technical and
human resources are used efficiently, they will result in economic benefits e.g. high
productivity, high product quality and high capital turnover, as well as human benefits e.g.
high autonomy, adequate ergonomics and broad work content.
These different manufacturing strategies will be explored below in an attempt to highlight
the key differences in the roles of the individuals and teams in these environments.
Understanding the impact of the different manufacturing strategies provides an essential
underpinning to understanding different tearn-based work designs in organisations.
1.4.1 The Conventional Assembly Line
The starting point for this discussion is the most traditional form of working in
manufacturing environments, the conventional assembly line. In conventional forms of
assembly organisation, the jobs of assembly operators are based on Tayloristic principles of
job design:
a) task cycles are of short length. Direct production tasks are specialised and highly
standardised and designed for "foolproof' execution. Therefore, the arnount of
discretion that operators have regarding how they execute their tasks, termed "work
method autonomy" by Breaugh (1985), is low.
b) jobs consist of the repetitive execution of a limited range of such routine tasks; that is,
jobs are specialised. There is a strict separation between direct and indirect production
tasks. Operators are responsible only for direct tasks and indirect tasks, such as quality
control, machine set-up, and routine maintenance, are performed by specialist engineers
and craftsmen. Operators do not plan or organise their own work. The extent of
control which operators have over how their activities are co-ordinated (scheduled,
sequenced, timed), termed "work schedule autonomy" by Breaugh (1985), is low.
Instead, operational activities are co-ordinated by supervisors and managers, who are
also responsible for assessing the performance of the operators. Therefore, the third and
final element of work autonomy identified by Breaugh (1985), termed "work criteria
autonomy", is also low.
c) the jobs of operators are highly specialised and so a vertical form of co-ordination of
operational activities is needed. In practice, there are likely to be many organisational
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layers between operators on the shopfloor and top management.
d) the specialised nature of the jobs, the need to work at a fixed, typically demanding pace,
and the low level of work autonomy may, in combination and according to the job
design parameters described earlier, be expected to lead to a very low level of job
satisfaction for operators.
There have been many attempts, spanning a wide geographical area covering Western
Europe, the USA and Japan to move away from conventional forms of assembly
organisation. On the basis of the structural characteristics of the modem forms ofassembly
organisation and the primary objectives being pursued by management, these attempts can
be divided into two broad classes, sociotechnical system and lean production teams.
The following table summarises some of the key differences between sociotechnical system
and lean production teams.
Table 1.1 A comparison ofteam types
Sociotechnical Systems Teams Lean Production Teams
Origins: England (coal mines, 1940's) Japan (Toyota Pull System,
and Scandinavia (Volvo Kalmar, 1960's)
1970's)
System Optimises: Mix of social and technical sub- Continuous improvement in
systems work operations
Expected Yield: Increased worker commitment Systematic gains in quality and
and targeted gains in quality and productivity
safety
System Constrainers Would Be: High levels ofteam High expectations of team
interdependence; limited autonomy; low
resources for technical redesign labour/management support
for continuous improvement
Typically Found In: Continuous production Assembly operations (high
operations (high autonomy interdependency among teams)
arnong teams)
Leadership: Depends on self-managing group Depends on strong tearn
leader; groups work with a
defined structure.
Membership: Common work area Common work area
Organisation Structure: Core building block Core building block
Links to Otber Teams: Tightly linked across shifts; Tightly linked to internal
loosely linked with other teams customers and suppliers
(adapted from Cutcher-Gershenfeldet aI, 1994)
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There are important conceptual and practical differences between sociotechnical systems and
lean production teams. These are summarised in the table and will now be explored in more
detail.
1.4.2 Sociotechnical Systems
Sociotechnical system teams have been promoted in Europe for more than 30 years because
of their beneficial effects on organisational effectiveness and the quality of working life.
Early researchers in this field suggested that socially ineffective structures could be a major
factor in preventing harmonisation (Trist and Bamforth, 1951) and creating alienation
(Emery, 1959).
The sociotechnical system emphasises the satisfaction of the needs of employees and
obtaining challenging work. As such, the focus is on work content and jo b redesign. This is
illustrated by the attention paid to such elements as regulatory tasks, autonomy and
wholeness of work. In Western countries, personal growth needs are important; there is a
need for autonomy and so attention in sociotechnical systems is paid to work content.
Sociotechnical systems clearly view people as a resource to be developed and a production
structure is favoured which decouples the production process into parallel units and which
gives maximum autonomy to them. According to sociotechnical system theory, the work
system should balance the needs of the organisation for efficiency and the psychosocial
needs of the worker and self-managing groups are promoted as ways to increase
productivity and human satisfaction. In sociotechnical systems, workers have autonomy
over their movements and to a certain extent can set their own working pace. The workers
are comparatively free to decide in which way results are achieved and to make their own
working arrangements. The standardisation of skills is an important co-ordination
mechanism. Interdependence is reciprocal, with all workers sharing responsibility and most
working closely together (Niepce and Molleman, 1996).
Self-management is seen as a substitute for leadership. The role of supervisors and leaders
of self-managing work groups ismore that of a facilitator and coach. There is an aspect of
job enrichment, with regulatory tasks (administrative and other duties) becoming an
integrated part of the job. Workers are given autonomy over work pace and work methods
(an example of Hackman's (1977) so-called vertical loading referred to earlier, in this
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instance in a group context).
Another important design parameter in sociotechnical system theory refers to the autonomy
of production units. Sociotechnical system theory, in line with the principles of group
technology, composes groups that with respect to their machine and human capacities are
able to produce whole products or parts. By paralleling work processes, the need for co-
ordination that exceeds the task group is minimised and the autonomy of the group is
maximised. Boundaries are important as they delineate groups and provide workers with a
sense of identity. The groups have a closed nature and both the boundaries between groups
and the autonomy of teams are strongly emphasised.
In sociotechnical systems, a multifunctional worker is able to perform several tasks that are
assigned to the group and job enlargement is limited to the boundaries of the group.
Sociotechnical systems emphasise the integration of sequential and related tasks in the jobs
of individual team members, enlarging the cycle time. This is to enable workers to get a
better insight into the way different processing steps influence each other and the worker
will be able to observe and correct deviations at an earlier stage, which will improve
performance.
1.4.3 Lean Production Systems
With lean production systems, the basic purpose is to increase profits by reducing costs
through completely eliminating waste such as excessive stocks or work force. Increasing
workers' morale is a subgoal to achieve the primary goal of cost reduction. Womack, Jones
and Roos (1990) assigned teams a crucial role in the lean production process, considering
them to be "the heart of the lean factory" (p.9). Lean production systems clearly view
people as a resource to be developed and acknowledge their importance in the labour
process. Lean production differs from classical mass production in minimising buffers, as
exemplified by just-in-time which is characterised by flow production and a large
interdependence. Minimising buffers not only serves the direct purpose of eliminating
inefficiencies. but also provides valuable information which can be used for increasing
productivity and efficiency.
In lean production, the leading co-ordination principle is the standardisation of work
processes. Time-and-motion studies develop exact standards for each process and lean
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production tries to achieve a perfectly balanced production system. This can lead to a
mechanical system where everyone is working at the same pace. Typical of the generated
standards, mainly caused by the attempt to create an unbuffered flow, is a situation in which
workers are physically and, in an ergonomical sense, bound to their workplace and have
hardly any freedom of movement. Each worker is expected to deliver a certain arnount of
work within an appointed timespan and the tearn as such has no influence on working pace.
Interdependence is sequential, with workers only able to start the execution of their tasks if
the workers prior to them have performed their tasks properly.
In terms of the distribution of control within the team, supervisors are traditional-style
leaders who derive their authority from their hierarchical position and their knowledge base.
Lean production stresses the importance of first-line supervisors. Teams are not
autonomous from management but are built around the supervisor. The supervisor is the
strong hierarchical leader who commands the tearn. Lean production systems do not give
workers autonomy over work pace and work methods as sociotechnical systems do, opting
instead for a fixed pace and standardised working processes.
The product being manufactured defines the production structure and stipulates the
particular sequence in which activities have to be performed. This means that tasks which
are product-technically closely related are not always connected at the operational level.
There is no need to locate people who work on the same part of the product in close
proximity to one another. It is common for non-related activities to be performed in
succession (Niepce and Molleman, 1996). This results in a low level of task identity. In
lean production, group boundaries are not clearly defined and are more open systems than in
sociotechnical system groups.
In terms ofmultifunctionality of workers, lean production strives for job enlargement byjob
rotation, with the expectation that workers will be capable of carrying out a wide range of
narrow tasks. Employees are rotated not only within teams but also between teams and even
between different departments. Job rotation does not increase the cycle time.
With regard to human values, lean production does not emphasise the redesign of jobs to
make them more appealing. Lean production has been successful in Japan, and the values
and norms towards Quality of Working Life are different in Japan than in the West (Niepce
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and Molleman, 1996). For example in Japan, the need for social relations is more intense
than the need for personal achievement and independence. Lean production relies heavily on
social relationships to satisfy the needs of workers and this is a different way of motivating
workers and influencing organisational behaviour than that underpinning sociotechnical
systems.
This discussion outlines the key differences between sociotechnical system and lean
production teams and distinguishes different forms of team-based work systems. This
increases our understanding and helps to explain the diversity of team systems found in
manufacturing environments and to derive insights into the general nature of team-based
work systems. This discussion also pinpoints some of the issues regarding compatibility
between manufacturing setting and team design.
The central message from Womack, Jones and Roos (1990) was that the performance gap
between Japanese and Western car producers needed to be closed by the latter adopting lean
production. In Europe this concept seems to have functioned as a catalyst for the diffusion
of team work (van Amelsvoort and Benders, 1996). As a result, in adopting team-working
there seems to have been a mix of Eastern and Western influences. There are however,
significant differences between sociotechnical system and lean production teams, both in
terms of philosophy and practical application and this may explain why some manufacturing
firms have experienced difficulties in the implementation of teams (Cutcher-Gershenfeld et
aI, 1994). Research by these authors suggests for example, that some assembly operations
are simultaneously attempting to encourage the formation of self-managing teams while
reducing buffers through reduced in-process inventory and just-in-time delivery. The
resulting tension between team autonomy and team interdependence can be managed
through strong leadership, but this does not fit the traditional view of teams as being self-
directed or autonomous.
The choice ofteam design is complicated, with type ofproduct, technology, physical layout
and organisational structure and culture being amongst the most important considerations in
the matching of a team system to a company (Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al, 1994). A lean
production system optimises flow-through manufacturing but reduces the amount of worker
autonomy. A sociotechnical system achieves worker autonomy by optimising the balance
between social and technical sub-systems, but may do so at the expense of efficiency or
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operating costs. Firms must pick the system that will maximise the strengths of the firm's
production technology and employees. Teams can be utilised in a variety of production
contexts. A tightly linked assembly operation will favour lean production teams and
constrain sociotechnical system teams, while a continuous production system will favour
sociotechnical system teams. An understanding of these differences is essential in any
organisational change to team working.
1.5 Contemporary Perspectives on Team Working
As the earlier discussion on the contextual factors driving team working highlighted, work
design in the 1990s is not as concerned with combating absenteeism, labour turnover and the
monotony associated with segmented repetitive tasks as previous eras of work design
research. Rather, an increasingly competitive business environment has forced organisations
to rethink their work design in an effort to promote quality, flexibility and greater customer
responsiveness. High performance work systems that put autonomous team working in
centre stage are seen as an effective way of achieving these goals and these team designs
draw from concepts and ideas from previous initiatives in this area (Buchanan, 1994).
Early adherents of sociotechnical systems theory and the quality of working life movement
emphasised the creation of a more humanistic approach to work design in order to provide a
more fulfilling work experience for employees. The present emphasis on self-management
focuses on "hard" business realities and contemporary applications are based on strategic,
rather than operational considerations, with the ultimate aim of securing competitive
advantage through greater flexibility and adaptability (see Figure 1.4 below).
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Figure 1.4 Contrast between sociotechnical systems in the 1970s and high performance team designs in
the 1990s
QWL in the 1970s
Aimed to reduce costs of absenteeism .:.
and labour turnover and increase
productivity.
Based on the argument that increased .:.
autonomy improves quality of work
experience and employee job
satisfaction.
Had little impact on management .:.
function beyond first-line
management.
"Quick fix" applied to isolated and .:.
problematic work groups
Personnel administration technique. .:.
(Source: Buchanan, 1994)
High-performance in the 1990s
Aimed to improve organisational
flexibility and product quality or
competitive advantage.
Based on the argument that increased
autonomy improved skills, decision-
making, adaptability and use of new
technology .
Involves change in organisation's
culture and redefinition of management
function at all levels.
Could take two or three years to change
attitudes and behaviour throughout the
organisation
Human resource management strategy
In addition to the factors mentioned above, the increasing interest in employee autonomy
has been fuelled by strategies, such as business process re-engineering, which have produced
flatter organisational structures by removing layers of management. In manufacturing
industries, new technologies and production methods, for example just-in-time inventory
control, total quality management and cellular production, require greater employee
involvement and less direct supervisory control (Parker and Wall, 1996).
As a result, the clear distinctions and operational constraints between the different team
types in different manufacturing settings described earlier have become blurred in the drive
to implement work design initiatives to improve business performance. So-called high
performance work design has emerged over the past decade. Applebaum and Batt (1994)
suggest that two distinct high-performance work design models are being pursued in the
United States. First, there is an American variant of the Japanese lean production system
pioneered by Toyota, which found influential support in the United States. Second, there is
the American team production model, which "combines the principles of Swedish
sociotechnical systems and self-directed work with those of quality engineering"
(Applebaum and Batt, 1994: 125). These authors go on to describe this model in the
following terms: "The American model of team-based high performance begins with
sociotechnicaljob design and the use of self-directed teams, but incorporates an eclectic set
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of ideas from other sources: just-in-time inventories from the Japanese, total quality and
statistical process control from Deming via Japan, incentive and compensation structures
developed in the American human resources model, and a uniquely American form of
labour-management partnership that emerged out of the American experience of collective
bargaining and joint quality oflife activities. The American team-based model leads to a real
distribution of power and authority in the workplace" (p.126).
Whereas the United States lean production model includes some limited employee
involvement through employee participation in problem-solving groups, the American team
production approach provides far greater opportunities for all staff to become fully involved
in organisational activities and, importantly, to take an active part in the decision-making
process (Applebaum and Batt, 1994). Core features ofsociotechnical systems are essential
to this model. Sociotechnical systems involve integrating the social and technical aspects of
a job, and because workers have intimate knowledge of what a task entails they are best
placed to organise work and optimise the potential of the technologies they are
using. Moreover, workers are also best placed to identify process improvements. This is
most likely to happen ifemployees work in teams, enabling them to view the whole process
rather than focusing on a segmented individualised task. Crucially, these teams must be
given the authority and incentive to pursue continuous improvement.
However, it is recognised that while self-management is at the heart of the team-based high
performance work system the degree of autonomy given to the teams varies. This variation
tends to be between self-managed teams that have control over all aspects of work,
including human resource issues and the freedom to liaise with supporting functions, and
those whose autonomy is confined to determining how work is performed to meet their
targets (Applebaum and Batt, 1994).
In some senses, integration of practices and techniques from different models of team
working (e.g. sociotechnical system and lean production teams) seems viable at the
philosophical and strategic level. This is especially the case as the current imperative driving
both types of team working initiatives is to improve business performance. However, this
integration may not prove as viable at an operational and practical level. The earlier
discussion of the philosophy and practices of sociotechnical system and lean production
teams demonstrates this. The strategic goals of the different work designs may be similar
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but the expectations and realities are completely different at an operational level. This
research will explore in some detail the strategic and operational issues surrounding the
development of different team designs in manufacturing settings.
1.6 Types of Work Groups and Teams
Within this context, companies seeking to establish team-based work systems find that there
is a huge diversity ofmeanings for the term "team". Workplaces are not only filled with lean
production teams, sociotechnical systems teams, but also off-line teams, training teams, task
force teams, sales teams etc. In much of the literature there is often no distinction made
among the alternative types of team systems and yet each has important advantages and
limitations in different situations. For the implementation and development of team
working, there must be congruence between the different systems and strategies that exist
within the organisation.
At this point, it is useful to introduce the Team Autonomy Continuum presented by Banker,
Field, Schroeder and Sinha (1996). These authors classify teams on a continuum with those
on the far right having the most autonomy, and those on the far left having the least
autonomy.
Figure 1.5 Team Autonomy Continuum
Traditional
Work Groups
Quality
Circles
Lean
Production
Teams
High
Performance
Teams
Semi-
Autonomous
Work Groups
Self
Managing!
Directing
Teams
Self
Designing
Teams
(adapted from Banker, Field, Schroeder and Sinha, 1996)
These different types of teams are defined by Banker et a1 (1996) in the following way:
Traditional work groups - in which workers perform core production activities and other
groups are responsible for support activities, such as quality control and
maintenance. Workers have no management responsibility or control. The first line
manager controls planning, organising, directing, staffing and monitoring.
Quality circles - in which membership is voluntary. Members are drawn from a particular
work group or department. The group has the responsibility for making suggestions but
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does not have the authority to make decisions. The problem-solving domain is limited to
quality- and productivity-related issues and cost reduction. Typically, the group is not
provided with systematic information on the firm's performance or strategic matters.
Lean production teams - in which teams work collectively to standardised work processes
and there is some limited employee involvement through employee participation inproblem-
solving groups.
High performance work teams - provide the opportunity for all staff to become involved in
organisational activities and, importantly, to take an active part in the decision-making
process. This approach incorporates ideas from sociotechnical systems job design, self-
managing teams, just-in-time, total quality, statistical process control and American human
resources policies.
Semi-autonomous work groups - in which workers manage and execute major production
activities. Other groups perform support activities, such as quality control and maintenance,
which are related to, but outside the scope of, major production activities.
Self-managing/directing teams - these are groups of workers who can self-regulate work on
their interdependent tasks. Group members have control over the management and
execution of an entire set of tasks, from the acquisition of raw materials through the
transformation process to shipping. This includes all the support activities, such as quality
control and maintenance, required to produce a definable product or to carry out a definable
part of a production process.
Self-designing teams - these groups have all the characteristics of self-managing teams and
they also have control over the design of the teams themselves and decide such issues as
what tasks should be done and who should belong to the teams.
The distinctions between the different types of teams are not always made clear in the
literature or by organisations when describing their team-based systems. Yet it would seem
that these distinctions are relevant and important when discussing the change to team
working and its development and implementation in any organisation in order to ensure
congruence between team design parameters and operational realities.
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1.7 The Trend to Team Working
So far this chapter has considered the context ofteam working and the variety of types of
teams that currently operate in manufacturing settings. The focus now shifts to the
prevalence of team working, its logic in the current economic climate and its associated
benefits and problems.
As already noted, the idea of team working is not a recent phenomenon. The following is a
list of American companies that have implemented some type of team working system
during the last two decades (the start dates for these teams are in brackets): Boeing (1987),
Digital Equipment (1982), General Electric (1985), Cummins Engine (1973), Procter and
Gamble (1962), Tektronix (1983). Among UK-based companies, Trebor Bassett first began
using self-managed teams at its greenfield site in Colchester in 1980 (IDS Study, 1984).
However, as far as the majority of businesses are concerned, the strategic drive to implement
self-management is a phenomenon of the 1990s. One American survey (by Development
Dimensions International, quoted in Caudron, 1993) found that most of the respondents had
two years or less of experience of self-management. Osterman (1994) estimated that more
than half of major US corporations were exploring some form of team-based work system,
although in companies implementing self-management not all workers were in such teams.
The concept of self-managed team working began in the 1950s in the UK with the Tavistock
consultants. However, examples of successful and sustained self-managed teams in UK-
based organisations have tended to be isolated and most observers would agree that self-
managed teams were a relatively rarity in this country before the 1990s. This is changing, as
indicated by a survey conducted by the Industrial Society in 1995. Indeed, just over 60% of
managers surveyed reported that their organisations were operating at least some self-
managed teams. However, only 10% of the managers said that most teams were self-
managed, whereas twice that proportion said that there were only a few self-managed teams.
Nearly 75% forecast that they would be using self-managed teams to some extent within
two to three years and more than 25% thought that most of their teams would be self-
managing by then. The survey also revealed that most self-managed teams were recent.
Approximately 30% had been introduced within the past year, while another 30% dated
from 2-3 years ago. 9% began 3-4 years ago and only 15% were over 4 years old.
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The survey authors suggested that self-managed teams were moving from "leading edge
status to mainstream" (Industrial Society, 1995: 2) and many well-known companies were
quoted as starting to experiment with self-managed teams at that time, including AT&T
Global Information Solutions, British Steel, Body Shop, Bonas Machine Company, Aston
Martin Lagonda, Western Provident Association and the Inland Revenue.
As such, it seems that while the concepts and ideas supporting self-management have been
discussed extensively in the literature during the last thirty years, the actual practice of
implementing self-managing teams has really only started in organisations within the last few
years with the changes in the economic and technological context of organisations. Ever-
increasing pressures affecting both private and public sector organisations have made any
approach to work design that produces demonstrable improvements in productivity, quality,
cost reduction and innovation likely to attract attention. Some businesses that have
implemented self-managing teams report substantial improvements in these areas (e.g. Manz
and Sims, 1993). For many organisations, the transition to team working has become a
matter of necessity as they seek competitive advantage.
1.8 The Logic of Team Working: Impact on Performance
Indeed, better customer service, problems solved quicker, more motivated staff and better
quality of output were the four top reasons for the introduction of self-managed teams
according to the Industrial Society survey in 1995. This survey also confirmed that many
employers now felt that successful self-managed teams created among other things: faster
reaction to changing business conditions; greater business flexibility; lower staff turnover;
and higher staff commitment, involvement and motivation. The main motive for the
introduction of teams was competitive pressure and the need to make the best, most
intensive use of resources, especially people resources. According to this survey,
organisations believed that they were gaining significant benefits from self-managed teams.
This is illustrated in the figure below.
20
Figure 1.6 Principal benefits ofself-managed teams
Better customer service
Problems solved quicker
Better motivation
Improved quality
Save money/increase productivity
Reduced staff turnover
Less absenteeism
____________________ ~46%)
(44%)
(44%)
(40%)
(27%)
(6%)
(6%)
--
(Source: Industrial Society, 1995)
In the following sections, the conceptual links between self-management and these aspects
of manufacturing performance will be explored.
1.8.1 Customer Service
Customer service has emerged as a key factor in the fight to secure a competitive edge in
manufacturing industry. Eccles (1991) suggests that customer satisfaction is the logical next
step in the development of quality measures. Quality focuses on getting it right first time,
every time; customer satisfaction is concerned with making sure that the product or service
is what the customer wants and is delivered in a way that will help build a lasting
relationship.
Employees playa critical role in the type of service that a customer receives. This is
increasingly true of shopfloor employees. Not only have internal customer-supplier systems
which operate in the same way as external customer relationships been introduced inmany
manufacturing organisations, but more shopfloor staff are coming into contact with external
customers. Self-managed teams give employees the authority to satisfy customer demands
and expectations.
1.8.2 Quality
Self-management and quality fit neatly together because self-managed teams can be seen as
an extension of, or a vehicle for, the continuous improvement process (Piczak and Hauser,
1996). A continuous improvement strategy involves every part of the organisation in the
search for small incremental improvements in products and processes. The reasoning is that
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if an organisation has quality systems, processes and methods, it will produce quality
products and services. Ifit continuously improves its systems, processes and methods then
by implication the quality of its products and services will also improve continuously (IRS
Management Review, 1997).
An effective continuous improvement strategy relies on employees identifying where
changes can be made, and the notion that employees are best placed to identify and initiate
improvements is something that the sociotechnical systems school has argued for many
years. Also, encouraging staff to search for possible improvements involves giving them the
authority to be innovative and creative and to implement change without fear of
recrimination. This is in contrast to the traditional hierarchical work structure that places
innovation entirely in the realm of management.
Continuous improvement systems utilise the mental skills of workers as well as their manual
abilities in the search for perfection. One of the skills that is considered a prerequisite for
effective continuous improvement is problem-solving. The development of problem-solving
skills is usually an important part of the training for self-managing work teams. Teams are
also responsible for maintaining quality standards throughout the group. Peer pressure,
which is a feature of self-managed teams, has proved to be an effective tool for controlling
and maintaining quality standards. The positive connection between quality systems and
self-managed teams has been shown in Xerox where they attribute their success in quality
initiatives to employee involvement (Applebaum and Batt, 1994).
1.8.3 Reducing Costs
The leaner, fitter and flatter organisation has emerged as businesses have restructured, re-
engineered and de-layered. An IRS Management Review survey (1996) found that more
than three-quarters of respondent organisations had become flatter since 1991.
The rationale behind de-layering is to reduce costs and to make organisations less
bureaucratic and more responsive to customer requirements. As managerial structures have
become condensed, greater emphasis has been placed on team working. Flatter enterprises
have entailed the devolution of responsibility and accountability to lower levels in the
organisation. In this context, self-managing teams are seen as an ideal way of establishing
employee control over many of the functions that were previously assigned to supervisors
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and managers.
Also with the aim of cost reduction and closely linked to self-managing team working is
cellular manufacturing, in which production is organised into a number of standalone units
operating rather like mini-factories within a factory. A survey of cellular manufacturing
systems by Ingersoll Engineers (1990) cited in the IRS Management Review (1997)
reported that 65% of respondents said there had been a reduction in indirect staff; 37% had
reduced the number of direct employees; 37% said that fewer support staff were needed and
49% had cut the number of supervisors.
1.8.4 Productivity
Mohrman and Novelli (1985) suggested two models to relate participation in quality circles
to improved productivity. Whilst their models specifically focused on quality circles, the
principles derived are also relevant to self-managed team working. The first model
suggested that participation in quality circles led to idea generation, which led to idea
implementation, which in tum led to improved productivity. It was the implementation of
the ideas themselves and the degree to which these ideas related to productivity that
contributed to productivity improvement. In the second model, participation in quality
circles led to favourable individual outcomes that improved job satisfaction, motivation and
task performance, and led to productivity improvement. This model incorporated many of
the elements of Hackrnan and Oldham's (1980) Job Characteristics Model.
Reviewing the empirical literature from economics, industrial relations and organisational
behaviour on the effects of participation on performance, Levine and Tyson (1990)
concluded that participation was more likely to have a positive impact on performance
''when it involved decisions that extended to the shopfloor and when it involved substantive
rather than consultative arrangements" (p.204). Participation is a central principle of self-
managed teams.
1.8.5 Job Satisfaction
In an empirical study of factors associated with job redesign, mental strain and job
dissatisfaction, Karasek (1979) found that it was the combination of low decision latitude
and heavy job demands that were associated with mental strain and job dissatisfaction.
Karasek went on to distinguish between two important elements of the work enviromnent at
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the individual level: (1) the job demands placed on the worker and (2) the discretion
permitted the worker in deciding how to meet these demands.
The results of this study are significant in this context, although the focus was on the
analysis of job content at the individual level and did not address the undeniably important
effects of work group and organisational processes except as they affect individual jobs.
Karasek's (1979) measures were similar to two central components of Hackman and
Oldham's (1975) Motivating Potential Score: autonomy in task organisation decisions and
variety in skill use. Constraints on decision-making, not decision-making per se, were the
major problem, and this problem affected workers in low status jobs with little freedom for
decision e.g. jobs with high levels of demands and low levels of decision latitude traditionally
included assembly line workers. The working individual with few opportunities to make
decisions in the face of output pressure was most subject to job strain and job
dissatisfaction.
Karasek (1979) concluded that job satisfaction could be improved by increasing decision
latitude independently of changes in workload demands if changes were made to improve
the workers' abilities to make significant decisions about their task structure, increase their
influence on organisational decisions and allow them discretion over the use of their existing
and potential skills. Again, these factors are essential features of self-management.
Across a range of areas, therefore there are logical connections between the goals of
organisations in introducing team working and the principles of self-management.
1.9 Work Teams and Manufacturing Performance
1.9.1 The Benefits of Team Working
The logic of team working notwithstanding, evidence as to the extent to which employee
autonomy has actually produced tangible benefits for organisations is mixed. Many ofthe
reports in the popular journals that cite positive benefits from the introduction of self-
managed team working, including substantial increases in productivity and improved quality,
are of an anecdotal nature and are not supported by robust research designs. For example,
Hoerr (1989) cites productivity gains that exceed 30% in some cases. He quotes one
company, a General Electric Co. plant in Salisbury, N.C. as having "increased productivity
by a remarkable 250% ... .... combining teamwork with flexible automation and other
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computerised systems" (p. 38). Schilder (1992) states that "Team direction is one of the
best techniques for realising a payback in quality and customer service. It's the ultimate
productivity tool" (p.68).
Schilder (1992) cites results that suggest that new facilities that adopt team direction from
day one are 30-50% better than results from traditional management structures. Results are
more difficult to tabulate for redesigned facilities. However, Schilder (1992) goes on to
document the changes at Northern Telecom's Morrisville repair facility where business was
not expected to increase. Telecommunications equipment repair historically had been a
money-losing business. However, it is stated that revenue went up 63% after implementing
self-managing teams in 1988; sales went up by 26% and earnings by 46%. Productivity per
employee increased more than 60% and scrap (materials unusable as a result of
manufacturing processes, such as human or machine error, or new product testing)
decreased by 63%. Quality results increased by 50%, and the number of quality inspectors
dropped by 40%.
Dumaine (1993) cites results from Johnson Wax with examples such as one team of workers
figuring how to switch a line from liquid floor wax to a stain remover in thirteen minutes
instead of three days. In another plant productivity increased by 30% in eight years while
the number ofmiddle managers was reduced from 140 to 37. In an earlier article, Dumaine
(1990) provided more examples ofthe success of teams, quoting results which show that a
team of Federal Express clerks solved a billing problem that was costing the company $2.1
million a year and an insurance company reduced the ratio of middle managers to workers
from 1 to 7 to 1 to 30 whilst improving customer service. Dumaine (1990) also reports that
a production team came up with a method for making forged wheels for vans that increased
output by five per cent and cut scrap in half.
Most of these studies reported short-term gains, but the organsations certainly believed they
received considerable benefit from the introduction of teams. However, as noted earlier,
many of these findings are of a somewhat anecdotal nature and there are not many well-
designed studies which evaluate the impact of self-managing groups.
The well-designed research that does exist on self-managing teams presents rather more
ambiguous results. Amongst the earliest experiments in this area were those completed at
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Volvo's Kalmar and Uddevalla plants. Kalmar was established in 1974 and was the first
purpose-built factory designed to accommodate the assembly of cars by autonomous work
groups. Teams of 15 to 20 members (although some were as small as two) were responsible
for their own quality of work and also had the authority to rotate jobs and vary the pace of
work (Buchanan, 1994). Volvo extended this approach further when the Uddevalla plant
began production in 1988. Autonomous teams of eight to ten employees were responsible
for building a complete car. Teams were responsible for training, maintenance, planning,
selection and tooling. The role of group spokesperson who allocated work, completed
reports and helped to solve individual and team problems was rotated (Wickens, 1993).
Krepchin (1990), reporting on Swedish auto makers emphasis on ergonomics, teamwork
and automation, stated that the early developments in Volvo's Kalmar plant in Sweden in
terms of allowing workers to control the pace of their efforts and focus on teamwork had
many benefits. These included: a 25% reduction in assembly completion time, a 57%
reduction in inventory turnover time, a 5% reduction in employee turnover and a 4%
reduction in absenteeism. The newer Volvo plant at Uddevalla reported similar findings.
However, both Kalmar and Uddevalla closed in 1993, despite the above findings and studies
showing that Kalmar was Volvo's lowest-cost assembly plant and that Uddevalla's
productivity had risen strikingly. It took 120 hours to assemble a car in 1990, 50 hours in
1991 and 32 hours in 1992 (Applebaum and Batt, 1994).
These closures were due in part to the changing car market, which meant that both plants
were not economically viable (Berggren, 1993). However, there were other problems, too.
A degree of managerial control was reasserted in the latter part ofthe 1970s and a reduction
in job enrichment opportunities. Absenteeism and labour turnover remained high in both
plants, although it is widely acknowledged that this may be attributed to a large extent to
Sweden's social security system (Wickens, 1993).
The management at Volvo insisted that the decision to close Kalmar and Uddevalla was due
entirely to market factors and not the work design techniques implemented in the plants
(Wickens, 1993). There were certainly considerable benefits resulting from these initiatives.
However, it appears that the benefits did not prove to be long-term and there were
significant changes in the work design during the intervention which reduced the
autonomous nature of the team working. These early studies provide an example of the
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ambiguous findings of the research on self-managing teams and reinforce an interest in the
long-term effects of such work design initiatives and the change to team working.
Some more recent studies have found that autonomous group working had a positive impact
on business performance. A longitudinal study of the introduction of an autonomous work
group in a food processing plant (Wall, Kemp, Jackson and Clegg, 1986) found that
productivity was greater in the autonomous group than among colleagues in three
comparison groups in traditionally-designed jobs. While the output ofthe four groups was
the same, the autonomous work group was more productive because there was no need to
employ supervisors. Moreover, members of this group experienced greater job satisfaction
than their counterparts.
These findings are supported by more recent research (Cordery, Mueller and Smith, 1991),
which found that employees in autonomous work groups had a more favourable attitude to
work than their counterparts in traditional jobs. Moreover, although the level of
organisational commitment among autonomous work group members declined over time,
they were still more committed than workers not given any autonomy. Banker, Field,
Schroeder and Sinha (1996) in a longitudinal field study examining the impact of work
teams on manufacturing performance showed that both quality and labour productivity
improved over time after the formation of teams.
These studies notwithstanding, support for the view that there are few robustly designed
studies of the impact of team working on business performance comes from Goodman et al
(1988). These authors quote figures from a review of 835 studies which presented some
empirical data, and found that only 6% of these had both "longitudinal, empirical data and
the necessary sample sizes, means, and significance testing to perform a reasonable
meta-analysis of these studies" (p.307). The data available revealed a bias toward collecting
attitudinal versus hard productivity data.
Goodman et al (1988) summarised the findings from the research and divided their analysis
data into two types of data: individual firm studies and meta-analyses. They believed that
individual firm studies provided a detailed picture of the nature of self-managing teams and
their effects on different criterion variables and report findings from three studies - Topeka
(Walton, 1982), Rushton Quality of Work Experiment (Goodman, 1979) and the
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confectionery plant study (Wall, Kemp, Jackson and Clegg, 1986). These findings are
summarised in the following table.
Table 1.2 Summary of findings from individual firm studies of self-management (adapted from
Goodman et ai, 1988)
To~ka Rushton Confectionery Co.
Commitment Initial increase; decrease after 3 No evidence. No evidence.
years, operational steady- state
and skill surplus; increase on
introduction of new products and
expansion.
Attitndes Similar trend to above; initial Positive job attitudes for first 20 Higher levels of work complexity
rise, a period of decline, then months. followed by decline. and involvement; in terms of
rising again. leadership, higher levels of
consideration and tolerance for
freedom. Greater levels of
intrinsic satisfaction.
Productivity Increase every year but one; Slight positive effect - 3 to 4 % Qualitative data indicate no
product quality high; overhead (this is an estimate). difference to work performance.
costs low.
S.fety No evidence. Improvements in safety; No evidence.
indicators included accidents,
violations etc.
Skills No evidence. Substantial increase in job skills. No evidence.
Turnover No evidence. No evidence. Higher turnover (may be
attributed to labour market) and
disciplinary dismissals (no
supervisors to shield employees).
Benefits vs Costs No evidence. Analyses indicate benefits slightly No evidence.
exceeded costs.
Indirect Effects Positive consequences - higher Positive consequences - Positive effects - employees
pay and job security. Negative improvements in communication preferred this form of work.
consequences - friction at senior and co-ordination, new talent Negative effects - managers
management levelled to Topeka recognised and promoted. experienced more stress.
managers leaving. Negative consequences -
increased stress for first-
line/middle managers and conflict
with the union.
From their analyses of these individual studies, Goodman et al (1988) concluded that self-
managing groups do change organisational effectiveness outcomes. They concluded that the
effects are greater on the more frequently measured attitude or quality of life indicators than
on business criteria such as productivity; the effects on attitudes are not uniform, i.e. that
they vary over time with the viability of self-managing teams; and finally, the rigour of the
research design affects the reported results with the more rigorously designed studies
showing more modest or no results.
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Overall, from the individual firm studies and the meta-analyses, Goodman et al (1988)
concluded that:
• self-managing teams had a modest impact on productivity,
• they did change attitudes but the change was specific to the intervention (changes in
attitudes about responsibility, control and job variety were expected, but not changes
about general satisfaction or commitment to the organisation),
• there were no clear trends for withdrawal behaviour (turnover and absenteeism), and
• they could improve safety.
All told, the findings from the empirical research are clearly not as impressive as those
quoted in managerial and consultants' reports on self-management and in the more popular
journals.
Recent research by Patterson, West, Lawthom and Nickell (1997) has taken a more holistic
view of research into the impact of work design initiatives on work performance. These
researchers started from the premise that managers know that people make the critical
difference between success and failure. The effectiveness with which organisations manage,
develop, motivate, involve and engage the willing contribution of the people who work in
them is a key determinant of how well those organisations perform. However, Patterson et
al (1997) acknowledge that there is surprisingly little research demonstrating the causal links
between people management and business performance.
To fill this gap Patterson et al's (1997) research focused on measuring the relationship over
time between people management and other managerial inputs, and business performance
output. They applied a rigorous, comparative analysis over time to the individual elements
of management activity and measured the contribution they made to performance. This
research builds on previous work (e.g. MacDuffie, 1995) to assess systems of human
resource management practices rather than individual practices. The logic behind this
proposition is that firm performance will be enhanced by systems of practices that support
each other and that have a mutually reinforcing effect on employee contributions to
company performance. For example, the effectiveness of a comprehensive training
programme may be increased when combined with appraisals to assess employee
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performance and target development needs
Patterson et al's (1997) results showed decisively that people management practices have a
powerful impact on performance and highlighted two clusters of practices that were
significant predictors of both change in profitability and change in productivity:
1. acquisition and development of employee skills (including selection, induction, training
and use of appraisals)
2. job design (including skill flexibility, job responsibility, variety and use of formal teams).
When the researchers examined change in profitability after controlling for prior profitability,
the results revealed that human resource management practices taken together explained 19
per cent of the variation between companies in change in profitability. Job design (flexibility
and responsibility of shopfloor jobs) and acquisition and development of skills (selection,
induction, training and appraisal) explained a significant amount of the variation. This
demonstrates the importance of human resource management practices. In relation to
productivity, human resource management practices taken together accounted for 18 per
cent of the variation between the companies in change in productivity. Job design and
acquisition and development of skills explained a significant proportion of the variation.
Researchers have traditionally directed most effort towards examining the relationship
between attitudes and individual job performance, particularly focusing upon the impact of
job satisfaction. The evidence of this research is fairly clear in indicating a weak but
significant association between job satisfaction, organisational commitment and individual
job performance (Iaffaldano and Muchinsky, 1985). Patterson et al (1997) focused on the
organisational level and examined the relationship between job satisfaction, organisational
commitment and company performance. They found that job satisfaction explained fiveper
cent of the variation between companies in change in profitability after controlling for prior
profit. Organisational commitment also explained five per cent of the variation. In relation
to the change in productivity, job satisfaction explained sixteen per cent of the variation
between companies in their subsequent change in performance. Organisational commitment
explained some seven per cent of the variation.
These results demonstrate the relationship between attitudes and company performance.
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They suggest that managers of organisations eager to promote productivity and profitability
should pay close attention to the attitudes of their employees and how they can be
influenced to be more positive. The results demonstrate that the more satisfied workers are
with their jobs the better the company is likely to perform in terms of subsequent
profitability and particularly productivity. As such, work design initiatives that impact on
worker satisfaction, such as self-management, are likely to impact on the profitability and
productivity of an organisation
1.9.2 The Problems of Team Working
There are a few celebrated, highly publicised, examples of firms that have successfully
adopted team-based systems, from a sociotechnical perspective or for reasons of competitive
advantage e.g. Topeka and Xerox. However, the above examples and discussion illustrate
that the findings of the research on self-managed team working are really quite ambiguous,
with only modest benefits described by the more robust research designs.
Despite the widespread interest in this form of work organisation, an understanding of what
takes place at a detailed and practical level in the implementation of team working in the
workplace is still rather limited. The information from both surveys and case studies comes
from a wide range of sources, including managers, consultants and researchers and there is
wide variation in its quality. The picture that emerges is often one-sided and may overstate
the degree of innovation and change actually taking place. Failed efforts are rarely reported
(Applebaum and Batt, 1994), which is why exploring the problems of introducing and
maintaining team working is considerably more difficult than exploring the benefits.
Figures from one recent study (Waterson et aI., 1997) suggest that the rewards of
introducing team working are not always forthcoming. Their study of 564 manufacturing
companies in the UK found that 55% of them over the previous six years had used team-
based working. However, the expected rewards from such initiatives had not always been
yielded and the productivity or quality improvements resulting from teamwork and other
such initiatives (e.g. JIT, TQM) had been judged as rather disappointing (Waterson et al.,
1997).
Early studies that exist (e.g. Trist and Dwyer, 1982; Walton, 1972; Goodman and Dean,
1982) suggest the reasons for the failure of self-managing teams over time include:
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withdrawal ofinitial sponsor; insufficient training; stress and burnout of first-line and middle
managers; lack ofsharing offinancial gains; lack of top management commitment; threats to
union viability; failure of diffuse projects; unrealistic expectations of benefits and declining
economic conditions.
Dumaine (1994) adds to this list: companies rushing out and forming the wrong kind of
team for the job: teams getting launched in a vacuum, with little or no training or support:
no changes in the design of their work and no new systems to help their communication.
These things lead to frustration and people trying to figure out why they are in a team and
what they are expected to do. Dumaine (1994) quotes Osterman as commenting "When
teams are introduced in combination with other organisation changes, they work. When
they're introduced as an isolated practice, they fail." (p.76). There is also a concern
expressed by Dumaine (1994) that teams are overused, created where they are not really
needed, or where it is inappropriate (lone wolves or creative thinkers). Most of the
researchers comment that it is usually a combination of these factors rather than one single
factor that affects the viability of the design.
The Industrial Society (1995) explored some of the difficulties in introducing self-managed
teams and these are presented in the figure below.
Figure 1.7 Principal difficulties in introducing/maintaining self-managed teams
Problems with senior/intermediate managers
Interpersonal problems
Conflict within the team
Teams rejecting responsibility/authority
Teams taking too much authority
Problems with team leaders
Other
Poor budgeting
Drop in attendance
Drop in quality
Customer complaints
Note: Don't know category: 33%
(Source: Industrial Society, 1995)
(32%)
(28%)
(25%)
(25%)
(12%)
(11%)
(5%)
(3%)
(2%)
(1%)
---
32
Significantly, their survey found that senior or intermediate managers represented the
biggest difficulty in introducing the new approach. Arguably, these are the people who felt
most threatened by self-managed teams. Team leaders were a relatively insignificant
problem. The survey also found that teams were twice as likely to give organisations a
problem by taking too little responsibility as by taking too much and that interpersonal
problems and intra-team conflict were two of the major problems that the employer was
likely to experience with the new set-up.
These results suggest that it may not be team working per se that is yielding limited results,
but rather factors in the organisational change process to team working. This belief is
supported by research findings. For example, Katz, Kochan and Keefe (1987) surveyed
plants of a major U.S. automobile manufacturer in 1979 and 1986 and found that work
teams had a negative effect on productivity. Explaining their results, the authors noted that
"the negative impact of work teams on plant productivity in the company resulted
from problems associated with introducing the system teams may yet help to improve
productivity" (p.709).
MacDuffie (1995) also supports this view. In an empirical study of human resource bundles
and manufacturing performance, Macduffie (1995) found that innovative human resource
practices affected performance not individually but as interrelated elements in an internally
consistent human resource system. These human resource systems contributed most to
assembly plant productivity and quality when they were integrated with manufacturing
policies under the organisational logic of a flexible production system.
Consideration ofthe nature ofthe organisational process in the change to team working and
the systems that support such a change may increase our understanding of the mixed results
from the research on self-managed teams. The issues will be explored in more detail in the
next chapter.
1.10 The Theoretical Link between TeamWorking and Performance
A common approach to measuring the impact of groups is to evaluate their effectiveness.
Group effectiveness is defined as performance and employee satisfaction (Gladstein, 1984).
More specifically, according to Hackman (1991), group effectiveness is the degree to which:
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(a) a group's output meets requirements in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness,
(b) the group experience improves its members' ability to work as a group in the future,
and
(c) the group experience contributes to individual satisfaction.
One of the key questions that needs to be addressed if organisations are to implement teams
effectively is why should self-managing teams be more effective than more traditional work
groups performing the same tasks? Understanding the theoretical mechanisms underlying
self-managing teams is a precondition for understanding their effectiveness. Also, why
should they be more effective than groups using other forms of participation (e.g. quality
circles)? One useful approach here may be to examine the theory underlying self-managing
groups. Hackman's (1982) model of work-group effectiveness appears to be an appropriate
way to organise this discussion.
Figure 1.8 An overview oftbe normative model of group effectiveness (Source: Hackman, ]982)
Material Resources
• Level of effort brougbtto
bear on tbe gro up task
• Amount of knowledge
and skill Ipplie d to task
work
• Appropriatenes s oftbe
task performln ce
strategies used bytbe
group
Organisational context Sufficiency of mlterial resources
required to accomplisb tbe task
_II and on timeA context tbat supports Ind
reinforces competent task
work via:
• Reward system _
• Education system
• Information system
• Tlsk output acceptable to
tbose wIIo receive it or
review it
Capability of members to
work togetber in future is
maintained or
strengtbened
Members' needs are
more satisfied tban
frustrated by tbe group
experience
•
Process Criteria of
Effectiveness Group Effectiveness
Group DesigD
•A design tbat prompts and
facilitates competeDt work
on the task via:
• Structure of the task
• Composition
• Group norms abo.t
performaDce
processes
I--
Group SyDergy
Assistance to tbe group by interacting
iDways tbat:
• Reduce process losses
• Create synergistic process gaiDs
At the core of this model are three process criteria: effort, knowledge and the
appropriateness of task performance strategies. Increases in these three criteria, given task
configurations, should improve the overall effectiveness of the group. The basic levers to
change the process criteria are group design, organisational context and group synergy.
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Self-managing groups bring about direct changes in group design and organisational
context, which in tum should bring about changes in group synergy; all three factors should
affect the process criteria.
Goodman et al (1988) use the Rushton case (Goodman, 1979) as an example to show the
effects of this type of change on group effectiveness. In this case, one of the major goals for
introducing teams was to increase safety. Changes in the structure of the group (that is,
greater control, responsibility, opportunity to make decisions, and so on) directly affected
the amount of effort expended and the level of group synergy. The problem-solving
opportunities in the groups permitted selection of new task performance strategies. The
changes in the organisational context (e.g. pay system, meetings and training) affected the
level of effort and knowledge directed toward safety behaviours. Changes in group synergy
affected the level of effort and adherence to task performance strategies. Changes in these
process criteria in tum had a positive effect on the group effectiveness criteria of safety.
This model may help in our understanding of why studies on performance of self-managing
teams produce such ambiguous results. Maybe one answer lies in one of the basic tenets of
sociotechnical theory from which self-managing teams are derived. This principle claims that
organisational effectiveness will be enhanced ifmanagement designs the social and technical
systems jointly in some optimum way, rather than focusing on one or the other. Self-
managing team interventions tend to modify the social system to fit the technological system
and do not jointly optimise both the social and technological systems. If this happened,
effects on productivity might be more pronounced.
Secondly, the basic theoretical rationale for self-managing teams is that ifworkers are given
control over a whole task, responsibility and variety, they will be more motivated to perform
that task. However, the instrumental behaviours that link effort and knowledge to the
performance criteria are not clearly identified. There is no linkage in self-managing groups
among the design change, the motivation and knowledge change and specific criteria such as
productivity. Similarly, with cohesiveness, there is an assumption underlying self-managing
teams that the design will enhance cohesiveness, which will increase group performance and
satisfaction. For cohesiveness to affect performance, there needs to be available visible
standards, deviant behaviour must be observed, the group must induce pressure, the deviant
worker must conform, and the conforming behaviour must be instrumental for performance.
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These conditions are not necessarily inherent in self-managing teams. Finally, there may be
ceiling effects. In many studies there has been little consideration given to optimwn settings
for these interventions. If technology or organisational context constrains the use of energy,
skill and problem-solving activity, there will be a ceiling effect on productivity (Goodmanet
al, 1988).
All of these factors are clearly important in understanding the link between self-management
and work performance. It is important that organisations view the changes in context and
consider the congruence of all the changes being considered in the system. An essential
feature of any successful change to team working will be the change process itself. Itwould
also seem essential for organisations to focus on what is necessary to help the project over
time, not just what is necessary to start up the team. Organisations need full commitment
over time, not partial commitment that is not sustained. Aspects of the internal support
system e.g. the reward system need to be re-calibrated over time and diffusion to other parts
of the organisation is critical. New work designs need legitimisation and infrastructure to
support these activities; feedback needs to evolve over time. Group designs are dynamic and
need to evolve over time and so there needs to be mechanisms to feed back information on
the change process (Goodman et al, 1988).
In line with this, Wood (1979) argues that the approach to organisational change should be
issue-centred as this will avoid the danger of defining the situation in terms of given
solutions (and hence operating with panaceas) and will treat the development and
modification of objectives as an integral part of the process of organisational change and not
something that can be provided once and for all, ahead and in abstract of the process. These
issues will be explored in some depth in the next chapter.
1.11 Conclusion
In this chapter, the focus has been on describing the background to team-working with the
aim of identifying some of the job design and contextual factors key to the effective
development of teams. The impact of different production practices on the nature of teams
and contemporary perspectives on team working were also considered. Attention was
drawn to the distinctions between different types of teams that currently exist within
organisations and that are described in the literature. Different team-based systems have
different characteristics and requirements; as such, it is essential to the successful
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implementation and development of teams in different organisations that these distinctions
are understood at an operational level.
This chapter also focused on quantifying the trend to team working in the UK, and
understanding the logic behind this work design initiative in the current economic and
technological climate. The benefits and problems of team working were explored and a
theoretical model presented to help explain the ambiguous nature of the results on the
benefits of team working. The chapter concluded with the consideration that there needs to
be congruence between the systems required for the change to self-managed teams and the
supporting organisational systems. These issues will be considered in some detail in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
Team Development and the Organisational Change to Team Working
2.1 Introduction
An organisation's strategy outlines the organisation's goals and the means for attaining these
goals. An organisation's structure is a means to help management achieve these goals.
Essentially, working out the strategy and the structure is the starting point for self-managed
teams. Securing an appropriate work environment is also an absolute prerequisite for
developing self-managing teams in the workplace (Robbins, 1998).
However, a successful change to self-management requires more. Team members, team
leaders and supporting staff have to learn how to fulfil their new roles. Individuals are used
to working in traditional organisations, in which self-management is generally an unknown
phenomenon (van Amelsvoort and Benders, 1996). Self-management changes the
management-employee relationship significantly. Command and control give way to
coaching, support, negotiation and persuasion. To achieve this new culture and style of
working, organisations need to embark on a programme of adjustment, focusing on a
number of key areas. This chapter considers in some detail frameworks and models
depicting the implementation and development of self-managed teams and the conclusions
drawn from them, and presents these as key to an increased understanding of the process
and the nature of the change to team working in organisations.
The focus on change processes is extended in the second part of this chapter, with
consideration of the nature and management of this change process. One factor highlighted
in the previous chapter concerned the mixed nature of the research findings. One suggestion
from these findings was that team working yielded less promising results than expected
because of the nature of the change process itself, rather than the concept of team working
per se. In the second part of this chapter, the discussion will focus on the nature of
organisational change. This section will start by contrasting the linear approach with the
processual approach to change, and go on to consider the seale of the change, the roles
played by change agents, the context of the change and the importance of congruence
between old and new organisational systems. On the basis of this literature review, a
statement of the objectives of this research will be presented.
38
2.2 Models of Team Development
Three models of team development are described in this section. These have been selected
for discussion from the numerous models presented in the literature because they provide in-
depth analysis of the team development process and have a sound theoretical and empirical
basis. The first model to be described is that of van Amelsvoort and Benders (1996). Their
model of the process of team development is based on three core principles:
a) From simple to complex - over time, an increasing number of managerial tasks are
integrated into the self-managing team. This is a gradual process and starts with a small
number of simple tasks. As progress is made, a larger number and more complex
managerial tasks can be assigned. The level of autonomy increases and team members
become used to increased degrees of responsibility and accountability. Team members'
confidence in their capabilities in handling their new work situation is gradually
developed.
b) From the individual to the team level - initially, people act as individuals and the
feeling ofbeing a team member has yet to develop. In the beginning, the team leader has
to approach team members as individuals. The process of empowering starts by
teaching individual team members to regulate their own work processes. At a later
stage of team development, team members can be assigned managerial tasks that are
needed for the team.
c) Strike a balance between employees' and organisational interests - an effective self-
managed team is oriented towards improving organisational efficacy. An important way
of realising this is to ensure that team members can handle their own work processes as
independently as possible and organisational constraints do not frustrate their attempts
to work effectively. A high job decision latitude is an important job characteristic of the
quality of working life (Karasek, 1979). From this point of view, employees' and
organisational interests cannot be separated. The figure below is a graphical depiction
of the team development model.
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Figure 2.1 Model for developing self-managed work teams
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(Source: van Amelsvoort and Benders, 1996: 165.)
As the figure illustrates there are four overlapping phases in the model and these are
summarised below.
a) Phase 1: bundling of individuals
Once the technical conditions for implementing teamwork have been set, team members
have to be trained to become multi-skilled workers. This enables team members to replace
each other in case of absenteeism, so that the production process can proceed. Furthermore,
being able to conduct a variety of tasks and provide a significant contribution to the overall
production process is important injob design terms (relating to four key features ofthe Job
Characteristics Model i.e. skill variety, task variety, task significance and autonomy). Finally,
investment in their training signals to employees that things are really changing and that the
change process is being taken seriously. A training matrix may be used for assessing the
extent to which team members are capable of carrying out tasks and for identifying training
needs.
In this first phase, team meetings are officially started and team members become involved in
the change process. The team's activities in the change process are planned for the next six
months and team meetings are held on a regular basis. Team members' communication
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skills may need to be developed further to achieve effective meetings. During meetings,
different kinds of operational problems are discussed and feedback on performance criteria
(e.g. production quantity and quality, safety, housekeeping) is given to the team by the team
leader. These performance criteria help the team focus on team performance.
b) Phase 2: group
The second phase focuses on integrating various organising and supporting tasks into the
team, with team members becoming involved in activities such as maintenance, quality
control, production planning, safety and dealing with absenteeism. Such tasks are
transferred from managerial and supervisory positions to operators and it is often a difficult
process, as managers and supervisors are effectively relinquishing power. Commitment to
building teams faces a vital test at this point with managers and supervisors having to find
new roles and perspectives. Team members need additional training and feedback on team
performance is still a key issue.
c) Phase 3: team
The first two phases provide the basis for working autonomously: the emphasis shifts inthis
phase to working together without the direct intervention of managers. This entails solving
conflicts between team members and consensual decision-making. Team building is a key
issue. The appraisal of the team's results becomes the responsibility of the team itselfand
the team is involved in establishing performance levels, performance indicators and
performance measures. In order to ensure the team's sense of responsibility with respect to
its results, a variable wage component is introduced into the wage system. This is usually a
small percentage of the total wages, so pressure to earn the bonus does not become
detrimental to the team's functioning in terms of co-operative behaviour.
Individual behaviour and performance are discussed openly on a regular basis and the annual
appraisal of a team member's functioning is done by a team member's peers and has an
influence on the individual's wages.
d) Phase 4: open team
At this stage the team is involved with internal customers, external customers and partners
and deals directly with clients and suppliers. The team also plays an important role in
appraising the team leader and participates in the strategic issues on a company level.
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Van Amelsvoort and Benders (1996) found that in the development of 267 teams in 23
organisations between 1992 and 1994,29% of the teams had just been established, 63% of
the teams were in the second phase and only 8% of the teams had entered the third phase.
None of the teams had reached the fourth phase. Their research also indicated that the
transition from the second phase to the third phase proved to be rather difficult and
suggested a number of reasons why this may be so. Namely:
• the third phase is less concrete than the previous two and focuses on psychological
group-dynamic processes. These are difficult to handle and team leaders often have
little or no experience in this area. From their practical experience, van Amelsvoort and
Benders (1996) also found that it was almost always the case that there were no
examples from which team leaders could learn.
• traditionally, team members are selected on their technical skills rather than on their
social and learning skills, but the latter are equally important for team development
• it is difficult for supervisors to transfer their tasks to shopfloor operators, breaking
through the established division oflabour, and
• phase 3 requires a change in reward system, which is often hard to achieve. A
performance-related group reward system requires a tailor-made design and must be
acceptable politically.
Van Amelsvoort and Benders (1996) also concluded from their practical experience that the
length of the team development process differs considerably between organisations and may
even vary within a particular organisation. They highlight a number of possible reasons for
this:
• differences in initial skill levels. Where initial skill levels are low, phase 1 lasts longer
and considerable training effort is needed.
• differences in required skill levels. This is influenced by two factors, the desired level of
multi-skilling and the breadth and depth of the skills to be learned. In production
processes where many and "deep" skills need to be learned, extensive training
programmes are required and may take up to five years.
• investment in training. Training costs may be considerable and require true commitment
from management as production processes may need to be interrupted or even stopped.
• quality of internal relationships. High trust relationships help the process of change.
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• varying degrees of acceptance of the new structure. In strong hierarchical cultures,
there is often a lack of commitment to the new organisational form; in participative
organisations, there is often more support and the process proceeds more smoothly.
Sustained managerial commitment as reflected in actions is crucial to the success ofthe
team development process
This is a very practical model, but one which has a sound theoretical basis in the concepts
of, for example, the Job Characteristics Model and the Quality of Working Life literature. It
also provides some analysis ofthe problems in the change process to team working and a
practical focus on several features which appear central to the successful implementation of
teams and which are described later in this chapter e.g. the organisational arrangements and
human resource support systems.
Holpp (1993) also presents a very practical model, in which he describes six stages of
development for teams to arrive at self-management (see Figure 2.2). In a similar vein to
the previous model, Holpp (1993) takes a linear view of the team development process and
focuses quite strongly on the transfer of responsibility and accountability from the leader to
the team members.
Figure 2.2 Six steps to self-direction
Moving towards self-directed teams
The self-directed team
ii iii iv v vi
The leader is
responsible for
daily operations
and makes most
decisions that
impact the team.
The leader is
accountable for
team activities
but the team
handles day-to-
day duties on
their own
The team is
responsible for
planning and
organising and
reports to the
leader on a
regular basis.
The team The team
organises its own handles all work
work and takes inputs and
full responsibility outputs
for quality and on its own
productivity. authority.
The team
administers
functions like
selection, hiring,
rewards and
discipline.
(Source: Holpp, 1993: 65)
Holpp (1993) believes that self-directed work teams generally begin as leader-based teams,
in which the leader is responsible for day-to-day activities and for making major decisions.
As the teams become increasingly more established, they take on more and more
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responsibilities, from handling day-to-day duties on their own, to planning and organising,
for quality and productivity, until finally they perform their own selection, recruitment and
disciplinary functions without the need for a formal leader.
The third model presented here comes from Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin (1997)
and their work on team-based cellular manufacturing. Team-based cellular manufacturing
involves grouping machines (lathes, drills, presses etc.) into groups or cells according to the
particular processes and their sequence which are required to produce parts or families of
parts. The technical redesign of production in this way creates the potential for the social
redesign of work so that workers operating as a semi-autonomous team can perform the
tasks in the cells. For this to happen, cell members need to become multi-skilled e.g. able to
operate different machines and carry out maintenance tasks, and empowered e.g. able to
take day-to-day operating decisions in the planning, execution and monitoring of cell
operations.
In place of the traditional first-line supervisor, teams have leaders who may be elected by
other team members rather than appointed by management. In addition, teams may be able
to stop production as and when they see necessary to discuss work-related problems and so
on. In their most advanced form, team-based cells might have considerable responsibility for
interacting with their environment to the extent that they have direct contact with customers
both inside and outside the organisation. Ultimately, they might operate, in effect, as mini-
business units themselves (Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997).
The result is a radically different approach to designing the technical and social aspects of
production from the traditional organisation and control of work proposed by the Taylorist
principles of a detailed division oflabour and hierarchical supervision. The various levels of
team-based working said to be enabled by cellular manufacturing techniques are summarised
in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3 Levels of teamwork in team-based cellular manufacturing
Levels of teamwork
step by step
STEP2
STEP I
Quality control
and inspection
Machine set-ups
Material handling
(in and out of cell)
Routine
Maintenance
Job rotation
Material handling
(within cell)
JOB
ENLARGEMENT
(Source: Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997: 148)
STEP 3
Innovation/change"
• Purchase new
equipment
• Hiring staff
• Training
• Continuous
improvement
Control of people
• Absenteeism
• Hours of work
• Evaluation
Control of work
• Scheduling
• Work methods
• Perfonnance
measurement
• Select own team leader
Boundary management
(otherdepts.)
STEP 4
Sales/marketing
Product design
Work standards
Workplace design
OHS standards
Materials ordering
Product costing
Boundary
management
(other orgs.)
AUTONOMOUS
TEAMS
The models presented here are grounded largely in the theoretical models of work redesign
described at the beginning of this thesis. The models themselves and the conclusions derived
by their authors from empirical research and practical experience provide an insight into the
team development process. Each of the models emphasises the gradual shift inresponsibility
and accountability for various production tasks and supporting activities from the team
leader or supervisor to the teams themselves and the change in focus from the individual to
the team.
All told, the key variables considered in these and similar models include: the initial analysis
of strategic needs and corporate planning (e.g. Industrial Society, 1995); team design
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(including team size e.g. Kulisch and Banner, 1993a, type of membership e.g. Piczak and
Hauser, 1996, type of activities e.g. Lawler, 1992 and managerial style e.g. Manz and Sims,
1993); job and task design (e.g. Sexton, 1994); training (e.g. Wellins, 1992; Kulisch and
Banner, 1993b) and rewards (e.g. Gandz, 1990).
These models also highlight some of the key issues that may prevent successful
implementation of self-management. An understanding of these factors is essential, because
the likelihood of failure of this work design initiative increases if the difficulties in
implementing and developing teams are underestimated. Indeed, in the previous chapter, the
somewhat ambiguous and rather disappointing results from the implementation of team
working were noted. Empirical studies (e.g. Jurgens et al, 1993; Badham and Naschold,
1994) also indicate the transition to team-based working has not necessarily resulted in the
unambiguous transfer of substantial autonomy to work teams and that team design initiatives
have encountered severe implementation problems and often failed to progress beyond
isolated pilot schemes.
These findings suggest there may be key factors pertinent to the successful transition to
team working that are not encompassed in the existing team development models. In this
context, it seems appropriate to build on the idea from the previous chapter that the
disappointing results relating to team working and business performance may be associated
with the change process rather than the concept of team working per se. What the factors
listed above and the associated research on the team development models provide are some
guiding principles to help organisations manage an effective change to team working. These
factors have tended to result from the views of senior management in post hoc case studies
and be rather prescriptive "how to introduce team working lists" (Whybrow and Parker,
2000: 107). However, such descriptions imply a smooth, linear process and provide a post
hoc rationalisation rather than an account ofthe reality encountered (Buchanan and Storey,
1997).
These models do not take into account the reality of the introduction ofteam working which
is a complex and political transition process, involving disruption to both diverse
organisational structures (e.g. Badham et al, 1995) and individual belief systems (e.g. Parker
et al, 1997). As Manz and Sims (1993) point out, the move to team working is a "dramatic
new revolution" (p.l) and a "fundamental change from the traditional organisation" (p.S).
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The transition to team working is a large-scale organisational change and the linear, step-by-
step process models of change that suggest team working be imposed on organisational
employees from the top (e.g. Lewin, 1951) are far from representative of this type of change
process in reality. It is the argument of the next section that the change management
process is crucial to the successful implementation of team-based work designs.
2.3 The Change Process
2.3.1 A Processual Framework of Change
The predominant models on the management of change remain rooted in the orthodoxy
imposed by Lewin's (1951) seminal work. His classic work on intergroup dynamics and
planned change has been particularly influential. Lewin (1951) argued that for change to be
successfully managed it is necessary to follow three general steps: unfreezing, changing and
refreezing.
The strength of this model lies in its simple representation which makes it easy to use and
understand. Indeed, this theory has proven to be useful in understanding planned change
under relatively stable conditions. This simplicity is also its major weakness as itpresents an
uni-directional model of change. With the continuing and dynamic nature of change in
today's business world, it no longer makes sense to implement a planned process for
freezing changed behaviours (Dawson, 1994). Implementing stability and reinforcing
behaviour which conforms to a rigid set of procedures for new work arrangements does not
meet the growing requirements for employee flexibility and structural adaptation to the
unfolding and complex nature of ongoing change processes. Indeed, the linearity which this
three-stage model suggests is not supported by the empirical evidence on the introduction of
new technologies and management techniques (Dawson, 1997). In addition, this approach
adopts a normative framework and assumes there is one best way to manage change that
will increase both organisational effectiveness and employees' well-being.
In today's dynamic business environment, revision of implementation strategies to overcome
or tackle unforeseen contextual difficulties in managing large-scale change is often needed.
Organisational change is a complex process which is influenced by powerful coalitions
within organisations and the history and the context in which the change is taking place
(Dawson, 1997). One approach that adopts the view that change should not be treated as a
series of linear events is the processual framework (Dawson, 1994). This approach suggests
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that expected outcomes detailed in initial plans may need revising and modifying as a result
of the ongoing interplay between the substance, politics, and context of change. These three
main groups of determinants form part of a less prescriptive and more analytical processual
approach to understanding organisational change.
The substance of change refers to the type of change (whether new technology or
management technique), scale of change (whether incremental or radical transformation) and
defining characteristics of the change initiative (content rather than labels). For example, do
the changes require a transformation in plant/divisional and/or corporate level operations,
and to what extent do the characteristics of the change programme (such as in the case of
just-in-time production systems) enable or constrain the development of new forms of work
organisation?
The politics of change is used to refer to the process by which certain well-placed
individuals, groups or powerful coalitions can influence decision-making and agenda setting
at critical junctures during the process of organisational change. An understanding of
organisational politics should be central to any approaches which seek to explain the process
of managing transition. For example, variations in commitment can significantly influence
the successful management of change (Guth and MacMillan, 1989), particularly where
differing vested interests between management levels and functions do not align with
strategic objectives (Wilkinson, 1983). The findings from Dawson's (1994) research on new
technology (following on from Boddy and Buchanan, 1986; and Clark et al, 1988) illustrate
how the effects of technology on work organisation are dependent not only on the
objectives, assumptions and values of those who make decisions about its use in
organisations but also on processes of social choice and political negotiation between
organisational factions during the implementation of new operating systems. As such, a
critical task in the introduction of new technology is the design by organisational
practitioners of implementation strategies (McLoughlin et al, 1995) and the mobilisation of
certain key occupational groups may be an essential prerequisite to the successful
management ofchange (e.g. Weir and Mills, 1973). Similar findings may be expected in the
implementation of self-managed team working.
Finally, the context of change is taken to refer to factors within the external environment and
those internal to the organisation, such as administrative structures, technology, history and
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culture and the product or service of the organisation. It is claimed that a historical
perspective on both the internal and external organisational context is central to
understanding the opportunities, constraints and organisationally defined routes to change
(Kelly and Amburgey, 1991). The co-existence of a number of competing histories of
change can significantly shape the process and outcomes of ongoing change programmes. In
this sense, the contextual and historical dimension can both promote certain options and
devalue others during the process of organisational change.
By combining these three dimensions it is possible to engage in a processual analysis of the
implementation of new forms of work organisations. Dawson (1997) found that these three
groups of determinants all acted to shape the process and outcomes of several collaborative
projects in work re-organisation. The processual framework also identifies three general
timeframes associated with organisational transitions, namely:
• conception of a need to change
• process of organisational transition
• operation of work practices and procedures.
This framework incorporates the temporal element of large-scale change by commencing
with a period which is defined as the conception of a need to change and ending with a post-
transitional period of operation, in which emerging organisational arrangements and patterns
of working relationships are further refined and developed during ongoing processes of
change. In practice, it is difficult to identify the start of or completion of a major change
programme, but it is useful for analytical purposes to identify periods of initial awareness
(conception of the need to change) and periods when organisational resources are
withdrawn from the management of particular change programmes and the new
organisational arrangements form part of daily work routines (operation of new work
practices and procedures).
In between these two periods lie the complex non-linear processes of change which may
comprise a range of different activities and events. Dawson (1994) notes that whilst it may
prove useful to identify and group a number of activities, tasks and decision-making
processes these should not be treated as representing a series of sequential stages in the
process of change (as with conventional stage models). The approach taken in the
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processual framework is that organisations undergoing transition should be studied "as-it-
happens" (Dawson, 1994: 4) so that processes associated with the change can reveal
themselves over time and in context.
In some areas, these activities, tasks and events may result from the plans and preparations
of management, in other areas decisions may result from the views, expectations and
demands of certain employee groups or their representatives. In addition, certain individuals
may act as major facilitators or inhibitors of change and prove instrumental to the success or
failure of change programmes. In the process of managing change an organisation may
move back and forth between various tasks and activities, and straddle the general time
frames associated with conception, transition and operation (Dawson, 1994).
This temporal framework of change can also be used to accommodate the existence of a
number of competing histories on the process of organisational transition (these
organisational histories may be further refined, replaced and developed over time). The
dominant or "official version" of change may often reflect the political positioning of certain
key individuals or groups within an organisation, rather than serving as a true representation
of the practice of transition management. They may also act to shape, constrain and
promote the direction and content of future change programmes and as such warrant
examination under this approach (Dawson, 1994).
In this research, this framework will be used to analyse the process and outcomes of
managing the large-scale organisational change to team working. The team development
models presented earlier suggested a somewhat linear, step-by-step process of change.
According to the processual approach, transitional phases in this change process are unlikely
to occur in a neat linear fashion, but rather may overlap, occur simultaneously, stop and
start, and be part of the initial and later phases of major change programmes. This research
will explore team development in the context of this processual approach.
In the next section of this chapter, processual themes important in team development will be
considered inmore detail. Firstly, the substance of change, in this case the transition to self-
managed team working, will be considered, along with the scale of change and whether this
is an incremental or radical transformation. The second area offocus will be the politics of
change and the process by which certain well-placed individuals, groups or powerful
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coalitions can influence decision-making and agenda setting at critical junctures during the
process of organisational change. Change agent and operational roles will also be
considered in this context. Finally, there will be some discussion about the internal context
of the change, such as the organisational arrangements and administrative systems.
2.3.2 The Scale of Change: Incremental versus Radical
Traditional assumptions about change have been based on the concept of incremental,
cumulative change. Advocates of the incremental model see change as being a process
whereby individual parts of an organisation deal incrementally and separately with one
problem and one goal at a time. By managers responding to pressures in their local internal
and external environments in this way, over time, their organisations become transformed
(Burnes, 2000). As Pettigrew et al (1992) note "The received wisdom therefore is that
change will take place through successive, limited and negotiated shifts" (p. 14).
There has been considerable support for the incrementalist perspective (e.g. Quinn. 1980,
1982) and in recent years the pre-eminent exemplars of incremental change have been the
Japanese companies (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989). Dunphy and Stace (1992) believe this
approach avoids both the stagnation engendered by fine tuning and the brutality associated
with rapid corporate transformations. However, as Mintzberg (1978) argues both
incremental and radical change are apparent in organisations as they tend to undergo long
periods of incremental change, interspersed with brief periods of revolutionary change.
Gersick (1991) builds on this concept and proposes the punctuated equilibrium paradigm as
a challenge to the more traditional incremental assumptions about how change works. This
paradigm proposes that fundamental change cannot be accomplished piecemeal, slowly,
gradually and comfortably and conceptualises change as an alternation between long periods
when stable infrastructures permit only incremental adaptations, and brief periods of
revolutionary upheaval. This new way of thinking has far-reaching implications for
organisational practice and theory about when and how change occurs and how it can be
managed. More important, it offers some promising conceptual tools for understanding the
issues facing organisations in an environment where incremental adaptation increasingly
appears to be unequal to the economic, social and ecological dislocations taking place (Loye
and Eisler, 1987).
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The punctuated equilibrium model is based on the idea that relatively long periods of
stability (equilibrium) are punctuated by compact periods of qualitative, metamorphic
change (revolution). The interrelationship of these two modes is explained through the
construct ofa highly durable underlying order or deep structure. This deep structure iswhat
persists and limits change during equilibrium periods, and it is what disassembles,
reconfigures, and enforces wholesale transformation during revolutionary punctuations
(Gersick, 1991).
Deep structure is the set of fundamental choices a system has made of (1) the basic parts
into which its units will be organised and (2) the basic activity patterns that will maintain its
existence. Deep structures are highly stable for two general reasons. Firstly, the trail of
choices made by a system rules out many options, at the same time as it rules in mutually
contingent options. Secondly, the activity patterns of a system's deep structure reinforce the
system as a whole through mutual feedback loops. Tushman and Romanelli (1985) descnbe
five kinds ofstructural and performance choices that make up organisations' deep structures
(1) core beliefs and values regarding the organisation, its employees and its environment (2)
products, markets, technology and competitive timing (3) the distribution of power (4) the
organisation's structure and (5) the nature, type and pervasiveness of control systems.
Within equilibrium periods, the system's basic organisation and activity patterns stay the
same. The equilibrium period consists of maintaining and carrying out these choices.
Systems make adjustments that preserve the deep structure against internal and external
perturbations, and move incrementally along paths built into the deep structure. Pursuit of
stable deep structure choices may result in behaviour that is turbulent on the surface.
Tushrnan and Romanelli (1985) describe the refinements and incremental steps human
systems take during equilibrium periods as they work to achieve goals built into their deep
structures. These authors believe these convergent periods are " ... relatively long time
spans of incremental change and adaptation which elaborate structure, systems, controls,
and resources toward increased coalignment, [which] mayor may not be associated with
effective performance (pp. 173). [They are] characterised by duration, strategic orientation,
[and] turbulence ..... (pp. 170). During [these] periods ... inertia increases and competitive
vigilance decreases; structure frequently drives strategy" (pp.215).
One ofthe major questions generated by the punctuated equilibrium paradigm concerns the
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inertia that maintains a system's equilibrium. Tushman and Romanelli (1985) discuss three
barriers to radical change in human systems: cognition, motivation and obligation. Limits on
the awareness of alternatives constrain change in behaviour (Simon, 1976). Motivational
barriers to system change are based on wishes to avoid losing opportunities, losing power
struggles, failing at more difficult tasks or losing control over one's situation if the
equilibrium ends (Gersick, 1991). Tushman and Romanelli (1985) discuss the inertial
constraints of obligations among stakeholders inside and outside a system. They suggest
that even ifa system overcomes its own cognitive and motivational barriers against realising
a need for change, the ''networks of interdependent resource relationships and value
commitments" generated by its structure often prevent its being able to change (1985: 177).
Another explanation for the stability of equilibrium periods is that systems benefit from this
kind of persistence. These benefits have to do with the ability to pursue goals and
accomplish work. The practices built into systems prescribe the methods to use and
promises that certain questions will ultimately reward pursuit and this is why managers, task
groups and organisations respond to obstacles by inventing ways to persist with their goals,
not by changing their basic direction. Tushman and Romanelli (1985) define equilibria as
periods during which organisations become more internally consistent and suggest that
"selection processes favor ... organisations whose strategic orientations are consistent with
internal and external environmental demands" (pp. 195). When the environment is
reasonably stable, organisations that maintain equilibrium should become more and more
thoroughly adapted to carry out their missions. By sticking to a course, a system can
become skilled at what it does (Gersick, 1991).
The third major component of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm is the revolutionary
period. Revolutions are relatively brief periods when a system's deep structure comes apart,
leaving it in disarray until the period ends, with the choices around which a new deep
structure forms. Revolutionary outcomes, based on interactions of systems' historical
resources with current events, are not predictable; they mayor may not leave a system better
off. Revolutions vary in magnitude (Gersick, 1991). In Tushman and Romanelli's (1985)
terms " .. reorientations are relatively short periods of discontinuous change where
strategies, power, structure, and systems are fundamentally transformed toward a new basis
of alignment (pp. 173). Recreations are reorientations that also involve discontinuous
change in core values which govern decision premises ... [They are] the most radical form
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of reorientation (pp. 179). During reorientations, organisation inertia decreases, competitive
vigilance increases; strategy drives structure" (pp. 215).
This discussion about the punctuated equilibrium paradigm explains why proponents ofthis
model do not believe that incremental changes in a system's parts would alter the whole. As
long as the deep structure is intact, it generates a strong inertia. first to prevent the system
from generating alternatives outside its own boundaries, then to pull any deviations that do
occur back into line. According to this logic, the deep structure must first be dismantled,
leaving the system temporarily disorganised, in order for any fundamental changes to be
accomplished. Next, a subset of the system's old pieces, along with some new pieces, can
be put back together into a new configuration, which operates according to a new set of
rules.
According to the punctuational paradigm when basic premises change, all of the premises
contingent on them are affected. This idea contradicts the gradualist view of systems as
never moving (or having to move) very far from their status quo during anyone step.
Systems in transition periods undergo, first, a breakdown of the old equilibrium and a period
of uncertainty about the future, before choosing a new basis around which to crystallise a
new deep structure.
Tushman and Romanelli (1985) consider that revolutions occur because ofthe same features
of deep-structured systems that generate inertia; the mutual interdependence of their parts
and action patterns and the fact that deep structures determine how systems obtain resources
from the environment. These features open systems' deep structures to two basic sources of
disruption: (1) internal changes that pull parts and actions out of alignment with each other
or the environment and (2) environmental changes that threaten the system's ability to
obtain resources. For example, from an internal perspective, an organisation's growth strains
its existing structures and practices (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). The external
perspective presents a less orderly source of change and Tushman and Romanelli (1985)
provide a picture of shifts that can make organisation's strategic orientation inappropriate
for their environments, including (foreseeable) maturation in product life cycles and
(unforeseeable) changes in the legal and social climate, or the invention of substitute
products and/or technologies. Such internal or external shifts do not, by themselves, cause
revolutionary change; they only create the need.
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Revolutions themselves seem to require decisive breaks in systems' inertia. One way in
which the inertia of the equilibrium period can be broken is by "performance pressures ...
whether anticipated or actual" (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985: 1979). Tushman, Newman
and Romanelli (1986) describe as typical the scenario ofan organisation falling into serious
trouble before responding by replacing its top management. They found that externally
recruited executives are more than three times more likely to initiate frame-breaking change
than existing executive teams. The newcomer has the opportunity to see the system in an
entirely different context than incumbent members and has the explicit task of breaking the
old deep structure and establishing a new one. Tushman and Romanelli (1985) stress the
importance of organisational leaders in managing reorientations.
During equilibrium periods, organisational systems may make incremental changes because
members want to try something new. During revolutionary change system members are no
longer directed by their old deep structures and do not yet have future directions. As such,
they may experience uncertainty, often accompanied by powerful feelings. For example,
Tushman et al (1986) described organisational reorientations as inescapably risky and painful
to participants, yet potentially exhilarating too. This emotion often plays an important
motivational role in the transition. Tushman et al (1986) also noted that without an
adequate combination of urgency and optimism organisational systems at transition points
may cling to old patterns, even while they recognise the need to change, or they may simply
quit. Eisenhardt's (1989) research, showing the importance of a trusted advisor in helping
organisations make major decisions fast and effectively, suggests transitional figures may
also be critical in organisational reorientations where top executives remain in place.
Articulation of a new vision is central to organisational reorientation (Tushman and
Romanelli, 1985). The sheer urgency and discomfort of being without a functioning
structure lend intensity to the search for new solutions. As Tushman et al (1986) point out,
an organisation in transition is unstable on a number of fronts. If a new order does not take
control relatively quickly, numerous vested interests may pull it toward its old structure;
transition periods may end quickly by default.
A few case histories have supported the idea that fundamental transformations occur
according to the patterns predicted by the model. For example, Tushman, Newman and
Romanelli (1986) examined the life histories of four organisations, AT&T, General Radio,
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Citibank and Prime Computers, and described a progression of equilibrium periods during
which organisational systems, structures and strategies were consistently reinforced toward
increasing coherence with the organisation's basic missions. The equilibrium periods were
punctuated by very brief periods of intensive and pervasive change, culminating in the
formulation of new missions and the initiation of new equilibrium periods. Bartunek (1984)
described repeated failures of a religious order to accomplish fundamental transformation
until both the structure and the interpretive schemes of the organisation were rapidly and
dramatically revised. Other studies have explored some of the correlates and consequences
of revolutionary transformation. For example, Miller and Friesen (1984) showed that
organisations that radically and quickly altered their formal structures, decision-making
routines and information-processing devices performed better over their lives than
organisations that changed gradually or incrementally.
As Gersick (1991) noted, punctuated equilibrium theorists typically contrast their prediction
of discontinuous and pervasive transformation with a view ofnonrevolutionary, or gradual,
incremental transformation. For example, Miller and Friesen, following Cyert and March
(1963), characterised the nonrevolutionary view as depicting "individual subunits of
organisations dealing incrementally and disjointedly with one problem and one goal at a time
while emphasising short-run reaction to short-run feedback" (1984:222). Non revolutionary
views of organisational transformation thus emphasise the relative independence of
organisational subunits as managers seek to adapt to changes in their local internal and
external environments. Over time, as subunits repeatedly alter their goals and relationships
to local environments, the organisation as a whole becomes transformed.
Punctuated equilibrium theorists, by contrast, stress the interdependence of organisational
subunits. Following Mintzberg (1979), Miller and Friesen (1984) argued that organisations
must be constructed so as to ensure a complementary alignment among structural variables.
Tushman and Romanelli (1985) concluded that organisations develop "webs of
interdependent relationships with buyers, suppliers and financial backers .... and patterns of
culture, norms and ideology" (pp. 177) that legally and normatively constrain organisations
to an ongoing commitment to established activities and relationships. Gersick (1991)
described organisational deep structure as a system ofinterrelated organisational parts that is
maintained by mutual dependencies among the parts and with competitive, regulatory and
technological systems outside the organisation that reinforce the legitimacy of managerial
56
choices that produced the parts. According to this view, the result ofinterdependence is not
cascading adaptation over related organisational subunits, but rather resistance to change as
subunit managers seek to maintain a complex network of commitments and relationships.
Resistance to change is critical to punctuated equilibrium theory in that it establishes the key
condition that supports revolutionary transformation as the principal means by which
organisations can accomplish transformation. Resistance to change prevents small changes
in organisational subunits from taking hold or substantially influencing activities in related
subunits. As such, small changes in individual domains of organisational activity will not
accumulate incrementally to yield a fundamental transformation.
Results of empirical research by Romanelli and Tushman (1994) demonstrate that
revolutionary transformation, as predicted by the punctuated equilibrium model, is a
principal means by which organisations fundamentally alter their strategies, systems, and
structures. They found no evidence in their research to support the argwnent that very small
changes accumulated over longer periods accomplish fundamental transformation. Their
results support a key argument of punctuated equilibrium theory regarding the likely inability
of organisations to instigate or conclude a fundamental transformation via incremental or
gradual changes in organisational characteristics.
If these arguments are considered in the context of the change to team working, which is
essentially a fundamental transformation altering an organisation's strategies, structures and
systems, then the hypothesis must be that organisations will be more successful in effecting
this transition through a radical rather than incremental process. The methodological
implications emphasise the collection of documentary histories over long time periods.
2.3.3 The Politics of the Change
In this section, the internal politics of the change process will be considered, along with the
roles of the change agents and operational personnel.
2.3.3.1 The Political Perspective on the Change to Team-Working
Models describing the team development process typically underplay or do not look at the
complexity of the change from a political perspective. Indeed, Perrow (1983) notes that
sociotechnical theory has tended to underestimate the political dimensions of the design and
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implementation ofsociotechnical systems and that there has been little concern to investigate
the role oflocal and internal political processes which serve to configure the implementation
and final outcomes of change. Badham, Couchman and McLouglin (1997) also comment
that there has not been a focus on the systematic identification of the full political,
organisational and technical roles of the people responsible for the range of actions needed
to design, implement, run, defend and develop new sociotechnical configurations.
According to Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin (1997), the change to tearn working is
inherently vulnerable given the complex and novel nature of this work redesign initiative in
seeking to accomplish both technical and social change. These authors go on to say that
understanding the process of this change within organisations and how it can be managed, in
particular its micro-political dimensions and characteristics, is important as such projects are
likely to encounter difficult people issues and controversial politics.
In using the term vulnerable, Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin (1997) are distinguishing
two sets of conditions that make projects subject to organisational disruption and
consequently failure: their degree of complexity and how radical they are. These are two
key features oftearn-based work redesign programmes.
With complex projects, in contrast to more routine mechanistic types of change, there is a
large degree of uncertainty about what is to be done and how to do it. Objectives are less
clear, resource requirements not so well known, activities more often redirected and
schedules reorganised. As McCa1man and Paton (1992) observe, in such conditions it is
more difficult to achieve the shared perception of the project's goals and keep the necessary
commitment to provide a solution. More time and effort has to be spent ensuring effective
communication, addressing people's perceptions, encouraging flexibility and generating and
regenerating involvement in the face of new problems, setbacks and opportunities.
With radical change, problems arise from the degree to which organisational actors, culture
and structure have to be transformed for the project to succeed. The radical nature of such
projects is derived from two elements: the degree to which the change is central to the
organisation's strategy and survival and involves modifications throughout the organisation
(breadth) and the degree to which these modifications are a radical departure from existing
ways of doing things (depth). The more major the project in these two senses, the more
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politically controversial it is likely to be since the activities and interests of a wide range of
different groups may be fundamentally threatened.
Figure 2.4 Degrees ofvulnerability in change projects
RADICAL
Scope and depth of change
SIMPLE
High vulnerability
COMPLEX
Degree of uncertainty
Low vulnerability
INCREMENT AL
(Source: Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997: 151)
The radical nature of sociotechnical projects derives from their attempt to transform both
vertical and horizontal structures in the organisation. For instance, the creation of self-
managing work teams involves cutting across traditional semi-skilled work boundaries and
direct semi-skilled and indirect skilled demarcations. The complementary design of
interdependent technical (e.g. cells) and organisational (e.g. teams) structures imposes
greater demands for co-operation between industrial engineers and human resource
personnel, ergonomists or human factors engineers and systems designers, and design
engineering and manufacturing engineering. The self-managing nature ofteams involves not
only transforming line management, as supervisors become coaches to self-supervising
teams, but also reverses the traditional relationship between direct production and indirect
support departments. As engineering, accounting and personnel functions are devolved to
the teams, indirect departments move into more supportive relationships.
The introduction of such projects therefore requires clear links with corporate strategy as
senior management's commitment is crucial in overcoming opposition and securing the
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levels of investment required. It also involves considerable changes in the skills, attitudes
and activities of personnel at all levels. Direct labourers become responsible for far broader
aspects of their work, line managers become concerned with system development and
strategic issues and traditional specialists (e.g. industrial engineers, human resource
specialists and accountants) are required to work more in interdisciplinary and
interdepartmental teams, often in greater contact with direct production operations. Indeed,
for Brandon (1993) it is this necessity for interdisciplinary collaboration that makes such
strategic changes inherently vulnerable to the withdrawal of much needed support by
different functional groups.
The complexity of such projects also increases their vulnerability. There are a considerable
number of unknowns involved in their introduction. To take an example, in creating new
forms of teamwork, both management and the workforce have to overcome traditional
distrusts in order to offer rewards on the one hand and commitment on the other. Yet there
are inevitable uncertainties about how the other side will behave and how far the final result
will be either productive for the firm or rewarding for the employees.
In sum, by their nature, sociotechnical projects tend to cut across horizontal and vertical
boundaries within organisations and impinge on the interests of a broad range of
stakeholders who may perceive a variety of threats and opportunities. More than projects
which focus mainly on the technical dimensions of change, sociotechnical projects may be
characterised by political negotiations, alliances and compromises. As such, they are
particularly vulnerable to organisational disturbances and micro-political disruptions. In
such circumstances, the final nature of implemented change and its impact on productivity,
working conditions and so on will be crucially influenced by how conflicts and compromises
are managed and resolved during the change process.
This draws attention to the high level of configurational activity required to adapt general
models of team work to particular production and organisational environments of a specific
enterprise (Badharn, Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997). Moreover, this activity can impose
severe strains on project teams as apparently clear general directives become bogged down
in a myriad of details and compromises. In the organisational sphere teams are expected to
take on more responsibility and be trained to do so, yet how much responsibility, the speed
of introduction, the time and facilities available for training, the educational and cultural
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content of the training etc. are all far less clear. Decisions in all these areas require
considerable investigation, thought and effort to ensure that generic sociotechnical ideas are
effectively adapted to the specific demands of the organisation. The uncertainty, frustration
and potential for sabotage involved in the lengthy processes of resolving such issues is a
further factor which considerably increases such projects' vulnerability.
As such, a more direct focus on such issues as the nature and dynamics of the change
process and the micropolitical dimensions and characteristics of the change to team working
is essential. The organisational outcomes of change are not only bound by both internal and
external context but also uniquely shaped by local social choice and political negotiation
within the adopting organisation (e.g. Buchanan and Boddy, 1983 and Dawson, 1994). This
social and political activity has a crucial influence on outcome variables such as productivity
and the quality of working life.
2.3.3.2 Change Agents
This spotlight on the difficult people issues and controversial politics in the change process
also establishes a more direct focus on change agent activities. Indeed, there is now a
growing literature on the role of the change agent in dealing with the people issues in
running organisational change projects (Frame, 1994). For some this involves
supplementing a harder technically-oriented approach to the management of complex
projects with a softer people centred approach using established organisational development
methods (McCalman and Paton, 1992). For others, it means going beyond traditional
technical project management and organisational development methods and developing the
political backstage skills and techniques of the change agent (Boddy and Buchanan, 1992).
A common theme in aU such accounts is the difficulty of dealing with the people issues in
these complex, uncertain, soft or vulnerable change projects.
What Badham, Couchman and McLoughIin (1997) refer to as configurational intrapreneurs
are a crucial feature of the configurational process model in the production and maintenance
of new work designs, such as team working. Configurational intrapreneurs play the key role
of organisational champions, establishing and operating new configurations, managing their
boundaries, as well as ensuring their survival and guiding their development. Organisational
actors playing this role might included relevant line managers, manufacturing engineers,
human resource managers and senior executives. The term intrapreneur is used here to
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emphasise the internal organisational role played by such actors. However, their scope
should not necessarily be reduced solely to such an internal role as it may involve crucial
interventions in inter-organisational relations and in the activities of other organisations.
The term also directs attention onto the active, uncertain and risky process of ensuring that
production processes run smoothly, continue to receive support and are allocated the
resources necessary for their further development. Such actors manipulate both technical
and social elements, and overcome obstacles in both areas in order to design and implement
working technical systems. They include both the workplace change drivers and higher level
initiators and sponsors of change (Buchanan and Storey, 1997).
According to the processual perspective of change (e.g. Dawson, 1994), the change process
requires interlocking contributions of a multiplicity of such change drivers. The actions of
different groups and individuals in the organisation might not be consistent, or indeed
supportive of each other, over time. The reality of the process of change is therefore
iterative, with much back tracking (Buchanan and Storey, 1997) and the behaviour of the
change drivers throughout the change process is important in shaping both the process and
its outcomes. Buchanan and Storey (1997) argue that in a change process drivers of change
do not slot into predefined roles, but rather are likely to adopt a plurality of roles. Indeed,
individuals take up and switch roles depending on their perception of needs, personal
competencies, the position of other individuals and personal self-interest. According to these
authors, this role adoption and role switching represents an accomplished and contingent
selection of behaviours designed to achieve particular aims in an evolving and uncertain
context. The manner in which organisational events then unfold may be explained in part by
role taking and switching, and on the differential levels of competence with which
interlocking change drivers conduct themselves in the organisational change process.
All told, these principles emphasise the move away from prescriptive step-by-step
inventories and towards describing the roles and change management responsibilities that
facilitate the change process. The suggestion is that introducing change is not the
responsibility of one multi-talented individual. Different stakeholders adopt change-driving
roles, which can overlap and vary throughout the change process. Different individuals, or
groups of'individuals, may be expected to play different roles, contributing to the process in
discrete overlapping, identifiable and potentially conflicting ways, at different times
throughout the change process. Particular individuals, by virtue of their position in the
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organisation, their relationship to the changes in hand, and the nature of their potential
contribution, may be expected to assume multiple roles throughout the change. Buchanan
and Storey (1997) describe the change process as having multiple actors, multiple drivers
and multiple phases.
After reviewing different models and roles involved in change processes, Buchanan and
Storey (1997) suggest that drivers of change (individual stakeholders or groups of
stakeholders) could be expected to function in the following six roles:
• visionary, catalyst, "mover and shaker" - this role is primarily one of giving direction,
inspiration and support, and is traditionally seen as the domain of the chief executive, or
one in similar position (Williams, Dobson and Walters, 1993)
• analyst, compelling case-builder, risk assessor - this role involves assessing the value of
the vision in the organisation
• team-builder, coalition former, ally seeker - this role involves political activity, bringing
groups together and communicating about team working developments to prevent
uncertainty, suspicion, rumours, and worry about e.g. pay, conditions, leadership etc.
• implementation planner, action driver, deliverer - this role involves planning the times of
workshops and meetings etc., setting the agenda, and ensuring the date, time etc. are
communicated
• fixer, facilitator, wheeler-dealer, power-broker - this role involves helping others to
change and learn throughout the change process (Williams et al., 1993)
• reviewer, critic, progress chaser, auditor - this role involves feeding information back to
the stakeholders and holding the threads of team-based working together.
Such an approach does not suggest a top-down change process. The change management
roles and responsibilities outlined above could be played by individuals at any organisational
level. The temporal order of the roles and responsibilities is similarly not prescribed, thus
there could, for example, be many different stages throughout the process where visioning is
appropriate at different organisational levels. The flexibility of such a framework is
consistent with the iterative, complex and political nature of change processes as noted by
researchers above (e.g. Badham et ai, 1995). Thus, Buchanan and Storey's (1997)
framework of change roles appears to offer some insight into how the change process might
be facilitated without imposing linearity on the process or being prescriptive.
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In this context, the focus is on the different change driver roles that may be adopted by the
different stakeholders and groups of stakeholders throughout the implementation of self-
managing work teams.
2.3.3.3 Operational Roles
Alongside the change-driving roles adopted during the transition process, organisational
members continue to play their day-to-day operational roles. The nature of these
operational roles and the impact of the change to self-management on them are considered
below.
a) Managers and Supervisors
In the organisational change process, the commitment to the philosophy of empowerment
and to the change itselfby aUlevels of management has a direct influence on the success of
the implementation and team performance. For example, Manz and Angle (1993) describe
an insurance company in which service teams were introduced to disempower employees
and to increase management control. The Chief Executive Officer saw the potential for
teams to provide peer pressure and points of leverage for increasing his control of
employees. This directly contradicts the philosophy of empowerment and destroyed the
potential for self-managed teams, but demonstrates the influence of management on the
implementation and development of teams.
In fact, one of the biggest obstacles to the success of self-managed teams is what Manz,
Keating and DonneUon (1990) call the middle management brick wall. Success or failure is
often determined before the teams are put in place as managers and supervisors find it
difficult to prepare themselves to conduct business without traditional management and
move themselves beyond managing and supervising to facilitating and leading. These
findings were confirmed by the Industrial Society (1995) survey described in detail earlier.
The results of this survey indicated that the biggest difficulty in implementing self-managed
teams was the senior management in organisations.
Indeed, it is increasingly being recognised that it is managers and supervisors not employees
who offer greatest resistance to the redesign of the organisation from a traditional to a high
involvement structure. Even when their job security isn't threatened, managers and
supervisors still face the challenge of defining new roles for themselves when employees are
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striving for maximum autonomy. Schilder (1992) describes several companies which have
introduced team-working successfully and notes that a critical aspect on which the
management teams in Northern Telecom, Steelcase and Johnsonville Foods all agree is that
self-directed work teams need senior management commitment to succeed.
The decision to adopt teams and to move towards doing business without traditional
managers and supervisors requires the existing people at this level within the organisation to
make significant adjustments. Middle managers have always handled two main jobs:
supervising people, and gathering, processing and transmitting information. Work designs
based on self-management tend to give workers a high degree of autonomy and control over
their immediate behaviour. Typically, the workers are organised into teams on the basis of
relatively complete task functions. They make decisions on a wide range of issues, often
including such traditional management and supervisory prerogatives as scheduling work,
deciding who will work on what machine or work operation, how to address interpersonal
difficulties within the group, how to resolve quality problems and even administering pay
and vacations. Passing of power and control to lower levels in the organisation can be an
intimidating process for both managers and supervisors, stemming largely from their own
sense ofloss of status and power.
At the same time, the ever-expanding power and dwindling cost of computers have
transformed information handling from a difficult, time-consuming job to a far easier and
quicker one. In an instant, the middle manager's traditional functions have vaporised. The
new role of managers and supervisors with the introduction of self-management is
associated not with directing people, but with facilitating, advising and developing.
The extreme of the traditional approach is for managers to control and instruct the people
who work for them. Although few managers will operate as restrictively as this in practice,
sacrificing the command element of their job may still be a major challenge for them.
Managers will need training for the new approach. The behaviour and actions of the
managers will set the tone for the introduction of self-managing teams and largely determine
the chances of success. Unwillingness to let go, reverting to a blaming culture, taking back
control at the first sign of difficulties, will all send unmistakable signals to colleagues (Manz,
Keating and Donnellon, 1990).
The introduction of self-managing teams amounts to a major culture change and a key issue
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is whether senior management is actually prepared to release authority and responsibility in
the way that self-management demands. Some of these changes to the management roles
are described in the following table.
Figure 2.5 Types of manager
Old Manager New Manager
Thinks of self as a manager or boss Thinks of self as a sponsor, team leader,
facilitator or internal consultant
Deals with anyone necessary to get the job
done
Changes organisational structure in
response to market changes
Invites others to join in decision-making
Shares information
Tries to master a broad array of managerial
disciplines
Demands results
Follows the chain of command
Works within a set organisational·:·
structure
Makes most decisions alone
Hoards information
Tries to master one major discipline, such .:.
as marketing or finance
Demands long hours .:.
(adapted from Dumaine, 1993)
In her examination of factors predicting team orientation within organisations, Russ-Eft
(1993) found that one of the most important predictors was relationships within
organisation-wide management. This factor included such items as: management treats
people fairly, management keeps everyone informed, management keeps informed about
how employees feel, management helps people develop their skills. This study emphasised
the critical role the immediate manager or supervisor plays in the transition from the
traditional organisation to the team-orientated organisation.
In a study of over 60 work groups involved in quality of work life projects in seven
organisations, Trist and Dwyer (1982) found that managers had allowed almost all of the
projects to die out despite the impressive results that had been achieved. In many of the
projects, employees perceived their supervisors as not just disinterested, but negative toward
the quality of work life activities. Managers felt that they were caught in a bind and that two
sets of objectives that could not be satisfied simultaneously were being communicated to
them from their superiors: (i) get the work groups functioning; (ii) maintain performance
levels. They also felt that they were receiving neither the moral nor the resource support to
address effectively this new set of demands. Specifically, management were perceived as:
unwilling to change roles or policies that inhibited the more autonomous functioning of
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groups, slow to respond to suggestions, not directly involved enough in monitoring the
process and helping to solve problems, unclear on their roles in the new system,
insufficiently communicative with other groups, poorly trained in group process facilitation
and conflict management, and generally "going along with the program" instead of actively
trying to make it work.
When Trist and Dwyer (1982) shared these data with the corporate managers involved, they
were inclined to accept these data at least to some degree. They commented that such a
long-range strategic undertaking requiring a large investment of management time and
energy and a large investment in the training and development of the workforce was a
daunting prospect. It put a strain on other priorities and managers alike, especially as the
current systems of management practice had stood the test of time and both sides knew
where they stood.
In addition to these more general managerial roles and responsibilities, leading self-managed
employees calls for new perspectives and strategies which may not come naturally to those
involved (Manz, Keating and Donnellon, 1990). Traditional assumptions about power,
authority and influence are challenged with the introduction of self-management inwhich the
emphasis is on participative management and teams managing and leading themselves.
The above findings suggest that the effectiveness of high-involvement organisations is
affected by the managers' and supervisors' operational contributions to the implementation
and maintenance of the change process. Indeed, some researchers (e.g. Manz, Keating and
Donnellon, 1990) suggest that the conversion to self-managed teams is as dependent on
managerial and supervisory attitude and behaviour change as it is on the development of
teams. These authors found that traditional managers and supervisors recognised the need
to change, but they did not know what new behaviours were expected nor if they could
successfully learn and apply these new skills. Managers experienced a perceived loss of
power and control as they realised that their subordinates were to become their own
managers, and that their repertoire of management skills developed over years of experience
and struggle were becoming somewhat obsolete. Indeed, as Schilder (1992) states some
managers aren't able to make the transition. Statistics at Northern Telecom indicated that
about 25% of its first-line supervisors left after team direction was adopted.
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b) The Team Members
"You work as a team, rat on each other, and lose control of your destiny." This quote from
a team member and cited by Hoerr (1989) emphasises the fact that the concept of team
working troubles many workers. Team members are promised autonomy over their jobs, at
the same time their old ways of working are threatened.
However, Hoerr (1989) goes on to say that opponents of co-operative working get more
press than advocates of participation. In reality, Hoerr (1989) believes that people pro-
participation constitute a much larger portion of most work forces and quotes figures that
show in many plants where participation is not mandatory an average of about 25% of the
workers volunteer to join problem-solving teams, another 70% are passive supporters, while
only 5% remain opposed.
There are start-up problems for team members, too. For example, one team leader from
Mazda commented that initial training sessions prepared workers for unprecedented
invo lvement in shop-floor decisions, but that when they actually started producing cars there
was no such thing as teamwork. He commented: "All of a sudden, you were just another
factory rat" (Hoerr, 1989: 41). The team leader also commented that workers were
pressured to keep the assembly line moving even though they were told they had the right to
stop production to solve quality problems.
There are also barriers that separate management from employees that send signals to the
team members about trust. For example, Schilder (1992) mentions the time clock (with self..
management making employees responsible for their own breaks, lunches and work hours,
as long as the changes did not affect customer service or productivity), the reserved parking
spaces, executive dining facilities, dress codes etc. If these barriers persist after the
introduction of team working, they send signals to team members that things are really not
that different in the new set-up.
There are also suspicions among team members that the introduction of self..managingwork
teams is a way of getting rid of people. Perhaps more commonly, there is also a belief that
self-management is a way of handing over the stress of added responsibility to the team, for
which the supervisors are paid. One of the most important elements in implementing teams is
training, in such areas as job skills, business knowledge, problem-solving and team
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dynamics. Training eases the transition from traditional systems to teams, helping everyone
to understand change, as well as deal with their feelings (Industrial Society, 1995).
2.3.4 The Context of Change
The context of change is taken to refer to the past and present external and internal
operating environment as well as the influence of future projection and expectations on
current operating principles. External contextual factors include changing social
expectations and technological innovation. Internal contextual factors include the
production environment (discussed comprehensively in the previous chapter), products or
service and organisational arrangements and administrative systems. The internal contextual
factor of organisational arrangements and administrative systems are particularly pertinent to
the transition to self-management, in the sense that there needs to be congruence between
new working patterns and such systems to reinforce the change process. These systems are
discussed below.
2.3.4.1 Organisational Arrangements and Administrative Systems
Organisational arrangements and administrative systems refer to the structures, processes
and systems which are designed to motivate and facilitate individuals in the performance of
organisational tasks. The change to team working makes it necessary to review many ofthe
organisations' routine systems for managing people.
Self-directed work team settings depend on upskilling approaches to human resource
management CYoundt, Snell, Dean and Lepak, 1996) as the responsibilities of employees are
expanded greatly. With this change, production employees are expected to make the
transition from having limited responsibility for only the physical execution of work to a
situation in which their responsibilities are considerably increased to include, amongst other
things, planning, problem solving, quality assurance, scheduling, and maintenance. Self-
directed team working also emphasises group interaction, interdependence and information
sharing.
These changes create the need for different skills and attributes in employees. Appropriate
recruitment, assessment and training programmes that emphasise attracting and developing
individuals with appropriate technical, problem solving and interpersonal skills are essential
and become instrumental in achieving the strategic goals of these interventions. Employee
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interaction and information exchange must also be facilitated through appropriate structural.
appraisal and reward systems changes to promote, for example, a high degree of
interdependence and group problem solving.
It is essential that there is congruence between the objectives of self-management and the
policies and systems supporting its implementation. For example, if a company continues to
recruit individuals to work in individual jobs on an assembly line, it is unlikely it will acquire
people with appropriate team working skills and commitment to team working. Indeed, the
importance ofthe congruence of organisational arrangements between old and new systems
was emphasised in the Industrial Society survey (1995). The results of this survey stated
that one of the major obstacles to consider in the implementation of team working was
senior management taking the wrong attitude to what is a major cultural change. If top
management nominally hand more responsibility to the teams, while too many of the old
controls and fears stay in place, then the change to team working will not be successful.
Firms often fail to realise just how many of their traditional control systems for managing
people will need to change. Many management systems are based on superior-subordinate
relationships, like discipline, appraisal etc. and these are inappropriate in a culture where
teams need to feel free to take decisions.
In brief, the findings from the research cited above suggest that for the successful
implementation and maintenance of strategic manufacturing interventions there must be
appropriate alignment of organisational arrangements and human resource systems. In the
past, human and technical aspects of manufacturing have operated in relative isolation.
However, evidence suggests that when firms fail in their adoption of new technologies one
of the major stumbling blocks has tended to be the organisational arrangements and human
resource management issues rather than difficulties with the technical systems per se (Adler,
1988). For example, Lawler (1981) warned that when a firm's pay system is not aligned
with organisational changes it may not reward behaviour that is needed to make new
systems work. Worse yet, existing reward systems may actually elicit and reinforce
behaviour that is opposite to what is needed to make the changes work.
In this context, Nadler and Tushman' s (1979) congruence model of organisational behaviour
provides a framework and some useful concepts, which aid understanding of the dynamics
of this change, in particular the importance of aligning the organisational arrangements to
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the new working patterns.
In this model, organisations are seen as composed ofinterdependent parts. Changes in one
element of the system will result in changes in other parts of the system. Similarly,
organisations have the property of equilibrium; the system will generate energy to move
towards a state of balance. The model conceives of the organisation as being composed of
four major components. The first component is the task of the organisation, or the work to
be done and its crucial characteristics. The second component is composed of the
individuals who are to perform organisational tasks. The third component includes all of
the formal organisational arrangements, including various structures, processes, systems
etc., which are designed to motivate and facilitate individuals in the performance of
organisational tasks. Finally, there is a set of informal organisational arrangements, which
are usually neither planned nor written. but which tend to emerge over time. These include
patterns of communication. power and influence, values and norms, etc., which characterise
how an organisation actually functions.
The relationship among the components (task, individuals, organisational arrangements and
the informal organisation) is the basic dynamic of the model. Each component can be
thought of as having a relationship with each other component. Between each pair, there is
a relative degree of consistency, congruence or fit. For example, taking the type of work to
be done (task) and the nature of the people available to do the work (individuals), a
statement could be made about the congruence between the two by seeing whether the
demands of the work are consistent with the skills and abilities ofthe individuals. At the
same time the rewards that the work provides could be compared to the needs and desires of
the individuals. By considering these factors, an assessment can be made about how
congruent the nature of the task is with the nature of the individuals in the system.
The basic premise ofthe model is that organisations will be most effective when their major
components are congruent with each other. There is not one best organisation design. or
style of management, or method ofworking. Rather, different patterns of organisation and
management will be most appropriate in different situations. Changes in the environment
often necessitate organisational change e.g. in the context of self-managed team working,
factors relating to competition or technology may necessitate change in organisational
structure and strategy. To execute a new strategy, the organisation and its subunits
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(departments, groups, divisions etc.) must perform tasks that may be different than those
previously performed. Building on the model just described, this means that modification
may need to be made to organisational arrangements, individuals and the informal
organisation.
For example, one frequent problem is that organisations expect individuals to behave in
certain ways (particularly in a transition) while rewarding them for other conflicting
behaviours (Kerr, 1975). In particular, rewards such as bonuses, pay systems, promotion,
recognition, job assignment and status symbols all need to be carefully examined during
major organisational changes and restructured to support the direction of the transition. This
is a particularly pertinent issue in the context of the change to self-management, as most
traditional organisations recognise and reward individual performance. When self-
management is introduced, there is an expectation that individuals will assume team values
and co-operate as a team. Rewarding individual performance in such circumstances is
counterproductive.
Another concept from the model relates to the use of multiple and consistent leverage
points. If an organisation is made up of components which are interdependent, then the
successful alteration of organisational behaviour patterns must involve the use of multiple
leverage points or modifications in the larger set of components which shape the behaviour
of the organisation and the people in it (Nadler and Tichy, 1980). Structural change, task
change, change in the social environment, as well as changes in individuals themselves are all
needed to bring about significant and lasting changes in the patterns of organisational
behaviour. Changes that are targeted at individuals and social relations (such as training)
tend to fade out quickly with few lasting effects when done in isolation (Porter, Lawler and
Hackman, 1975). On the other hand, task and structural changes alone, while powerful and
enduring, frequently produce unintended and dysfunctional consequences (Lawler and
Rhodes, 1976). Change which is in the direction intended and which is lasting therefore
requires the use of multiple leverage points to modify more than a single component. The
changes have to be structured so that they are consistent e.g. the training of individuals
should dovetail with new job descriptions, reward systems or reporting relationships. In the
absence of consistency, changes run the risk of creating new poor fits among organisational
components and may result in decreases in organisational performance.
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The notion of congruence between organisational systems is particularly important in the
context of the change to self-management, given the strategic nature of the change and its
impact on all aspects of organisational behaviour. As such, an organisation making this
transition will need to ensure organisational arrangements and administrative systems
support the new work design.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, discussion has focused on the nature of team development with several
empirically based models presented to elaborate on this process. The focus then turned to
the limitations of these models in the context of the finding that the practical application of
team working seems to yield less promising results than expected. In particular, with the
transition to team working being a large-scale organisational change, the linear step-by-step
nature of these models does not seem representative of this change process in reality.
On this basis, the focus then turned to processual models of change and the contribution of
research in this area to increasing our understanding of the transition to team working. The
scale of this organisational change was considered with specific focus on whether, on the
basis of previous studies, this would be most effectively achieved through an incremental or
radical transformation. Research findings specific to the politics of the change to team
working and the roles of change agents and operational personnel were also considered,
along with the contextual factors important in the transition to self-management.
The identification of this gap between the linear, step-by-step team development models and
the reality of the change process to team working within organisations provided the focus
for this research. Indeed, on the basis ofthe findings in this literature review, the objective
of this research was established, as follows:
To examine, at apractical and detailed level, the team development and organisational
change processes in the large-scale transition to self-managed team working in
brownfield manufacturing sites.
This statement will be elaborated further after the discussion on research methodology in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
Research Design and Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methods that were employed in exploring the factors that
influence the team development process and the nature of the change to self-managing
teams in brownfield manufacturing sites. This research addresses these issues using a
longitudinal case study design, in recognition of the fact that team working is a
continuously evolving and changing process with many different stages of team
development (e.g. Katzenbach and Smith, 1993).
This chapter begins by detailing the epistemological base of the study and continues with
a description of the case study approach undertaken in line with this base. The chapter
then goes on to detail each of the individual research techniques, namely observation and
one-to-one and group interviews. This chapter presents the reasoning behind this
particular research design in this context. The specific details of the observation periods
and interview programmes (and in one case questionnaire design) for each of the four
companies selected for this five-year period of research are contained in the following
four case chapters.
3.2 Epistemological Stance
One question facing researchers across many disciplines relates to the gulf between the
positivists (or empiricists) and the phenomenologists (or social constructionists) (e.g.
Silverman, 1993). The positivist paradigm supposes a real world existence of an
objective, independent and value free truth. This objective truth can be uncovered by the
scientific method, which seeks to measure the degree of relationships among variables
(Cassell and Symon, 1994) and is seen to be systematically rigorous and reliable. As
such, the focus of the positivist paradigm involves measurement, causation and
objectivity.
The phenomenologists on the other hand assume that there is no clear cut objectivity or
reality and that the truth about the world is not independent of the individual hut is
dependent upon his or her perceptions, thoughts and beliefs (Atherton, 1993).
Phenomenologists therefore concentrate on interpreting and understanding what people
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say and do in their natural environments. They are concerned with the non-scientific
world of actors' interpretations of their situations (Dawson, 1994). As such, the
phenomenological paradigm includes understanding, meaning and subjectivity.
From an epistemological perspective, there are pluses and nunuses to both the
quantitative and qualitative approaches. On the one hand, the main criticism levelled
against a quantitative approach is that the research methods produce superficialdata and
may result in the complete physical separation of researchers from the field they are
studying (Bryman, 1988: Whyte, 1984). On the other hand, the quantitative approach
adopts the stance that true knowledge can only be obtained in the pursuit of science and,
hence, automatically discredits and devalues research which actively engages in the
subjective and non-scientific world of the actors' interpretation. Quantitative theorists
describe qualitative research as subjective, unscientific, having limited generality and
being "soft" (Dawson, 1994). For the quantitative researcher, the world is clearly
defined and the methods well documented, the biggest problem being whether the issue
lends itself to scientific inquiry. For the qualitative researcher, everything is grey,
ambiguous and at times "spiritual", the biggest problem being how to make sense of the
data and generalise from a small sample (Dawson, 1994). These comments
notwithstanding, Symon and Cassell (1998) suggest that the more recent
phenomenological paradigm and its associated qualitative research tools, which have
constantly been viewed in lower esteem, are becoming increasinglycredible.
In the context of this thesis, it is not such epistemological differences that are important,
but understanding the use of appropriate tools to tackle a particular research problem. It
is more beneficial to recognise that there are undoubtedly differences between the
quantitative and qualitative approaches, but that each approach has its advantages and
disadvantages in different contexts. Indeed, Campbell (1984) considers that science is a
polymorphous activity which draws on a range of theoretical and philosophical bases and
takes on a variety of different methods. Bryman (1988) suggests that in order to
overcome the polarisation in this epistemological debate, the researchers should select
the most appropriate techniques for investigating any specific research question. The
decision on which approach is appropriate is about balance, intellectual breadth and
rigour (Silverman, 1985).
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In the context of this research question and the investigation of self-managed team
development and factors that impact on the success or failure of the change process in
applied settings, the researcher recognised a greater affinity with the phenomenological
approach. This recognition is summed up in Hartman's (1990) comment that "there are
many truths and many ways of knowing" (p.3). As such, the research design
incorporates largely qualitative techniques within the case study approach to provide a
deep and full understanding of the key issues in the team development process and the
context of this change process i.e. the companies undergoing the organisational change.
This recognition stemmed in part from the work of several authors (e.g. Bryman, 1988:
Dawson, 1994) who note that qualitative methodologies have particular value and
significance for understanding the complex processes associated with change. Indeed,
qualitative research has made a significant contribution to the understanding of different
aspects of the phenomenon in question (e.g. Bryman, 1988). Change is not an event,
particularly radical and complex change, such as the implementation of self-managed
work teams. During the years the companies in this research were studied, changes were
occurring continuously. Change is a process, and hence the need for, and the value of,
qualitative longitudinal research which can compare and contrast changes in perceptions
and expectations over time. Qualitative research is suited to the micro-analysis of
change, identifying the details of a particular change over time. Indeed, as noted in the
last chapter, Dawson (1994) considers organisations undergoing transition should be
studied "as-it-happens" so that the processes associated with the change can reveal
themselves over time and in context.
In summary, Creswell (1998) defines qualitative research as "an inquiry process of
understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social
or human problem. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyses words,
reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting" (p.1S).
This researcher took a qualitative approach, using case study methodology to explore the
multiple dimensions of the process of organisational change to team working and display
the complexity of the issues involved. The methodology enabled the researcher to
describe what was going on in the organisational change to team working at different
stages of the change process, what some of the obstacles to change were and how
organisations tackled the barriers that arose in this process. The organisational change to
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team working is a complex process affected by many variables and, as such, it was
important to explore the issues in detail in their natural setting.
3.3 Case Study Methodology
Hartley (1994) defines case study research as a "detailed investigation, often with data
collected over a period of time, of one or more organisations, or groups within
organisations, with a view to providing an analysis of the context and processes involved
in the phenomenon under study" (p. 208). Robson (1993) suggests a case study is "a
strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of
evidence" (p. 52). From these and similar definitions, four important characteristics of
the case study approach may be identified, namely that: (i) it is an approach not a
method, and within this approach the researcher may use multiple methods; (ii) it is
concerned with context; (iii) it is concerned with the particular; and (iv) it can involve a
longitudinal element. Each of these characteristics will now be discussed in tum to
illustrate the appropriateness of the case study approach for exploring the team
development process and the factors affecting the success of the organisational change to
team working.
Firstly, the use of multiple methods within a case study strategy was important for this
research study. The use of multiple methods enabled the researcher to obtain a full and
in-depth picture of the team development process and the change initiative. The use of
multiple methods also enhanced the validity of the research by permitting triangulation
(Yin, 1994). Triangulation relates to the need to employ more than one method of
investigation and hence more than one type of data. By combining different sources of
data, validity can be said to be enhanced if either the conclusions drawn from the sets of
data are mutually confirming, thus providing cross validation, or indeed if discrepancies
exist as this shows the researcher has investigated a variety of explanations (Bryman,
1988). Yin (1989) also suggests that multiple sources of evidence establish construct
validity as they provide multiple measures of the same phenomena.
Secondly, concern for the context of study was important. This research was addressing
the team development process and the impact of different factors within the organisation
on the success or failure of this work design change. As such, the detail from the case
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study approach enabled the researcher to adequately identify the key contextual factors
in this change process. In line with this, Hartley (1994) suggests that the case study
approach is appropriate for understanding processes and behaviours which are little
understood.
Thirdly, the case study approach is concerned with the particular and Bromley (1986)
suggests that it has links with the idiographic domain. In this context, the particular
referred to each of the four case companies. In exploring these, the case study approach
permitted an in-depth organisational analysis, enabling a greater understanding of the
process of the change to team working.
Finally, many case studies include a longitudinal element. In the context of this research,
a longitudinal approach was particularly appropriate as team development is generally
recognised as taking between two and five years (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993). Indeed,
Robson (1993) suggests that when the main focus of research is to describe or assess
change over time, a longitudinal research design is appropriate. With a longitudinal
research design, the same set of people and the same issues or situations are studied over
a set time.
Qualitative research seeks to explain the interconnected and dynamic processes inherent
in everyday life and, as such, to avoid a static snapshot view of social life which may be a
characteristic of quantitative research. Through a concern with holistic and detailed
descriptions of social settings and a commitment to reporting actors' interpretations of
events, the final product is commonly a processual account of interaction and change
(Dawson, 1994). Longitudinal research was appropriate in this context as its continuity
allowed the researcher to follow the organisational changes and team development in the
four companies for periods of between eighteen months and four-and-a-half years.
Relatively few in-depth cases focusing on this work design initiative exist and
understanding of this change process will be greatly enhanced through longitudinal
research.
Cassell and Fitter (1992) also suggest that the longer time commitment involved in case
study research provides the researcher with an opportunity to develop relationships with
organisational members which enables the researcher to gain a greater insight into their
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collective understanding by actively sharing that experience. This was the experience of
this researcher and the close relationships developed over the long involvement (in three
of the cases this extended to almost four-and-a-halfyears) provided in-depth insights into
the change process at different level of the organisations.
However, practical consideration can limit the use of longitudinal research. For example,
longitudinal research requires a considerable time commitment from both the researcher
and the participants, which may not always be feasible. In this study, the researcher had
the time available to devote to a longitudinal design and had sustained access to all four
companies, which permitted such an approach. Finally, Cassell and Fitter (1992) suggest
that studies spanning a longer time period allow for greater influences on the research,
such as changes in operating personnel or technology. This researcher faced such
changes in the companies involved in this study. However, these were treated not as
problems, but as illustrative of a piece of real world research where things cannot be
easily controlled and where situations are dynamic.
To ensure high quality of the research design, the researcher has paid attention to the
case studies' construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability.
Construct validity refers to establishing correct operational measures for the concepts
being studied (Yin, 1989). Case studies have often been criticised for failing to develop
a sufficiently operational set of measures and for using subjective judgements to collect
the data. In this research, the construct validity has been increased by clarifying the
propositions, by discussing in some depth the development of the theoretical model and
by using as many sources of evidence as possible to measure each concept. Theory
development was an essential step in this research and the theoretical frameworks
presented in the earlier chapters provide the study propositions at the heart of the
research design. The propositions provide guidance in determining what data were
collected and the strategies for analysing the data.
Internal validity refers to establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions
are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships (Yin,
1989). When an investigator of a case study infers that a particular event resulted from
some earlier occurrence, the internal validity of the inferences comes into question. There
are important questions here, including: Have all the rival explanations and possibilities
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been considered? Is the evidence convergent? (Yin, 1989). Methods for addressing the
case studies' internal validity include pattern matching and chronology analysis. With
pattern matching, an empirically based pattern is compared with a predicted one. If the
patterns coincide, the results strengthen the internal validity of the case. The use of rival
theories is helpful by providing alternative causal relationships and, subsequently, a
consideration of rival explanations. The analysis of chronological events is a special
form of time-series analysis (Yin, 1989) that traces events over time and provides the
initial basis for causal inferences. The arraying of events into a chronology permits the
researcher to compare the chronology with that predicted by the explanatory theory. In
this study, the internal validity was increased by examining data from the cases carefully
in line with the theoretical explanations and by consistently seeking alternative
explanations. The case narratives trace the events associated with the change processes
over time.
External validity refers to whether a study's findings are generalisable beyond the
immediate case study and has been a major barrier in doing case studies. Critics typically
state that single cases offer a poor basis for generalising, but as Yin (1989) points out
there is a different premise for generalising case studies than that used for generalising
survey research. Survey research relies on statistical generalisation, whereas case studies
rely on analytical generalisation. In analytical generalisation, the researcher generalises a
particular set of results to some broader theory. Theoretical propositions were used to
guide the case analysis in this research. As Yin (1989) has noted, however, the
generalisation is not automatic. A theory must be tested through replications of the
findings in a second, third and so on study. This replication logic is the same that
underlies the use of experiments, and allows scientists to generalise from one experiment
to another. In this research, each case had a specific theoretical basis and data were
collected using repeated measures. In the case conclusions, the researcher generalised
from the particular set of results to the broader theory. The researcher also included
some cross-case analysis in this study and these techniques are considered later in this
chapter. The cross-case analysis increased the generalisability of these research findings.
The goal of reliability is to minimise the errors and biases in the study. Accurate
documentation of the procedures followed will increase reliability and in this research a
case study protocol (for example, the data collection instruments and the procedures)
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and a case study database (all data collected from the case studies, such as observation
and interview notes and records) were used. A case study protocol is essential when
using a multiple case design
Whilst the case study approach was most appropriate in the context of this research,
some disadvantages are evident. Yin (1989) notes that "the demands of a case study on
a person's intellect, ego and emotions are far greater than those of any other research
strategy" (p. 62) and indeed this research was at times very demanding, especially in
terms of developing close relationships with four very different companies and sets of
people. Also, a criticism frequently aimed at the case study approach is that
generalisation is limited. However as already noted, Yin (1989) argues that case studies
as analytic units should be thought of in the same way as a complete experiment. Case
studies use repeated observations, discussions and interviews etc. in a particular context
in the same way the traditional scientific experiment uses repeated measures on
participants. In this study, repeated observations and interviews were used.
In summary, the case study approach was adopted in this research to enable the use of
multiple methods over a relatively long period of time, to provide a greater
understanding of the context of the research and hence allow a more detailed
understanding of the nature of the change to team working.
3.4 Research Design
This research was designed around four cases, each case being the longitudinal study of a
company implementing self-managing team working over a period of between two and
five years. This approach was taken to remove the limitation of some of the other
studies in this area, which typically focus on the early stages of the change to team
working. It is widely acknowledged (e.g, Katzenbach and Smith, 1993) that the change
to team working takes between two to five years and it is realistic to expect that the
organisations, and the teams themselves, face different challenges at different times in the
change process. As such therefore, this researcher was keen to take a more longitudinal
perspective and to clarify some of these issues.
Rather than just follow one organisation over a period of four or five years, the
researcher selected and worked with four organisations. Each of these organisations had
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made the decision to implement self-managed team working and the senior managers
were in the early stages of discussions about the transition process at the time the
researcher became involved in the process. The overall timescale for the researcher's
involvement in the development of team working across the companies was from start-
up to almost five years. This design provided the opportunity for in-depth insights into
the factors that led to the success or failure of team working at different stages of team
development. The inclusion of four companies in the study provided the researcher with
greater confidence in making generalisations to companies outside the scope of this
study. This approach also removed one of the problems associated with longitudinal
research in one organisation only, i.e. that the organisation being studied decides to stop
the change initiative for some reason (as happened with Clearwipe in this research, for
example). Although such a failure provides valuable research data in itself, it limits the
scope and impact of the research.
The research design is illustrated below.
Figure 3.1 The research design
SMTs -3 months
(age in years)
o 1 2 3 4 5
Pilot studies
(case methodology)
Clearwipe plc
Nova Cosmetics
Research Cases
Clearwipe plc
Berg Transmissions
Optel Corporation
Nova Cosmetics
As Figure 3.1 illustrates, the case study settings enabled the researcher to follow the
transition to team working throughout the transition process from the initial stages of
team design to the later stages of team development. In each of the case studies, a
variety of methods were used including interviews, observations and documentary
analysis, over periods of up to five years. Indeed, it was the researcher's intention to
work with all four case companies for about four years, but as Figure 3.1 illustrates,
Clearwipe did not progress the initiative beyond eighteen months.
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The cases were used individuallyand collectively to enable the researcher to illustrate the
issues described in the earlier chapters on team implementation and development and the
nature of the change process. The cases focused on different perspectives of the change
to team working in manufacturing organisations and the researcher used the findings to
develop a framework, which is presented in the concluding chapter.
3.5 Tbe Research Process
Multiple sources of information were used in each case including observations,
interviews, and documentary analysis. This range of data provided a detailed
description of the issues in each company and enabled the researcher to interpret the
cases in the light of the frameworks of team working and the nature of the change
process described in earlier chapters. In one company also, some questionnaire data was
collected (and this is discussed in the relevant case chapter as it is only applicable to one
case).
3.5.1 Gaining Access
Prior to the start of this study, the researcher had been involved in lecturing on public
training courses at Brunei University on the design and implementation of self-managed
team working. During these events, the researcher encountered about sixty companies
considering the transition to team working. These contacts provided the base from which
the four companies involved in this study were selected according to the criteria
described below.
In terms of locating the specific sites for the research, there were certain basic criteria
that needed to be established to enable valid comparisons to be made between the
companies. The main objective of the research was to explore the development of self-
managed team working in brownfield manufacturing sites. The researcher decided to
base the research in brownfield manufacturing sites, in part because as Parker and
Jackson (1994) note there has been a lack of research attention given to forms of high-
involvement management in brownfield sites and yet many such sites are introducing
team working, but also because the implementation of self-managed work teams is
fundamentally different in existing operational situations than in new ones. All told, this
decision immediately excluded some options e.g. greenfield manufacturing or service
organisations.
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The researcher ensured that all the brownfield companies had the same stated aim at the
outset of the change initiative, namely that they were implementingand developing self-
managed work teams. The companies were also selected not just because they were
accessible but also because they seemed ordinary. One of the purposes of the research
was to highlight the reasons for success and failure of team working in brownfield
manufacturing sites and the researcher was keen that the results be relevant and
applicable to companies outside the scope of this research. As such, the companies were
selected because they represented typical cases, highlighting the normal or average
organisational change to team working (Cresswell, 1998). This allowed the researcher
more freedom to interpret the data against the theoretical frameworks, to make logical
generalisations and to apply the information to other organisations. These three criteria
obviously provided limitations in the choice of companies.
Also, in case study methodology a bounded system is typically studied, in this instance
the development of self-managed teams and the process of change to team working. In
some of the companies approached, the change to team working was embedded within
wider organisational initiatives. As such, outcomes would have been difficult to
interpret. Finally, there was the issue of gaining access to the company. Some
companies presented so many barriers (e.g. limited access time, limited opportunity to
meet team members etc.) that producing an in-depth analysis of the organisational
change would have been impossible. To some extent, therefore, the choice of
organisations was determined by those managers and teams that agreed to participate in
the study.
Wedgewood (1995) suggests companies which make the most fitting case studies are
those who are progressive i.e. receptive to new ideas and open-minded, changing i.e.
introducing new working practices and also committed to a partnership relationship i.e.
believe that the research is mutually beneficial. All four companies displayed these
characteristics. They were progressive in the sense they were taking on new ideas to
maintain competitive advantage. They were changing by implementing self-managing
team working and they believed that this research would be beneficial to all parties and
hence were committed to a relationship with the researcher.
Access to the four companies was gained through submitting proposals and gaining the
84
permission of senior personnel (the Managing Director and/or the Human Resources
and Operations Directors). Gaining access was a fairly long and time-consuming
process. Indeed, researchers (e.g. Buchanan et al, 1998) have long recognised the
difficulty that access to case study organisations poses. It was also the case that once
initial access had been gained, this needed to be continually reviewed and relationships
maintained and developed.
With regard to the type of access, the researcher was ultimately aiming to negotiate long-
term access to enable a longitudinal design to monitor the change to team working over
time. Additionally, the researcher needed access to a large number of different parties
within the organisation to capture the various perspectives on the change process. In
line with recommendations from Easterby-Srnith et al (1991), the researcher ensured that
during initial contacts with the companies both the researcher's and the organisations'
objectives were considered. For example, to establish reciprocity between the parties,
the companies were offered feedback reports on the research findings. Johnson (1975)
suggests this type of report promotes the exchange nature of the relationship between
the researcher and the participant organisation. Additionally, Strauss and Schatzman
(1973) suggest that by offering feedback to the company, the company can be assured
that the researcher will not hit and run.
Access is a continual process as there are many doorways to be negotiated and
relationships change over time (Strauss and Schatzman, 1973). In all the organisations,
access began with contact at senior levels and the development of these relationships.
Through appropriate introductions, the researcher then began to develop relationships at
other levels of the organisation. At all times, participants were provided with
information on the nature of the research, why the researcher was interested in the site,
how much time the researcher would be on site and the nature of that presence (e.g.
observing, discussing, interviewing). Initially, the researcher spent time in the companies
becoming familiar with the activities and the relationships between employees. The
confidence of team members was gained by, for example working on the lines or joining
in with social events, and participation by teams and individuals was voluntary. The
researcher provided all participants with explanations about the central purpose of the
study and the procedures. The confidentiality of the participants was protected in this
research.
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In a sense, the aim was to develop cognitive access (Saunders et al, 1997), to enable the
researcher to reveal the reality of what was really happening in the change to team
working at all levels of the organisation. This was very important in the context of this
research question. Relationships at all levels in the companies built up incrementally over
time to the point where the researcher was asked to attend team meetings at the
companies and was welcome at any time on the shopfloor to observe the teams and chat
with team members and their managers.
As the relationships developed, the researcher was gradually able to introduce more
intrusive methods of research. Johnson (1975) suggested the merits of using an
incremental strategy to gain depth of access. Primarily this involves developing positive
relationships using fairly unobtrusive methods and when relationships are established
more obtrusive methods, such as interviews can be used.
To build up in-depth pictures of the cases, the researcher collected extensive forms of
data. In each company, the researcher:
a) conducted observations of teams performing their work and attending meetings. The
number of visits to each team was determined by the researcher's judgement of the
amount of additional information that would be obtained by observing further
meetings. In all cases, the teams were willing for the researcher to attend multiple
meetings and spend as much time as required observing their work on the shopfloor.
The researcher recognised one limitation of this approach i.e. the potential for team
members to alter their behaviour when an observer is present, and this reinforced the
need for a multiple method approach
b) carried out semi-structured one-to-one and group interviews with managers, team
leaders and team members, which were later transcribed
c) had access to organisational documents and analysed memos, minutes of team
meetings and other records
d) collected performance-related information, where possible.
All told, a multiple method strategy was adopted and a strategy of "weaving back and
forth among methods" (Whyte, 1976: 216) was used. These individual research methods
are considered in some detail below.
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3.5.2 Observation
(a) The Research Technique
Observation essentially involves going into the field and analysing what has been seen
(Mays and Pope, 1995). Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) point out that all social
research takes the form of participant observation and involves participating in the social
world in whatever role and reflecting on the products of that participation. More
specifically, researchers have defined several different forms of observation. For
example, Robson (1993) sees the two extremes of observation as being participant
observation at one end and structured observation at the other. Gold (1958) classified
types of observation associated with the participant observation end of the continuum:
complete participant, participant as observer, observer as participant and the complete
observer.
At the start ofthis study, the researcher took on the role ofa complete observer to get to
know the physical layout of the shopfloor and the patterns of machinery and methods of
working. However, the most fitting description of the type of observation used
throughout the research was the participant as observer. In this role the observer reveals
their identity as an observer to the participants. The observer then tries to establish close
relationships with members of the group being observed and tries to gain the trust of the
group. This type of observation allows the researcher to become involved in activities or
areas that would usually be out of bounds (Yin, 1989). All of these characteristics of the
participant observer role apply in this study. The researcher made the nature of the
research clear to the participants and developed close relationships at all levels of the
organisations. This enabled access to meetings and invitations to join in with more
informal events, such as coffee and lunch gatherings. Greater insight into people's
feelings and expectations was therefore possible.
As well as allowing the researcher access to areas, events and groups that would
otherwise be inaccessible, observation also uncovers discrepancies between what people
say and do (Robson, 1993). This quality of observation became more important as the
study progressed, for example in providing insight into the data from the interviews.
Also, observation can uncover behaviours which have become unconscious or are
difficult to verbalise (Mays and Pope, 1995). This was important in approaching
relatively sensitive issues, such as people's feelings about team working and their
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expectations/concerns about the change process. One of the benefits of the observation
was that by seeing the social world of the participants the researcher was in a better
position to understand the other sources of data.
(b) The Observation Process
As noted above, the observations in the organisations took several forms in this research.
Firstly, the researcher spent time becoming familiar with the layout of the different
shopfloors and ascertained the nature of the different work processes (as a complete
observer). Secondly, a more detailed observation of the different work processes took
place, for example chatting to team members on the job and asking them about their
parts of the work process and team working. Robson (1993) documents this approach
of using informal discussions as part of the observation process. Indeed, to get a broader
picture as well as make sense of the data collected, it was important to spend some time
doing "research-by-wandering about" (Dawson, 1994) in each company. It was possible
to discuss some of the issues surrounding the change to teams with the operators/team
members, in addition to the more formal, semi-structured interviews. These informal
group and individual discussions were important to later analysis of the interview data.
Thirdly, the researcher was invited to team meetings and more informal team gatherings.
This was a valuable experience as it demonstrated the acceptance of the researcher into
the organisations and highlighted some of the team development and change issues in the
companies.
Robson (1993) notes the importance of recording observations made as soon as possible.
To limit observer bias through, for example selective memory, this researcher tried to
write up field notes on the same day as the observations were made. Delbridge and
Kirkpatrick (1994) suggest that there are three types of data generated by participant
observation. Primary observation, which are notes about what happened or what was
said at the time; secondary observations which are statements made by the observer of
what happened or what was said and experiential data which relates to feelings and
perceptions as the observer experiences the process that is researched. Primary
observations were permitted on the shopfloor in situations such as meetings and
secondary observations related to the informal chats with the various organisational
members. Experiential data were nearly always collected and this involved the
researcher detailing thoughts and feelings about what had been observed.
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The observation notes provided an account of what happened chronologically over a
particular period of change in the company. Notes were also made on issues of specific
concern, such as the type of contingencies managers or team leaders had to deal with, or
any deviant events in implementing and developing teams. The data analysis was an
ongoing activity which moved back and forth between the field and the data already
collected (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984). Observation and analysis were heavily interwoven.
Robson (1993) notes that this interweaving of analysis and observation is characteristic
of the case study approach.
The observation notes collected during the study were used to validate much of the data
collected during the semi-structured interviews. The evidence and the findings contained
in the annotated summaries from the interviews were subsequently cross-checked and
validated with the material contained in the observation notes.
(c) Reliability
The main threat to the reliability of the observation data comes from observer bias. This
observer bias is to a large extent unavoidable. Delbridge and Kirkpatrick (1994) argue
that "because we are part of the social world we are studying we cannot detach ourselves
from it, or for that matter avoid relying on our common sense knowledge and life
experiences when trying to interpret it" (p. 43). However, there are methods for limiting
the impact of observer bias. In this study, field notes were written up as soon as possible
to try to limit selective memory and the strategy of looking for alternative explanations
was also used to reduce bias as it forced the researcher to have a wider focus.
All told, the process of observation was ongoing throughout the research study. All of
the data collected was useful in building up a contextual analysis of the company and
providing a further source of evidence for cross validation of the individual and group
interview data. Indeed, the examination of team implementation and development over
such a long-time period in the companies meant that observational methods also became
critical to establishing the process of change. According to Bryman (1988) the use of
participant observer methods is essential in studies which use semi-structured
interviewing as one of their primary methods of data collection to ensure the inclusion of
a sense of process.
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At the outset of the researcher's work with each company, observation and time spent
on the shopfloor proved instrumental in establishing good relationships, building up
rapport and eventually being seen as another member of the organisation. By the end of
the work in each company, the researcher was often included in informal group
discussions and this proximity to the teams being studied and the familiarisation with
their work patterns produced very rich and detailed data. Observational research was
used to enable the team development and change processes to be better understood.
3.5.3 The Interview
3.5.3.1 The One-to-One Interview
(a) The Research Technique
Kahn and Cannell (1957) define interviews as purposeful discussions between two or
more people. Essentially, this discussion represents a flexible and adaptable way of
finding things out (Robson, 1993). The type of interview adopted here was the semi-
structured interview. Robson (1993) defines this type of interview as one in which" the
interviewer has worked out a set of questions in advance, but is free to modify their
order based upon a perception of what seems appropriate in the context of the
conversation, can change the way they are worded, give explanations, leave out
particular questions which seem inappropriate with a particular interviewee or include
additional ones" (p. 231).
The semi-structured interview has been classified as non-standardised and as respondent
(Healey, 1991). It is non-standardised, because although the researcher has a list of
guiding questions, their exact use can vary in practice and it is respondent because the
interviewer directs the interview and the interviewee responds to the questions.
The researcher adopted a semi-structured interview because this type of interview
provides some structure but allows the researcher a level of flexibility in the questions
asked. This was important as it allowed the researcher some latitude in approaching the
questions at different levels of the organisations at different times of team development.
Teams do not develop at the same rate even within the same organisation.
In all the companies, there was considerable planning of the first interview. Saunders et
al (1997) suggest that knowledge of the organisation and the areas to be addressed helps
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increase the credibility of, and trust in, the researcher. The interview questions were
open-ended. Cohen and Manion (1989) suggest that open-ended questions are flexible
and allow the interviewer to probe and to go into more depth if appropriate. Open-
ended questions also result in unexpected or unanticipated answers which may suggest
hitherto unthought of relationships or hypotheses.
Interviews followed the sequence suggested by Robson (1993) of introduction. warm up,
main body of interview, cool off and closure. All interviews began with introductions
and explanations of the purpose of the interview. The researcher chose to write down
the interviews rather than record them, as much of the material provided by team
members was sensitive and team members generally felt more comfortable without the
presence of a tape recorder. This was largely because they were completely unused to
being recorded, felt self-conscious about it and consequently less able to express
themselves freely.
Even as the relationships with the interviewees developed over the transition periods, the
interviewer started each interview by asking easy, non-threatening, factual questions to
warm up the interview and put the interviewee at ease. As the interview warmed up,
issues relating to the major purpose of the interview were explored. As these were semi-
structured interviews, the interviewer introduced certain areas and asked questions based
on the responses on the interviewee. The sequence of the interview questions sometimes
changed from the original guiding list but all major areas were covered.
(b) The Interview Process
A programme of semi-structured interviews was carried out in all companies with all
appropriate levels of staff in relevant functional areas in the operating units. Essentially,
the purpose of the interviews was to chart the change to team working and the team
implementation and development processes within the four organisations. As such, the
interview questions were very factual questions about the events and activities that were
occurring within the organisations during the transition period.
The number of interviews varied according to the number of employees within each
company, but also according to the amount of new information elicited from the
respondents during the interviews. As such, it is not simply the case that the more
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employees within the organisation, the greater the number of interviews. Indeed, both
Clearwipe pIc and Nova Cosmetics had approximately 450 employees on the shopfloor
during the transition period and 82 and 117 interviews were conducted respectively
within these organisations. Optel Corporation had between 700 and 1,000 shopfloor
employees during the transition period and 69 interviews were used to establish the team
implementation and development process. However, the total number of interviews was
high within Clearwipe plc and Nova Cosmetics because of the difficulties encountered by
these organisations in the team implementation and development process, the need for
the researcher to gain insight and understanding of these problems and the fact that the
researcher continued to learn new information from the interviews.
To expand further on this last point, the interview questions focused on factual
information describing the team implementation and development process, and not, for
example, attitudes about team development. As such, the researcher came to a point
during the interview programmes within each company when no new information about
the team development and change process was being elicited. This point was reached
sooner in some companies than others. For example, when Berg Transmissions switched
in 1997 to Toyota Production Tearns with their strict code and disciplined approach to
work, the researcher discovered quite quickly that she was not learning anything new
from the interviews with the different people involved in the change process. On the
other hand, when Nova Cosmetics entered the second phase of their team development
process in 1995 and a period of uncertainty and confusion began a more extensive
interviewing programme was required as the interviewer was gathering a wealth of
information from the Human Resources Manager, Business Unit Leaders, Advisers and
Team Members about the change and the problems being encountered across the
Packaging Department. As noted above, this is reflected in the number of interviews
conducted in these companies at these times i.e. in Berg Transmissions there were eleven
interviews and in Nova Cosmetics there twenty-four interviews during this period (see
Table 5.1 in Chapter Five and Table 7.2 in Chapter Seven for more detail).
The specific schedule followed for carrying out interviews was determined with the
assistance of all the parties involved (managers, team leaders and team members) and
details of the interview programmes within each company are included in the case
narratives. The interviews varied enormously in length, but usually lasted about one
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hour. The topics covered variously over time included: job history, current work
practices, job content, work organisation, individual/team job tasks and responsibilities,
the role of the manager/supervisor, training, organisation structure, team structure, team
development, team relationships, production methods, the nature of the work,
perceptions/attributions of effectiveness, experience of innovation and change and
employer practice and philosophy. Specific details of the interview programmes are
provided in the individual cases and there are copies of interview schedules and
observation notes in Appendices 1 and 2.
Overall, in each company, the interview programmes lasted for approximately four years,
although there was some variation, e.g. the programme in Clearwipe was much shorter
because the transition process ceased after eighteen months. The longitudinal nature of
the study meant that repeat interviews became critical methods of establishing the
process of change and data were collected in each company in phases. The researcher
interviewed key players in the change initiative every three months or so, sometimes
more frequently. For example, in Clearwipe when it became apparent that the change to
team working was struggling interviews were conducted every six to eight weeks with a
range of team members, team leaders and managers.
(c) Interview Analysis
The literature suggests that there is no one best way of analysing qualitative interviews
(Robson, 1993; Saunders et al, 1997). Indeed, to suggest one best way would contradict
the very nature of qualitative research. Broadly speaking however, researchers have two
choices in analysing qualitative data. Researchers can take an inductive approach which
explores qualitative data without a pre-determined framework, or a deductive approach
which uses a theoretical or descriptive framework to analyse the qualitative data (Yin,
1994). In this study the researcher adopted a deductive approach, having already
developed broad theoretical positions relating to the team development and change
process from the literature and on the basis of which the researcher had developed
interview protocols for the semi-structured interviews.
With all the interviews, the analysis of the information began soon after the collection of
the data. It was intended that by being closer to the data a more adequate analysis could
be undertaken. The interviews were transcribed to iron out any nuances and to fill in any
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gaps. Also, the field notes were sometimes difficult to read and contained abbreviations
and the transcription process enabled the researcher to interpret these and fill in any
missing data while the information was still fresh in her mind. When the field notes were
reviewed, the researcher was stimulated to remember things which had been noticed or
said at the time. These additions were marked by double parentheses in the transcripts to
guard against bias (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The transcription process allowed the
researcher to re-familiarise herself with the interview data.
Essentially, there were three levels of analysis of the interview data in this research. As
already described, the interviews were semi-structured and guided by a series of
questions (see the Sample Interview Protocol in Appendix I). The first level of analysis
of the data from the interviews was quite straightforward in some ways, in that it was
more a matter of compiling the wealth of information from the individual and group
interviews within the organisations than analysing the words or phrases used during the
data collection. This was a very descriptive activity. During the interviews the
respondents were asked very factual questions about team development, e.g. is the team
involved in the day-to-day maintenance of machinery? Or is the team involved in setting
up machines? By asking similar questions about the change process and team
development in a series of interviews with a range of people over several years, the
researcher built up a detailed picture of what was happening in the team development
process within each organisation. The responses to these questions enabled the
researcher to chart the team implementation and development process over time.
This part of the process involved taking the concrete answers given by the respondents
to specific interview questions and summarising these into a meaningful and accurate
narrative describing the change process to team working in the different organisations.
This process required little judgement or word recognition on the part of the researcher.
Extracts 1 and 2 in Appendix 3 are examples of interview transcripts in which
respondents are providing answers to specific questions about team development.
The first extracts (Extracts from Interviews at Clearwipe with Pilot Team Members) are
from repeat interviews with a pilot team member in Clearwipe. In these extracts, the
researcher is asking questions about the development of team empowerment, specifically
whether team members are becoming involved in the maintenance of machinery (see
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Appendix 1 - Interview Protocol, questions about Team Empowerment). These extracts
provide information about training team members in skills associated with machine
maintenance and indicate some of the obstacles faced by the team members in this
process e.g. the limitations on team member's involvement through lack of training and
the particular restrictions placed on some team members in completing machine set-ups
because they were too short to reach some of the machine parts.
The second extract (from an interview at Berg Transmissions with the Plant Manager)
provides an insight into the approach taken by Berg Transmissions to involve team
members in continuous improvement activities. The extract provides information on the
nature of the infrastructure changes that were implemented towards the end of 1998.
The company introduced new terms and conditions for the team members, which
required total active participation in kaizen activities, and to support this a new pay
system was also introduced.
At the second level of analysis, the researcher was required to use a more inferential
approach to the data. The researcher collected some data during the interviews which
was not in direct response to the interview questions. This was often in the form of
examples or stories about things that had happened during the different phases of the
change or team development process. These examples or stories were often volunteered
at the outset of the interview, during the settling-in phase when more general and open
questions were asked, or they emerged out of the discussions at the close of the
interview when trying to elicit whether there was anything else of significance the
respondent wanted to discuss or felt had not been covered adequately elsewhere. At a
basic level, the researcher used content analysis on this type of interview data. Patton
(1990) describes content analysis as a common type of category generation, which
involves finding patterns in the data and placing each pattern into a category. The next
section describes in some detail how the researcher conducted this analysis.
The analysis of these examples or stories broadly followed the approach described by
Miles and Huberman (1994). The theoretical frameworks established by the researcher
at the outset of this work guided the development of the interview protocols and also
guided the content analysis. Having said that, the researcher was aware of the
importance of being open to things that she had not known about or did not expect to
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find in the information, and was careful not to be too rigid in examining the information
only according to the conceptual frameworks.
In analysing this information, the researcher started by coding the appropriate parts of
the interview transcripts. Coding involves differentiating and combining the data and
making reflections on this information (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Codes are attached
to chunks of information, of varying size, but usually in this research to phrases,
sentences or paragraphs. Examples of how the information was chunked are given
below. These examples are taken from the fuller interview transcripts contained in
Extract 3 (interviews at Optel Corporation with Resource Support Team Members) in
Appendix 3.
The first chunk relates to a phrase (in Extract 3A), namely "The learn clammed up ..... " The
researcher highlighted this phrase in the text as it described the reaction of team members
to an incident that had taken place on the shopfloor. Team members had been asked
what had happened and were not forthcoming about the event. This was a team
response to a particular event.
The second chunk refers to a sentence (also in Extract 3A), namely "For some reason, a
shoe was thrown by one of the learn and injured somebody." This sentence was highlighted in the
text as an event which occurred within a team and was related to Health and Safety
issues. With regard to Team Empowerment, there are specific issues relating to the
teams ensuring their own work area is safe and to assuming responsibility for Health and
Safety standards (see Interview Protocol in Appendix 1). Again, this information was
used as an indicator of an issue relating to team empowerment.
The third example (from Extract 38) concerns a potential barrier to the team
development process in the form of a problem associated with the new peer group
assessment system, and provides an example of a paragraph-sized chunk of information.
It reads as follows: "The peer review - implemented 10 help generate team spirit, bUI identifying good
and poor performers at intervals seems 10 compromise team spirit in some teams. Whoever is reported as a
poor performer knows the rest of the team has done this. Linked 10 pay, so it is a big issue for the learn
members. Not enough is done 10 help the poor performer and the team is left to deal with the issues and
tensions. It's divisive, blocks the progression of team work ". Again, this comment was not elicited
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from a specific question about the peer review system, the change process or team
procedures, it was an issue presented during a warm-up conversation. The material
provided some information about the development of new organisational arrangements in
Optel Corporation and their potentially negative impact on team development.
All told, these three extracts provide examples of how information collected during
interviews, but which was not in direct response to interview questions, was chunked.
The focus of all the interviews was the change process and the implementation and
development of team working and these examples demonstrate that the data provided
largely comprised factual descriptions of events or activities which were occurring during
this transition period. Essentially, the information was chunked and coded because it
was not collected in direct response to interview questions about particular team
implementation and development issues. As such, it required some degree, albeit limited,
of interpretation.
In this research, descriptive codes were used to code this information from the interviews
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). Descriptive codes entail little interpretation; essentially
they attribute a class of phenomena to a segment of text. The codes used were, to some
extent, based on similar groupings of ideas to those contained in the interview protocol.
For ease of use, the codes were semantically close to the terms they represented.
The following table provides examples of these codes and there is a more extensive
listing provided in Appendix 4. The examples presented in this table are extracted from
the data contained in more detailed interview transcripts also in Appendix 3. These
particular extracts are summarized in Table 3.1 to enable the author to describe more
meaningfully, and with reference to specific interview data, the process undertaken in
coding the interview information.
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Table 3.1 Examples of Code Categories
CODE CATEGORY EXAMPLE
TEAM EMPOWERMENT (TEAM EMP)
Housekeeping (HK) "Housekeeping is a big issue at the moment, especially as we
are at the end and have the walkway next to us. The operators
keep talking about the empty boxes left on the line and how
they get knocked across and over towards the tape" (Nova
Cosmetics - Adviser)
"I am still not happy with the way the place looks. Had the
Housekeeping Team down- but the team have still not taken
on board what they said. I have told them the standards for
the Unit, highlighted the problems specifically. They should
do all this, not wait to be told all the time - it is their
responsibility to keep the area clean and tidy." (Nova
Cosmetics - Adviser)
Safety (SAF) "For some reason, a shoe was thrown by one of the team and
injured somebody" (Optel Corporation - Resource Support
Team Member)
Problem Solving (PROB SOLV) "The girls on labelling were fed-up .... with having to label by
hand. There has been a problem with base labels which has
meant hand labelling, and the base labels on mascara bottles
are very small, which makes it worse. Identified in morning
meetings and they set up a visit from the supplier." (Nova
Cosmetics - Adviser)
TEAM PROCESSES (TEAM PRO)
Cohesiveness (COH) "The team clammed up .." (Optel Corporation - Resource
Support Team Member)
Trust (TRUST) "If the team won't talk, tell people what happened, and are not
open, then it suggests a lack of trust" (Optel Corporation
Resource Support Team Member)
CHANGE PROCESS (CHGE PRO)
Barriers (BARR) Whoever is reported as a poor performer knows the rest of the
team has done this. Linked to pay, so it is a big issue for the
team members. Not enough is done to help the poor
performer and the team is left to deal with the issues and
tensions. It's divisive, blocks the progression of team work"
(Optel Corporation - Resource Support Team Member)
The codes e.g. TEAM EMP: HK (Team Empowerment: Housekeeping) were noted in
the left-hand margins of the interview transcripts. The right-hand margins of the
transcripts were used for more general comment, particularly for reflections and noting
points to cross-check with other data or things to follow up during the next wave of data
collection e.g. in Extract 3A a note was made to cross check any problems relating to
trust with other interview/observation data. This process of coding the information is
examined in more detail below, with specific reference to the interview transcripts in
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Extracts 3 and 4 in Appendix 3
Extract 3 in Appendix 3 focuses on information from interviews with Resource Support
Team Members within Optel Corporation and provides examples of general comments
and observations made by the respondents. The comments were not made in response to
specific interview questions and, as such, they were to some extent more open to the
researcher's own interpretation. Both extracts provide specific examples of team
activities or events.
In Extract 3A, the Resource Support Team Member is describing an incident that
occurred during the night shift, when a member of a team threw a shoe, causing injury to
another person. The first chunk of information coded was "a shoe was thrown by one of the
team and injured somebody", and this was noted as "TEAM EMP: SAP" in the left-hand
margin, as it related to team empowerment and safety issues. In the margin next to the
second chunk i.e. "the team clammed up.. ", the researcher noted "TEAM PRO: COH" as
the fact that none of the team talked about the event related to the team development
process and reflected some degree of cohesiveness between team members. The final
chunk coded in this extract was "If the team won't talk, tell people what happened, and are not
open, then it suggests a lack of trust". This was coded as TEAM PRO: TRUST. The
respondent was specifically commenting on an aspect of the team process relating to
trust between the team and management.
The researcher also noted in the right-hand margin the need to check this event out
against other information. On the one hand, the team demonstrated a level of
cohesiveness in response to this event, and cohesiveness is one feature of the team
development process. On the other hand, the respondent implied there was a lack of
trust between the team and management. Trust is also a feature of the team development
process and lack of trust may detract from team development. As such, the researcher
needed to check information from other sources to understand this event and the
researcher noted this in the margin.
In Extract 38, the Resource Support Team Member is describing the implementationof
the peer review system within Optel Corporation. This system is part of the new
organisational arrangements implemented to enhance team development, but the
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respondent was commenting that without the right support, such systems might, in fact,
have been creating a barrier to this process. This sections goes as follows: ..Whoever is
reported as a poor performer knows the rest of the team has done this. Linked to pay, so it is a big issue
for the team members. Not enough is done to help the poor performer and the team is left to deal with the
issues and tensions. It's divisive, bloclcs the progression of team work".
This was coded as CHGE PRO: BARR as it is describing how the new system may in
fact have been creating a barrier to the progression of team work. The poor performers
in teams knew that other team members had identified them as such, and as the peer
review was linked to pay this had a financialimpact. The respondent felt that not enough
was done to help the poor performer, the team was left to deal with the tension and
issues arising from this situation and that this provided a block to the progression of
team working.
The extracts contained in Section 4 of Appendix 3 illustrate further the descriptive
coding used, but also illustrate how the researcher interpreted this data over time. This
section contains data from interviews with advisers/supervisors within Nova Cosmetics.
The examples provided in this series of extracts come from different time periods during
the interview programme. Each example was initially coded individually and
descriptively, but then later during the process of constructing the case narratives,
interpreted within the context of the other examples and the team development process
within Nova Cosmetics. The first extract (4A) was from April 1994 and describes the
fact that the operators seem to recognize the need for housekeeping activities, but do
nothing about the boxes on the line i.e. "Housekeeping is a big issue at the moment, especially as
we are at the end and have the walkway next to us. The operators keep talking about the empty boxes left
on the line and how they get knocked across and over towards the tape ". This was coded TEAM
EMP: HK. At this stage in the team development process, the team were not taking
responsibility for housekeeping activities.
Extract 4B is from a subsequent interview in April 1995 and describes the team members
on one line taking the initiative to solve a problem with the labelling machine.
Specifically, the information reads (but this is abbreviated in the table because of the
limitations of space) "The girls on labelling were fed-up, more and more so in fact, with having to
label by hand. There has been a problem with base labels which has meant hand labelling, and the base
labels on mascara bottles are very small, which makes it worse. Identified in morning meetings and they
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set up a visit from the supplier (through me, but asked for by them). The supplier saw the problem and is
changing the material. It was a real boost for something 10 happen, made everybody feel good." This
was coded TEAM EMP: PROB SOLV. At this point in the change process, the team
members were taking some responsibility for some of the problem-solving associated
with their tasks and activities.
The final extract in this section (4C) describes problems with housekeeping again and
comes from an interview in November 1996. It reads as follows: '" am still not happy with
the way the place looks. Had the Housekeeping Team down- but the team have still not taken on board
what they said. 'have laid them the standards for the Unit, highlighted the problems specifically. They
should do all this, not wait to be told all the time - it is their responsibility to keep the area clean and tidy. "
This was also coded TEAM EMP: HK and, similar to Extract 4A denotes the team
members unwillingness to take responsibility for housekeeping activities.
These three extracts provide meaningful information on team development individually,
but interpreted in the context of the change process within Nova Cosmetics reflect the
move towards and then away from team empowerment. The three extracts represent
different periods of time in the transition process and indicate how team members at the
start of the change process were unwilling to take the initiative, then moved towards
some degree of empowerment and then became unwilling again to take responsibility for
their work area. Together, these extracts illustrate one of the central findings of the
case, namely the shifts in team member's willingness to take the initiative over time.
In the final stage of the analysis of this data, the researcher focused on constructing
narratives from the information to write the case descriptions and to explain the team
working implementation and development process in the four case organisations included
in this research. The information elicited from the interviews was used to compile
summaries to describe and explain the change process and team implementation and
development in each of the four companies. The case narratives were generally ordered
chronologically to reflect the team development process.
(d) Reliability and Validity
In utilising semi-structured interviews as a key research tool in this study, the researcher
had to consider the issue of the reliability and validity of the interview data. Reliability,
IS said to be threatened by the lack of standardisation in semi-structured interviews
101
(Robson, 1993). This is related to bias both from the perspective of the interviewee and
the interviewer. To some extent, a level of bias existed in this study, as the interviewer
had a frame of reference devised from earlier literature searches and information about
the company. However, it is accepted that the researcher could not avoid having some
influence on the research. Indeed, some authors (e.g. Marshall and Rossman, 1989)
suggest that non-standardised methods, such as the semi-structured interview used in this
study, are not necessarily intended to be repeatable since it represents reality at that point
in time and a situation which may be subject to change. The interviews in this research
represent a perspective on the change to, and development of, team working in all four
organisations. Whilst issues of reliability may not have been paramount in the interview
process itself, it was important that interviewer bias did not develop at the analysis stage.
To counteract this, the researcher deliberately looked for examples which did not fit into
the categories devised.
The validity of the interview data was also a prominent issue. It is important that the
interpretation of the data collected can be said to be trustworthy. Sykes (1991) suggests
that the flexible, interactive and probing nature of interviews ensures that issues are
covered from a variety of angles, thus increasing validity by increasing the likelihood that
the researcher has obtained a full picture or account. Additionally, in this research the
interviewer had other forms of data with which to cross validate the interview data e.g.
the observational records.
As such, the researcher considers that the one-to-one interview data were both reliable
and valid.
3.5.3.2 The Group Interview
(a) The Research Technique
As the researcher was interested in studying the actions and opinions of work teams,
group interviews seemed a natural choice as part of this research programme. Group
interviews capitalise on communication between research participants in order to
generate data and encourage participants to talk to each other rather than the interviewer
(Kitzinger, 1994). Group interviews are also relatively unstructured and free flowing
and aim to facilitate the expression of ideas and opinions (Zikmund, 1994).
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Group interviews were selected for a number of reasons. Firstly, group interviews were
a suitable way to explore people's knowledge, experiences, opinions and attitudes
(Denning and Verschelden, 1993). The group interviews allowed people to talk of their
experiences and thus allowed the researcher to understand how these opinions might be
constructed. Secondly, group interviews provided a vehicle to study groups in a
relatively natural situation i.e. group discussion (Krueger, 1994). This property provided
access to a variety of communication which is useful because people's knowledge and
attitudes may not be entirely encapsulated in reasoned responses to direct questions
(Kitzinger, 1995). Indeed, Kitzinger argues that everyday forms of communication may
tell us much about what people know or experience. Saliently, these descriptions of
people's knowledge and experienceswill be in their own vocabulary.
Thirdly, in this study the group interviews capitalised on naturally occurring groups
(Kitzinger, 1995). This was advantageous as it allowed the identification of shared and
common knowledge and the existence of group norms for example. This was an
important characteristic in the context of the team development process. Fourthly,
through the group processes and interactions with each other, the research participants
were able to explore and clarify their ideas and opinions in ways that would be less easily
accessible in a one-to-one interview (Kitzinger, 1995). Some of the issues inherent in
team development (e.g. the trust between the team and management) are not always easy
to discuss and it was considered that the group interview may facilitate this process.
Finally,Watt and Ebbutt (1987) argue that the discussionwhich groups generate helps in
yielding a wide range of responses. This is useful for several reasons. It may take the
research in unexpected directions, prompting issues that the researcher had not
previously considered. Additionally, the wide range of opinions may also include critical
comments. Indeed, Kitzinger (1995) suggests that groups often highlight more critical
opinions. In this context, the teams or groups were able to talk openly and freely and
negative comments were revealed in some cases.
Group interviews also have their disadvantages. For example, Kitzinger (1995) suggests
that the group dynamics in operation may silence voices of dissent. In this research,
there were a few examples of very dominant members of the group influencingthe group
dynamics (e.g. the pilot team leader in Clearwipe, although in this case this provided an
accurate reflection of how team meetings and shopfloor discussions were usually
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conducted). The confidentialityof the groups is also compromised through the presence
of other research participants. Saunders et al (1997) suggest that in conducting group
interviews a high level of skill is required in order to maintain focus and encourage
research participants to talk to each other. Indeed, Krueger (1994) notes that the
researcher has less control in the group interview situation as participants have the
potential to influence the course of the discussion. Finally, the data generated can be
cumbersome and complex (Kitzinger, 1995). In this study, the researcher did experience
some of these problems, in particular transcribing the interview data when there was
more than one person talking at once, which was in fact quite a common occurrence.
(b) The Group Interview Process
In this research, the group interviewswere conducted with established teams. Given the
nature of the research question and the constraints of working in an applied operational
setting, theoretical sampling was inappropriate. However, in all organisations the
selected groups represented a range of the shopfloor work teams and different levels of
the organisation. The fact that the sample comprised naturally occurring work groups
capitalised on people's shared experiences. By interviewing complete work teams, the
researcher also met the requirement prescribed by Morgan (1988) for having a minimum
of six organisational members. Most of the self-managing teams established in the
course of this research programme comprised between six and ten team members.
During the group interviews, the researcher worked to a list of guiding topics and
questions. This guide included content and process questions (Steyaert and Bouwen,
1994). The content questions related to the level of team development and the nature of
the change. The process questions related to attempts to stimulate the group, by asking
for illustrations of responses. The critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954) was
employed as a way of maintaining focus and establishing in-depth examples of behaviour.
The group interviews usually lasted for about an hour and were conducted in a setting
familiar to all the participants e.g. the staff restaurant, rest room or shopfloor meeting
rooms. The sessions began by the researcher introducing the purpose of the discussion
i.e. to explore the team development and organisational change process. Participants
were requested to talk to each other rather than the researcher and the researcher
stressed that there were no right or wrong answers to any of the questions. The
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researcher also stressed the confidentiality of the group discussions. The discussions
always started with general topics before moving on to the specific and the critical
incident technique was used to elicit examples.
(c) Group Interview Analysis
The analysis of the group interview data followed a similar procedure to that described
earlier for the analysis of the one-to-one interview data. The main difference was that
the transcription of the data was more time consuming given that there were many
respondents within each session. Given the group dynamics in these interviews. examples
of the group processes were included in the coding scheme e.g. laughter. changes of
mind etc. (Kitzinger, 1995). Examples that did not fit the framework were sought in an
effort to counteract bias.
(d) Reliability and Validity
Concerns about the reliabilityof group interview data echo those described for the one-
to-one interviews. For example. Calder (1977) notes that there is a concern about the
subjectivity of the technique and a feeling that any given result might have been different
with different respondents. a different moderator or even a different setting. The
reflexive nature of qualitative research can help in answering these concerns. Reflexivity
refers to ways in which the researcher influences the research (Johnson, 1999).
Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) argue that the researcher cannot escape from the
social world in order to study it. Therefore, qualitative research accepts that the
researcher is likelyto have some influenceon the research process.
In order to address concerns regarding threats to reliability some authors (e.g. Johnson,
1999: Sykes. 1991) have suggested that the entire research process is made transparent
to others. Marshall and Rossman (1989) have suggested keeping a research diary to
facilitate this process. With respect to the group interviews conducted in this research,
the researcher recognises that she is likely to have had some influence on the data
collected. In relation to Calder (1977). it is also recognised that to some extent different
data were collected from different respondent groups. As such, this is not considered
problematic. Rather it is seen as intrinsic to this type of qualitative research. Also. a
detailed account of the process has been provided to enable others to see how the group
interviews were conducted and how the conclusions were reached. Finally,to counteract
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bias, deliberate attempts were made to look for data which did not fit the categories
devised.
The validity of the group interview data can be said to be high for several reasons.
Firstly, there is high ecological validity as the group interviews were conducted in a
naturalistic setting i.e. group discussion. Secondly, there is high face validity, owing
largely to the believability of the participants' comments (Krueger, 1994). Thirdly, as
the group interviews uncovered a wide range of opinions, it is likely that a fuller picture
has been obtained, thus increasing validity (Sykes, 1991). Finally, the validity of the data
is further enhanced through the triangulation with the other collected data.
3.5.4 Documentary Analysis
The final part of the data collection in the cases related to the analysis of documentary
evidence. In all the organisations, permission was granted for the researcher to access
documents such as strategy documents planning the change, training plans, team role and
task descriptions and minutes from team meetings. The researcher found it extremely
useful and informative to analyse documents relating to the change to team working. In
particular, the data from strategy documents tended to provide information about the
context of the change and minutes from team meetings tended to chart the progress of
team development in terms of their responsibility for problem-solving and different tasks
etc. An example of the latter type of document is included in Appendix S.
The researcher recognises the limitations of documentary analysis in the sense that the
documents were open to different interpretations and did not necessarily represent the
objective truth. However, the documentation provided a supplementary source of
information and was particularly useful in providing information about events that had
occurred between visits. As such, it was logical to access the documents and cross
validate the relevant information with data from observations and interviews.
In practice, the actual design of the research and the data collection techniques were
influenced by various opportunities and constraints within the organisations, such as
production schedules and crises and the success and failure of particular teams.
Essentially, during data collection particular emphasis was given to the importance of
using a number of complementary techniques: for example, observation, informal
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individual and group discussion, in-depth interviewing and use of documentary material.
In addition, whilst the write-up of material often relied heavily on interview data, the
information collected through the use of these other complementary techniques was
equally central to the final analysis. In particular, observation notes proved to be an
important data source, providing a chronology of events; an account of routine and
unforeseen activities and tasks; an awareness of the informal organisation of work; and
the non-linearity of the processes of change.
In the course of the data collection, there were many field issues to resolve in each
company. The nature of all the companies was such that they tended to be very reactive
to market demands and there were many occasions when operational issues took
precedence over scheduled interviews and meetings with teams and team members. As
such, the researcher underestimated the time it would take to collect extensive data from
each company at the outset and greater immersion in the companies was required than
was originally planned. In the final analysis, up to thirty-five days was spent in each
company, meeting with the teams and conducting interviews and observations. The
length of time spent in the companies varied greatly and depended on the number of
teams within the organisation, the number of team members and the managers involved,
as well as the participants' level of interest. It was often more difficult to schedule
interviews and groups meetings with the less committed or interested team members.
3.5.5. Ethical Issues
Research ethics concern ''the appropriateness of your behaviour in relation to the rights
of those who become the subject of your work, or affected by it" (Saunders et al, 1997:
109). Ethical issues were a particular issue in this research as it involved real world
organisations. Indeed, Wells (1994) suggests that "in general the closer the research is to
actual individuals in real world settings, the more likely are ethical questions to be
raised" (p.290).
Ethical issues were paramount in this study as the researcher was charting the
organisational changes as they occurred. The researcher followed the ethical guidelines
of the British Psychological Society (1991), which state that the researcher should: not
deceive participants, cause physical or psychological harm to participants, invade the
privacy of participants and should respect the anonymity of research participants.
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Research ethics were considered at all stages of the research, from gaining access to
reporting the findings.
3.6 Piloting the Research Techniques
Final preparation for the research involved piloting the observation and interview
methods. The pilot studies were used to refine the data collection plans and procedures
to be followed and to assess the wording of the questions developed for the individual
and group interviews. Observational methods, interview formats, and documentary
analysis were piloted in the three-month period prior to the change to team working in
Clearwipe and Nova Cosmetics.
Access to both companies was negotiated prior to the start of the transition to team
working and a considerable amount of time was spent collecting contextual data, through
meetings and interviews with managers, advisers and team members. The researcher
spent time observing the production process, the nature of the work and the work
organisation. The researcher worked as an operator on several lines to establish a closer
relationship with the line workers and gain more in-depth knowledge of the production
process. The researcher also piloted the interview questions with managers and
operators, transcribed the data and analysed the content, developing themes and
summaries. Observation notes were incorporated into these summaries to provide a
fuller picture.
The pilot studies were instrumental in refining the methodological issues of this research
and of considerable value in developing an understanding of conducting research in an
applied setting. The pilot studies were also instrumental in expanding the very theoretical
basis of the researcher's knowledge, in refining the objectives for the study and in
consolidating the research focus.
3.7 Cross-Case Analysis
This research comprised four case studies of brownfield manufacturing organisations
undertaking the transition to team working. Each case tells its own story and provides
insight into the research objectives focusing on the team development and change
process in organisations. Theoretical frameworks were used to study each case in depth.
However, the four cases together also tell a story. As such, and as Silverstein (1988)
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considers, there is tension between the particular and the universal and the need to
reconcile an individual case's uniqueness with the need for more general understanding
of generic processes that occur across cases. In this study, as well as the analyses of the
particular individualcases, the researcher undertook cross-case analysis to enable a focus
on the more generic themes relevant across the cases.
There are several reasons why cross-case analysis is important. Firstly, it enhances
generalisability. Some authors argue (e.g. Denzin, 1983) that this goal is inappropriate
for qualitative studies. However, in the context of organisational case studies, it does
seem important to know something about the relevance or applicability of research
findings to other similar settings. Multiple cases, adequately sampled and analysed
carefully, provide focus on the question of whether the findings make sense beyond the
specific case (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
A second, more fundamental reason for cross-case analysis is to deepen understanding
and explanation (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Glaser and Strauss (1967) note that
using multiple comparison groups finds out under what sets of structural conditions the
hypotheses are minimisedand maximised. Multiple cases help a researcher find negative
cases to strengthen a theory through examination of similarities and differences across
cases. Multiple cases provide information about the specific conditions under which a
finding will occur and about the general categories of how those conditions may be
related (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that there are two different approaches to cross-
case analysis: the case-oriented and the variable-oriented. Ragin (1987) considers a
case-oriented approach focuses on the case as a whole entity, looking at configurations,
associations, causes and effects within the case, and only then turns to comparative
analysis of a number of cases. The cases are examined for underlying similarities and
constant associations, comparisons made between cases with different outcomes and on
these bases the researcher starts to form more general explanations. The variable-
oriented approach is conceptual and theory-centred from the start, casting a wide net
over a large number of cases (Runkel, 1990). The building blocks are variables and their
inter-correlations, rather than cases. In the variable-oriented approach, the details of any
specific case recede behind the broad patterns found across a wide variety of cases, and
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little explicit case-to-case comparison is done.
Ragin (1987) notes that each approach has pluses and minuses and neither approach is
better for making qualitative data analysis. In this research. a case-oriented strategy was
utilised. Yin (1989) advocates a replication logic and this was used to assess the
different factors that impact on the team development process and the success or failure
of the change to self-managed work teams. A theoretical framework is used to study
one case in depth and then successive cases are examined to see whether the pattern
matches those in previous cases. Such a research design requires multiple case studies
and uses multiple methods to collect data in each case. The multiple-case replication
design uses theory to predict what should be found for each case. The cases either
support or refute the theory. The replication logic is particularly effective when the
theoretical framework clarifies the conditions under which a particular phenomenon (e.g.
successful self-managed work team implementation) is expected to be found, as well as
the conditions where the opposite is expected to occur (e.g. failure to implement self-
managed work teams). If the characteristics of the cases exist as the theoretical
framework proposes, the case studies, in aggregate, would provide strong support for
the initial set of theoretical propositions. If the cases are in some way contradictory, the
initial propositions must be revised and re-tested with other cases.
In this thesis, the findings from each case study are presented in separate chapters and
the focus in these chapters is very much on the particular. In the concluding chapter of
the thesis, the concepts from the theoretical frameworks, configurations, associations,
causes and effects are considered and a more comparative analysis of the cases is
presented, involving an investigation of the underlying similarities, associations and
different outcomes of the cases. The focus turns to the universal and the search for more
general explanations. A new conceptual framework highlighting key team development
and change process issues in the transition to team working is presented in the
concluding chapter.
3.8. Case Descriptions
The next four chapters are dedicated to the case descriptions. Each case begins with an
outline of the context and organisational setting, a chronology of the change process and
detailed descriptions of the development of the teams. The data collected from
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interviews, observations and documentary analysis is presented for each company and
the data summaries are related to the literature, providing different levels of analysis and
broader interpretations of the meaning of the case.
For each case study, a single narrative was written to describe and analyse the case. The
four cases are each structured in a similar way to display cross-case comparisons and to
enable the researcher to analyse the data, draw conclusions and to input into the theory
on the development of teams. This also allows the reader to examine the answers to the
similar questions within each case and to make cross-case comparisons. The description
of the implementation and development of team working in the companies is presented
chronologically, because the events unfold and follow a process. The case studies are
bounded by time and cover events over time. Themes that are interrelated across the
cases are identified and explanations developed in the final chapter.
3.9. Conclusion
In summary, the researcher has adopted methods from the phenomenologist paradigm in
this study. A case study strategy was employed to enable an in-depth, multi-method
approach. Observation, one-to-one and group interview and documentary analysis
techniques were used to gain a detailed understanding of team development and the
nature of this change process in four brownfield manufacturing organisations. These
methods were complementary and enabled the researcher to explore the different aspects
of the team development and change processes described in the previous chapter.
On the basis of the discussion of the methodological issues, the objective stated at the
end of Chapter Two was elaborated as follows:
The objective of this research was to examine, at a practical and detailed level, the
team development and organisational change processes in the large-scale transition
to self-managed team working in brownfield manufacturing sites. This was
undertaken through empirical evidence drawn from a detailed knowledge of case
study data collected over a period of almost five years in four organisations.
The next four chapters contain these case narratives.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Case Study One: Clearwipe plc
4.1 Synopsis
Recognising the importance of work design in gaining competitive advantage, this UK-
based manufacturing company decided to introduce self-managed team working. The
initiative was piloted over a six-month period in the packing area of one of the
Manufacturing Units and then introduced more widely across the Unit in the following
eighteen months.
This case focuses on three key aspects of the introduction of self-managed team
working: firstly, the initial stages of self-managed team development on a brownfield
site, with particular emphasis on team design and the nature of the production
environment; secondly, the process by which the work design changes were introduced
and, thirdly the rationale for, and success of, a pilot study in the context of the change to
self-management.
The company took many positive steps to introduce self-managed teams, including the
creation of a steering group to manage the initiative, training for team leaders and team
members and support and guidance from external consultants. Initial successes were
suggested by organisational performance data for the pilot team. For example, the
company has cited improvements in efficiency of 2-3% in the first six months (IRS
Management Review, 1997), although these improvements do not appear to have been
sustained over the long term.
A key issue in this case concerns the design of the self-managing teams within the
context of the existing production system. A key implication from the case is that the
nature of the implementation process has a significant impact on the eventual outcomes.
4.2 Introduction
One of the central themes presented in recent years is that modern production conditions,
driven in particular by changes in product markets and technology, favour autonomous
team-based working far more than ever before. The many different types of team design
were described in Chapter One.
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In practice however, the potential for using self-managing work teams in the context of
some organisational designs and production practices seems to be restricted for several
reasons. Three of these reasons are described here in the context of this case. Firstly,
there may be problems associated with the "fit" between the design of the teams and the
design of the production system. Secondly, despite the claimed commitment of
management to team-based working, it has not necessarily resulted in the unambiguous
transfer of substantial autonomy to work teams in many cases (Jurgens et al, 1993).
Thirdly, contemporary initiatives have encountered severe implementation problems and
often failed to progress beyond isolated pilot schemes (e.g. Badham and Naschold,
1994). In this case, there is also a discussion about whether the introduction of a pilot
scheme in the context of such a radical initiative as the implementation of self-managing
teams may present its own problems, in part at least because of the complexities of the
existing and traditional organisational systems.
These issues will be explored in the context of this case from a processual perspective as
described in Chapter Two. The processual approach to change enables examination of
the links between team working initiatives, the scale, content and context of the change,
and team effectiveness. Findings from this case relate to the team design and
manufacturing strategy, the influence of politics on the change process with specific
reference to operational roles played by the managers, supervisors and team members,
and organisational arrangements and systems (particularly pay). In this case, these
factors are explored in the context of a company at the outset of the change to team
working and the data and analysis are therefore concerned with the factors pertaining to
the successful implementation of team working in the early stages of the change process.
4.2.1 Team Design and Manufacturing Strategy
Taking first the issue of the fit between the design of the teams and the design of the
production system, an assumption made by some organisations is that it is quite
straightforward to create self-managing work teams in the context of the existing
manufacturing strategies in an organisation, especially when operators are already
working in groups or cells. Indeed, at the outset of initiatives to introduce self-managing
work teams, some organisations do not consider the strategic nature of the change to
self-managed team working and the radical restructuring required for the implementation
of this form of work design (Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997).
113
In some cases, problems relate to the competing demands of new work design and
existing strategies, for example, the fit between the team design and the production
practices. Certainly, there is evidence of these problems in recent research, particularly
pertinent examples of which, in this context, relate to the introduction of self-managed
work teams into lean production environments. Some organisations may have created
difficulties in the implementation of self-managed teams by mixing systems with different
philosophical and practical bases.
Research by Cutcher-Gershenfeld et at (1994), cited in Chapter One, is an example of
work supporting these ideas. These authors found that some UK manufacturing
operations are simultaneously attempting to encourage the development of self-managed
work teams while reducing buffers through reduced in-process inventory and just-in-time
delivery. The resulting tension between team autonomy and team interdependence could
have been managed through strong leadership, but this did not fit the traditional
sociotechnical systems view of teams as being self-managed or autonomous.
Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al's (1994) findings illustrate the types of problems associated
with the practice of self-managed work teams and the pressures of lean production
systems. At a practical level, the problems manifest themselves in the schism between
the philosophy of autonomy, team decision-making and internal organisation on the one
hand and the constraints of lean production on the other. The system of lean production
lends itself to a strategically planned, hierarchically driven management system within
which task-orientated teams can operate to produce continuous improvements. The
driving objective behind lean production is to eliminate waste. This elimination takes
place in removing work in progress, stock, independent inspection and rework from the
production system. Teams within a lean production environment may be flexible and by
necessity are interdependent, but they are inextricably linked in a production process
which is formally structured and bureaucratically organised to achieve high productivity
with lower costs. Self-managed work teams, on the other hand, require an environment
where autonomy and independence are possible and where structure is internally imposed
by the team members who are responsible for making production-related decisions.
This brief discussion illustrates some of the fundamental incompatibilities between the
underlying philosophical and practical bases of these two systems. The following case
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will explore in detail some of the practical problems and issues relating to the
implementation of teams designed according to principles of self-management in the
context of a lean production environment.
4.2.2 The Implementation Process
On a completely different note, the second argument of this case is that the change-
management process is crucial to successful implementation of self-managed work
teams. Complex and novel projects, such as the introduction of self-managed work
teams, are inherently vulnerable, because they seek to accomplish both technical and
social types of change which potentially raise many political issues (Badham, Couchman
and McLoughlin, 1997).
In recent accounts of such change initiatives, a common theme has been the difficulty of
dealing with the people issues and controversial politics that surround uncertain and
vulnerable projects. Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin (1997) use the term
vulnerable to describe changes that are complex and radical, both features of the
transition to self-management. With complex projects, there is a large degree of
uncertainty about what is to be done and how to do it. Objectives are not always clear,
resource requirements not always well known, activities often redirected and schedules
reorganised. As McCalman and Paton (1992) observe, in such conditions it is more
difficult to achieve the shared perception of the project's goals and keep the necessary
commitment to provide a solution. More time and effort has to be spent ensuring
effective communication, addressing people's perceptions, encouraging flexibility, and
generating and re-generating involvement in the face of new problems, setbacks and
opportunities.
With radical change, problems arise from the degree to which individuals, culture and
structure have to be transformed for the project to succeed. The transition to self-
management is radical because the change is central to the organisation's strategy and
involves modifications throughout the organisation and these modifications are a radical
departure from existing ways of doing things. The more major the project in these two
senses, the more politically controversial it is likely to be since the activities and interests
of a wide range of different groups may be fundamentally threatened. The likelihood of
political disruption and opposition will increase the project's vulnerability.
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The radical nature of this change also derives from the fact that both vertical and
horizontal structures in the organisation are being transformed. The creation of self-
managing teams involves cutting across traditional semi-skilled work boundaries and
direct and indirect demarcations. There are greater demands for co-operation between
all levels and functions in the organisation and a transformation of line management, as
supervisors become coaches and the traditional relationship between direct production
and indirect support departments is reversed. As technical functions (e.g. engineering
and personnel) are devolved to the teams, indirect departments move into more
supportive relationships (Badharn, Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997). The removal of
such traditional work boundaries and demarcation lines is a source of potential disruption
in organisations.
Indeed, the transformation of both horizontal and vertical boundaries with the
introduction of self-managed work teams impinges on the interests of a broad range of
stakeholders, who may perceive a variety of threats and opportunities. More than
projects which focus on the technical dimensions of change, sociotechnical projects may
be characterised by political negotiations, alliances and compromises. In such
circumstances, the final nature of implemented change and its impact on productivity,
working conditions and so on will be crucially influenced by how conflicts and
compromises are managed and resolved during the change process.
The introduction of self-managing teams also involves considerable changes in the skills,
attitudes and activities of personnel at all levels. Direct labourers become responsible for
far broader aspects of their work, line managers become more concerned with system
development and strategic issues and traditional specialists (e.g. engineers and human
resource specialists) are required to work more in interdisciplinary teams, often in
greater contact with direct production operations.
The complexity of such projects also increases their vulnerability. There are a
considerable number of unknowns involved in their introduction. For example, in
creating new forms of team work both management and the workforce have to overcome
traditional distrusts in order to offer rewards on the one hand, and both effort and
commitment on the other. Yet there are inevitable uncertainties about how the other
side will behave and how far the final result will be either productive for the firm or
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rewarding for the employee (Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997).
In the change process itself, as self-managing work teams are adapted to the particular
production and organisational environment, clear directives become complicated by a
myriad of detail and compromises. For example, teams are expected to take on more
responsibility and be trained to do so, yet how much responsibility, the speed of the
introduction, the time and the facilities available for training, the educational and cultural
content of the training etc. are all far less clear. The uncertainty, frustration and potential
for sabotage involved in the lengthy processes of resolving such issues is a further factor
which considerably increases a projects' vulnerability.
In summary, a company may take many positive steps to implement self-managed teams,
communicating about the need for change and a vision of the future state and enabling
key players to participate in the design and introduction of the teams. However, there
are many issues relating to the complexity and vulnerability of the change to self-
management and the implementation process, which may have an adverse impact on the
outcome of the initiative. This case will explore these issues using a wealth of
information collected from an extensive interview programme.
4.2.3 The Introduction of a Pilot Team
The Industrial Society survey (1995) found that despite the complexity of initiating self-
managed work teams relatively few have been piloted. In fact, only 25% of
organisations surveyed had piloted self-managed work teams in their organisations. The
additional complexities engendered by implementing a pilot team in an already
complicated change process suggest that alternative strategies in introducing self-
managed work teams may hold more appeal to many organisations.
Indeed, it is proposed in this thesis that one of the major problems with piloting self-
managed work teams relates to the radical and complex nature of the change. To be
successful team-based work designs must fit with the organisational arrangements and
systems. This notion of congruence was discussed in some detail in Chapter Two, in
particular the importance of the fit between organisational systems (existing
organisational structures, policies and procedures) and the team-based systems being
implemented. For example, Nadler and Tushman (1979) suggest that organisations will
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be most effective when their major components are congruent with each other, that
changes in one element of the system will result in changes in other parts of the system
and that organisations seek equilibrium,moving towards a state of balance.
Taking this perspective, if an organisation introduces a pilot team-based work unit in an
operational environment in which there is a traditional, hierarchical structure, supported
by organisational arrangements and systems based on individual values, there will be
conflicting pressures on the team. In the team development process, efforts will be made
to influence the team to act and think as a unit, yet they will still be working and
receiving rewards in a traditional, individual-oriented system. In a pilot situation,
organisational arrangements, such as supervisory and managerial practices and reward
systems, will not be changed and will continue to support an individual approach to
work. All elements of the work environment need to be congruent to sustain team-based
work systems. When one pilot team is introduced in one part of an organisation, this
congruence does not exist.
It is, however, important to recognise that organisations face a difficult question when
implementing radical and fundamental change initiatives, such as self-managed work
teams. There is the need to balance a test of the proposed structure, to make sure it
works in practice in a particular environment, with the realisation that such a test in itself
may prove impractical because of the lack of congruence between the old and the new
organisational systems. In some ways, the introduction of pilot teams may represent
caution and the realistic concern to maintain organisational effectiveness. In the case of
self-managing work teams, however, pilot teams may in themselves create too many
obstacles to success and doom the initiative to failure. This is essentially because key
figures are operating in two systems (the old and the new), with two sets of
arrangements, policies and procedures and achieving a workable balance in a changing
environment is very difficult.
4.3 Aims of the Case
In the present case, there are three aims. Acknowledging recent work conceptualising
the problems of fit between lean production manufacturing strategies and self-
management, the first objective of this case is to explore the implications and practical
limitations of implementing self-managed work teams in an existing assembly line and
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cell-based lean production environment. The focus will be on the impact of the change
on specific features of the work organisation, such as leadership, autonomy and
interdependence.
Accepting the difficulties inherent in the introduction of self-managed work teams in a
lean production environment, the second aim of this case is to examine in some detail the
implementation process and the complexities of the people issues in such a change
process. Qualitative data from an extensive interviewing programme will be used to
explore the politics of the change process, in terms of people's perception of the changes
to vertical and horizontal structures and the removal of demarcation boundaries between
direct and indirect work. The case will also consider managers' and team leaders' styles
in handling these sensitive changes and the effect of this on team member's behaviour.
Also, with regard to the implementation process, the case will explore the problems
created by uncertainty. Even in a change process with detailed action plans and the
participation of those involved in the change, there is room for frustration and
uncertainty and lessons can be learnt from detailed case analysis.
The proposition in relation to the third aim is that in a complex and radical initiative,
such as the introduction of self-managed team working, a pilot study is not the most
appropriate implementation strategy. The nature of organisations is such that they seek
to maintain a steady state. To effect a change, the forces for change must be stronger
than the forces to maintain the status quo. This is unlikely to be the case when only a
small part of the organisation changes, unless special features are introduced, such as the
creation of an "elite" team or rewards associated with the change process. When one
pilot team based on the principles of self-management is created in an environment
designed on the basis of interdependence, low control and individual values and rewards.
then there is a problem of congruence between elements in the system and there are
inherent barriers to success. Heavy demands are placed on people expected to operate
with the demands of two competing and conflicting systems simultaneously. Data
collected from interviews with team members, team leaders and managers is used to
explore the nature of the problems associated with implementation of pilot self-managing
work teams.
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4.4 The Design and Methods of the Case
This case was designed as a longitudinal study, investigating the implementation of self-
managed work teams over a two-year period from their introduction into the
organisation in November 1996. Multiple sources of information were used in this case,
including observation and structured interviews (both individual and group).
4.4.1. Observation
As a first step, after the negotiations with the company to secure participation in the
study, the researcher initially took on the role of passive observer on the shopfloor. At
this stage, there was no involvement with any of the operators, and the idea was to learn
about the work environment before the team working intervention. This short period of
observation provided an opportunity to learn about the work processes and products,
and to record details ofthe physical setting, events and activities.
The researcher took on the participant as observer role throughout the remainder of the
study and spent time on the shopfloor and at meetings, observing the teams and advisers
and their activities, interactions, work patterns etc.
4.4.2. Interviews
The researcher conducted a programme of interviews to collect data on the transition to
team working (see Table 4.1 below). The interviews started prior to the intervention and
continued on a quarterly basis throughout the two-year research period. Both one-to-one
and group interviews took place face-to-face and off the shopfloor. All the interviewees
had a minimum of one year's experience within the company.
4.4.2.1. One-to-One Interviews
This study was initiated at the beginning of the change process and the researcher was
able to interview all the key players in the intervention, including team members, team
leaders and managers. The one-to-one interviews were used to gather detailed data and
personal perspectives about the change to, and the nature of, self-managed team
working. Interview protocols were used to record comments.
4.4.2.2. Group Interviews
Group interviews were seen as advantageous and included in the design because in a
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team-based work setting they were considered likely to yield important information
about the teams i.e. the changes, team dynamics and team problems from a team
perspective. Individual comments and ideas from members of the groups (i.e. complete
teams or groups of team leaders) provided the other group members with inspiration and
thoughts about the initiative. Again, interview protocols were used to record comments.
Table 4.1 Interview Programme: Schedule ofinterviews within Clearwipe (numbers of interviews
in brackets)
Cell Teams: September 1997 - June 1998 One-to-One Interviews: Manufacturing
Director (1); Production Director (3);
Training Manager (3); Technical Support
Facilitator (2); Team Leaders - 3 repeat
interviews with 3 Team Leaders (9); Cell
Team Members - 3 repeat interviews with
3 Cell Members (9)
Pilot Study: November 1996 - January
1997
Pilot Team: January - May 1997
One-to-One Interviews: Manufacturing
Director (2); Production Manager (3);
Personnel Manager (2); Training Manager
(2); Pilot Team Leader (2); Pilot Team
Members - 2 repeat interviews with 2
Team Members (4)
Group Interviews: Steering Group (2);
Pilot Team (1)
One-to-One Interviews: Manufacturing
Director (l); Production Manager (3);
Personnel Manager (2); Training Manager
(3); Pilot Team Leader (3); Pilot Team
Members - 3 repeat interviews with 3
Team Members (9)
Group Interviews: Steering Group (2);
Pilot Team (2)
Group Interviews: Cell Teams - 4 repeat
interviews with 3 Cell Teams (12)
4.5 Company Background
4.5.1 Company Profile
Clearwipe plc is an American-owned manufacturer of vehicle windscreen WIper
products, employing approximately 450 permanent and 200 temporary staff at its factory
in South Wales. The site opened in 1992 after the company relocated from its plant in
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Brentford, West London, which had been established in 1928. Clearwipe plc supplies
original equipment to the main UK-based car companies, including Ford, Honda, Rolls-
Royce, Rover and Vauxhall, and to the domestic and overseas after-market. Overall, it
exports about half of its production. In the 1996-97 financial year, Clearwipe pIc UK had
a turnover of £32 million. The company holds a range of quality accreditations,
including ISO 14001 and 9001, and is a Ford Ql , Rover Group RG2000 and
Volkswagen VDA-6 rated supplier. It received Investors in People accreditation in
1995.
4.5.2 The Work Environment before Self-Managed Team Working
When Clearwipe plc relocated to Pontypool from West London in 1992, it was intent on
establishing a wholly different culture and way of organising work that would secure
commitment from all employees and assure the company's long-term future. Changes
were planned to the old production system, the rigid job demarcations and the status
differences, which had characterised the Brentford factory for almost 65 years. In their
place, Clearwipe plc intended to introduce cellular manufacturing, kanban systems, team
working and total flexibility across all areas of the company. An open management style
and single-status terms and conditions were also planned for the new factory. By 1996,
these plans had been implemented with varying degrees of success. For example,
Clearwipe plc had moved towards a just-in-time philosophy of operations and had
introduced cellular manufacturing and kanban control, but had been less successful in
changing to team working and an open management style.
The original blueprint for the new factory included the introduction of self-managing
work teams, with the hope that these teams would be established in every part of the
plant that lent itself to this form of work design. However, the logistical requirements of
relocation meant that plans for the introduction of self-managing teams were put on hold
initially. This was mainly because a large product inventory was needed to satisfy
customer demand while relocation and start-up were accomplished and the move to
South Wales also coincided with an upturn in the demand for Clearwipe plc's products.
As a result, the emphasis of the plant in the first few years was solely on "output" and
some of the intended initiatives, e.g. open management and self-managed team working,
did not materialise. Also, only fifty Brentford personnel made the move to South Wales
and these people were employed on short-term contracts to facilitate the transfer. This
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meant that an entirely new workforce had to be trained before the plant was fully
operational. Whilst the introduction of self-managed team working was not initiated
immediately, the company continued to use appropriate selection procedures to ensure
that the operators employed would be suitable for a future change to self-managed team
working.
The decision to resurrect the idea of self-managed work teams was taken in November
1996. Observations and qualitative data from interviews with operators, team leaders and
managers in January 1997 revealed that the work design of the operators at that time
was very traditional. Clearwipe plc manufactures high volume, low cost products and
fluctuations in product demand create unpredictability and variability in the production
units. The manufacturing operations are based on lean production principles. This has
resulted in high interdependence amongst groups of workers, completing a narrow range
of different tasks. The interviews revealed that the operators' tasks were largely
standardised, fragmented and specialised, and had a low level of task identity. Work
method and work pace were set by management. Essentially, the operators had little
control over what they did, and how and when they did it. The team leaders and
supervisors were responsible for planning the work, recording and analysing team-related
data (efficiencies, scrap, and downtime), allocating jobs and tasks and liaising with
internal and external customers. The technicians in each section were responsible for
changeovers and machine maintenance and the line feeders provided the lines/cells with
the necessary materials. In many ways, the operators waited to be told what to do and
when to do it. Team leaders were inundated by very basic questions from operators all
the time. This is illustrated by the following quotations taken from the interviews with
team leaders in January 1997:
" ... whenever I am at my desk, people come and ask me for a form for holidays or absence, for
example, and yet they know that what I will say is 'fetch one from the personnel cupboard '.. "
.....if any part of the machine goes wrong they come and ask me what to do, knowing that what I
will say is find a team member who is trained on that bit or call a technician. And still, they ask
me first every time. "
The amount of variety that operators had in their jobs was limited, partly because of the
nature of the tasks themselves, but also as a consequence of the distinctions made
between the direct and indirect tasks (the operators and the support functions). For
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example, technicians were called to complete even routine changes to machines,
although it was widely acknowledged that many operators were so experienced on the
machines they could already carry out these changes if they were so inclined. Other
operators would have been able to carry out these changes quite easily after appropriate
training. Job feedback was also limited with, for example, operators having no
involvement in calculating performance data, nor receiving feedback from that
information.
Each cell/line was responsible for performing a limited set of interdependent tasks.
Operators had limited information processing and decision-making to do during task
performance and, in many ways, the lean production system at Clearwipe pIc provided an
environment which encouraged programmed and routine responses from the operators.
The cells/lines were hierarchically driven by the team leaders. The lean production
system, with no buffer stocks, created an environment in which the emphasis was on
keeping the production process going. In early 1997 in Clearwipe plc, it was the team
leaders, not the team operators, who solved any problems arising on the shopfloor to
achieve this. As such, there was limited collaboration between celllline members and
limited ownership of the production process. The following table summarises the work
organisation prior to the implementationof self-managedteam working in Clearwipe pIc.
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Table 4.2 Cbaracteristics of tbe lean production system in Clearwipe pic.
Cbaracteristics of
manufacturin or anisations
Lean Production in Clearwipe pic
Origin
Primary Goals
Assembly operations
Leadership
Task cycles
Work method
Work organisation
Job rotation
Indirect tasks
Material Flow
Individual work pace
Links
Japan - Toyota Pull System, 1960s
Continuous improvement in work operations; improvements in
organisational flexibility and product quality for competitive
advantage
High interdependence among groups of workers
Depends on strong team leader
Fragmented, specialised tasks - low level of task identity
Standardised tasks - exact standards developed for each process, the
cells/lines have no influence over work pace or method
Cells/lines, with strong leaders chosen by management
Scheduled, workers carry out a wide range of narrow tasks
Responsible for quality control, problem-solving etc. to reduce costs
and improve quality
Pull system; no buffer stocks; system fits with high interdependence
and strong leadership
Set by management, variations impossible
Tightly linked to internal customers - to improve product quality
The very traditional organisational structure at Clearwipe pic is indicated in the following
figure, which illustrates the hierarchical nature of management in the organisation at
November 1996. Although the figure describes only one section of the organisation (the
one focused on later in the case study), it is representative of the organisational structure
as a whole.
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Figure 4.1 Organisational structure of the BladeS/Packing Manufacturing Unit at Clearwipe pic in
November 1996
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During the initial interviews in January 1997, it emerged also that some of Clearwipe
pIc's managers believed it was harder to make the change to self-managed team working
on a brownfield site in 1997-8 than it would have been to persevere with the change on a
greenfield site in 1992. Attitudes, expectations and patterns of work behaviour had
evolved to fit the existing structure, systems and culture, and the managers considered
redefining these in an organisational change process to be an extremely difficult task.
4.5.3 The Rationale for Self-Managed Work Teams
The rationale behind Clearwipe plc's decision to implement self-managing teams was,
according to the Manufacturing Director, to "tap the talent of its people" in terms of
innovation and ideas by letting operators and team leaders take on greater responsibility
and control of their work areas. As mentioned in the last section, the jobs performed by
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the majority of the operators on the shopfloor were monotonous, involving a number of
repetitive tasks. Self-managed team working was seen as a way of improving work
performance and increasingjob satisfaction, by providing individualemployees and teams
with more control over their day-to-day activities.
In early 1997 in Clearwipe pic, there was considerable unpredictability in the work
environment created by fluctuations in product demand. One of the features of the
introduction of self-managed work teams was the belief that the teams would be able to
exert some control over the variability in the production environment. Research (e.g.
Cordery, Wright and Wall, 1997) indicates the importance of self-managed work teams
being able to control aspects of the production environment.
Self-managed team working was also seen as an extension of the continuous
improvement philosophy, with the aim of giving staff a greater understanding of the
whole production process, right through to the end-user. According to the
Manufacturing Director "taking ownership is the bottom line" and self-management would
enable the company to serve the customer better. It is interesting to note that, at the
outset of this initiative, self-management was seen as an extension of the continuous
improvement philosophy. In fact, as it transpired, the juxtaposition of the two very
different philosophies of continuous improvement and self-management proved
incompatible in this production environment.
In the change process, it was envisaged that the nature of the organisation would move
from a traditional autocratic, hierarchical structure to a team-based, participative,
involvement structure.
4.5.4 The Design Process for Self-Managed Team Working
The key stages of the implementation process and the timing of the different
interventions during the change process are recorded on the time line below.
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Figure 4.2 Tbe timing of events in tbe move towards self-management
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Towards the end of 1996, Clearwipe plc's management decided that it was appropriate
both from an economic and an operational point of view to pursue its vision of self-
managed team working. The Manufacturing Director and the Personnel Manager led this
initiative and the following steps took place as part of the preparation for, and
implementation of, self-managed team working. These steps are described below,
loosely in chronological order.
multi skdhng and analyse
their own performance data
4.5.4.1 Deciding on a Model of Self-Managed Team Working
The first step was to identify an appropriate model of team working. In November 1996,
the Manufacturing Director and the Personnel Manager attended an externally run course
on the introduction of self-managed work teams. They also visited other companies to
see self-managed team working in action and to benchmark themselves against other
manufacturing organisations.
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In January 1997, a steering group was set up, with cross-sectional representation from
the organisation. The steering group included the Manufacturing Director, the Personnel
Manager, the Manufacturing Unit Manager (Blade Assembly/Packing), the Training
Manager, a team leader and external consultants. The steering group's remit was to
consider the design of the team and to identify training requirements, support systems
and timescales.
The steering group decided on a model of self-managed team working, in which teams of
three to ten team members would gradually assume responsibility for a range of the
duties assigned to team leaders under the existing structure. No restructuring would
take place and teams would be created from existing work units. The size of each team
would depend on the size of the original work units or cells. At this time, in January
1997, a widely accepted perception of the team leader's role was that too much time was
spent fire-fighting and reacting to endless, unnecessary question and problems from
operators. It was believed that providing the operators with more control and autonomy
over their immediatework environment would enable team leaders to invest more time in
wider company issues, such as operational strategy and planning, and free them from
their predominantly reactive role.
The steering group agreed that the self-managed work teams would assume
responsibility for the organisation of, and have authority to take decisions in, the
following areas: day-to-day manufacturing decisions (e.g. planning and scheduling
orders, prioritising lists for customers), machine changeovers, housekeeping, problem-
solving and administration (e.g. recording and analysing team-related data on scrap,
efficiencies, downtime, absence and sickness), developing and maintaining a training
matrix for the team to ensure all team members were multi-skilled, job rotation (e.g.
making decisions about the allocation of jobs and tasks within the team), quality, and
internal/external liaisonwith other teams and customers. In January 1997, responsibility
for these tasks resided with the team leaders and the aimwas for the self-managingteams
to have little or no reliance on team leaders in these areas within twelve to eighteen
months of the introduction of self-management. The responsibility for, and authority to
take decisions about, the allocation of holidays and overtime, and involvement in the
budget process would be devolved to the teams in the longer term. Responsibility for
discipline and assessment would remain with the team leaders/managers.
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The steering group based their decisions about the nature of the work to be assumed by
the teams by marrying a textbook view of the subject with the practical realities of the
situation within the company. For example, Wellins et al (1991) define self-managed
work teams as groups of employees who have responsibilities for managing themselves,
assigning jobs to members, planning and scheduling work, making production-related
decisions and taking action to remedy problems. Taking this definition one step further,
Manz (1992) considers that self-management lies on a continuum. At one end, a low
degree of self-management implies that the team has little discretionary decision-making
power or responsibility beyond such a rudimentary level as when to take a lunch break or
when to call maintenance for a repair. At the other end, a high degree of self-
management implies that the team has great latitude in decision-making, including such
responsibilities as the procurement of raw materials or the hiring and firing of team
members. The practicalities of the situation for Clearwipe pIc resulted in them aiming
the initiative at the high end of this continuum.
In terms of team working aspects of this definition and initiative, there is a notion that a
work team is a group of individuals working interdependently to solve problems and
accomplish tasks (Manz and Sims, 1993). Again, as with self-management, the use of
teams may also be thought of as lying on a continuum (Manz, 1992). At one end, teams
with a low degree of interdependence consist of employees who rarely see each other
and perform their tasks without exchanging information or materials. At the other end,
teams with a high degree of task interdependence consist of employees who frequently
interact and constantly exchange materials and information to complete their tasks.
Clearwipe plc's aim was to create a high degree of interdependence between the team
members.
All told, the design of teams in Clearwipe pIc was such that their success depended on
team members' willingness to engage in self-managing behaviour and to share
responsibility with other team members.
These plans for the transfer of responsibilities from team leader to team member and
associated role shifts were very much in accordance with the team development
frameworks described in Chapter Two (i.e. van Amelsvoort and Benders, 1996: Holpp,
1993: Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997). There would be a gradual transfer
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of responsibility and accountability for daily operations and associated decisions from the
team leader to the team members, until the team reached the situation in which the team
members handled all inputs and outputs on their own authority and were involved in
functions like selection and rewards.
The Manufacturing Director believed that the teams would go through three stages
before successful self-management was realised. First, they would develop their own
norms and ways of dealing with things (looking inward); second, they would establish an
effective working relationship with their internal suppliers and customers; and finally,
once these two goals had been achieved, they would develop closer contact with external
customers.
The steering group agreed that the leadership role would gradually transfer from the
"external team leaders" to "elected team leaders" within the teams and they drafted
definitions of all new roles (the new external team leader role, the elected team leaders,
team members and facilitators). The steering group decided that the transition to self-
management would begin with a pilot team in the Blade Assembly/Packing Unit, which
would be initiated in late January 1997, and gradually extend to other areas of the
organisation.
4.5.4.2 Timescales
At the strategic, philosophical level, there was a realistic view about the length of time it
would take to implement and develop successful self-managing work teams within
Clearwipe plc, i.e. two to five years. In January 1997, the steering group devised an
action plan describing the different stages of team development and implementation and
the timescales for each stage. This clearly reflected a long-term perspective.
At a more practical day-to-day level, however, there seemed to be an expectation that
teams would produce more immediate changes and results and indeed, there was some
pressure from management on the pilot team and the first cell teams to produce results
quickly.
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4.5.4.3 Training
Training was considered key to the success of self-management. Members of the
steering group underwent formal classroom training in leadership and problem-solving
skills in January 1997. The members of the pilot team attended a one-day training
programme in January which introduced the concepts of self-management, as well as
providing problem-solving skills training. The Training Manager and the team leader of
the pilot team also attended a one-day course in facilitation skills.
4.5.5 The Pilot Self-Managed Work Team
4.5.5.1 Implementation
The pilot self-managing work team was set up in January 1997 in the packaging area of
the Blade AssemblylPacking Manufacturing Unit. The packaging area was chosen
because its proximity to the customer in the supply chain made it a good starting point
for the forging of closer customer links. Also, any teething problems could be addressed
without adversely impacting other areas of production. The layout of the production
process at Clearwipe plc is illustrated in Figure 4.3 below.
Figure 4. 3 A plan of the shopfloor layout at Clearwipe pic.
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Another reason the packaging area was identified as appropriate to pilot self-managed
team working was because a new automatic packaging machine was installed in 1996
and its initial performance had failed to live up to expectations. The introduction of self-
managed team working with a focus on continuous improvement was believed to be one
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way of tackling this performance problem.
In addition, packaging was a self-contained unit and its group of workers a clearly
identifiable team. The existing group was an appropriate size for a self-managing team,
with eight members, and it was clearly possible for the group to take more control over,
and responsibility for, their day-to-day activities. The group was relatively
interdependent, working on common products and reporting to the same team leader.
The initial reaction to the notion of self-management among team members was very
positive. The steering group, which included the pilot team leader and the Training
Manager, decided on a plan for the transition to self-management. A logical starting
point seemed to be the development of multi-skilling in the team, and the associated
development of a training matrix. Team members would be able to learn the technical
skills for changeovers, for example, fairlyquickly and could design and set up the matrix
itself. This would provide a feeling that things were starting to change and would be
rewarding for team members, as well as immediatelyincreasing variety in the job.
It would also tackle a persistent problem for the team. A large amount of the downtime,
which reduced efficiency and was a major issue for the senior managers, stemmed, in
part at least, from only one team member having the skills and confidence to carry out
changeovers and minor technical adjustments to the packing machine. Once the training
matrix was developed, and as team members became more multi-skilled, decisions about
the allocation of tasks would become the responsibilityof the team.
Alongside this practical initiative, the team members were asked to use their newly
acquired problem-solving skills by starting to record and analyse team-related data and
by developing a continuous improvement project to work on as a team. As mentioned
previously, machine and operator efficiencywere considered to be a problem, averaging
about 55%, and this was a key issue the senior managers wanted the team to address
through self-management. By recording and analysing their own data, and having to
describe and document reasons for downtime, machine stoppage etc., the team would
gain more knowledge about their work practices, and would be more likely to take
ownership of any problems and responsibility for solving them. These problem-solving
activities would significantlyincrease the cognitive demands of the team members' jobs.
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At this stage, the team leader's role in the transition to self-management involved guiding
team members to handle their new responsibilities, attending team meetings and
providing input to the team's problem-solving projects. The team leader was also
adapting to a new role, trying to provide guidance without directing the team in their
work and without taking responsibility for their problems. The steering group agreed
that when the team was sufficiently developed, some functions of the team leader role
would transfer into the team to an elected team leader. Indeed, a leader was selected
within the pilot team after three months. The Training Manager took on the role of
facilitator for the pilot team at the start of the transition period, to advise and guide in
team meetings and help develop the team members' interpersonal, team working and
meeting skills.
4.5.5.2 Pilot Review
In May 1997, the pilot self-managed team ceased to be self-managed for two main
reasons. Firstly, product demand increased dramatically and the company needed to
introduce shift working into the packaging area. The self-managed team was split up to
ensure operators with experience on the machine were available across both shifts.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there was some frustration amongst senior
managers because little visible progress seemed to have been made towards self-
management and towards improving performance, especially efficiency. It is interesting
to note with regard to this second point that, although the performance of the pilot self-
managed team did not improve significantly as the steering group and senior
management had expected, team performance did not dip either. In fact, it has been
reported by Clearwipe pIc that during this period efficiency improved by 2-3% (IRS
Management Review, 1997). Pilot team performance in Clearwipe pIc did not conform
to the pattern widely acknowledged in the literature (e.g. Katzenbach and Smith, 1993),
in which there is a clear downturn in performance by teams before noticeable
improvements.
However, despite this frustration with regard to efficiency data, there were some
significant changes in the team and the way they worked together during the five-month
pilot period. Clear, sustained benefits were not achieved in terms of improved efficiency;
however, the team members took on more responsibilities, became more multi-skilled
and achieved results in several continuous improvement projects, whilst maintaining
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stable, albeit low, performance levels.
The pilot self-managed team did, in fact, start to assume responsibility for, and to take
decisions in: day-to-day manufacturing decisions (requesting information on customer
deadlines, to know which products to build and when, to help reduce numbers of
changeovers and hence downtime and the team also requested an inexpensive solution to
a machine problem to reduce downtime); allocation of tasks and job rotation;
housekeeping (changing the layout of the work area to a more logical and productive
configuration and relocating some stock items to save operators carrying large boxes
over, or pushing them under, a conveyor): team-related data (calculating their own
efficiencies, starting to analyse efficiencyproblems and to generate ideas to tackle some
of the more immediate problems, recording their data visually); training (team members
started to train each other on machine skills and to transfer knowledge; previously, only
one team member had the knowledge and experience to complete changeovers and four
team members had developed these skills by May 1997 and these four team members
also learnt to set up the machine); internallexternalliaison (liaisonwith one customer led
to changes in the configuration of boxes sent to the customer, which solved a problem
for that customer).
There was also a significant change in terms of team dynamics. Over the five months
that the team was self-managed, the team dynamics improved remarkably, with team
meetings becoming more productive and constructive. The team was starting to develop
norms (Tuckman, 1965). The team selected a team leader after three months. This
elected team leader was the person with the most technical skills, who could already
handle changeovers and minor technical problems and who was, therefore, well placed to
pass on this knowledge to other team members. The elected team leader was also
responsible for convening team meetings and leading those meetings.
Peer pressure developed in the team, as it evolved. For example, team members were
initiallyprotective of colleagues who were absent, not wanting to confront them on their
return and make them account for their absence. This changed, as the team realised that
it was responsible for its own performance. The team established its own norms with
regard to absence.
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In many ways, it is clear that, although the pilot self-managed team did not demonstrate
the immediate and tangible performance improvements, particularly the improvements in
efficiency, anticipated by the senior managers, the team did develop significantly over the
five-month period. Within the team itself, the team members had started to assume
responsibility for monitoring efficiency data, downtime, scrap etc. and to plan their work
(increasing the cognitive demands of the job). The team members started to become
multi-skilled (increasing job variety) and were working more interdependently as a team
in taking on these new roles and functions. The team was clearly a long way from
becoming self-managed, but it was certainly the case that the team members' jobs had
been enriched and enlarged (Badham, Couchman and McLouglin, 1997).
One of the mam reasons for introducing a pilot team in one area, before wider
implementation of the self-management initiative, was to identify any particular problems
that would hinder the wider dissemination of teams in Clearwipe pic. Some of the key
issues highlighted by the pilot study are now described.
Team meetings were supposed to take place on a regular basis (i.e. weekly) to review the
transition to self-management and the progress of the team members in taking on their
new responsibilities and to provide an opportunity for the team to discuss their problem-
solving projects. Other meetings took place as and when necessary and were designed to
facilitate the team's progress towards self-management. One of the initial difficulties
with the meetings was that they were scheduled, on the instructions of the senior
managers, to take place outside the shift times. Team members were paid overtime to
attend these meetings, but the timing of the meetings (e.g. 7am, an hour before the usual
starting time) meant that some people had difficulty making arrangements to get to the
meetings, because of, for example, transport- or childcare-related problems. The fact that
they were outside normal working hours was perceived by the team members to reflect a
lack of commitment to the transition to the self-managing work team initiative by senior
management.
The meetings themselves went through quite a standard pattern of development, with
team members in the early meetings spending their time very negatively, complaining
about the company and the problems facing them in the self-management initiative
(forming). They then moved into a second phase (storming), with team members vying
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to define their roles in the team (Tuckman, 1965). By the end of the five-month period
of operation, the team was starting to develop norms. There were problems, however, in
the team meetings. For example, individual team members came up with lots of ideas for
improvements, but had no real idea how to put them into practice. This situation
increased feelings of uncertainty as team members knew they should be doing something
but were unsure what to do and how to do it. The team leader and the facilitator were
trying not to be directive, rather to coach and guide, but it seems the team members were
not ready for this approach. As a consequence, the meetings became "talking shops",
with few of the initiatives discussed put into practice. This was frustrating for team
members and senior managers alike. Communication problems also came to the surface
when suggestions failed to get the support of other team members.
It was also difficult for the team to achieve any real control over their work methods and
work pace. The production process is such that the tasks are very standardised and the
Blade Assembly cells and Packaging line work interdependently to assemble and package
the products. This following example illustrates this. The pilot self-managed team
suggested a change to the way in which the work orders were processed, to reduce the
number of machine changeovers required and hence the downtime. Running small
batches on this machine has always been a problem because of the amount of downtime
required for changeovers. However, as fundamental to the success of the team in gaining
control over their work area and as logical as this suggestion seemed, it was impossible
to implement without a radical change to the work processes and configuration of the
cells in Blade Assembly. Senior management considered this inappropriate in a pilot
situation.
The interface between the pilot self-managed team and other areas of the plant did not
work well either at first. The packaging team was initially frustrated that other
departments did not take it seriously because they were operating with an elected team
leader rather than a formal team leader. In spite of the single-status ethos of the plant,
there was an initial reluctance among team members to approach managers or team
leaders in other sections, the general feeling being that it was the job of the unit manager
to do so.
The steering group, whilst professing to understand that the change to self-management
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is a major cultural change, requiring major shifts in attitude and behaviour, seemed to
have expectations of quick results. A lot was expected from the pilot team in a short
time. There was also particularly strong emphasis on the efficiency problems of the team
from senior management, and this was reflected in all their dealings with the team. At the
outset, when the team was being set up, team members were encouraged to think of an
efficiency-related issue for their first problem-solving project. Many of the team
meetings turned into problem-solving meetings, with the team focusing on their inability
to increase their efficiency. In the face of this emphasis on efficiency, other achievements
went unnoticed and were not acknowledged by the managers, causing disappointment
amongst team members. The belief also developed amongst the team members that the
managers had only one goal for the self-management initiative i.e. to improve their
efficiency, and that the discussions about making their jobs more interesting through
increased variety and autonomy were meaningless.
It was clear from the outset that some of the team's efficiency problems were created by
the operators rather than the machine. The team was only just starting to develop the
confidence and cohesion to tackle sensitive people issues towards the end of its
operational period. In team development, it is quite usual (e.g. Katzenbach and Smith,
1993) for teams to take on safe, practical projects in the first instance. The managers
were also disappointed that the pilot team did not seem to want to take responsibility for
the packing machine. For example, when the machine was down for a whole day, the
team did not self-manage, they waited for the team leader to tell them how to spend the
day, whilst engineers repaired the machine.
Day-to-day responsibilities (see previous list) were devolved to the team from day one.
The pilot team discussed the nature of self-management with the steering group, the
trainer and external consultants and expectations of self-management were shared. It
seems, however, that despite the action plans for the devolution of tasks and some
timescales for the transition process, the team did not know how to take on these
responsibilities and needed a considerable amount of direction and guidance from the
team leader and facilitator. There still seemed to be some considerable uncertainty for the
team members and team leaders about their roles, responsibilities and expectations.
There were also some problems with commitment by one of the key players associated
138
with the pilot self-managed team. The elected team leader did not always attend team
meetings and did not share his knowledge with the team, despite that fact that he had the
most technical knowledge about the packaging machine and this was one of the reasons
he had been elected to this role. Although the notion of multi-skilling was discussed
widely with the team, and it was a clear expectation of self-management that the team
members would share their knowledge and experience, the elected team leader did not
want to share his knowledge with other team members. Nor was he always immediately
available when the machine stopped which had a negative impact on team performance
(increasing downtime and decreasing overall efficiency). At least in part, this behaviour
was politically motivated by the elected team leader, as he felt he should be upgraded to
technician with his knowledge and skills. The situation was made more complicated
because management did not want to tackle this problem as a disciplinary issue. They
wanted the team to be self-managing and take on the responsibility for dealing with their
own problems, although the team was clearly not ready to do this at this stage.
It was also difficult for the team leader to fulfil her role. With the pilot team, her role
was as a facilitator. With the other teams in the area, she had more of a traditional,
supervisory role. The transition between the two types of role, from tell-direct to coach-
participate, whilst simultaneously working with the pilot self-managed team and other
groups of workers in her section, was extremely difficult to manage. The team leader
also acknowledged that she found it extremely difficult to pass on her responsibilities to
the team members e.g. to involve the team in the planning and scheduling of work,
because of a lack of trust about how well things would be done.
At the beginning of June 1997, the steering group reviewed the experiences of the pilot
self-managed team and decided to introduce self-management more widely in the Blade
AssemblylPackaging area. Although it was difficult to ascertain the tangible benefits of
the self-management from the pilot team, there was a belief that the initiative had had
some successes. The pilot team had maintained their level of efficiency (albeit at a low
rate), whilst initiating changes in their work environment and whilst team members
became more multi-skilled. It was also widely believed that now some of the problems
associated with the introduction of teams had been identified, these could be tackled
quite readily when teams were implemented in new areas. In this sense, the pilot study
was deemed to have been beneficial.
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4.5.6 The Introduction of Self-Managed Work Teams
In September 1997, on the basis of the outcomes from the pilot self-managing team. the
steering group decided to introduce self-management more widely in the Blade
AssemblylPacking Unit, but with a different underlying set of parameters. For
operational reasons, it was agreed that there would be no further development of self-
management in the Packing area. The original pilot team had been split between shifts
and new self-managing teams would need to be developed. There were still considerable
problems with efficiency in the Packing area and it was considered counter-productive to
try to develop new teams under these circumstances, as the emphasis would inevitably
still be on performance problems.
It was decided that self-managed work teams would be introduced in the Blade
Assembly section. This section was divided into approximately 30 cells of three or four
operators, with each cell working interdependently to assemble different windscreen
wiper blade products. In this section, as in Packing, the operators had little control over
their work (timing and method), and the variety in their jobs was very limited. Feedback
on work performance was also very limited, although, unlike in the Packing area, most of
the cells operate consistently at a high level of efficiency. The distinctions made between
the different jobs in the section were quite similar to those made in the Packing area.
Team leaders were responsible for planning the work, recording and analysing team-
related data, allocating jobs and liaising with internal and external customers. The
technicians were responsible for machine changeovers and maintenance and the line
feeders provided the cells with components. Again, the cells were an appropriate size to
become self-managed teams and it was clearly possible for the cell members to take more
control over, and responsibility for, their day-to-day activities.
Unlike in the Packing area, inclusion in self-managed teams in the Blade Assembly area
was voluntary. The Manufacturing Unit Manager placed notices around the section
describing the initiative and held an informal "Information Session", which included
team-building activities for people interested in pursuing the idea. On the basis of this
session, 24 operators volunteered and six self-managing teams were created. The
Training Manager had devised a training plan and the objective was that the self-
managing teams would go through a fairly extensive three-month period of training. The
training started with sessions on problem-solving techniques, including calculating
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efficiency and downtime, monitoring scrap costs and rejects and planning works orders
and arrears. The team members were trained in technical skills, to enable them to
complete changeovers and solve simple machine problems. A training matrix was
developed for each cell team to monitor the multi-skillingof the team members. Finally,
there were training sessions in team working techniques e.g. leadership skills, meeting
skills, decision-making skills and team development. In short, there was a clear action
plan for the introduction of these teams, including a detailed training plan for each team,
a description of when responsibilities were to be transferred from team leaders to team
members (including, for example, involvement in day-to-day manufacturing decisions,
such as planning and scheduling orders) and a summary of achievement targets. The
action plan was quite detailed to remove some of the uncertainties that were outlined by
the team leader and team members in the pilot team.
The cells took on the mantle of self-management towards the end of September 1997. A
natural team leader was elected in all the teams within a matter of weeks and team
meetings took place on a regular, weekly basis. These meetings were used to discuss the
team data on efficiency and downtime and also to address the continuous improvement
projects. In the first few weeks of their development, each team was asked to decide on
a topic for a project. The idea was to tap into the teams' potential for identifying and
solving their own problems, with the teams being asked to tackle important issues in
their own environments in the first instance. The teams were provided with appropriate
materials and resources. Not only was this initiative designed to encourage teams to
take more control of their work environment and provide them the opportunity to start
to act more autonomously, but it was also believed that initial successes were important
for team development. The types of projects initiated included, for example, designing a
new tray for assembly components, as team members considered there was a problem
with parts spilling out of existing trays, and designing a chart of product characteristics
to help teams with changeovers.
At the outset of the initiative during September and October 1997, interviews with the
team members and team leaders revealed a great deal of enthusiasm for self-managed
team working. Many of the team members felt comfortable taking on their new
responsibilities and welcomed the opportunity to take more control of their work
environment and solve some of the problems that had been nigglingthem. Also, some of
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the team members were already confident in calculating team-related performance data
and completing changeovers having spent five years watching the technicians do this
task.
During October and November 1997, the team leaders began to train team members in
problem-solving techniques and the teams created charts showing efficiency, downtime
etc for display in their cells. The technicians began to train the team members in
technical skills to complete changeovers. The teams were also carrying out their
continuous improvement projects. The teams were given time to tackle their projects and
an engineer from the Production Unit provided technical support. This engineer also
tried to act as a facilitator and monitor the progress of the projects on a regular basis.
Two of the groups completed their projects within about six weeks, although they did
not then initiate new projects.
In January and February 1998, interviews with the team members and managers revealed
that the teams were now completing routine changeovers and were monitoring their
efficiency and downtime on a daily basis. They were also maintaining their high output
and efficiency rates. Prior to the start of the move to self-management, team members
had been responsible for allocating tasks within the cells and for quality control and
inspection and, as such, it was now evident that the changes made to date had resulted in
job enlargement and job enrichment (e.g. Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997).
It was also evident from the interviews that, at this stage, team members had little
involvement in decision-making, even when decisions directly affected their particular
team. Team leaders seemed reluctant to involve team members in these activities, either
through lack of time or trust.
It was apparent through observation that with regard to the performance data, although
the teams collected and plotted the data effectively, they did not take ownership of any
problems identified nor did they initiate problem-solving projects on the basis of the data.
The facilitator tried to encourage these activities, but the teams were very similar to the
pilot team in this respect and continued to wait to be told what to do and how to do it
rather than starting to take ownership and responsibility for the problems affecting their
work area. This was, in part, a legacy of the prevailing tell and direct supervisory culture
of Clearwipe pIc over the previous five years, but also an artefact of the production
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system, in that the manufacturing process required tight links between cells. In such an
environment, it was difficult for one cell team to act as an independent unit in tackling a
particular problem. The production processes were so tightly linked that any changes
made in work processes in one cell team had a wider impact across other cell teams and
required extensive co-ordination across cell team boundaries.
Indeed, partly because of this problem, and partly because of the attitudes of the team
members, building on the job enlargement and enrichment to the next phase of the
transition towards self-management proved a difficult step for the cell teams in Clearwipe
pIc and affected their development from January 1998. As already stated, there was an
unwillingness on the part of the team members to take up responsibility for initiating
continuous improvement projects based on their analysis of performance data. There
were also practical difficulties with team members from each cell taking control of work
scheduling and work methods, the next stage in the plan for transferring responsibilities.
The practical difficulties related to the manufacturing process. More than one cell was
responsible for building each product type and, as a result, meeting works orders
required the sharing of information and co-ordination between cells.
This role had traditionally been undertaken by the team leaders, who were in a position
to take an overview of the workload of all the cells. In the transition to self-
management, the aim was to enable team members to become involved in work planning
and scheduling. However, as the design of the self-managed work teams in Clearwipe pIc
was based on existing cell units, the requirement for co-ordination across team
boundaries for planning and scheduling purposes mitigated against self-management in
each cell. Given the pace and timing of work in each cell, it was impossible for team
members from a particular cell to be in a position to take an overview across a number of
cells and inappropriate for them to direct the work of other cell teams. The basic
principles of sociotechnical systems and self-managing teams require the maximisation of
the autonomy of each group and the minimisation of co-ordination across group
boundaries (Niepce and Molleman, 1996). The self-managed work team design in
Clearwipe plc did not fit this parameter and this limited team development in this respect.
This question of the design of the teams in relation to the existing production
environment was, perhaps, the most fundamental and essential issue faced by Clearwipe
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plc in the implementation of self-management and the associated problems were having a
major impact on the team working implementation process by January 1998. Trying to
create self-managed teams from existing, interdependent cells in a lean production
environment posed its own particular problems, two of which are described above.
Whilst it undoubtedly seemed more practical to initiate such a programme of change on a
small scale using existing work units, there were inherent obstacles to success in such an
initiative because of existing organisational and operational parameters. In this case, this
was particularly apparent as the intervention was being piloted with a small number of
the operational cells. Disrupting the entire work force was impractical for the
introduction of a pilot scheme, but there were built-in barriers to success for a new work
design in an existing framework. Organisational practices and systems had been created
to fit with and support the old work design. It seemed the most obvious and logical idea
to create self-managed work teams based on existing work units. However, in this case,
teams members were not really able to take more control of their work area, in terms of
planning, scheduling and liaising with customers, as was intended in the design process.
The nature of the change and its effects on the people involved complicated the
intervention further. There were three team leaders in the Blade Assembly area and each
had responsibility for two self-managed work teams. The team leaders were responsible
for training the teams to collect and monitor performance data and for guiding them
towards the solution of problems. However, in supervising all the other cells in their
section, the team leaders were expected to operate in a very traditional manner and direct
all work activities. In a very busy manufacturing environment, the effective maintenance
of the two roles was very difficult, especially as the facilitator/coach role was a new one
and problems regarding production were always pressing and demanding. The team
leaders found it difficult in a very reactive environment to guide teams to solutions and
facilitate decisions with some teams and to direct other teams in their actions. The team
leaders also found it difficult to manage the process whereby they let go of some of their
responsibilities to self-managed work team cells but withheld them from the other cells.
This resulted in limited transferral of responsibilities.
The development of the self-managed work teams was also affected by the attitudes of
the team members. Interviews in January and February 1998 revealed that the team
members had expectations about autonomy and control over their work from the
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introductions to self-management given by the senior managers prior to the start of the
initiative. These expectations proved hard to meet in practice. The self-managed work
team members believed that their jobs had been enlarged and enriched, but were still very
constrained by the production system and the work pace, methods and standards set by
management. The system did not enable them to become increasingly self-managing and
interviews revealed that some team members were frustrated by this, fuelling speculation
about the viability of management's ideas.
Between January and April 1998 negative feelings towards the change became
increasingly apparent. In the interviews at the outset of intervention, self-managed work
team members had been very positive about taking on additional responsibilities,
especially as many of them were already confident in handling these tasks. However,
feelings seemed to change amongst the team members once they had started to take on
the new tasks (e.g. changeovers). The sentiment developed that self-managed team
members should be paid more because they were doing more.
Comments to this end from the interview programme included:
". we are doing more work than the other cells. so we should have more money. Otherwise. it is
not worth it. People doing less than us get the same money as us...
", and it's notfair to expect us to keep on doing more things without us getting somethingfor it."
Senior managers had explicitly stated from the outset that there would be no immediate
financial rewards for making the change to self-management. Financial rewards would
only be forthcoming in the long-term if the change was successful and resulted in
financial savings for the company.
This issue proved to be quite a big stumbling block and by March 1998 some of the
initial enthusiasm for self-managed team working was wavering amongst team members.
By this point, two of the teams had withdrawn their support for the initiative, saying they
were no longer interested and had ceased to work on their projects. In many ways, the
issue faced by the company with regard to the organisational systems (e.g. rewards)
reflects the same problem faced by the company in the context of the manufacturing
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systems. That is, as already described, Clearwipe pIc did not wish to make substantial
changes to existing manufacturing systems and fundamentally redesign the cells until
there was evidence that the intervention was successful. By not making these more
radical changes however, the company was creating barriers to the success of the new
initiative. Similarly, the company did not want to make changes to the organisational
support arrangements until there were seen to be financial returns. However,
maintaining these systems whilst implementing a new work design initiative again proved
to be an obstacle to success. In this case, maintaining the existing reward system while
implementing work design changes to enrich and enlarge operators' jobs created
resistance.
By the early part of 1998, the technicians had also started limiting their co-operation,
resenting the extra work entailed in training operators to complete changeovers and
feeling in some way that this should not be operator work. Technicians believed that
they were more skilled than operators and had more status. Interviews revealed they
preferred a situation in which there was a clear demarcation between operator and
technician roles. By not making themselves available to train the operators, their support
for the initiative was tacitly withdrawn.
By June 1998, it was widely accepted that the cells were no longer operating as self-
managed teams. The production- and system-related problems encountered in the work
redesign remained unresolved and the transition to self-managed team working was no
longer possible. An analysis of the final situation shows that some progress had been
made in the transition to self-management in Clearwipe pIc. Team members maintained
targeted levels of output and efficiency whilst taking on new tasks and responsibilities i.e.
changeovers, analysis of performance data and continuous improvement projects.
Clearly, team members' jobs were enlarged and enriched.
Team members seemed to view these as additional tasks to do as part of their jobs but
there did not appear to be a change in mindset about their roles. Whilst being quite
positive about the changes initially, team members did not seem to want to take control
of their work areas, for example, by initiating changes in response to production
problems highlighted by their data analysis.
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The analysis of the change process also revealed barriers in the existing production and
organisational systems that limited progress in the transition to self-management. The
design of the teams to fit existing cell structures mitigated against the successful
transition to self-managed work teams in some ways. Understandably, in initiating the
change senior management wanted to see whether the idea of self-management worked
in the company in principle before making more radical and far-reaching changes to work
design. However, to enable team members to become self-managing in the longer-term,
there needed to be a team design in which teams could become involved, or take control
of some of the production-related decisions in their work areas.
Similarly, piloting a radically different work design raised issues of fit with existing
organisational systems and arrangements. In this case, reward systems and supervisory
style were particular issues. Team members and team leaders were making significant
changes to the way they worked, within the context of old patterns of behaviour from
the other people with whom they worked. For example, the team leaders were
facilitating and coaching the team members in two of their cells and telling and directing
the operators in their remaining seven or eight cells. In practice, their position was quite
untenable and unsustainable given the pressures of a high-volume production
environment.
4.6 Discussion
By June 1998, all of the cell teams had given up working towards self-management and
the managers decided to stop the initiative and review the situation. The introduction of
a self-managed team-based work design had not been successful in Clearwipe pIc.
This case focuses on three key aspects of the early stages of the introduction of self-
managed team working in a brownfield manufacturing organisation and provides an
insight into the problems encountered in this change process. Specifically, the case
highlights the implications of implementing self-managed work teams in an existing
assembly line and cell-based lean production environment and explores in depth the
practical limitations of different team design characteristics. The case also examines
contextual and organisational factors in the change to team working, including the
importance of the informal organisation (power and politics) in complex and radical
change processes and the congruence of organisational arrangements between existing
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and new systems. In addition, this case highlights the problems in a radical work
redesign initiative of using a pilot study as part of the implementation strategy. Each of
these themes will be examined more fully in the final chapter of this thesis.
These themes are also explored further in the following cases. Issues surrounding the fit
between manufacturing strategy and team design are considered from a different
perspective in the next case. This case also examines in some depth the problems of
team leaders' and team members' uncertainty about their roles, responsibilities and
expectations in such a complex, radical and vulnerable change as the one to team
working. In this second case however, the outcome is somewhat different. The
importance of the congruence between old and new organisational systems and
arrangements in team development is explored in detail in the third case in this thesis and
the final case considers the nature of the operational and change agent roles in the
transition to self-management.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Case Study Two: Berg Transmissions
5.1 Synopsis
In 1995, this UK-based manufacturing company decided to introduce self-managing work
teams. The senior management team within the company was committed to changes geared
around the production system and considered that a team-based organisation would provide
the structure to enable significant improvements in quality, productivity and efficiency.
To establish a focus on the key issues in this case, it is important to note early in this
narrative that from the outset of the change process the company's aim was to implement
self-managing work teams. In practice over the four years of the researcher's involvement,
Berg Transmissions was successful in implementing lean production teams. During the
transition process, the company encountered difficulties in the change to self-management as
a consequence of which they changed direction. Essentially therefore, this case tells the story
ofthe transition to lean production teams, acknowledging the company's view that this is a
step on the road to self-management. This case narrative considers the nature of lean
production teams and the influences on the team development and change process that
resulted in this outcome. As such, theoretical and practical considerations from this case
provide insight into the nature of team development and associated change processes.
Specifically, this case focuses on three key aspects of the introduction ofa team working in
this company. Firstly, the case explores the interrelationship between the nature of the
production environment and team design, with particular emphasis on self-managing work
teams, lean production teams and the Toyota Production System. Secondly, the focus is on
the transition to team working and this case considers whether the team members' roles and
responsibilities were up-skilled or de-skilled with the development of team working. Finally,
the case discusses the deep structure changes and the importance of introducing new
organisational support systems and arrangements in establishing team working. In this
company, these changes included the introduction of an open-book policy, revised contracts
for process operators, role re-definitions, training and employee development activities and
the streamlining of the selection, grading and reward systems.
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A key issue in this case relates to the fit between the existing production system and team
design. A key implication from this case is that deep structure changes are fundamental in
the successful transition from traditional work environments to collaborative, team-based
work designs.
5.2 Introduction
Workers' roles and responsibilities in industrial organisations have been a consistent theme
in the studies of industrial sociologists and management theorists (Rose, 1975). For
example, a major concern ofTaylorism in the early part of this century was the breaking of
the power that work groups were able to exercise. For the later human relations movement
the issue was how the same power could be harnessed in management's interests (Procter
and Mueller, 2000).
The recent focus on team working draws on two main traditions. The first of these is
sociotechnical theory and the idea of self-managing work teams and the second is Japanese-
style work teams or lean teams (Benders and van Hootegem, 2000). One unifying feature
between the different styles of team working, which is apparent in the current wave of
interest in teams, relates to the strategic nature of team-based work designs and the
accompanying emphases on performance, organisation and culture. However, considerable
operational differences exist between the self-managing teams of the sociotechnical tradition
and the lean teams of the Japanese model (and these are discussed in detail in Chapter One).
Team members' autonomy, control and responsibility for their work plans, schedules and
operations and intemalleadership are the defining features of self-management. Researchers
have intimated similarities between self-managed teams and lean teams with respect to some
of these features. For example, Womack et al (1990) claim that in the lean team plant the
maximum number of tasks and responsibilities are transferred to the team members.
However, these claims have not been substantiated by recent research. Indeed, this research
suggests that worker autonomy in lean team plants can be highly circumscribed by tight
supervision and the close coupling of teams in the production process (Delbridge, Lowe and
Oliver, 2000). This research has also cast some doubt on the extent of the multi-skilling
which some commentators claim underpins lean teams. If this is the case, there would
appear to be a down- rather than an up-grading of the skills utilised by team members. The
transition to both self-managed work teams and lean teams does entail, however, a shift of
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focus from individual tasks to collaborative team work.
These findings emphasise the differences in team-based work designs and the importance of
the fit between the production system and the team design. In some production settings, for
example those operating the Toyota Production System with its high dependency between
different stages of the production process and the rigid standardisation of tasks and
processes, some collaborative work designs will be more appropriate than other designs.
The importance of the congruence between different parts of a system is also apparent with
regard to a company's deep structure or organisational support systems and arrangements.
In the transition to any style of team working, the shift in focus from individual tasks to
collaborative team work necessitates changes in the organisational support systems and
arrangements. Systems within a more traditional company structure tend to be based on the
individual as the key organisational unit. With a team-based work design, the organisation
needs to facilitate employee interaction and information exchange, and reward team
involvement, team decision-making and interdependence. The fundamental, underlying
philosophy and premises behind team working are completely different to those behindmore
traditional forms of working.
As such, traditional organisational systems focusing on the individual may pull the
organisation back to its old structure. Research by Pullen (1976) confirms this assertion in a
study which found that there were long-term problems for work teams in which team
members were paid on an individual basis. Organisational arrangements and support systems
that fit a new work design are fundamental to a successful change process and the
development of team working and reinforce the new work design through mutual feedback
loops.
The following introductory section of this case explores the nature of the Toyota Production
System and the implications for team-based work designs. It then goes on to consider the
level of skill and autonomy inherent in lean team settings, before focusing on the key
characteristics of organisational systems in a lean environment.
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5.2.1 Just-in-time and the Toyota Production System: Implications for Team
Design
Just-in-time is the Western embodiment ofa philosophy and series of techniques developed
by the Japanese. The Toyota Motor Company has led the development of just- in-time in
Japan and Toyota's version of just- in-time is called the Toyota Production System.
The philosophy behind just-in-time is founded on doing the simple things well, on gradually
doing them better and on squeezing out waste every step of the way. Just-in-time literally
means producing goods and services exactly when they are needed, not before they are
needed so that they will have to wait as inventory, nor after they are needed so that it is the
customers who have to wait (Slack et ai, 1995). In addition to this "time-based" element,
there are the requirements of quality and efficiency.
Bicheno (1991) considers the aims of just- in-time are to meet demand instantaneously, with
perfect quality and no waste. A fuller description from Voss (1987) states that just-in-time
is a disciplined approach to improving overall productivity and eliminating waste. It
provides for the cost-effective production and delivery of only the necessary quantity of
parts at the right quality, at the right time and place, while using a minimum amount of
facilities, equipment, materials and human resources. Just-in-time is dependent on the
balance between the supplier's flexibility and the user's flexibility. It is accomplished
through the application of elements which require total employee involvement and team
work. A key philosophy of just-in-time is simplification. This last point is key in
considering the implications of just-in-time for team-based work designs, suggesting a
Tayloristic approach to this issue.
The adoption of a just-in-time approach to organising operations does not imply that the
stated aims will be achieved immediately, rather, it describes a state which a just-in-time
approach helps to work towards. The just-in-time approach places important new demands
on to the operation's functions. In fact, ideally, just- in-time requires a high standard in all an
operation's performance objectives including, quality, speed, dependability and flexibility.
At the core of just- in-time philosophy of operations, there are three key principles. The first
is to eliminate waste, or any activity which does not add value (e.g. over-production, waiting
time, transport, process, inventory, motion and defective goods). The second is to involve
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everyone and just-in-time philosophy is often put forward as a total system. Its aim is to
provide guidelines which embrace everyone and every process in the organisation. An
organisation's culture is seen as being important in supporting these objectives through an
emphasis on involving all of the organisation's staff. Just-in-time encourages (and often
requires) team-based problem solving, job enrichment (by including maintenance and set-up
tasks in operators' jobs), job rotation and multi-skilling. The intention is to encourage a
high degree of personal responsibility, engagement and ownership of the job.
The third principle is continuous improvement (the Japanese word for which is kaizen) and
this concerns moving closer to the idealised state of meeting demand instantaneously with
perfect quality and no waste (Bicheno, 1991). Continuous improvement involves everyone,
managers and workers alike and stresses adaptability, team work and attention to detail
through small incremental steps.
Continuous improvement focuses on improving performance through more and smaller
incremental improvement steps. For example, modifying the way a product is fixed to a
machine to reduce change-over time is an example of an incremental improvement. While
there is no guarantee that a small step towards better performance will be followed by other
steps, the whole philosophy of continuous improvement attempts to ensure that more
improvement will follow (Slack et al, 1985).
Indeed, in continuous improvement it is not the size of each step which is important. Rather
it is the likelihood that improvement will be ongoing. Similarly, it is not the rate of
improvement which is important, it is the momentum of improvement. It does not matter if
successive improvements are small, what does matter is that every month (or week or
whatever) some kind of improvement has actually taken place (Slack et al, 1985).
These three basic tenets of just-in-time philosophy can be used to guide the actions of
operations managers in many different activities and many different contexts. There is also a
collection of tools and techniques associated with just-in-time which promote the
operational conditions which support this philosophy and are a means for cutting out waste
(Slack et al, 1985). These focus on basic working practices, design for manufacture,
operation focus, small simple machines, layout and flow, and total people involvement and
include:
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(a) Discipline - work standards, which are critical for the safety of company members and
the environment, and for the quality of the product, must be followed by everyone all of
the time.
(b) Flexibility - it should be possible to expand responsibilities to the extent of people's
capabilities. This applies equally to managers as it does to shopfloor personnel. Barriers
to flexibility, such as grading structures and restrictive practices, should be removed.
(c) Equality - unfair and divisive personnel policies should be discarded. Company
uniforms, consistent pay structures and open-plan offices, which do not differentiate
between full-time and hourly-rated staff, are examples of this.
(d) Autonomy - to delegate increasing responsibility to people involved in direct activities
of the business, so that management's task becomes one of supporting the shopfloor.
Such autonomy is manifest in a just-in-time operation in activities such as the following,
line stop authority, material scheduling, data gathering, and problem solving, which
become the responsibility of the shopfloor personnel.
(e) Development of Personnel- over time the aim is to create more company members who
can support the rigours of being competitive. This ensures a richer mix of people
working on improvement activities than the average company. Partly, this is achieved
by long-term personal development of company members.
(t) Quality of Working Life - many just-in-time concepts fall into this category, for
example, involvement in decision making, security of employment, enjoyment and
working area facilities.
(g) Creativity - not just to do the job successfully, but to improve it for the next time.
Just-in-time is also a method of planning and control e.g. pull scheduling, kanban control
etc. One explanation ofjust-in-time relates to the notion ofhigh dependency i.e. take away
the inventory and the mutual dependency of the different stages of the production process
increases. High dependency is also apparent in the just-in-time practice of empowering
shopfloor staff and the use of the internal customer concept, making the organisation
dependent on their actions.
The total people involvement aspect of just-in-time sees shopfloor staff taking on much
more responsibility to use their abilities to the benefit of the company as a whole. They are
trained, capable and motivated to take full responsibility for all aspects of the work they do.
In turn, they are trusted to carry out these responsibilities with autonomy for their own work
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area and expected to participate in such activities as the following:
• the selection of new recruits
• dealing directly with suppliers over schedules, quality issues and delivery information
• the self-measurement of performance and improvement trends
• spending improvement budgets
• planning and reviewing work done each day through communication meetings
• dealing directly with customer problems and requirements.
In the context of this archetypal Japanese production system, described as lean production
by Womack et al. (1990), the basic work group is identified as a team. Although the
emphasis is very much on the advantages of running production with the lowest possible
level of inventories, on ajust-in-time basis, it is also claimed that "it is the dynamic work
team that emerges as the heart of the lean factory" (Womack et at, 1990:99).
In their recent research, Benders and van Hootegem (2000) examine the nature of this type
of Japanese production team, drawing on Dore's (1973) and Cole's (1971) classic studies.
They identify the key characteristics of the Japanese model as the focal position of the
foreman; the minute description and rigorous regulation of work through standard operating
procedures; and the use of continuous improvement (kaizen) techniques to effect marginal
improvement in these standard operating procedures rather than more radical innovation.
The nature of these Japanese- style work teams will be discussed in the next section.
5.2.2 The Transition to Lean Teams: Up-Skilling or De-Skilling Jobs?
The focus on all aspects and types of teams, including Japanese-style work teams, has been
extensive in recent years (Procter and Mueller, 2000). Indeed, a body of literature has
emerged, which has made increasing worker autonomy and flexibility, coupled with
increased involvement through team working, central to discussions of high organisational
performance, particularly in manufacturing organisations (e.g. Osterman, 1994). Generally,
the change to team working is seen to represent a shift towards a collaborative system of
working, with a reduction in the level of direct supervision and devolution of control
responsibilities for elements of shopfloor work. The primary mechanism for control stems
from the creation of a new set of values and beliefs (cultural control) which serve to
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reinforce co-operative team work and group regulation. This restructuring is believed to
improve the quality of working life for employees and increase management's ability to
adapt production to changing market conditions.
The recent popularity of team-based work has been prompted by a series of model plant
case studies, examples include NUMMI (Adler, 1992), Saturn (Rehder, 1994) and Nissan
(Wickens, 1987). The survey findings of the International Motor Vehicle Survey (Womack
et al., 1990) have been especially influential. This work alleged the advent of post- Taylorist
work organisation and claimed substantially superior performance for manufacturing plants
using shopfloor work teams. Womack et al. (1990) identify team-based work organisation
with flexible multiskilled workers as central to the lean factory and through the active
involvement of workers, ''the truly lean plant transfers the maximum number oftasks
and responsibilities to those workers actually adding value to the car on the line"(Womack
et al., 1990:99).
However, more recent research suggests that the link between the introduction of team
working and the transference of autonomy, responsibility and new skills to team members is
not altogether straightforward. Indeed, there is an ongoing debate about the nature, process
and consequences of introducing new production and service arrangements for the
organisation and control of work (Dawson, 1994). This debate is being supported by
empirical evidence which seeks to identify the uneven and dynamic relationship between
integrated automation and work organisation (Webster, 1992); the consequences of change
for work intensification (Turnbull, 1988); and the limits to flexible work and employment
practices (Dawson and Webb, 1989).
On the one hand, there are those who consider the main thrust of the change to team
working has been to replace Tayloristic or Fordist type work structures with a more flexible
model ofmanagement practice. For example, Piore and Sabel (1984) advocate that modern
industry is replacing Fordist and neo-Fordist organisational structures with more flexible
multi-skilled forms of specialist craft production. This movement towards "flexible
specialisation" is seen to provide a new industrial strategy which is enabling firms to
accommodate continual change and innovation on the shopfloor (Piore and Sabel, 1984). It
also marks the end of the detailed division of labour with the emergence of a more worker-
oriented approach to factory organisation (Mathews, 1989). The general characteristics of
156
this emerging form of work organisation are seen to comprise a broadening of job
categories; the formation ofwork teams; decentralised decision-making; skill-based reward
systems; increased training schemes; and better selection procedures. On the other hand, not
all researchers consider these changes represent a movement towards new forms of
production arrangements. Dawson (1994), for example, considers the current
transformation in work is occurring within an existing Taylorist or Fordist framework.
As a result, a debate has emerged and arguments have become polarised. For example,
Piore and Sabel (1984) consider that the new production arrangements are a qualitative shift
in the way production is organised and signal a movement away from the detailed division of
labour associated with Tayloristic and Fordist type production systems and a general
upgrading of skills. Other researchers (for example, Dawson, 1994: Thompson, 1990)
consider the current transformation in work is occurring within an existing Fordist or
Taylorist framework and argue that the current changes represent more sophisticated
techniques for reasserting managerial control. Specifically, these researchers question
whether the adoption of Japanese production methods and labour management practices
really results in an upskilling of work for team members.
Recent research evidence from detailed empirical investigation of the process of creating
work teams and the organisational ramifications of the associated change in the nature of
shopfloor control provides some insight into this issue (Dawson, 1994). Case study data
suggest that worker autonomy in lean team plants can be highly circumscribed by tight
supervision and the close coupling of teams in the production process (Delbridge, Lowe and
Oliver,2000). These authors suggest that worker autonomy is limited in lean team working
in the autocomponents industry. Workers have very little responsibility for managing a
variety of issues concerning production, maintenance or people issues within the team.
Delbridge, Lowe and Oliver (2000) state quite clearly that ''there is no support for the
notion that the adoption oflean team working leads to greater worker autonomy." (p. 139).
These authors go on to say that, on the surface, lean teams have greater responsibility for
production-related tasks, but when the distribution of this responsibility within the team is
examined the lion's share remains with the team leader. Responsibilities that have been
delegated to the shopfloor for activities such as the allocation of work, the pace of work and
production scheduling appear to lie in the hands of the team leader. The role of operators is
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minimal in lean teams (Delbridge, Lowe and Oliver, 2000). This lack of autonomy is further
evident in the case of responsibilities that relate to the management of the team. It appears
that while team leaders have some involvement in settling grievances, the shopfloor has very
limited involvement in other activities such as hiring and firing.
Moreover, tasks that could be described as off-line and skilled (e.g. maintenance activities)
have not been transferred to the team to the same extent as routine activities such as
inspection and rework, and they remain the prerogative of specialist skilled workers.
Delbridge, Lowe and Oliver (2000) conclude that these findings cast doubt on the extent of
the multi-skilling which some commentators claim underpins lean teams.
Delbridge, Lowe and Oliver (2000) comment further on this difference between lean team
and other work groups regarding the distribution of responsibilities to the team leaders
rather than the team members. Team leaders play a pivotal role in co-ordinating activities in
Japanese manufacturing facilities. In effect, team leaders represent an additional tier within
the management system. A good deal of the role involves disturbance handling, such as
coping with uncertainty and co-ordinating operational activities following fluctuations in
workload, shortages of parts and so on, and team leaders playa significant role in process
and quality improvement. These findings are consistent with case study research that
suggests team leaders act as the "eyes and ears" ofrnanagement, since they are responsible
for the process by which workers volunteer knowledge about their work. For example,
Fucini and Fucini (1990) and Graham (1995) report team leaders actively incorporating
workers' tacit knowledge via problem-solving activities.
The case study data also reveal some interesting findings with regard to the involvement of
workers in problem solving and continuous improvement. In plants with lean teams,
managers report a significant role in both quality and process improvements for their
shopfloor operators. This is consistent with those who have advocated a recombination of
"thinking" and "doing" in contemporary manufacturing (e.g. Kenney and Florida, 1993).
These activities do represent a fundamental shift in the division of labour and have been at
the centre of the arguments of proponents of team working as the "best way" to organise
work (Womack et al., 1990).
In summary, research findings from Delbridge, Lowe and Oliver (2000) confirm that lean
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team working does not represent an advance in worker autonomy. The data from these
researchers reinforce the idea that lean teams are management's response to the need for
greater operational flexibility. Workers may be involved in production-related tasks and
have a considerable onus placed on them for improvements, but this occurs within a highly
standardised and routinised work regime.
The research evidence also suggests that management have been conscious of the need to
seek fit between existing systems and the shopfloor structures they adopt. Some of these
systems and structures are culturally determined. There are, for example, differences
between lean teams in Japan and lean teams in the UK. Lean teams in Japan have less
responsibility than those in the UK for improvement activities and team leaders in Japan
have greater responsibility than those in UK for controlling and appraising workers and
representing workers' grievances (Wood, 1990).
This debate raises some interesting questions about the relationship between factory layout
and strategies for increasing employee involvement in the work process. For example,
Friedman (1977) has concluded that there are two ends of a continuum of strategies open to
companies in the pursuit of profit. There is direct control as found under Tayloristic forms of
work organisation, and responsible autonomy, where an individual or group of workers is
given discretion over the direction of work with a minimum of supervision for the purpose
of maintaining managerial authority. By combining Friedman's (1977) characterisation of
managerial strategies for control with an understanding of the mechanisms for achieving
shopfloor control, Dawson (1994) argues that a useful categorisation ofthe choices open to
practitioners in the management of change can be constructed (see Figure 5.1).
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Figure S.l The organisation and the control of work
COLLABORATIVE
TEAMWORK
A
Teamwork reorganisation and the
maintenance of conventional control
systems (e.g. failure to change
supervisory systems of control)
DIRECT
c
Teamwork and responsible autonomy.
Employee commitment and workgroup
culture reduces the need for direct
control mechanisms on the shopfloor
RESPONSIBLE
AUTONOMYCONTROL
Conventional flow-line manufacturing
systems with a detailed division of
labour and well defined system of
supervisory management
8
Conventional work organisation with
devolution of control responsibility for
quality (e.g. just-in-timelTQM
programmes)
D
(Source: Dawson, 1994: 33) INDIVIDUAL TASKS
The horizontal dimension refers to shopfloor control responsibility in the fonnofFriedman's
(1977) responsible autonomy/direct control continuum and the vertical dimension refers to
the division of labour from single operator tasks to collaborative team work. This
framework allows for the co-existence of personal, structural and cultural control
mechanisms with individual and work group arrangements. By using these dimensions, it is
possible to chart four quadrants of possible changes in the organisation and control of work
following the introduction of new production concepts.
Quadrant B represents the conventional flow-line manufacturing systems with a detailed
division of labour and well-defined system of supervisory management. Under this system,
control over pace and pattern is built into capital equipment (technical control) and little
attention is given to employee commitment and collaboration. In contrast, quadrant C
represents a harmonious and collaborative system of industrial relations under new
production arrangements. These new arrangements are seen to signal an end to Taylorist
forms of work organisation and include a commitment to participative decision-making, an
emphasis on team work, a culture rooted in the ideas of flexibility, change and collaboration
and the replacement of supervisors with facilitators. A new set of beliefs and values
supported by a language of co-operation (cultural control) and a system of rewards
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(structural control) acts as the primary mechanism for controlling employee behaviour on
the shopfloor.
Quadrants A and D represent variations on these types. Quadrant A refers to a change in
work organisation towards team work without restructuring supervisory management or
conventional production control systems. Quadrant D refers to the introduction of new
ways of working, such asjust-in-time management, which involves a devolution of control
responsibility to the shopfloor without any major adjustments to the structural layout of the
plant (Dawson, 1994).
This framework for analysing shifts in the organisation and control of work under new
production arrangements emphasises the importance of organisational values and belief
systems for creating, developing and sustaining collaborative team work practices on the
shop-floor. It also raises the critical questions of how these transitions are being managed
and what they mean for conventional workers who are expected to change their beliefs and
values towards the nature and purpose of work.
In this case, the framework will be used to explore and help categorise the changes
introduced in this company. It is evident that considerable differences exist between the
sociotechnical tradition of self-managed teams, the lean teams of the Japanese model and
other types of work teams in terms of autonomy, responsibility, control and collaboration.
The implementation of some teams may fit a post-Taylor framework, this will not be so
apparent in the development of other teams.
As Mueller (1994) argues "companies design team work not according to some best model,
but according to their objectives" (p. 399). In this respect Bratton (1991), in his study of
cellular work structures on manual engineering skills, concludes" the direction of change is
not a simple one of upskilling or deskilling. Skills have political dimension; they are shaped
and determined by social choice and complex configuration of opportunities and constraints
(p.393)."
The third area of focus in this case relates to the organisational support systems and
arrangements appropriate for a team-based work organisation and these will be considered
in the following section.
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5.2.3 Organisational Support Systems and Arrangements
Procter and Mueller (2000) state that there is a widespread recognition that team working
will or should entail changes in organisational systems. This is in line with the sociotechnical
principle of support congruence, which states that "the systems of social support should be
designed so as to reinforce the behaviours which the organisation structure is designed to
elicit" (Cherns, 1976:790). Cohen et al (1996), drawing on Lawler (1986, 1992), find that
among the four basic sets of explanatory variables they use, it is those relating to
organisational context that have the strongest relationship with team effectiveness. They
argue that the strengthening of this context should be the first task for organisations
embarking upon team working. In examining the importance of context, four key areas will
be considered here.
5.2.3.1 Recruitment and Selection
The change to team working creates the need for different skills and attributes in employees.
As such, appropriate recruitment and selection programmes that emphasise attracting and
developing individuals with appropriate technical, problem solving and interpersonal skills
become instrumental in achieving the strategic goals of the team working intervention.
With the introduction of teams and the creation of a collective approach, groups and
individuals are required to work closely together and to depend on each other in ways in
which they are traditionally unaccustomed. Whenjobs and functions become integrated, an
individual's co-ordination with others becomes critical. Teams of workers become
responsible for productivity, quality etc. and the team decides who will perform what work
on a given day and how individuals will rotate among the various jobs.
The team replaces the individual as the primary work unit. As such, it is no longer feasible
to select people on the basis of their individual behaviour and performance to work in a
collective, interdependent situation. In fact, individual selection and assessment may attract
people who are not team players, which may inhibit co-operation and team work and detract
from the overall system (Snell and Dean, 1994). A collaborative work design requires
appropriate selection procedures emphasising problem-solving and interpersonal skills.
162
5.2.3.2 Training and Development
Dunphy and Bryant (1996) consider that there is still a tendency to underestimate the
implication team working has for training. Moreover, in looking at team working's
implications for training and development, it may not simply be a case ofproviding more. As
Buchanan (1994) argues, given the emphasis on the organisation and the constant need to
change, a functional, task-based form of training needs to give way to more general
concerns about personal development and competencies. These in tum will be designed to
feed in to the individual's contribution to, and identification with, the team and the
organisation as a whole.
In their two case studies, Findlay et al (2000) found that training in the "soft skills", with
their emphasis on attitudes, which are preferred by many employers to more formally
acquired, technical skills, had effects in an indirect manner. The training legitimised change
and strengthened the normative aspects of team working.
5.2.3.3 Grading Systems and Role Profiles
Job classification practices are an important organisational system used to measure and
determine employees' contributions. The practice of job classification implies that the
characteristics of employees' jobs capture differences in their contributions and that
differences in pay reflect differences in skill, effort, responsibility and the working conditions
inherent in those jobs.
In a team situation the distinction between job classifications becomes blurred, and, as a
consequence, arbitrary distinctions in job classifications need to be eliminated. If
organisational arrangements appear to favour one function or role over another, there is
likely to be a reduction in collaboration and co-operation (Snell and Dean, 1994).
It is also important to recognise in traditional work practices that job classifications are
assumed to capture the differences in employee contributions and that performance is largely
determined by the production system. In team working, employees' contributions transcend
the job per se to substantially affect output. As such, distinctions between classes of
employment must be diminished to encourage interaction and co-ordination and appropriate
assessment and reward systems established to recognise this.
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5.2.3.4 Reward Systems
Finally, compensation systems may also have an impact on co-operation and co-ordination in
team working initiatives (as illustrated in the Clearwipe case, for example). Adjusting
compensation systems may be one the most instrumental methods for eliciting, reinforcing
and sustaining behaviour required for the success of this work design initiative. There is
often an implicit assumption that the rewards of team working will or should be intrinsic to
the job itself and that extrinsic reward, especially financial reward, is not such an issue (e.g.
Manz, 1992). Indeed, Knapp et al (1996) found that firms introducing team working in the
Australian automotive industry were much quicker to introduce non-monetary forms of
recognition than they were monetary ones.
This notwithstanding, it is apparent that some forms ofpayment systems are better suited to
team working than others. Indeed, the types of compensation systems common to many
traditional work environments are based on individual performance and can provide
powerful disincentives for co-operation. The change to team working affects task
uncertainty, which increases with complexity, variety and task interdependence, and there is
need for individuals to rely on or collaborate with others to complete work. Harvey and von
Behr (1994) found that the individual piece rates operating in both Germany and the US had
the effect of encouraging workers to stay on one machine in order to maximise earnings and
this hampered moves to greater flexibility.
While simple piece rate systems have become less common in recent years, one of the major
trends in payment systems has been the adoption of performance-related pay based on
individual appraisal (Kessler, 1994). The likelihood is that such systems will work to
undermine the principles and objectives of a team-based organisation. Lloyd and Newell
(2000) show how among a pharmaceutical sales-force the operation of team working was
severely hampered by the fact that evaluation and pay continued to be based on individual
objectives and performance, rather than individual contribution to team objectives and team
performance, or indeed team performance itself
Similarly, if the organisation rewards seniority, this may also have an adverse effect on team
working initiatives. In traditional work practices, seniority pay rewards experience as a
surrogate for knowledge and skill in a stable environment and rewards loyalty to reduce
uncertainty within the system. Organisations based on team working require continuous
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learning and value flexibility. As systems change, new skills and procedures supplant old
methods and skills and the value of seniority may be diminished. In team working, rewards
must emphasise continuous learning and the value-added derives from increased flexibilityin
a dynamic environment (Snell and Dean, 1994). Employees must be motivated to acquire
new skills and to have the flexibility to apply those skills in a timely way (Snell and Dean,
1992).
As such, skills-based or team-based payment systems would seem particularly appropriate
for the development of team working (Lawler, 1991). With skills-based pay, employees are
rewarded for learning new jobs and developing a broad array of talents. For example, iftask
complexity, variety and uncertainty increase with self-direction, skills-based pay may
reinforce employees' efforts to understand new aspects of the production system, and
enhance their ability to solve non-routine problems (Lawler et al, 1992).
Several authors (e.g. Pearce, 1987; Coombs and Gomez-Meija, 1991) have also noted that
team incentives are based on the assumption that task uncertainty, interdependence and
complexity require co-operation among employees. Team-based rewards promote an
environment in which individuals' goals are intertwined and these rewards are more than
motivational. Wagner, Rubin and Callahan (1988) found that workers soon learned how
various activities fit together and made process and quality improvements as a team. In
traditional work practices, for example, the focus is on individual incentives, reflecting
division of labour and separation of stages and function. With team working, it is essential
there are at least elements of team incentives to encourage co-operation and joint problem
solving.
In team-based working, employers must facilitate employee interaction and information
exchange and researchers (e.g. Pearce, 1987) have contended that group-based performance
incentives promote these behaviours in production environments characterised by a high
degree of interdependence where no clear identification of individual contributions can be
made. Similarly, a shift from hourly to salaried compensation tends to promote
egalitarianism, which facilitates group information sharing and problem solving (Pfeffer,
1994).
All told, organisational systems are held in place by written records, organisational
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traditions, corporate regulations, administrative systems, employee expectations and
precedents etc. and it is often difficult to align these systems to new work designs. They are
part of the deep structure. However, the underlying philosophy, premises and working
practices behind teams are completely different to those behind more traditional forms of
working. As such, during the transition to team working, traditional organisational systems
may work against the change and pull the organisation back to its old structure. In the team
implementation and development process, it is essential if teams are to develop and mature
that appropriate team-based organisational support systems and arrangements are
implemented to support the initiative and maintain the force for change. New organisational
arrangements reinforce new structures as a whole through mutual feedback loops.
Arrangements appropriate for collaborative team working will be explored in this company.
5.3. Aims of the Case
This case follows the implementation of a team-based work design (initially self-managed
work teams, later lean production teams) over a four-year period in an UK-based
manufacturer of automotive components.
There are three key aims in this case. The first aim is to examine the congruence between
production systems and team design. The hypothesis is that the team design must fit the
existing production environment for the successful transition to team working. The second
aim focuses on the characteristics of lean production teams and explores whether team
members' roles and responsibilities are up-skilled or de-skilled with the transition to lean
teams. The final aim is to consider the idea that appropriately aligned human resource
systems are essential for the successful development and maintenance of team-based work
designs. The hypothesis is that organisational arrangements that fit the new work design are
fundamental to the successful transition from individual tasks to collaborative team work.
The author has observed the introduction of team working in Berg Transmissions since 1995
and has gathered data on the implementation process and the development of new
organisational arrangements through observational methods and interviews with senior
managers, employee representatives and team members. This information will be used to
describe the production system, the nature of the teams and the organisational arrangements
and systems implemented to support the transition from a traditional manufacturing work
design to a collaborative, team-based work design.
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5.4. The Design and Methods of the Case
This particular case was designed as a longitudinal study investigating the implementation of
team working over a four-year period from its conception in late 1995. In the main, the
detailed information used in this case comes from 0bservational methods and structured one-
to-one interviews with senior managers, in particular the Plant Manager, the Human
Resources Manager, team members and employee representatives. All interviewees were
long-serving members of staff, with a minimum of two year's experience within the
company.
The interviews started before the initial changes took place in the transition to team working
and continued throughout the research period. Where possible, the interviews were
conducted away from the interviewee's workstation. Interview protocols were used to
record comments. Details of the interview programme are included in the following table.
Table 5.1 Interview Programme: Schedule of Interviews within Berg Transmissions (numbers of
interviews in brackets)
Design Phase: One-to-One Interviews: Plant Manager (l);Human
November 1995-February 1996 Resources Manager (1); Employee Representative
(1); Team Member (1)
Self-Managed Work Teams: One-to-One Interviews: Plant Manager (1); Human
February 1996-February 1997 Resources Manager/Team Members (1); Employee
Representative (2); Team Leaders - 2 repeat
interviews with 2 Team Leaders (4); Team
Members - 2 repeat interviews with 2 Team
Members (4)
Group Interviews: Shopfloor Self-Managed Work
Team (1)
Toyota Production Teams: One-to-One Interviews: Plant Manager (1);
February 1997 - April 2000 Facilitators/T eam Leaders - 2 repeat interviews
with 2 FacilitatorslTeam Leaders (4); Service
Operators (1); Team Members - 2 repeat
interviews with 2 Team Members (4)
Group Interviews: Toyota Production Team (1)
167
5.5. Company Background
5.5.1 Company Profile
Berg Transmissions is part of a North-American corporation, with sales worldwide in 1998
worth $2.1 billion and net earnings of$95 million. The organisation is a technology-driven
supplier ofhighly engineered components and systems, primarily for automotive drivetrain
applications. The corporation, which operates in 13 countries serving the North American,
European and Asian automotive markets, employs about 10,000 people worldwide and is an
original equipment supplier to every major auto maker in the world. Its products provide key
technology for engines, transmissions and 4WD. The organisation recognises manufacturing
as key to product leadership, with the emphasis on implementing the "best-of-the-best"
practices.
Berg Transmissions's factory in South Wales was set up over thirty years ago with a design
capacity of 100,000 units per year and predicted workforce of3,000. New industry was
being encouraged to move to South Wales at the time to compensate for declining
employment opportunities in the coal and steel industries. Berg Transmissions's decision to
go for a new factory was clearly influenced by the optimistic forecasts for the future.
In fact, the reality has fallen short of the expectations, and the company has faced periods of
large-scale redundancies and, at times, imminent closure. The new plant reached a peak of
80,000 units and generated 1,400 jobs in 1974 but, over the years, has been affected by the
oil crisis, market changes e.g. the influx of Japanese suppliers, and problems in the motor
industry e.g. British Leyland in the 1970s. In 1998, when this research was being
conducted, the plant employed 340 people and had a turnover of £35million.
5.5.2 The Work Environment before Team Working
The research for this case started in late 1995, but a review from the mid-1980s (Mayon-
White, 1984) provides some understanding of the company's background and history as well
as an insight into some of the ongoing issues facing the company. This review reveals that
some of the problems in the early 1980s included:
a) a factory that was too large for the scale of manufacturing in operation, with the result
that the operation could be improved by consolidation
b) low productivity compared to some other similar plants owned by the corporation
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c) high scrap rates and quality problems
d) limited market for their line of products in Europe
e) a danger of the product becoming obsolete.
Knell (1999) also comments that the industrial relations climate in the company by the late
1970s was characterised by a lack of respect for management and low morale and
motivation.
There were several important plus-factors balanced against these, however, including:
a) a relatively new, well-equipped factory
b) the determination of the workforce to make a go of this (many having previously lost
jobs in the mining and steel industries)
c) the belief of the management team that a well-equipped factory with a loyal workforce
must be able to find products to manufacture at a profit.
Mayon- White (1984) notes that in the mid-1980s, management decided to tackle the
problems of quality and productivity through an approach which valued openness between
management and staff. The management team looked at other companies, including
Japanese-owned operations, and recognised that communication and employee involvement
were keys to the future and were the best route to quality control, reduced wastage and
higher productivity. As such, quarterly communication reviews with groups of employees,
consultative meetings with the unions, quality circles and productivity improvement groups
were amongst a range of measures introduced to improve productivity and reduce wastage.
Throughout this period and until the mid-I 990s, the structure of the organisation remained
very traditional however, with a hierarchy of operators, foremen, inspectors, chief
inspectors, supervisors, managers etc. There was a single piece flow production system,
inherent in which was a great deal of interdependence between the different groups on the
shopfloor. Machines were operational all the time and the operators ran the machine tools,
only stopping to react to breakdowns and for tool changes. From the mid-I 990s, the senior
managers started to focus very heavily on the implementation of ajust-in-time production
system.
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Until the introduction of team-based working, the management style was very much
"command and control", and "old-fashioned" according to the interview data, in the sense that
operators spent eighty per cent of their time doing their jobs and twenty percent of their time
solving associated problems. The operators' jobs were largely product assembly and very
routine. There was some skills training, which allowed for limited rotation between jobs
but, on the whole, operators had limited autonomy and responsibility. Clear distinctions
were made between different roles and functions on the shopfloor.
5.5.3 The Rationale for Team Working
The drive to improve quality and efficiency through employee involvement continued into
the 1990s, with the focus eventually shifting to the implementation of team working. In the
early I990s, other companies within the corporation were also beginning the team
implementation process. Within Berg Transmissions at this stage, the business strategy was
aimed at growth in volume and new single style products, rather than diversification.
Technology was changing rapidly and older business was being phased out. Senior
managers considered these changes, along with the legacy of employee involvement
initiatives over the previous ten years, provided an appropriate and logical background for
the introduction of a team-based work design. In 1996, after several months of research by
a design team, self-managing work teams were introduced. The goal of this work design
initiative was very specific, namely to improve quality and efficiency.
In many ways, the introduction of a team-based approach was born out of a crisis, and was
an attempt by senior managers to break a cycle of adversarial, low-trust relationships. Also,
between 1993 and 1999, the company was faced with increasing demands for higher quality
and flexibility and reductions in costs, in an environment offaster rates of change, increased
competitor base and global supply. To compete and win, the company needed the skills,
knowledge and the determination of everyone and worked hard to sustain the team
development initiative, particularly during periods of adverse trading conditions.
The team working values at Berg Transmissions were encapsulated in the following extract
from their vision statement: ..Through team work we will identify the necessary and best methods to make
things happen. We will share information. resources. ideas and develop the skills necessary to meet the
challenges of the future. maintaining an exciting work environment where decisions are made by the
appropriate team H.
170
5.5.4. The Implementation of Team Working
Key stages of the implementation process and the timing of the different interventions during
the team implementation period are recorded on the time line below.
Figure S.2 Tbe timing of events in tbe move towards a team-based work design
Toyota Production
Teams Introduced
Training Repeated
Design Team
researches
self-managed
team working
1995 Feb 1996 Feb 1997 ----.... April 1997 August 1997 Late 1998IEarly 1999 .
H. .~ t --..
Self managed work Training fur design team, group
"Successful" Toyota teams
established, supported by contractual
teams introduced leaders and facilitators changes, introduction of team
leaders, pay and grading changes,
introduction of an open book policy,
and a focus on kaizen activities
5.5.4.1 Self-Managed Team Working
In 1996, Berg Transmissions introduced self-managing teams. The senior managers were
committed to changes geared around the production system and there was a widespread
belief at this time that in a team-based organisation it would be possible to make significant
improvements in quality, productivity and efficiency. Indeed, senior managers considered
that the introduction of process-related teams would enable them to deliver their strategies
for continuous improvement and problem-solving and to focus on supply chain and time to
market issues. Teams would also enable the company to meet the demands of the Toyota
Production System, also being introduced at this time. The company had some experience
ofteam working, in that cross-functional teams already existed in the company for particular
projects. These teams were formed to address one-off events, to kick-start major change or
to review changes. Membership of cross-functional teams was optional and such teams
were part-time and disbanded upon completion of the task. There was no apparent
awareness within the organisation at this time that the goals of self-management and lean
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production were in any way conflicting.
The design team had gathered data and established an understanding of the nature of self-
managed teams and how to implement them e.g. types of structure, training etc. The aim
was to organise the teams around product assembly, and for the teams to increase their
ownership of the production process, by taking responsibility for their own planning, and for
organising their own activities.
The senior management team made the appropriate structural changes e.g. designating the
teams, providing guidance to team members on the nature of team working and encouraging
them to take more responsibility for the production process. They also provided training for
managers, group leaders, and team leaders, focusing on the nature of team working and
problem-solving techniques.
The teams were small, comprising between five and eight permanently designated members.
Each team was expected to take responsibility for a defined part of the process. The team
leaders were to act in the role of serving the team. They did not have supervisory duties.
Specifically, their role was to check that team members adhered to the systems and
standards, to help prepare for changeovers, and to ensure work was carried out at the right
speed. They were also responsible for carrying out training and team briefings, and to check
on performance, policies, plans etc. Team leaders were expected to hold briefing sessions for
the teams, focusing on what was happening, how the teams were doing, deadlines,
reminders etc.
The design team and the senior managers were keen to instil an attitude in the workforce,
that if something needed doing, it was the teams' responsibility to do it immediately.
Indeed, the senior managers were keen for self-management to work "straight of!". i.e. for the
teams to adopt these ideas immediately, take control and responsibility for their areas of the
production process and to use their initiative in solving problems, deciding what to do etc.
In some ways, this attitude presented an impediment to the implementation process.
Interviews with team members at this time revealed feelings of "we are a team. but what is it we
are supposed to do. how do we get on with the work, how do we create time and space to do improvements?"
The team members did not understand the practicalities, challenges, targets, and goals
inherent in self-managed team working and were reluctant, at this stage, to take
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responsibility for, and control of, their own work areas. Senior managers became
increasingly frustrated that the teams were having problems with implementing the concepts
of self-management. For example, if there was a problem with a machine resulting in
downtime, then the team members were expected to take responsibility for not only solving
the problem, but also for using the downtime time productively. They were expected, for
instance, to help out other teams/team members in the intervening period. This did not
happen and senior managers did not guide the teams over this hurdle. They expected the
teams to take on the mantle of self-management, and use their collective initiative to come
up with such solutions.
Another example of the problems encountered with self-management at this stage concerned
planning activities. The teams were given targets e.g. to reduce scrap by x%, but again
nothing happened. The team members simply did not seem to know "how" to plan to make
things happen. There did not seem to be a mechanism for turning their understanding of the
principles of self-management into practice. Again, analysis of the data from the interviews
reveals that managers believed that now the teams were self-managing, they should know
what to do, and how to do it, after all they were closest to the tasks and activities on the
shopfloor. The team members, however, despite the newly established team structures and
environment and the talk about team working, did not really consider this a new way of
working or feel any differently. Comments from team members reveal that although they
were now called self-managing, essentially, in their view, not much else was different.
Another problem encountered by the teams related to their interdependence. The team
members worked in a continuous production environment and the teams were highly
interdependent. As such, the team members felt there was pressure on them not to take time
out for continuous improvement activities. The interviews with team members reveal that
they simply did not know how to schedule these activities into their work and, again, they
felt because they were self-managing, they received no support or guidance.
5.5.4.2 Toyota Production Teams
The drive to create self-managing work teams continued for about six months. During this
time, senior managers became increasingly concerned that the teams were not taking on the
mantle of self-management i.e. that they were not taking control and responsibility for their
part of the process, and as such the initiative was not working. As a result, towards the end
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of 1996, their attention turned to the concept of Toyota teams, based on the Toyota
Production System and time-based improvements. Toyota teams were receiving very
positive reports from other companies within the corporation in the United States and this
type of team working seemed to address some of the problems associated with self-
management in Berg Transmissions.
Toyota teams are production-oriented, designed to deliver improvement strategies and
imbued with the discipline of the Toyota Production System. During an interview, one of
the senior managers within Berg Transmissions commented that he was attracted to this type
of team because it "adds in aspects of understanding", that is, all aspects ofteam working are
defined in detail. This includes the structure of the team, the number of team members,
where team members should be and when, who does the different tasks, when they should
be done and how long they should take and this is all linked to improvement strategies. This
form of team design addressed some of the key stumbling blocks of self-management within
the company, particularly the practicalities of how the teams should handle some of their
new roles and responsibilities.
In February 1997, senior managers in Berg Transmissions decided to establish Toyota teams
across the whole organisation. By November 1997, there were 47 teams in all, including a
Management Team, a Group Leader's Team, 3 Logistics Teams, a Finance Team, 6
Engineering Teams, 26 Production Teams, 6 Technical Teams, a Human Resources Team
and 2 Production Services Teams. This research focuses on the production teams. The
senior managers' ultimate goal remained the creation of self-managing teams, and they
firmly believed that the move to Toyota Production teams was one way to achieve this.
Some of the basic structures of the Toyota production teams in Berg Transmissions were
similar to those established for the self-managing work teams. The teams comprised
between five and eight people, but one operator took on the role offacilitator. The teams
were designed around single piece flow, with machines being operational all the time. The
nature of the production process meant that all the teams were tightly linked to each other.
As such, the process operators were largely interdependent. The teams were also designed
such that they had a defined part of a process, a challenge, a leader and an outcome or goal
to drive improvement. Teams were permanently designated, and where they included
temporary workers, these people were dedicated to particular teams.
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The organisational structure was changed to considerably reduce the hierarchy and
comprised only four layers, namely director, manager, group leader and operator.
Effectively, there was one Manufacturing Manager and Group Leader for each product
department, responsible for about 60 process operators across shifts. Skilled technicians
were assigned to product departments as well as to the central facility.
Figure 5.3. Team organisation within the company.
MANAGEMENT TEAM
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS
(adapted from figure provided by the Plant Manager)
To enable the workforce to make the transition to Toyota teams, training was provided
between February and April 1997 for the design team, group leaders and facilitators on
teamwork and improvement. This included eight days in total dedicated to courses and
workshops on principles of total quality, problem solving, performance and measurement,
Q.O.S. and 8D corrective action, production system (awareness), team work, leadership,
team building, team briefing, internal customer concept and benchmarking and policy
deployment (awareness).
The roles and responsibilities of group leaders, facilitators and operators were defined in
great detail with the move to Toyota Production teams. The group leader or coach was
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chosen by management and was responsible to management for the performance of the
teams. The group leader created and maintained links between teams and provided cross-
functional support for the teams. The group leader had some traditional supervisory tasks
and acted as a conduit for information flow to and from the teams. More specifically, the
group leaders were involved in many key activities, including:
(a) determining business goals for the departments, including planning the business
objectives into departmental 0bjectives annually and setting targets and goals to achieve
the overall business targets and goals; carrying out monthly planning of activities to
meet objectives and communicating these to the group; monitoring performance against
these plans and where necessary taking corrective actions; evaluating the need for
overtime and organising with group members as and when necessary.
(b) establishing business performance measures including reviewing the skills of the teams
every three months; ensuring quality, quantity or progress was measured at the end of
operations; selecting data sources (for all areas of responsibility) that show performance
and ensuring that these data charts were displayed and presented (QCDSM); explaining
departmental quality improvement objectives to group members and facilitators;
summarising team activities and objectives and comparing them with the overall
departmental quality objectives; monitoring progress to objectives and reporting at
departmental meetings and management meetings; allocating responsibility for process
improvements to correct quality problems; checking the detail of teams' cost reduction
schedules and comparing them with the overall target for the department; and, directing
and leading activities to achieve cost reductions.
(c) communicating on a wide range of issues, such as, group and team performance and
where performance was poor in meeting targets, directing necessary countermeasures;
presenting monthly costs to the department and in doing so promoting and directing
cost and waste reduction activities; explaining the company's policies, values and
business situation to group members and facilitators on a monthly basis; understanding
and implementing work regulations and rules and counselling/disciplining group
members who broke the rules; ensuring work-related complaints are dealt with without
delay; encouraging group members to generate ideas, big and small, to eliminate waste,
for example, and promoting this activity by showing the number of ideas generated by
the department and their affect upon the reward scheme; planning and acting to ensure
training of group members; leading departmental meetings; carrying out employee
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development reviews with group members at least once a year; promoting health, safety
and environmental policies; reporting departmental safety statistics and ensuring relevant
countermeasures were in place; and, providing time and direction for facilitators to
undertake their activities and brief their teams.
The leadership of the teams was by a facilitator who was part of the team. The facilitator
worked with the group leader to plan improvement activity events and agree goals. The
facilitator helped ensure the team's plans and planning activities were capable of meeting
agreed targets of improvement and organised the team to carry out these improvement
activities to reach the agreed targets. The facilitator also helped the teams organise and
make decisions about day-to-day activities, e.g. helping to contain problems when they arose
and decide if the resolution ofa problem was within the team's capabilities. The facilitator
referred difficult issues to the group leaders. Communication was a key feature of the
facilitator's role, as it was the facilitator's responsibility to carry out team briefing sessions
on a regular basis to keep the team informed about their progress and help eliminate conflict
within the team. The facilitator also communicated with the group leader and with other
facilitators on a regular basis about team activities and team issues. The facilitator identified
training needs with team members, planning with the group leader when training was to take
place and monitoring progress. At this time, facilitators received a £50Opa supplement for
taking on this role.
The role of the service operators was to support or fill in for team members undergoing
training; organise off-line gauge checks; keep records of output, defects and breakdowns;
maintain stocks of process consumables; cover short-term absences of team members;
support/fill in for team facilitators and carry out their activities; check/fill machines with
lubricant/coolant/cutting fluid; support/fill in for team members carrying out tool changes
and changeovers; move parts in and out of cell e.g. to heat treat, from heat treat, to
assembly; maintain 5S standards. Where an operator's role included this service factor, it
was worth £698pa.
The operators/team members received on-the-job training designed to make them more
multi-skilled. With the guidance of the facilitators, they were responsible for allocating
process tasks, but not defining targets and goals. The company assigned breaks and
allocated specific times, and it became the team members' responsibility, again with the
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guidance of the facilitator, to organise themselves around these schedules. The team
members operated across cells to enable time-based operations to work.
The service operators were responsible for delivering raw material to the teams and the team
members finished and packed goods for the dispatch area. Team members were responsible
for changeovers and set-ups, and if they needed engineering support they were responsible
for requesting it through the group leader. The service operators helped solve problems,
and it was the team members' responsibility to manage waste. SPC documented
instructions were prepared for team members. Team members were responsible for quality
assurance in the process cycle time and for the housekeeping in their work areas.
The activities and tasks of the teams were designed around standardised workflow
methodology. A cross-functional team dedicated time to gaining knowledge from external
training events about Toyota best practices and then worked with the teams on kaizen
events. The cross-functional team worked with the teams for a week, standardising and
documenting operational processes and exposing problems. The idea was that the processes
were established in this way and then the teams took responsibility for making them work
and ensuring they did not revert back to old practices.
As such, everything was timed and scheduled for the team members. Every second of the
day was accounted for, with the objective of exposing problems. Waste was removed e.g.
stretching, twisting, bending and lifting. Time out was planned for meetings, breaks and
improvement activities. The aim was to drive out variation and discover how to improve, to
reduce costs and to meet market place prices. The team design and activities focused on
quality, systems, standardisation, and documentation and these enabled team members to
identify variations and problems to be documented and then tackled. Essentially, the teams
were in place to implement the Toyota Production System and to remove all wastes
associated with under-productivity or over-productivity. One result of this standardisation
and documentation was that new team members could join teams at any time and easily pick
up the routine. Another was that limited communication was needed between shifts. With
the work standardised to this extent, no hand-over period was required.
All told, the principles and practices embedded in the Toyota teams were far-removed from
the original framework driving the earlier transition to self-management. The Toyota team
178
design removed much of the decision-making central to the concept of self-management.
Interviews with senior managers in the company revealed that the standardisation "made the
life of the operator easier, because it took work out, rather than added it in ". In the effort to remove the
blocks, which had prevented self-management, the managers considered "prescribed roles for
team members and facilitators would make the teams work. Targets for improvement were cascaded into
departments". The managers felt that despite the standardisation and exact definition of the
process, the operators still had "some discretion and control in terms of time to carry out non-standard
tasks (improvement activities)".
This standardisation was enabled, at least in part, by the engineering teams, which designed
processes appropriate for a Toyota Production System. These design processes included
standardisation of aspects, such as, walk time, load/unload, feeds/speeds, and types of
machine tools for single piece flow e.g. points for putting things down, inspection etc.
Another requirement was that the engineering teams designed machine tools not to be too
highly specialised, to enable team members to understand and fix them. Automation was
another key feature, to take out the boring parts, but conveyors were not put in unless they
delivered single piece flow. Maintenance technicians and operators put preventive
maintenance schedules in place across 80% of the plant to give teams more ownership of
preventive maintenance. The team members and technicians became increasingly familiar
with the equipment and, as a result, more able to come up with preventive measures
themselves.
There were no role demarcations in the production teams and team members rotated
between roles. If an operator went off the line, then another team member took on hislher
role. The operators stopped the machines for breakdowns and changeovers and it was the
teams' responsibility to resolve any problems. If, for example, a machine was down, the
team was expected to address the problem and in the intervening period e.g. whilst waiting
for parts. to go and help out other team members/teams. This was now prescribed practice
for the teams, whereas under self-management, the team members were expected to use
their initiative to establish a similar course of action.
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Figure 5.4. Tbe communication and briefing system.
BREAKDOWN
INDICATORS
TO TEAM ISSUES
MONTHLY
DEPARTMENTAL
BRIEFS MONTHLY
(adapted from figure provided by the Plant Manager)
Team members were encouraged to learn from each other and to try to avoid establishing
"pecking orders". They were also encouraged to handle their own grievances within the team
and not to spend time in team briefings griping about each other and any problems. Team
members were involved in within and between team meetings, and meetings with managers,
suppliers and customers and encouraged to use their skills and knowledge to find
appropriate solutions to problems. For example, with regard to breakdown problem areas,
team members were expected to get involved, measure what was happening, and target what
needed to be done. If team members took time out, they were now supposed to understand
the impact of this on the team and workflow.
Process operators were recruited with assembly skills or taken on young and trained. The
selection process placed emphasis on technical skills (how to assemble things) and team
work and involved an assessment centre approach, using tests and practical games. The
employee representatives were involved in the process, but management made the final
decision.
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Team members were not paid for skills. In early 1997, a Self-Financing Reward Scheme,
based on a design by a cross-functional team, was implemented to encourage the sharing of
new ideas and was based on improvements to drive out waste. Any suggestion, activity, or
idea from any employee, if accepted, got £5, which was put in a "pot". Examples of the
types of savings made included identifying spare equipment, and selling it. The resultant
savings from the improvement of the suggestion were shared 35% to the pot, and 65% to
the company based on the first year's savings only. The reason for this split was explained
by the fact that some money had to be spent to implement the ideas to support price
pressures. Anyone, including those employees considered to be employed to generate
improvements, could put into the scheme. The value of the pot was shared out equally to aU
employees twice per year. On average, the scheme paid out £500 per year to each
employee.
Each employee had a development review, which was not linked to pay, and included
assessing training needs and training received, attitudes, likes, and dislikes. Team appraisal
focused on key business measures e.g. quality, quantity, delivery, cost, safety, morale,
turnover, and attendance.
Much of the progress the company made in implementing Toyota teams during 1997 and
1998 involved designing these new structures, procedures and methods of working. The
senior managers decided on the structure of the teams e.g. operators, service operators,
facilitators, group leaders and departmental managers, defined these roles in some detail and
introduced relevant training courses. The senior managers also made considerable progress
in standardising workflow methodology. However, in terms of team development, and the
adoption of team working practices by the teams themselves, the transition to Toyota teams
was not particularly smooth during the first year.
In fact, the stumbling blocks in the transition process were remarkably similar to those
encountered during the introduction of self-management. These included the teams showing
theoretical understanding of team working. mainly derived from the training courses, but not
delivering in practice, and team activities being haphazard rather than consistent. Some of
the training was repeated (e.g. with Group Leaders in August 1997) but significant changes
had not yet occurred and the team spirit was still not apparent during 1997 and the early part
of 1998.
181
Data from the interviews revealed that some of the problems were cultural, in the sense that
the Toyota team design is based on Japanese principles, and is "severe", whereas accepted
Western work practices in the company have tended to be more "flexible". In the early stages
of its introduction, this was a big issue and created conflict, realised in a rather antagonistic
attitude towards the new ways of working. However, the senior managers focused on the
detailed "end of the process" and the workflow methodology, and the teams began to recognise
there was a lot of waste. The company had always been very open in its communication of
information, a legacy of the earlier employee involvement initiatives and the partnership-
based approach developed by the company, and employees were aware of the company's
difficult financial and market position. As such, the teams began to recognise that they could
reduce waste and costs, and this had an impact on their willingness to adopt these
standardised procedures. As one interviewee revealed, "the team members want job security,
pensions are important". The fact that the team members were prepared to follow the
standardised procedures, however, did not result in teams. Indeed, as one senior manager
explained, after almost one year, "the teams seemed to have just entered storming phase, and not
understood the real challenges yet".
This notwithstanding however, senior managers did note improvements on some of the key
measures. One observation made by a senior manager during an interview was that "under
the traditional work structure the operators spent eighty per cent of their time doing their jobs and twenty per
cent of their time solving problems. Now it is changing, and this makes problems simpler". Through the
teams' work in supply chain activities, supply rejects were reduced from 1500 parts per
million to 547 parts per million. Other activities to drive out waste include switching to a
single carrier, reducing costs by £100,000 per year, reducing suppliers of electrical spares
components 33 to 3, and suppliers of oils, lubricants and components from 24 to 2.
Attendance rates remained the same at 97%-98% and there was no increase in turnover,
which was already low at 0.5%.
These results suggested the improvement and waste reduction activities were having a
positive impact on business performance during 1997 and 1998. Team development,
however, was not regarded in such a positive light. Interviews revealed that the team
members adapted to their prescribed roles, but still "only did what was asked of them. " Overall,
the senior managers considered there was no evidence of team spirit.
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5.5.4.3 Infrastructure Changes
During 1998, the senior managers became increasingly aware that the Toyota teams were
not developing, nor were they as dynamic as expected. Towards the end of 1998, the Plant
Manager again decided to change the emphasis of the initiative, to reinforce the business
objectives at team level, and to continue with performance improvements.
One of the changes in emphasis made by the Plant Manager at the end of 1998 related to the
term "facilitator", which had been introduced to describe the internal leadership role within
the team with the implementation of Toyota teams in 1997. These facilitators were
extensively trained and very capable. However, the Plant Manager considered that the term
conveyed the wrong message about their function and ultimately did not believe team
members would follow a facilitator. As such, the Plant Manager changed the title to team
leader.
The company provided the following description of the expectations and accountabilities of
this team leader role from a Manufacturing perspective. The role was designed to assist in
'driving' continual improvement. The team leader was expected to become the primary
leader on a day-to-day basis, whilst remaining part of the operator group. Key
accountabilities included: liaising with the group leader; organising and directing day-to-day
activities to manufacture parts; adjusting manning, builds etc.; participating in the
development, co-ordination and evaluation of training within his/her group; documenting
data pertaining to key measurements as identified by the group leaders; and providing the
primary leadership in problem solving.
Also, at this time, and reinforcing the above role title change, the company implemented new
"Process Operator Role, Terms and Conditions of Employment Working Practices". Team
members were required to sign a contract to say, amongst other things, that they would
follow the team leader. The following points are extracts from this contract, which required
operators to:
• totally accept the changes required in working practices and behaviour to operate within
the Toyota Production System as required by the Company e.g. not just making bits, but
actively participating in 5S (housekeeping), process mapping, standardising work, kanban,
and kaizen activities.
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• be totally active in the participation in continual improvement as required by the
Company e.g. kaizen or other improvement techniques and exercises, and problem-solving
teamwork.
• participate in total productive maintenance as required by the Company, carrying out
operator tasks as scheduled e.g. keeping clean, lubricating, performing checks etc. and
confirm on checklist.
• have total acceptance of team leaders and the direction by team leaders e.g. including,
but not limited to, allocation of tasks, and people to those tasks, training and working
methods.
• be totally involved in providing performance data, measurement, and monitoring
progress, hourly/daily, as requested e.g. output, feed/speed, quality/scrap, breakdowns,
changeover timing, tool life etc.
• be totally flexible to adapt to the changes required to grow the business for the future
e.g. operating machines/equipment/cell manufacturing and/or service operating (lubricants,
support changeovers, spare tooling, production material, first-off checks, etc.), supporting
teams/cells. Adopting different/additional tasks and responsibilities as may be
expected/dictated by customers. (Past experience: SPC, gauging, health and safety activities
etc.)
All told, team members were expected to follow their team leader's direction in terms of
work structure, but the team leader had no disciplinary power.
The changes to the role title, the expectations and accountabilities of the team leaders and
the introduction of the new terms and conditions were all completed amicably at the end of
1998. There was no payment differential for team leaders, but with the new contract of
employment the whole operator group moved up one level in the pay system. The Plant
Manager commented during an interview that "it was always the company's vision to make afair
exchange i.e. as the team members' roles expanded. they would receive additional pay". Indeed, the
objectives of changing the pay and grading system included simplification, eliminating
anomalies, and recognising flexibility. All employees received the same incremental increase
as a result of pay talks and this increase was based upon the plant performance and not on
the individual, appraised performance.
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There were no other changes to the reward systems during this time and the Self-Financing
Reward Scheme continued to reward improvements as it had done since 1997. The Plant
Manager commented, however, that any improvements based on kaizen activities, which had
increased rapidly as a standard part of all jobs during this period, also went into the ''pot'',
e.g. kaizen activities resulted in improved performance through reducing overtime. Such
improvements resulted in reduced wages and there was a need to reward people as an
incentive to continue with these changes to ensure they did not lose out financially.
The Plant Manager believed that with the new grading system, team members on the same
pay rate and with the same status norms, the team spirit was better. He also believed that
the new role profiles introduced in early 1999 further reduced anomalies and status
differences. Instead ofa precise job description for eachjob within the organisation, groups
of jobs were positioned into roles and a wide banding used for the grading and resultant pay.
This system emphasised the nature of the different roles in the organisation, taking the focus
off individuals and their particular knowledge and skills and engendering more emphasis on
team roles and responsibilities. These role profiles included a description of the main
purpose of the job, subdivided into key accountabilities (what has to be done, main areas of
accountability and responsibility), competencies (how things are achieved), success criteria
(what's expected to be achieved - results/objectives), and knowledge and skills (needed for
the jobholder to do the job at that time).
The specific key accountabilities were a list of statements, identifying the purpose of the job,
along with the end results required in order to achieve this purpose. The characteristics of
these accountabilities included details of all the key outputs of the job and end results (not
duties or activities), with the emphasis on actions that led to an end result. Typically, the
company expected to see between four and eight accountabilities. The knowledge and skills
section listed the knowledge and skills the job holder needed to do the job and was technical
in the broadest sense e.g. commercial, health and safety, engineering and administrative.
The focus in all areas of the role profiles was on the job, not the individual, and this
emphasised the contribution of the different roles and not the different individuals in the
team.
In early 1999, the Plant Manager also reassigned the teams, with the total number of process
teams decreasing from 26 to 24. The teams became slightly larger, usually comprising six or
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seven members, with a maximum of ten. Each team was responsible for part of the
production process, with a number of team leaders working on each shift with the group
leader. Team leaders were responsible for holding short, regular team meetings at which
production issues were discussed. The focus in these meetings was on improving
performance and team leaders established their own patterns e.g. holding meetings weekly
(for about fifteen to twenty minutes) or daily for about five minutes per shift. The team
meetings were complemented by departmental level meetings once a month at which group
leaders led discussions about business/operating matters and presented plans, performance
data, deadlines etc. In these meetings, group leaders also cascaded business objectives to
the teams.
Throughout 1999, as at all other stages of team development since 1996, the company
continued to focus on performance improvement. Kaizen activities were one facet ofthis,
representing a team approach to, and structured way of, solving problems. Seniormanagers
also considered training was important in making team work more concrete and in
improving performance and five days training was provided for process operators in kaizen
activities. Prior to this, at the start of the transition to Toyota teams in 1997, the company
had tried to get volunteers for kaizen activities. In 1999, participation in kaizen activities
became part of the process operators' contracts and, subsequently, kaizen events were
organised once a month. Eight process operators at a time were taken from their work
areas for a week to focus on improvement. They received a day-and-a-half training on
kanban signals, how to measure process inventory, and one-piece-flow. For the following
three-and-a-half days, two groups of four went out to resolve issues pertinent to their areas,
with the support of kaizen group leaders. As a result, team members established a better
understanding of problem-solving, innovation, structure, best practice, and where the
business was going. To date (early 2000), one hundred people have been involved in these
events. Interviews indicated that the biggest concern of team members related to "their fear
for jobs through kaizen, and that workers were being exploited H. In response to this, senior managers
firmly believed and stated that "the company's aim was to drive out waste, not people H.
At a more general level, the company established a training plan for employees. During
1999, there was emphasis on training, not just for kaizen activities, but also training on
products, machine tools, problem solving, teamwork, leadership and team building, team
briefing, internal customer concepts and benchmarking and policy deployment awareness,
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which senior managers considered had a major impact on performance. Data from
interviews revealed that among a minority of the operators, there was still "some suspicion of a
hidden agenda i.e. people were being selected for redundancy. And operators didn't all want to develop".
Some operators did "not see the point of becoming involved in the process", commenting that they
"happy with what they were doing, and considered they were already making a contribution. "
The company also implemented an employee development programme for all employees, to
enable the company to compare the training and development needs of individuals with
business needs. Group leaders worked with individuals on their development needs and
every employee had an employee development review at least once a year to discuss
development, building it into the objectives of the organisation. On the basis of these
reviews, plans were put in place to improve individuals' abilities to do their jobs and to meet
both company and personal objectives. Nobody was forced into being developed, but the
company's support extended to cash funding and day release for those wanting to
participate in further education. The principle underpinning the organisation's employee
development philosophy was to make full use of the intellectual ability of all employees.
The Toyota Production System provided a structure and a strict code for all activities on the
shopfloor in Berg Transmissions. By 1999, performance was measured every hour and any
problems identified. If the teams were not able to solve the problems in half-an-hour, they
escalated to the group leader, after half a shift they went to the management, and after one
shift to the Plant Manager. This was part of the strict code.
This strict code was also part of the team development initiative to help teams clarify and
understand their purpose. The strict code provided a discipline for the teams. At the outset
of the overall team development initiative in 1996, the teams did not know how to behave
and what to do. The Plant Manager now considered that the Toyota Production System
provided the teams with this knowledge about the business.
The company also had an open book policy and there was constant and consistent
communication to the teams, sharing information through briefings about the business and
people, question and answer sessions, involvement in monthly quality meetings, weekly unit
meetings, planning meetings and by the provision offeedback. Operators were able to see
the minutes of meetings published on the information boards and to review actions of
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minutes. Data on all aspects of business performance were available in charts and through
meetings, including information on the financial performance of the company, relating to
costs, profits and sales. Also, the union representatives were included in every discussion
about business performance, about the teams, issues relating to overtime, overall financials,
quality, etc.
The recruitment policy and procedure were also driven by a strict code. The procedure
included three structured interviews, with the same twenty to twenty-five questions on
ambitions, technical skills, problem-solving etc. asked of everybody. Different interviewers
handled different sections of the interview and asked the different questions. As such, an
objective score defined acceptance or rejection. Potential recruits also took part in an
assessment centre, with included psychometric tests. technical tests, team activities and
individual activities. The recruitment procedure continued to include employee
representatives and team leader input.
In early 2000. towards the end of the researcher's involvement in the company. the Plant
Manager believed that the company had succeeded in creating effective teams. The team
members now had pride in their work and team spirit. Team members were involved in
continuous improvement activities and had access to the business and financial data. The
teams were performance/success driven and team members had the opportunity for personal
growth and improvement.
The company also claimed that team working practices had contributed to clear
improvements in business performance and enabled the company to reposition itself in the
market quickly. For example, accidents decreased from sixteen per month in September
1998 to seven per month in September 1999. Warranty costs decreased from £160,000 in
1997 to £24,000 in 1999, and in the first quarter of2000 they were £1200 (annual costs
were not available at the time of completing this case in September 2000). In 1999,
employee turnover was below 0.5%, and employee attendance was 98%. The company also
started to enjoy sustained growth through new products and an increased customer base and
experienced the longest period ever without compulsory redundancies. In 1993, the
company's turnover was £20m, with products nearing the end of their life cycle. In 1998,
turnover had increased to £35m, with new products in expanding markets.
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In summary, the situation in Berg Transmissions in early 2000 was such that production was
carried out by twenty-four teams, each with a team leader, divided into groups under group
leaders. The teams were there to improve the performance of the company by challenging
the status quo and improving the process. Teams in cells carried out the assembly process,
which was organised on a single piece flow as far as possible. Team leaders decided onjob
assignments within teams, organised the work schedules and measured team performance.
As a consequence of this system of work organisation, operators took on more functions, in
the sense that they were able to rotate between different roles, and their jobs were enriched
by their involvement in continuous improvement and problem-solving activities.
In 1996, the senior managers in the company had had a vision, to generate performance
improvement by organising the process operators into self-managing work teams. The
company had not achieved this vision by early 2000. Rather, the company had created what
they deemed to be effective Toyota teams, and the Plant Manager retained the aim of
working towards self-management. The Plant Manager believed that the strict code and
structure inherent in the Toyota Production System was enabling the tasks and
responsibilities in the process to become second nature to team members. However, he still
maintained that the teams had some control and responsibility over their work, in the sense
that the teams could decide, for example, when and whether to improve the system e.g. by
lowering inventory, or taking time out of the cycle. It was also the team members'
responsibility to recognise and solve problems. The Plant Manager considered that the
introduction of Toyota teams eradicated some of the stumbling blocks to the creation of
self-managing work teams, e.g. team members' uncertainty ahout what to do and how to do
it. As such, the Toyota teams provided a platform for further team development towards
self-management.
In terms of the change process, the creation of Toyota teams was deemed to be successful
by the senior managers within the company. The Plant Manager considered the initial
structural redesign into teams had been effectively supported by the changes that had been
made to the infrastructure since late 1998. Initial attempts in 1997 to create Toyota teams
had not been successful without this supporting framework. These changes included the
introduction of an open-hook policy, contractual changes for all process operators, the
redefinition of the team leader's role, kaizen training events and activities, employee
development initiatives and streamlining the recruitment, reward and grading systems and
189
the introduction of role profiles to eliminate the focus on the individual and demarcation
issues. The Plant Manager considered these changes have helped build respect, open and
honest communication and the involvement of people and, as such, enabled the effective
development of Toyota teams.
5.6 Discussion
In 1996, this company set out to introduce self-managing teams. As the case discussion
shows, senior managers within the company faced barriers during the implementation of self-
managing teams and in 1997 the emphasis switched to the creation oflean production teams.
By early 2000, senior managers considered these lean teams were working effectively and
having a positive impact on business performance.
This case highlights similar problems to those encountered in Clearwipe plc in terms of the
fit between the team design and production system characteristics. These findings build on
recent research (e.g. Cutcher-Gershenfeld et aI, 1994) on the incompatibility of self-
managed work teams in lean production environments. In the change to team working, this
case also considers the shift in focus from individual tasks to collaborative team work and
from doing to thinking, and raises issues about the de-skilling, rather than up-skilling, of
team member's jobs. Indeed, in this company, delegation of team-related tasks did not
increase the autonomy of team members. In fact, team leaders effectively took on a more
pivotal ro Ie and assumed these responsibilities. Finally, this case discussion reinforces earlier
work (e.g. Cohen et al, 1996, and the findings reported in the previous case) with regard to
the importance of congruence between new patterns of working and organizational systems
and arrangements. For the successful transition to, and maintenance of, collaborative team
working, a company must ensure the appropriate alignment of its human resource systems.
Each of these issues will be considered in more detail in the final chapter of this thesis.
One particularly interesting aspect of this case is the process by which teams adopted,
adapted, and developed. The team idea evolved in this organisation. At the outset, there
was a focus on implementing self-managing work teams. Factors inherent in the design of
the production setting provided obstacles to the success of this initiative (Buchanan, 2000).
This was especially problematic in the adverse economic climate faced by Berg
Transmissions, which created the impetus for a sharp focus on the operational issues of
productivity, efficiency and effectiveness.
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The teams in this company have evolved into lean production teams and the case analysis
suggests they are operating successfully and effectively. It is impossible in this thesis to
predict how the evolution of the teams will continue in this company. The data from this
case does support the notion that the longevity implied in the literature for the life cycle of
team working is not a true reflection of what really happens in team development initiatives
(Buchanan, 2000). Indeed, team working developments would seem to have a much shorter
life cycle. The Plant Manager in this company confirms this with his view that "team working
is a constantly evolving vision Ho Indeed, the Plant Manager retains the goal of the teams reaching
level of self-management. Whether this is achievable with the existing production strategy
and the impact of Toyota teams in de-skilling certain aspects of team roles essential to self-
management, e.g. team autonomy and responsibility for planning and scheduling etc.,
remains to be seen.
The third case in this thesis explores further the importance of congruence between new
work designs and their supporting organisational arrangements and systems. This case also
considers the scale of the change to team working, contrasting radical and incremental
approaches.
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CHAPTER SIX
Case Study Three: Optel Corporation
6.1 Synopsis
On 9 September 1994,Optel Corporation switched overnight to self-directed team working.
Initially, self-direction was chaotic, but as problems were resolved and appropriate support
frameworks established, it came to be recognised by senior managers as the best way to
organise the company's production processes. Notwithstanding the difficulties of attributing
success directly to team working, the company has won four Queen's Awards to Industry in
the past ten years, increased output and expanded the workforce in the last three years, and
regularly cites improvements in employee satisfaction over the same time period (i.e. 1995-
1998). The company believes team working has played a large part in these successes.
There are two key areas offocus in this study. The first concerns the nature of the change
process which, in this case, was a revolutionary transformation. The second concerns the
organisational arrangements and systems successfully established to support this
transformation to self-directed team working. These include a twelve-strong resource
support team to facilitate the move to self-direction and to help resolve team-related
problems, the establishment of prime roles within each team, making individual team
members responsible for specific functions and activities, a new career development
structure, team-oriented recruitment and selection procedures and team-based assessment
and reward systems.
One key issue in this case relates to the brief period 0f intensive and pervasive change, which
culminated in the formulation of new strategies, structures and systems within the company.
Another issue concerns the establishment of organisational support systems congruent with
the new organisational design, which were important in reinforcing a new deep structure in
the organisation and a new period of equilibrium. A key implication is that organisational
arrangements and support systems that fit a new work design are fundamental to a
successful change process, in this case the transition to self-directed team working, and
reinforce the new work design as a whole through mutual feedback loops.
192
The difficulties inherent in attributing success to, and measuring success of, team working
initiatives, are also discussed.
6.2 Introduction
Traditional assumptions about change have been based on the concept of incremental,
cumulative change. By contrast, the Punctuated Equilibrium Model (Gersick, 1991) is based
on the idea that relatively long periods of stability (equilibrium) are punctuated by short
periods of qualitative, metamorphic change (revolution). The interrelationship of these two
modes is explained through the construct of a highly durable underlying order or deep
structure. This deep structure is what persists and limits change during the equilibrium
periods, and it is what disassembles, reconfigures, and enforces wholesale transformation
during evolutionary punctuations (Gersick, 1991). The new activity patterns of an
organisation's deep structure reinforce the new system as a whole.
The punctuated equilibrium paradigm proposes that fundamental change cannot be
accomplished piecemeal, slowly, gradually and comfortably, and indeed case histories have
supported the idea that fundamental transformations occur according to the patterns
predicted by the model. For example, Tushman, Newman and Romanelli (1986) examined
the life histories of four organisations, AT&T, General Radio, Citibank and Prime
Computers, and described a progression of equilibrium periods during which organisational
systems, structures and strategies were consistently reinforced toward increasing coherence
with the organisation's basic missions. The equilibrium periods were punctuated by very
brief periods of intensive and pervasive change, culminating in the formulation of new
missions and the initiation of new equilibrium periods. More significantly perhaps, for
organisations contemplating change, empirical studies (e.g. Miller and Friesen, 1984) have
shown that organisations that radically and quickly alter their formal structures, decision-
making routines and information-processing devices perform better than organisations that
change gradually and incrementally.
In line with this, but with the focus at an individual rather than organisational level, Beer,
Eisenstat and Spector (1990) also question traditional views of change. They believe that
many change programmes are flawed because they begin by trying to change the knowledge
and attitudes ofindividuals, which they consider will lead to changes in individual behaviour.
A common assumption is that changes in individual behaviour, repeated by many people,
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will result in organisational change. Beer, Eisenstat and Spector (1990) believe that this
understanding of the organisational change process is "exactly backward" and that
"individual behaviour is powerfully shaped by the organisational roles that people play"
(p.99). The most effective way to change behaviour, therefore, is to put people into a new
organisational context, which imposes new roles, responsibilities and relationships on them.
This creates a situation that, in a sense, forces new attitudes and behaviours on people. Two
of the key assumptions behind this approach include firstly, the notion that individual
knowledge, attitudes and beliefs are shaped by recurring patterns ofbehavioural interactions
and secondly, the notion that the effects of the organisational system on the individual are
greater than those of the individual on the system. In a new organisational context, such as
that created by a revolutionary change for example, new ways of working and new roles,
responsibilities and relationships are orchestrated for individuals within the system and force
new behaviour.
The following, introductory section of this case explores in some depth, firstly the
Punctuated Equilibrium Model, then goes on to consider the characteristics of organisational
systems in maintaining a self-directed team working environment and finally examines the
evaluation of this type of work design
6.2.1 The Punctuated Equilibrium Model
The punctuated equilibrium paradigm has three mam components: deep structure,
equilibrium periods and revolutionary periods. Deep structure is the set of fundamental
"choices" a system has made about (1) the basic parts into which its units will be organised
and (2) the basic activity patterns that will maintain its existence. Deep structures are highly
stable for two general reasons. Firstly, the trail of choices made by a system rules many
options out, at the same time as it rules mutually contingent options in. Secondly, the
activity patterns of a system's deep structure reinforce the system as a whole, through
mutual feedback loops (Gersick, 1991). Tushmanand Romanelli (l985) describe five kinds
of structural and performance choices that make up organisations' deep structures. These
include (1) core beliefs and values regarding the organisation, its employees and its
environment; (2) products, markets, technology and competitive timing; (3) the distnbution
of power; (4) the organisation's structure; and (5) the nature, type and pervasiveness of
control systems.
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Within equilibrium periods, the second component of this paradigm, the system's basic
organisation and activity patterns stay the same; the equilibrium period consists of
maintaining and carrying out these choices. Tushman and Romanelli (1985) believe that
human systems make refinements and incremental steps during equilibrium periods, as they
work to achieve goals built into their deep structures. These authors believe these
convergent periods are" ... relatively long time spans of incremental change and adaptation
which elaborate structure, systems, controls, and resources toward increased coalignment,
[which] mayor may not be associated with effective performance (p. 173). [They are]
characterised by duration, strategic orientation, [and] turbulence ..... (p. 170). During
[these] periods ... inertia increases and competitive vigilance decreases; structure frequently
drives strategy" (p.215).
Tushman and Romanelli (1985) define these equilibrium periods as phases during which
organisations become more internally consistent and suggest that "selection processes favor
. .. organisations whose strategic orientations are consistent with internal and external
environmental demands" (p. 195). When the environment is reasonably stable, organisations
that maintain equilibrium should become more and more thoroughly adapted to carry out
their missions. By sticking to a course, a system can become skilled at what it does
(Gersick, 1991).
The third major component of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm is the revolutionary
period. Revolutions are relatively brief periods when a system's deep structure comes apart,
leaving it in disarray until the period ends, with the "choices" around which a new deep
structure forms (Gersick, 1991). Revolutionary outcomes, based on interactions of systems'
historical resources with current events, are not predictable; they mayor may not leave a
system better off. Revolutions vary in magnitude (Gersick, 1991). In Tushman and
Romanelli's (1985) terms" .. reorientations are relatively short periods of discontinuous
change where strategies, power, structure, and systems are fundamentally transformed
toward a new basis of alignment (p. 173). Recreations are reorientations that also involve
discontinuous change in core values which govern decision premises ... [They are] the most
radical form of reorientation (p. 179). During reorientations, organisation inertia decreases,
competitive vigilance increases; strategy drives structure" (p. 215).
During equilibrium periods, organisational systems may make incremental changes because
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members want to try something new. This is not the case for change of revolutionary
dimensions. System members begin revolutionary periods because their equilibrium has been
broken. Since they are no longer directed by their old deep structures and do not yet have
future directions, systems' members experience uncertainty, often accompanied by powerful
feelings. For example, Tushman et al (1986) described organisational reorientations as
inescapably risky and painful to participants, yet potentially exhilarating too. This emotion
often plays an important motivational role in the transition. Articulation of a new vision is
central to organisational reorientation (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). The sheer urgency
and discomfort ofbeing without a functioning structure lends intensity to the search for new
solutions. As Tushman et al (1986) point out, an organisation in transition is unstable on a
number of fronts. If a new order does not take control relatively quickly, numerous vested
interests may pull it toward its old structure; transition periods may end quickly by default.
Punctuated equilibrium theorists typically contrast their prediction of discontinuous and
pervasive transformation with a view of nonrevolutionary, or gradual, incremental
transformation (Gersick, 1991). The punctuational paradigm challenges traditional
assumptions about how change works and the discussion to this point helps explain why
from this perspective, incremental changes in a system's parts would not alter the whole. As
long as the deep structure is intact, it generates a strong inertia, first to prevent the system
from generating alternatives outside its own boundaries, then to pull any deviations that do
occur back into line. According to this logic, the deep structure must first be dismantled,
leaving the system temporarily disorganised, in order for any fundamental changes to be
accomplished. Next, a subset of the system's old pieces, along with some new pieces, can
be put back together into a new configuration which operates according to a new set of
rules.
Also according to punctuational paradigms, when basic premises change, all the premises
contingent on them are affected. This idea contradicts the gradualist view of systems as
never moving (or having to move) very far from their status quo during anyone step.
Systems in transition periods undergo a breakdown of the old equilibrium and a period of
uncertainty about the future, before choosing a new basis around which to crystallise a new
deep structure.
One of the basic premises of punctuated equilibrium model is that the pattern offundamental
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organisational transformation is one ofradical, brief and pervasive change involving most or
all key domains of organisational activity. On the other hand, non-revolutionary views of
organisational transformation emphasise the relative independence of organisational subunits
as managers seek to adapt to changes in their local internal and external environments. Over
time, as subunits repeatedly alter their goals and relationships to local environments, the
organisation as a whole becomes transformed.
Punctuated equilibrium theorists stress the interdependence of organisational subunits.
Following Mintzberg (1979), Miller and Friesen (1984) argued that organisations must be
constructed so as to ensure a complementary alignment among structural variables.
Tushman and Romanelli (1994) conclude that organisations develop "webs of
interdependent relationships with buyers, suppliers and financial backers .... and patterns of
culture, norms and ideology" (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985: 177) that legally and
normatively constrain organisations to an ongoing commitment to established activities and
relationships. Gersick (1991) describes organisational deep structure as a system of
interrelated organisational parts that ismaintained by mutual dependencies among the parts
and with competitive, regulatory and technological systems outside the organisation that
reinforce the legitimacy of managerial choices that produced the parts.
According to this view, the result of interdependence is not cascading adaptation over
related organisational subunits, but rather resistance to change as subunit managers seek to
maintain a complex network of commitments and relationships. Resistance to change is
critical to punctuated equilibrium theory in that it establishes the key condition that supports
revolutionary transformation as the principal means by which organisations can accomplish
transformation. Resistance to change prevents small changes inorganisational subunits from
taking hold or substantially influencing activities in related subunits. As such, small changes
in individual domains of organisational activity will not accumulate incrementally to yield a
fundamental transformation, as suggested by gradualist views of change.
Indeed, results of empirical research by Romanelli and Tushman (1994) demonstrate that
revolutionary transformation, as predicted by the punctuated equilibrium model, is a
principal means by which organisations fundamentally alter their systems, strategies and
structures. They found no evidence in their research to support the argument that very small
changes in organisational characteristics accumulated over longer periods accomplish
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fundamental transformation. Revolutionary changes were shown to be positively and
significantly influenced by major changes in environmental conditions and successions of
chief executive officers.
On a rather less positive note, Tushman and Romanelli (1985) suggested that revolutionary
transformation may constitute a dangerous endeavour for organisations, increasing their risk
of short-term failure. Revolutionary transformation fundamentally disrupts established
activities and understandings, and nothing guarantees that the resulting configuration of
activities will be better than the previous configuration.
6.2.2 Organisational Strategy, Systems and Arrangements
Contextual and organisational factors have a direct and important impact on the successful
implementation of self-directed team working. Organisational strategy outlines the
organisation's goals and the means for attaining those goals. In the 1990s, self-direction is
seen as a strategic intervention, which will improve organisational flexibility and product
quality for competitive advantage.
More generally, the 1990s has also brought recognition that effective management of human
capital, not physical capital may be the ultimate determinant of organisational performance
(Adler, 1988). Many manufacturing initiatives (for example, advanced manufacturing
technology and statistical process control) depend heavily on employee skills and
commitment as key components in the value creation process (Snell and Dean, 1992). It is
therefore, instrumental for manufacturing firms to harness the productive potential of their
employees to achieve superior performance. Human resource activities are frequently
acknowledged to playa central role in linking employee capabilities with the performance
requirements of the firm. Research in this area (e.g. Snell and Dean, 1992) has focused
predominately on manufacturing strategies, such as advanced manufacturing technology,
just-in-time and total quality. However, the findings would seem to be equally pertinent in
the context of the implementation of self-direction. This is partly because at a strategic level
this initiative is concerned with the effective management of human capital, and partly
because at a practical level there are similarities in some aspects of the interventions. For
example, self-direction has a similar impact on job characteristics and places a similar
emphasis on collective perforrnance as some manufacturing strategies.
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An example of research in this area is Youndt, Snell, Dean and Lepak's (1996) work
exploring the relationship between human resource management, manufacturing strategy and
firm performance. Their findings relate to the contingency view of the human resource
management - performance relationship in manufacturing settings and are of direct
relevance in the context of this case. The contingency perspective posits that an
organisation's strategic posture either augments or diminishes the impact of human
resources practices on performance, For example, at a basic level the argument might be
that human resource management is superfluous to performance in manufacturing firms
unless human capital is somehow a central component of the firm's manufacturing strategy.
That is, if a firm's approach to competition depends on, or makes use of, the talents and
capabilities of employees, then human resource management practices would be more likely
to have an impact on performance, otherwise the connection between human resource
management and performance might be minimal.
Youndt, Snell, Dean and Lepak (1996) argue that the three primary manufacturing strategies
of cost, quality and flexibility each imply something different about the potential role of
human resources in improving firm performance, suggesting that the best human resource
system is contingent on the manufacturing strategy ofa firm. In support of this, Wright et
al. (1995) found that organisations exhibited higher performance when they recruited and
acquired employees possessing competencies consistent with the organisation's current
strategies.
The most relevant finding of Youndt, Snell, Dean, and Lepak's (1996) research in this
context concerns the implementation of quality strategies in manufacturing organisations.
The authors comment that quality strategies, which focus on continually improving
manufacturing processes to increase product reliability and customer satisfaction, require
employees to make the transition from an environment in which their responsibilities are
limited to only the physical execution of work to one in which their responsibilities are
expanded to include for example, planning, troubleshooting, problem solving, quality
assurance, scheduling, and maintenance. Skill acquisition and development are essential in
the implementation of quality strategies, which emphasise the technical problem solving and
interpersonal skills of employees.
Organisations must also provide the context to facilitate employee interaction and
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information exchange. As such, human-capital-enhancing human resource systems, those
with such features as selective staffing, selection and training for technical and problem
solving skills, developmental performance appraisal and group reward and incentive
schemes, are consistent with the performance requirements underlying a quality strategy.
The findings from Youndt, Snell, Dean and Lepak's (1996) study of97 plants suggest that
the apparent main effect of human-capital-enhancing human resource management on
performance is predominately a function of the performance enhancements obtained when
firms link human-capital-enhancing human resource systems with quality manufacturing
strategies.
Whilst Youndt et aI's (1996) research specifically focuses on quality strategies, the findings
are directly relevant to the strategic use of self-directed work teams in organisations.
Changes to the nature of jobs and job characteristics in the transition to self-direction are
very similar to those described above in relation to the implementation of quality strategies.
In this change, production employees are also expected to make the transition from having
limited responsibility for only the physical execution of work to a situation in which their
responsibilities are considerably expanded to include, amongst other things, planning,
problem solving, quality assurance, scheduling, and maintenance. Self-directed team
working also emphasises group interaction, interdependence and information sharing.
Self-directed work team settings depend on upskilling approaches to human resource
management (Youndt, Snell, Dean and Lepak, 1996). In a self-directed work team
environment the strategy might be to improve quality, although there are many alternative
reasons for introducing self-direction e.g. to improve productivity, increase flexibility,
reduce lead times etc. Whatever the reason for the introduction of self-direction, the
responsibilities of employees are expanded greatly. These changes create the need for
different skills and attributes in employees. Appropriate recruitment, assessment and training
programmes that emphasise attracting and developing individuals with appropriate technical,
problem solving and interpersonal skills are essential and become instrumental in achieving
the strategic goals of these interventions. Employee interaction and information exchange
must also be facilitated through appropriate structural and appraisal and reward systems
changes to promote, for example, a high degree of interdependence and group problem
solving.
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In brief, the findings from the research cited above suggest that for the successful
implementation and maintenance of strategic manufacturing interventions there must be
appropriate alignment of human resource systems. In the past, human and technical aspects
of manufacturing have operated in relative isolation, but evidence suggests that when firms
fail in their adoption of new technologies, the major stumbling blocks tend to be the human
resource management issues rather than difficulties with the technical systems per se (Adler,
1988). For example, Lawler (1981) warned that when a firm's pay system is not aligned
with organisational changes it may not reward behaviour that is needed to make new
systems work. Worse yet, existing reward systems may actually elicit and reinforce
behaviour that is opposite to what is needed to make the changes work.
With these principles in mind, the following section explores human resource systems at a
practical and detailed level, considering the link between changes in work design and job
characteristics and their direct impact on human resource systems. As already described, the
change to team working alters the nature of employee contribution and in the process,
requires different organisational systems to manage performance (Snell and Dean, 1994).
Employees operating in self-directed teams are no longer machine operators, but have
become creative, adaptive, multi-skilled problem-solvers. Groups and individuals are
required to work closely together and to depend on each other in ways in which they are
traditionally unaccustomed. Whenjobs and functions become integrated, an individual's co-
ordination with others becomes critical. Teams of workers become responsible for
productivity, quality etc. and the team decides who will perform what work on a given day
and how individuals will rotate among the various jobs. The team replaces the individual as
the primary work unit and this has an impact on all aspects of the human resource cycle,
from selection through training to reward systems. Organisational arrangements, such as
assessment and compensation systems, need to recognise and reward collective effort and
flexibility (Snell and Dean, 1994). It is not feasible, for example, to select people on the
basis of their individual behaviour and performance to work in a collective, interdependent
situation. In fact, individual selection and assessment may attract people who are not team
players, which may inhibit co-operation and team work and detract from the overall system.
Job classification practices are an important organisational system used to measure and
determine employees' contributions. The practice of job classifications implies that the
characteristics of employees' jobs capture differences in their contributions and that
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differences in pay reflect differences in skill, effort, responsibility and the working conditions
inherent in those jobs. All employees performing the same job are viewed as equal
contributors. In a traditional factory, individuals do not have discretion over their
performance. In self-directed team working, individuals have more involvement with the
production process and problem solving and have more responsibility for work activities. To
fulfil these responsibilities, employees use diagnostic, interpersonal and problem-solving
skills. In this situation, the distinction between job classifications becomes blurred and at a
simplistic level, it is not just managers who think and workers who do. As a consequence,
arbitrary distinctions in job classifications, payment systems etc. e.g. hourly vs. salary pay
need to be eliminated. If organisational arrangements appear to reward one function above
others, there is likely to be a reduction in collaboration and co-operation.
Other aspects of organisational arrangements, such as rewards for seniority in traditional
settings, may also have an adverse effect on team working initiatives. If the organisation
requires continuous learning and values flexibility, and as systems change, new skills and
procedures supplant old methods and skills, the value of seniority may be diminished.
Instead, firms may require a reward system that motivates employees to acquire new skills
and to have the flexibility to apply those skills in a timely way (Snell and Dean, 1992). To
do this, some firms have introduced skill-based pay (Lawler, 1991). With skill-based pay,
employees are rewarded for learning new jobs and developing a broad array of talents. For
example, if task complexity, variety and uncertainty increase with self-direction, skill-based
pay may reinforce employees' efforts to understand new aspects of the production system
and enhance their ability to solve non-routine problems (Lawler et al, 1992).
Finally, compensation systems may also have an impact on co-operation and co-ordination in
team working initiatives. Adjusting compensation systems may be one of the most
instrumental methods for eliciting, reinforcing and sustaining behaviour required for the
success of this new work design initiative. Compensation systems based on individual
performance can provide powerful disincentives for co-operation. The change to self-
directed team working requires individuals to rely on or collaborate with others to complete
work. Several authors (e.g. Pearce, 1987; Coombs and Gomez-Meija, 1991) have noted
that team incentives are based on the assumption that task uncertainty, interdependence and
complexity require co-operation among employees. Team-based rewards promote an
environment in which individuals' goals are intertwined and these rewards are more than
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motivational. Wagner, Rubin and Callahan (1988) found that workers soon learned how
various activities fit together and made process and quality improvements as a team.
All told, the required contributions of employees change significantly with the introduction
of self-directed team working. In traditional work practices for example, the focus is on
individual incentives, reflecting division of labour and separation of stages and functions.
With self-directed team working, it is essential there are at least elements of group incentives
to encourage co-operation and joint problem solving. In traditional work practices, use of
hourly wages assumes that the differences in employee contributions are captured in job
classifications and that performance is largely determined by the production system. In team
working, employees' contributions transcend the job per se to substantially affect output.
Distinctions between classes of employment are diminished and assessment and reward
systems must recognise this. In traditional work practices, seniority pay rewards experience
as a surrogate for knowledge and skill in a stable environment and rewards loyalty to reduce
uncertainty within the system. In team working, skill-based pay rewards continuous learning
and the value-added derived from increased flexibility in a dynamic environment (Snell and
Dean, 1994).
It is also important to recognise that in the context of organisational change processes it is
assumed that managers will develop organisational arrangements, e.g. assessment and
reward systems, to fit new work designs. This is often not the case however, as once in
place, administrative systems are notoriously intractable (e.g. Gerhart andMilkovich, 1990).
Organisational systems are held in place by written records, organisational traditions,
corporate regulations, administrative systems, employee expectations and precedents etc.
and it is often difficult to align these systems to new work designs. They are part of the deep
structure. Also, it is widely accepted in change situations (e.g. McCalman and Paton, 1992)
that people have a vested interest in maintaining the existing arrangements, and hence
maintaining the status quo. This may effectively be considered part of the inertia within
equilibrium periods.
The fundamental, underlying philosophy and premises behind self-directed work teams are
completely different to those behind more traditional forms of working. As such, old
organisational systems may pull the organisation back to its old structure. Indeed, research
supports this assertion with, for example, Pullen (1976) finding that in a situation in which
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workers were organised into teams but paid on an individual basis, there were long-term
problems for the work groups. Similar issues and problems were encountered and described
in the first case. In Clearwipe, members of the developing teams were expected to work
interdependently, but continued to be selected, assessed and rewarded on an individual basis.
This continuation of old systems and arrangements in the context of a new work design
presented one of the barriers to the successful development of teams in this organisation.
In the team implementation and development process, it is essential if teams are to develop
and mature towards self-direction that appropriate team-based organisational structures,
systems and arrangements are implemented to support the initiative and maintain the force
for change. For example, the organisation will need to facilitate employee interaction and
information exchange and reward team involvement, team decision-making and
interdependence. New organisational arrangements reinforce new structures as a whole
through mutual feedback loops.
The second aim of this case is to explore the relationship between human resource
management practices and self-directed work teams and to examine the organisational
arrangements required to support self-directed team working. It is acknowledged that
changes to organisational systems and arrangements take years rather than months to
develop and implement within companies. As such, the focus in this case is on the later
stages of the team development process.
6.2.3 Evaluation of Self-Directed Team Working
The imperative for implementing team working has changed over the years. As such, the
determination of appropriate strategies for evaluating the success of self-directed work team
initiatives has not been a straightforward undertaking. Reports on self-direction in the
1990's (e.g. Buchanan, 1994) unanimously conclude that these initiatives, unlike the early
socio-technical interventions, are not concerned with combating absenteeism, labour
turnover and the monotony associated with segmented and repetitive tasks. Rather, an
increasingly competitive business environment has forced organisations to rethink their work
design in an effort to promote quality, flexibility and greater customer responsiveness. High
performance work systems that put autonomous team working in centre stage have emerged
as an effective way of achieving these goals.
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The experiments in autonomous group working pursued by adherents of sociotechnical
systems theory and the quality ofworking life movement in the 1960's were concerned with
the creation of a more humanistic approach to work design in order to provide a more
fulfilling work experience for employees. Measures of the success of these initiatives related
to withdrawal behaviour, job and employee satisfaction and organisational commitment.
These "soft" factors have now been replaced by "hard" business realities. The current focus
on self-directed teams in organisations is based on strategic, rather than operational
considerations, with the ultimate aim of securing competitive advantage through greater
flexibility and adaptability. Measures of success in this context relate to operational
efficiency, productivity and profitability.
Notwithstanding the different focus of the measures of success of self-directed work teams
over the years, there are still two key difficulties in the evaluation of such initiatives. The
first concerns the measurement of the impact of self-directed team working initiatives. As
Goodman, Devadas and Griffith Hughson (1988) state" ... there are not many well-designed
studies that evaluate the impact of self-managing groups" (p. 307). The second relates to
the fact that those studies that do exist provide conflicting results. Survey data (Industrial
Society, 1995) suggests that the introduction of self-managed work teams can result in
better customer service, problems solved more quickly, better motivation and improved
quality. However, rigorously researched studies produce more ambiguous results.
Indeed, the results of this more rigorous research were considered extensively in Chapter
One (Section 1.9 Work Teams and Manufacturing Performance) with a full discussion of the
studies by Wall, Kemp, Jackson and Clegg (1986), Cordery, Mueller and Smith (1991),
Banker, Field, Schroeder and Sinha (1996), the meta-analysis by Goodman et al (1988) and
the more recent and holistic approach taken by Patterson, West, Lawthom and Nickell
(1997).
Of particular interest in relation to this case are the aspects of Patterson et al's (1997) work
relating to job design and the demonstration of the link between the management of people
and the performance of companies. Their research comprises a ten-year longitudinal study
(1991- 2001), which examined market environment, organisational characteristics and
managerial practices in over one hundred UK manufacturing companies. Their findings
support the notion that firms can make full use of a skilled and motivated workforce by
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promoting job designs which provide enriched jobs for employees in terms of variety, skill
flexibility and increased autonomy. In these jobs, employees have responsibility for such
activities as problem solving, maintenance, scheduling and quality assurance and work teams
are seen to positively affect productivity. Whilst this research does not specifically mention
self-direction, it is clear that this type of work design initiative creates the kind of enriched
jobs that positively affect productivity.
The final aim of this case is to consider the evaluation and measurement of self-direction and
human management practices in the Optel Corporation.
6.3 Aims of the Case
The case described in this chapter follows the implementation of self-directed work teams
over a four-year period in a UK-based company that manufactures components for
telecommunications equipment.
The author has observed the development of team working in the Optel Corporation from its
infancy in 1994 and has gathered data on the implementation process and support systems
through interviews with senior managers, production managers and team members. This
information has been used to describe the transformation process and the human resource
practices implemented in the subsequent years to support the change from a traditional
manufacturing work design to self-directed team working and has enabled the researcher to
address the key aims in this case i.e. to examine the revolutionary nature of the change
process to self-direction in this company and to explore the idea that a company must ensure
the appropriate alignment of its human resource management systems for the successful
development and maintenance of self-directed work teams. (These aims are described more
fully in the Introduction to this case in Section 6.1.)
The final part of this case will examine the difficulties inherent inattributing success to, and
measuring success of, the self-directed team working initiative in this UK-based operational
unit of a global company. The company considers the transition to team working to be a
success, both in terms of improvements in employee satisfaction ratings and in business
performance. The change to self-direction took place in September 1994 and results from
the company's own Employee Satisfaction Surveys completed between 1995 and 1998 are
available; however, there is no hard, causal data to support the link between team-based
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work design and improved performance. This chapter discusses the barriers faced in trying
to establish the causal links between the changes in work design and business performance in
this company.
6.4 The Design and Methods of the Case
This particular case was designed as a longitudinal study, investigating the implementation
of self-directed work teams over a four-year period from their infancy in 1994, with
particular focus on the factors key to the successful development ofteams in the later stages
ofthe implementation process. In the main, the detailed information used in this case comes
from structured interviews (both individual and group), although some reference is made to
in-house survey data in the evaluation section.
6.4.1 Interviews
The researcher conducted a programme of interviews to collect data on the implementation
of team working. The interviews started in the first year of the intervention and continued
twice yearly throughout the research period. Both one-to-one and group interviews took
place, face-to-face and, where possible, away from the interviewee's workstation. All
interviewees, except for the successive Operations Directors, had a minimum of six months
experience with the company. Successive Operations Directors were interviewed as soon as
possible after their arrival in the company, partly, at least out, of courtesy and to ensure
continued access within the company for the researcher, and partly for the purposes of the
research. Details of the interview programme are included in Table 6.1 below.
6.4.1.1 One-to-One Interviews
The researcher was able to interview all key players in the intervention, including successive
Operations Directors and Production Managers, resource support team members, team
members and Human Resource Management and Training personnel. The one-to-one
interviews were used to gather detailed information about the implementation process and
the changing support systems. Interview protocols were used to record comments.
6.4.1.2 Group Interviews
Group interviews were conducted, where appropriate, with people who formed natural work
groups and who were involved in the change process. These included group interviews with
resource support team members, who tended to work in groups of two or three on particular
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projects, and with groups of Production Managers, who managed the teams on the
shopfloor and frequently encountered similar issues and problems across the different teams
as they developed. Group interviews were also conducted with team members.
Table 6.1 Interview Programme: Schedule oflnterviews within Optel Corporation (numbers of
interviews in brackets)
Director of Operations (2): 1994 - 1996 One-to-One Interviews: Director of Operations
(2); Production Managers (2); Human
Resources Manager (2); 0 D Manager (4);
Training Team Members (2); Resource
Support Team (RST) Members - 2 repeat
interviews with 2 RST Members (4); Clean
Room Manager (2); Production
Controllers/Product Centre Co-ordinators (2);
Team Members (4)
Group Interviews: Training Team (1 );
Production Managers (1); Resource Support
Team (2- repeat); Self-Directed Work Team
(1)
Director of Operations (3): 1996 - 1998 One-to-One Interviews: Director of Operations
(1); Production Manager (2); Human
Resources Manager (2); Training Team
Members (2); RST Members - 3 repeat
interviews with 2 RST members (6); Clean
Room Manager (3); Product Centre Co-
ordinators (2 - repeat); Team Members (4)
Group Interviews: Production Managers (1 );
Resource Support Team (2 - repeat); Self-
Directed Work Teams (2 - repeat)
Director of Operations (4): 1998 - 1999 One-to-One Interviews: Director of
Operations (I); Production Manager (2);
Human Resources Manager (1); Training
Team Members (2); RST Members (1); Clean
Room Manager (I); Product Centre Co-
ordinators (1); Team Members (2)
Group Interviews: Resource Support Team
(1); Self-directed Work Teams (1)
6.4.2 Survey Data
In October 1994, the researcher obtained agreement from the senior management team
within Optel Corporation to survey a cross-section of employees (team members, resource
support team members, managers and administrative staff) on an annual basis, using a
questionnaire specifically designed for this research. The senior management team also
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agreed to allow the researcher access to the relevant financial information from the company
and management accounts. The researcher's intention was to examine team development
and employee satisfaction through the questionnaire and to relate this information to the
company's financial performance. At this stage, the company were keen to monitor and
evaluate the intervention in an objective way.
In early 1995, the new senior management team decided there were too many similarities
between the in-house survey they were now intending to use and the researcher's
questionnaire and withdrew their original agreement. Itwas felt that the employees would
be overburdened by, and become fed up with, completing two questionnaires each year.
However, members of the senior management team were keen for the researcher to continue
examining the link between team development, employee satisfaction and company
performance. As such, the researcher was encouraged to use the data from the in-house
survey for the same purpose.
The survey used in 1995 (and in subsequent years, albeit in a different form each year) was
an "Employee Opinion Survey" administered by the Gallup Organisation in Optel
Corporation, as well as within other parts of the organisation worldwide and in similar
organisations. On the basis of the results, Optel Corporation was able to make comparisons
with other organisational groupings within which the particular work unit resided, with
company employees at other locations and with a select group of peer companies engaged in
a variety of types of business. The senior managers at Optel Corporation considered the
annual surveys provided an "insight in to the company's effectiveness in creating a work environment that
enables employees 10 contribute 10 their full potential" (Senior Production Manager, 1997). The
company always considered the survey results a starting point for dialogue, action planning
and follow up and believed the results provided the opportunity to identify and address
issues within the organisation.
Some of the seales included in the original (1995) Employee Opinion Survey were broadly
comparable with those included in researcher's intended questionnaire. For example, in
Optel Corporation, jo b satisfaction and organisational commitment were measured by seales
widely used in organisational research (Cook and Wall, 1980; Warr, Cook and Wall, 1979).
Job satisfaction was assessed by employees rating their level of satisfaction with features,
such as fellow team members, autonomy to choose work method, job variety, physical
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working conditions, immediate boss, pay, etc. Organisational commitment was measured by
a scale which tapped three interrelated components of employee commitment: identification
with, involvement in and loyalty toward the company. On this basis, and with a new
agreement from the company for access to all the survey results, the researcher decided to
continue with the attempt to evaluate the team working initiative, despite reservations about
lack of control of the data handling. Once again, the senior management team was keen to
support the researcher's involvement, believing the results would be useful within the
company.
What the researcher (and perhaps, the company) did not know at this stage in 1995 was
that, in fact, different surveys would be used each year. This was despite the original
assurances of the senior management team that the company would ask a sample of
employees to complete the same survey on an annual basis, which would enable the senior
managers to chart the progress of team development and monitor employee satisfaction.
There was some comparability between the surveys in 1995, 1996 and 1997, but subsequent
versions have differed substantially.
The use of different questions over the years prevents direct comparisons between the years
and does not allow a clear picture of the nature of employee satisfaction within the company
to be established for the transition period. However, some survey results will be presented in
the case to illustrate a few of the measurement problems associated with the change
processes and the introduction of self-directed work teams. As far as is possible,
conclusions will be drawn about the results in the context of the concurrent changes taking
place in the implementation of self-direction within the company.
6.5 Company Background
6.5.1 Company Profile
Optel Corporation is a Canadian-owned manufacturer of semiconductor lasers and receivers
for telecommunications equipment and is located in the South - West of England. The
company designs, builds and integrates digital networks for customers in the information,
communication, entertainment, education and commerce markets.
This particular manufacturing site is recognised by the company as a global centre of
excellence inoptoelectronics and boasts one of the largest "Clean Rooms" in Europe. The
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company's European operations generated revenues of$3.03 billion in 1996. At the current
time (mid-1998), Optel Corporation employs over 1300 people, including about 1000
shopfloor staff
6.5.2 The Work Environment before Self-Directed Team Working
Staff employed by the company prior to the transition to self-directed team working in
September 1994 were interviewed in early 1995 and asked to describe the organisation and
its structure before the change process. The shopfloor was divided into product areas and
the interviews revealed that, prior to the change, the shopfloor hierarchy had a traditional
structure organised around the product lines and consisting of a manager, a superintendent,
supervisors, team leaders and operators. In many ways, it was a command and control
structure. The supervisors controlled what the operators did, and how and when they did it.
Many of the operators' jobs involved product assembly and were quite routine, but there
was training to enable operators to become multi-skilled and to move between machines
within the product areas. It remained the supervisor's decision who received training and
who operated which machine. Essentially, this multi-skilling increased the variety inthe jobs
and enabled operators to rotate between jobs on the product lines. This was seen as
important because many of the operators' tasks required precision and had a tendency to be
repetitive. Operators were involved in quality control and inspection, but had no autonomy
and limited feedback on their performance. Clear distinctions were made between different
roles and functions on the shopfloor.
The interview data indicated that in the work environment before the implementation of self-
directed work teams the operators' jobs involved job rotation and material handling within
the cell, and some responsibility for quality control and inspection. In terms of the different
levels of team work described by Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin (1997), the
operators' jobs were at Step ltjob enlargement) and were moving, at least to some extent,
towards Step 2 Gob enrichment). The supervisors, however, maintained firm control over
work activities, such as scheduling, planning etc.
The interviews also revealed that the organisational arrangements and systems were
designed to fit this traditional structure and reflected the hierarchical nature of the work
design. Communication tended to take place vertically, mainly from top to bottom. Human
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resource personnel and production managers were solely responsible for the recruitment and
selection of shopfloor staff, who were assessed on their individual abilities and their potential
and willingness to learn some technical skills, such as soldering and microscope work. Staff
were appraised annually by their supervisors and managers on their individual behaviour and
their contribution to the product areas and they were paid on the basis of their individual
performance. Career development was hierarchical with staff progressing from band one to
band two as an operator, then to team leader, to supervisor, to superintendent, and so on.
All told, the organisational systems and arrangements were very individual-orientated,
reflecting the traditional, hierarchical nature of the organisational structure.
6.5.3 The Rationale for Self-Directed Work Teams
The rationale behind the move to self-direction was that the company wanted to empower
people to make their own decisions and to take responsibility for their own actions, in order
to maximise results in the production area, in terms of productivity, quality and lead times.
Optel Corporation had already set up self-directed work teams in factories inNorth America
and Canada and were intent on introducing the same approach at this site. Also, the
previous owners of the company had introduced team working with team leaders in selected
areas of the plant. Extending team working, in the shape of self-directed work teams, was
seen as the best way to organise the company's production processes to increase
productivity and improve quality and lead times.
6.5.4 The Implementation of Self-Directed Team Working
The researcher was involved with the company between 1994 and 1999 and the key stages
ofthe implementation process and the timing ofthe different interventions during this period
are recorded on the time line below.
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Figure 6.1 The timing of events in the move towards self-direction
Introduction of Resource Support
Team, Production Controllers and
Product Centre Co-ordinators
Revolutionary
transformation to self-
direction
Director of
Operations
replaced
Production Controller role
disappears: Product Centre Co-
ordinator numbers increase
Prime Roles
established
Third
Director of
Operations
appointed
Fourth
Director of
Operations
appointed
Radical
overhaul of
shift patterns
Explosion in
business
growth
III.
9 September 1994 December 1994 1998 ....1995 1996 1997
Training for managers and
Resource Support Team
members begins
Training for team
member begins and
Manufacturing First
course implemented
New systems for peer
group assessment, team
selection and career
development
implementation
On 9 September 1994, Optel Corporation shopfloor employees switched to self-directed
work teams. After several weeks' discussion, the Director of Operations at that time made
the change to self-directed work teams overnight. This was a revolutionary transformation
and the existing shopfloor hierarchy, consisting of managers, superintendents, supervisors,
team leaders and operators was swept away and replaced by a two-tier structure of
production manager and operator.
Before the self-directed work teams were introduced, the Director of Operations had spoken
to groups of shopfloor staff to sell them the concept. Interviews with staff reveal that "he
was a good communicator" and that "a lot of staff went for it". The Director's rationale behind the
overnight switch to self-direction was that ifyou give staff weeks of training beforehand, it
is simply another case of telling people how to act. Ifpeople are left to their own devices,
they will eventually establish their own direction. One comment from an interview with a
new team member expresses this well: "Ifyou leave people to their own devices they willfind their own
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direction and make their own plans as 10 how 10 organise work."
The first day of self-direction is described as having been fairly chaotic. In the interviews,
staff describe their uncertainty about what was expected from them and their concerns about
planning their own workloads. Initially, the new shopfloor structure consisted of one
manager in charge of each of the three main production facilities, with a combined
workforce of 700. It was impossible for so few managers to control the day-to-day
activities of so many employees. As a result, even members ofstaffwho were not attracted
by the idea of self-direction, although many were, really had no option but to try to get used
to it.
The Clean Room was organised into three main production facilities and the teams were
designed to fit this layout, with specific teams designated to specific product lines on specific
shifts. From the first day of self-direction, the teams had to take control of their day-to-day
work activities including planning work, deciding on work methods, organising team
members etc. At this stage however, there was an internal rather than an external focus and
team members did not have contact with customers.
Interviews with the managers revealed that productivity and quality both dipped to begin
with, but this did not last long. One manager present at that time commented in an interview
"Ihe change hit output hard. customers were unhappy" and that "people were not happy, not with what the
Director did, but the way thai he did it". These comments were based on the fact that initially the
change had an immediate, negative impact on productivity and quality. A few weeks after he
orchestrated the change to team working, the Director responsible for the change was
moved to another job.
9 September 1994 represented a revolution in Optel Corporation, leading to a period of
disarray when the organisation's deep structure came apart. Optel Corporation's strategies,
structures and systems were fundamentally transformed. The new self-directed work teams
were not left without direction or support for too long. With the arrival of a new Director
of Operations towards the end of 1994, the organisation entered a new period in which the
organisation sought to become more internally consistent, to work to make choices around
the new deep structure and to achieve associated goals. In order to facilitate the move to
self-direction, the company formed a twelve-strong resource support team, made up of
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former managers, superintendents, supervisors, operators, schedulers and some office staff.
Its purpose was to help in solving team-related problems and the selection of resource
support team members was made on the basis of whether they would be "good at smoothing the
way to self-direction". The resource support team role was purely advisory, with no supervisory
remit. In the short term, the role of the resource support team members was to:
• facilitate the transition to self-directed team working, and
• counsel and guide the self-directed work teams on any team-related issues.
In the longer term, the role of the resource support team was to help design and implement
new organisational systems and arrangements, for example, to:
• design and administer the team review process
• educate and train the self-directed work teams in the prime roles (described later)
• provide recruitment process support
• facilitate the band three (promotion) process.
Interviews with a range of people across the organisation reveal that the resource support
team was widely believed to be effective in dealing with people-related issues. The resource
support team members helped the teams to solve problems, organise their workload and deal
with other work-related issues.
The role of the resource support team changed significantly as the self-directed work teams
became stronger, more able to solve their own problems and find their own direction.
Indeed, within a few months, the resource support team was reduced to fivemembers, partly
because some of the original members felt uncomfortable in this new role and partly because
the initial chaos was abating. By 1998, the resource support team had only three members,
who were available to help the teams if required, but their role was largely administrative
and involved facilitating the peer group assessment.
The new Director of Operations implemented other structural changes in late 1994/early
1995. Four new managers were introduced to run the product lines and two new roles were
introduced. Six production controllers were selected as "master schedulers" and six product
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centre co-ordinators were selected to work on the production lines to ensure that the
schedule was met. Production controllers and product centre co-ordinators did not have a
supervisory remit or control over the teams.
General training in self-directed team working started for managers and resource support
team members during 1995 and training for operators started in 1996. Further
reorganisation took place in mid-1996 when a third Director of Operations arrived and the
number of production managers was increased to eight. The new Director implemented a
training programme on team working for all operators, including modules on the nature of
team working, communication and handling conflict. There was some resistance to the
training from some people "as a waste of time for all operators" and, after a break of nine months,
the training programme was reorganised. Twenty modules on all aspects of team working
were prepared and were available to the teams. All team members had to buy into the
package to access the training. If one team member did not do so, then none of the team
completed the training. About two hundred people in twelve months undertook this
training. Over the same two-year period, the company ran a "Manufacturing First" course,
looking at manufacturing, scrap, inventory etc. and this course was open to all areas of the
company. Most of the staff went through this training programme.
In 1996, the role of production controllers ceased, but the numbers of product centre co-
ordinators increased to sixteen. At this time also, there was a major change to the shift
patterns, which had a significant impact on staff morale. Negative feelings towards the
company were created by what was effectively a reduction in pay for some people as a result
of changes to shift premiums and meant that some people were less willing to take on team
responsibilities for a short period of time. This was damaging to the team development
process for a while.
However, by March 1998, 75 self-directed work teams were established in total. Team size
varied from a minimum of five people to a maximum of fifteen people. Teams were
dedicated to product lines in the ten main product areas in the Clean Room. Each team had
responsibility for a definable part of the production process and for test, assembly and
alignment processes. By March 1998, through training and support activities, many of the
teams had developed to the extent that they could take control of all their work activities
and they had the skills, resources and materials to be self-directing. This work design
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initiative did not change what the team members did in terms of making the products, but
enabled the team members to learn how to manage the process.
At this stage, the interviews revealed there was some variation between the teams in terms
of the level of empowerment and there were differences in terms of how the teams handled
their autonomy. Well-established teams, for example, controlled their own holiday cover,
overtime and scheduling, whereas some of the less developed teams did not exercise this
same level of authority, relying somewhat more on the resource support team members and
other support functions.
The structure immediately after the transition to self-direction comprised only three jobs,
operator, technician, and production manager, with no real link between them. By contrast,
the structure within which the teams operated in March 1998 consisted of six roles,
operator, resource support team member, technician, product centre co-ordinator, nightshift
co-ordinator and production manager. As well as the resource support team, a number of
these other roles, such as product centre co-ordinator, had been created to help support self-
direction. In the intervening years, staff in the different support functions had also been
developing the skills necessary to help the self-directed work teams.
By March 1998, there were ten production managers, one manager for each product group.
The reduction in the ratio of operators to managers (from 250: 1 to 100: I) was enabling the
managers to focus more fully on team development. This in turn enabled them to provide
more support for the teams.
The significant growth in business experienced by the company in the intervening years led
to an influx of new team members on the shopfloor during 1997 and 1998. As a result,
many new teams were formed, and new team members integrated into established teams.
Interviews reveal that the new roles and structures implemented to support team working
e.g. prime roles and the resource support team, enabled such teams to develop and become
established quickly.
All told, the transition to self-direction resulted in significant developments in team
empowerment. Whilst there were still differences between teams in 1998, team members had
considerably increased variety, autonomy and feedback in their jobs and control over their
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work environment. Team members were responsible for housekeeping, safety, scheduling,
quality, new product introduction, training, team discipline, team selection, team reviews
and controlling holiday cover and overtime.
The teams created by Optel Corporation fit into the self-management classification of
Banker et aI's (1996) team autonomy continuum, although the terminology used by the
company is self-directed work teams. The groups of workers self-regulate their work on
interdependent tasks. They manage and execute an entire set of tasks, in this case a
definable part of the production process, and they have responsibility for support activities,
such as selection and assessment. Many of the teams also have direct customer contact.
In terms of the team development process, the overnight switch to teams was a
revolutionary transformation and created a dramatic start to the initiative. However, team
development has taken place very much in accordance with the models proposed in an
earlier chapter by, for example, van Amelsvoort and Benders (1996) and Holpp (1993).
These models suggest that teams go through a series of stages in this change process.
At the outset, training is introduced to enable operators to become multi-skilled, to improve
the production processes, by enabling operators to cover for each other, as well as to
improve the job design in terms of variety and autonomy. Meetings are introduced for
performance feedback and discussion of operational problems. Team members then become
involved in activities such as maintenance, quality control and planning, before taking on
responsibility for working autonomously. This involves establishing performance levels,
performance indicators and performance measures for the team, as well as solving team
problems and conflicts. Finally, the teams become involved with customers and suppliers
and administer functions like selection, rewards and discipline (e.g. van Amelsvoort and
Benders, 1996; Holpp, 1993).
In many companies, the transition to self-direction is described in these terms and the
different stages of development are seen as goals. The teams are established over time and
development and training is focused on achieving these goals. In Optel Corporation, whilst
the transformation to a team structure took place overnight, the change to self-direction
within the teams was a much more gradual process and paralleled the stages described
above.
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Leadership and managerial roles have also been discussed quite widely in the context oftheir
importance in the transition to self-management. Indeed, in the Industrial Society survey
(1995), senior management was cited as one of the biggest difficulties in the implementation
of self-managed teams. In Optel Corporation, the interviews revealed that successive senior
managers had the overriding belief that this was the best structure for the organisation.
Between 1994 and 1998, there were four new Directors of Operations, and, despite their
different business priorities, all of them had an enormous commitment to the change and had
expectations that their managers would support a self-directed team-based work design As
one interview revealed, there was in some ways "a feeling that there was no going back".
Indeed, the nature of the change process in the form of a revolutionary transformation may
have been fundamental to this feeling of "no going back". The change in Optel Corporation
was a short period of discontinuous change, in which the strategies, power, structure and
systems were fundamentally transformed. Choices were then made around which a new
deep structure formed, Over the intervening years, Optel Corporation established new
patterns of activities and human resource systems based on the team structure. The
company entered a new period of equilibrium. Subsequent changes within the organisation
have been incremental changes to systems and structures. However, the organisation's new
basic systems and activity patterns, based on this team structure, have remained the same,
reinforcing the new work design.
The senior management team in Optel Corporation attribute much of their recent business
success to the creation of self-directed work teams on the shopfloor. Indeed, senior
managers within the company worked hard to ensure that factors key to the effective
transition to team working were in place. For example, the senior management team
maintained a clear strategy and vision of the end-state, ensured alignment between
production strategy and team design and placed a great deal of emphasis on the
implementation process itself, by facilitating a change in manageriallleadership style,
supporting extensive training programmes, and communicating widely about the need for,
and direction of, the change.
Indeed, one of the features of particular note and importance in this research relates to the
organisational arrangements and systems, which were designed and implemented to
reinforce the transition to self-directed team working and create the values essential to
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maintaining a team working environment. As described in the literature review, congruence
between the strategy, structure and systems is integral to the overall success of any change
process. The structural changes that have been described in the implementation process in
this case were reinforced by changes to organisational arrangements and systems. The
researcher believes that these organisational arrangements and systems were an essential
component of the successful transition to self-direction in this company.
Given the nature of the change process to team working, the introduction of new
organisational arrangements and systems tends to be associated with the later stages of the
transition to self-direction. The structural changes and the creation and establishment of
teams essentially take place first, then the focus shifts to implementing appropriate support
systems e.g. team-based selection, appraisal and pay systems. In many ways, this company
has been quite unique within the overall framework of this research in reaching the stage of
self-directed team development when it became appropriate to design team-based
organisational arrangements and systems.
The second part of this case focuses on these team-based human resource processes and
systems. The changes to the organisational arrangements and systems in Optel Corporation
are described in some detail below. These will be used to help our understanding of the
organisational and contextual aspects of the processual approach to change presented in
Chapter Two.
6.5.5 Organisational Arrangements and Systems
The abolition of almost all managers after the switch to self-direction created an initial
difficulty, in that there were no effective communication channels between the teams and
between the teams and the other functions. This had a particularly negative effect on the
crucial relationship between the teams and the engineers or technicians. There were no clear
guidelines to indicate how the teams should relate to the engineers, or make clear the role of
the engineers with the self-directed work teams. In the first few weeks of self-direction, the
engineers, who interface frequently with the operators, did not possess the communication
or persuasive skills required to support the teams. Engineers were used to telling people
how to perform tasks, not persuading them to adopt what they believed to be the best
course of action, or helping them if they had adopted a different approach.
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The appointment of a new Director of Operations towards the end of 1994 led to some
changes, with the belief that building support frameworks round the self-directed work
teams would help reinforce the new work design and solve some of the initial problems with
team working, including the communication issues.
Nadler and Tushman (1979) describe the need to support any change with the introduction
of policies, procedures and structures to fit the new situation. In a similar vein, Gersick
(1991) refers to the activity patterns ofa system's new deep structure reinforcing the system
as a whole, through mutual feedback loops. In this case, the transition had been made from
an individual-oriented, hierarchical culture to an empowered, team culture and appropriate
organisational arrangements and supporting frameworks were important to develop and
sustain the initiative.
Organisations have properties of equilibrium (Nadler and Tushman, 1979). To make a
change successful, the forces for change must outweigh the forces against change or the
forces to maintain a steady state. It is essential to get the relationships amongst the
organisational components right. Therefore, in a work redesign initiative, if changes have
been made to the way in which tasks are completed and individuals start to work in a
different way, it is necessary to change the organisational systems to support this new design
and to maintain a steady force for change. The interdependence of elements in the
organisational system means that congruence between the different parts is essential for
change initiatives to be successful and for organisational effectiveness (Nadler and Tushman,
1979).
In this case, to change the culture and team members' attitudes from their individual and
hierarchical orientation to an empowered, team-based one, the organisation needed to
implement communication, information, selection, appraisal and pay systems that supported
and rewarded autonomy and team working. As described earlier, the formal organisational
arrangements in existence at the time of the transition to self-direction in Optel Corporation
were designed to fit a traditional, hierarchical, and individual-oriented culture. They did not
feature team working as a basic component and therefore the introduction of a team
working ethos made some of the systems entirely inappropriate. For example, the
recruitment and selection process in existence at the time of the transition did not include
assessment of interpersonal, team working skills or style of work group behaviour and the
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removal of the hierarchy during the change reduced upward career opportunities for the
team members. New systems were needed to reward attitudes and behaviour congruent
with the new team-based structure.
These new organisational arrangements included the introduction of prime roles, a new
banding structure, and new team-based selection, assessment and discipline systems.
6.5.5.1 Prime Roles
The first step was to establish an element of structure within the teams, to facilitate
communication and information exchange between the teams and with the support functions,
whilst maintaining a clear sense of equality, co-operation and interdependence amongst team
members. To do this, prime roles were created within each team, making individual team
members responsible for specific functions and activities.
Figure 6.2 Prime roles within teams
PRODUCTION TEAM
A team had five prime roles: health and safety; human resources; quality and engineering;
scheduling; and materials and training. The team members themselves decided who should
fill the various prime roles and generally it was someone who was suited to the task or who
had a particular interest in the area. It was also common for prime roles to rotate. They
were the key communications link between teams and support functions.
Prime roles were not leaders by another name and, indeed, there was more than one prime
role in each team to stop the role taking on a leadership function. Each prime was
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answerable for hislher own area of responsibility, but it was the collective unit that was
accountable for team performance. The training prime, for instance, "fed back to the team all
training-related information, maintained the skills matrix, and organised and monitored training".
All told, the prime role was:
• a role not a job
• not a supervisory substitute
• usually for a minimum period of one year
• suggested by a manager, but could not be enforced by a manager
• agreed by the team
• responsible for training the replacement, and if the replacement was off sick or on leave
for providing cover, and
• available for shift handover.
Prime roles did not attract any extra payment. Initially, this caused a few problems, as some
people thought that they should be paid for taking on additional responsibilities. The
question of payment was resolved however, by establishing another main element of the
supporting framework, career development.
Interviews with team members revealed that a few still felt the role was under-valued and
not worth the hassle. However, this was rather a minority view, and the introduction of the
prime roles was more widely acknowledged as a success in terms of providing a strong
communication link between teams and support functions.
6.5.5.2 Career Development
Shopfloor employees became very aware at an early stage ofthe change process that the
eradication of many supervisory and managerial functions had destroyed the traditional
career paths in the company. As a result, the ambitious were de-motivated by precisely the
system that was supposed to maximise employee motivation. This proved only a temporary
problem as a new banding system was introduced, which gave operators the opportunity to
move to a newly created band-three grade, whereas previously they would have been limited
to band two. The new band-three grade was a stepping stone to managerial, technical and
223
other positions.
There were three steps in the progression to band-three grade and team members were
nominated for development by the team:
• Step one: an individual had to be a good performer in terms of time management and
discipline, among other measures.
• Step two: the employee had to demonstrate good individual performance, and an
assessment was made of this. Technical skills, such as microscope and soldering abilities,
had to be of a high standard. Candidates also needed to possess good team and
interpersonal skills, including the ability to make a presentation, to facilitate groups and to
interact effectively with people at all levels of the company, and with external suppliers.
Normally, someone at this stage would have taken on one of the prime roles, and, for this
reason, prime roles were considered to be an important element of career development.
Those unsuccessful at this stage had to be nominated again, while successful candidates
moved on to a band-three assessment.
• Step three: this was a rigorous evaluation based on a one-day assessment programme
that included group exercises and an interview with management and the human resources
department. Employees at this stage received feedback and a development plan from an
external consultant, regardless of whether they passed or failed.
One of the key features of the new banding system was the emphasis on team-related skills
and behaviours, as well as the more traditional focus on individual abilities and technical
skills.
6.5.5.3 Team Discipline
Teams also had the authority to deal with cases where individuals were regarded as "not
pulling their weight" and teams could enforce remedial action. This authority was exercised
through an employee improvement plan, which involved team members, a resource support
team member and the individual concerned discussing the problem team member. The
resulting plan gave the team member three months to improve his or her performance or
then face disciplinary action. Employee improvement plans were the main mechanism by
which the team could maintain effective control over individual team members.
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6.5.5.4 Team Selection
By March 1998, the company had recruited an additional 200 operators since the
introduction of self-direction and teams had taken on a role in the recruitment process. As
well as being assessed on technical skills, there was a team exercise and a criteria-based
interview with human resources staff and members ofthe resource support team. Candidates
had to display appropriate group working skills and all potential recruits had to meet the
other team members also. Team feedback was regarded as crucial in selecting operators and
team members had the final say as to whether a person would fit in with the team.
6.5.5.5 Peer Group Assessment
Teams in each production area had targets covering productivity, recovered hours, output,
quality and scrap. Pay was based on team and individual performance in achieving these
targets. Consequently, there was peer group pressure to ensure the teams were performing
effectively. Team metrics focused on the whole production line, not just on one team. There
was, therefore, also outside pressure on the teams to meet their performance targets.
Three times a year, each team member underwent a formal peer assessment, facilitated by
the resource support team. Individuals were assessed according to seven criteria, including
teamwork, attitude and ability. Team members evaluated each other in tum and the
confidential ratings were keyed into a computer database. Initially in 1996, the teams agreed
that 40% of any future pay increase should be based on the peer assessment, with 60%
determined by the manager's evaluation, based on overall team performance. The latter
element was modified in 1998 to include an element of individual performance, although this
only accounted for a very small percentage of the managerial rating.
Peer assessment was suggested by the nightshift teams themselves after complaints against
the previous top-down appraisal system, particularly the fact that managers could not
accurately evaluate the performance of 250 people (at that time, there was a ratio of one
production manager to 250 operators). By 1998, it was considered to be an effective and
fair tool. Team members had to justify the marks they awarded their colleagues. Aggrieved
individuals could complain to their manager if they thought that their peer assessment result
was unfair.
At the early stages of team development, peer group assessment was an emotional
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experience for some team members. For example, interviews revealed that in some cases a
team member marked low one year may have used the system to get back at work mates the
next year. More generally, however, the interviews revealed that the peer group assessment
system was believed to work well, particularly with well-established teams and it did
succeed in reinforcing the team systems and values in place in the company.
The organisational arrangements and frameworks described in this case emphasise the
importance of support factors in a successful organisational change process to team
working. The findings from the case outline the importance in a work design initiative, such
as self-directed team working, of what MacDuffie (1995) refers to as internally consistent
human resource systems. Expanding on this idea further, using Hackman's (1982) model of
work group effectiveness (described in Chapter One), the work redesign initiative at Optel
Corporation brought about direct and congruent changes in group design and organisational
context. The company designed the teams to facilitate work on the relevant production
tasks and provided an organisational context to support and reinforce competent production
work. In terms of group design, the tasks were structured around definable parts of the
production process, the composition of the teams was thought through in terms ofsize and
range of technical and social skills, and there were clear expectations with regard to
performance. New organisational systems, such as selection and appraisal procedures, were
introduced which reinforced team-based values and attitudes.
According to Hackman's (1982) model, changes to group design and organisational context
are basic levers to create group synergy and to change the three process criteria of
effectiveness i.e. effort, knowledge and appropriateness of task performance strategies. In
tum, these changes should improve the overall effectiveness of the group, in terms of
acceptable output, team growth and team member satisfaction.
At this point, therefore, it is appropriate to consider the effectiveness of the implementation
of self-direction in this company. The changes to the structure of the organisation and
supporting systems changes provided the framework for team effectiveness and there was
certainly a belief amongst the senior managers that the company benefited from this
initiative. Senior managers regularly commented, for example, that between 1994 and 1998
the company had increased output and expanded the workforce and there was a strong belief
that team working had played a large part in this. This belief was reinforced, at least in part,
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by the senior managers' observations of team development across the production area. Not
only did the existing teams become well-established and assume responsibility for the
production process, but newly-created teams developed quickly, supported by the new
team-based organisational systems and arrangements introduced by the company.
However, Optel Corporation is not unusual in facing problems measuring and quantifying
this success. The complexities of many large organisations tend to create problems in
directly measuring and attributing success to a particular change initiative. In this case, there
are difficulties with attributing success directly to team working and these will be discussed
in the next section.
6.6 Measuring Success
6.6.1 Data Collection
The move to self-direction at Optel Corporation involved tremendous upheaval throughout
the company. Nevertheless, successive Directors of Operations retained self-direction,
partly because it was an organisation-wide initiative and commitment to team working was
expected from senior managers throughout the company, and partly because it was generally
"deemed to be a successful initiative and to have contributed to the growth of the company". Interviews
revealed that there was a belief amongst senior managers that people had adapted well to the
new work design and environment and that the company had created a workforce, which not
only "had high expectations ", but also provided "a source of competitive advantage".
From a business perspective, one interesting aspect of the company's evaluation of team
working was that it was largely intuitive. Successive Directors of Operations developed the
initiative because they "believed in its success", but on the whole, there was little quantitative
data available to demonstrate this success, or to allow some element of causality to be
determined. Some of the ambiguity in the evaluation process stemmed, perhaps, from the
fact that there are many problems in attempting to measure the impact of work design
initiatives on business performance generally, and these were not recognised by the senior
management team at the start of the intervention.
Indeed, problems associated with evaluating the impact of self-direction are perhaps
reflected in the fact that evidence cited by many organisations to support their claims for the
success of the initiative is rather anecdotal. There is often a lack of scientific research to
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support these claims.
These comments notwithstanding however, efforts were made in this company, by the
researcher as well as the senior management team, to evaluate the impact of the change
process. For example, it was agreed that an annual attitude survey would be implemented,
that systems would be put in place to monitor ''team metrics", such as team efficiency and
productivity across the production areas, and that the outcomes of the survey would be
related to team and company performance data. However, the collection of appropriate data
was not sustained over the five-year transition period, in part at least, an artefact of the
overwhelming number of changes that took place within the company during this time.
There were many organisational problems associated with measuring the effects of the
change to self-direction on business performance in Optel Corporation. These problems
included the constraints imposed by corporate headquarters when working with one work
unit of a large, complex organisation, the long-term nature of the change itself and the fact
that there were many concurrent changes to both the personnel involved in the change and
the organisational arrangements and systems. For example, between 1994 and 1998, there
were some significant changes in the senior management team in Optel Corporation. There
were four different Directors of Operations and Senior Production Managers in four years,
each with slightly different priorities and a slightly different perspective on the change. An
upturn in product demand during this same time period led to a dramatic increase of
approximately 33% in the operator workforce, with the numbers of operators rising from
700 in 1994 to over 1,000 by the end of 1998. This resulted in the creation of many more
teams in the production areas. The introduction of these new teams in the production areas,
working alongside the more developed and mature teams, made it difficult to monitor the
impact of team development and its effect on team efficiency and productivity etc. Over the
same time period, the attitudes of the teams were also affected by concurrent changes to
organisational systems and arrangements. For example, in 1996, there was a radical
overhaul of shift patterns, which created chaos for several months, and significantly lowered
the morale of some team members because it resulted in the reduction of overall pay.
The original senior management team were very committed to the change process and the
evaluation and measurement of the intervention. However, collecting meaningful
quantitative data and making "hard" measurements against the ever-changing background of
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people, structures and systems within the organisation proved very difficult. As a result, it
was impossible to evaluate in any meaningful way the impact of the work redesign to self-
directed work teams on the company's ability to successfully meet an ever-increasing
demand for their products.
Further reasons why the researcher found evaluation of the process difficult are explored
below. For example, the researcher could not make comparisons between different work
areas with different work patterns because the whole company made the transition to self-
direction simultaneously. The researcher also found it impossible to chart the impact of the
different changes to the organisational systems and arrangements and explore their effect on
business performance. This would have required detailed and consistent data collection,
rather than relying on annual employee satisfaction data, as well as the identification of
discrete actions and timings across the business. The problems of identifying discrete
actions and timings of initiatives and evaluating their impact on performance are exemplified
by two different events in 1996. It was widely acknowledged during the interviews that
radical changes to the shift patterns and concomitant reductions in overall pay lowered some
team members' morale and this was believed to have a negative effect on performance. At
the same time, a training programme for team members also began, which was expected to
have a positive effect on team performance. It was impossible on the basis of the data
collected in this company to separate out the effects of shift pattern changes from the effects
of the training programme and link these to the team working initiative. As Snell and Dean
(1994) comment the interaction between the work design and the context may moderate the
relationships in work design initiatives and there were certainly many complexities in trying
to measure the outcomes in this case.
All told, because of the nature of the change to self-direction and its effects on all aspects of
the organisational systems and arrangements, it is complicated for organisations to evaluate
the impact of the change. In this case however, the complications were increased by the
concomitant changes in the company, for example, the frequent changes to senior
management personnel and the business growth resulting in the dramatic increase in the
number of teams. These constant changes undermined the researcher's attempts to keep
good quantitative records of, for example, team efficiency and productivity in the different
production areas. The introduction of self-direction coincided with a period ofphenomenal
growth for the company. In part, the senior managers attributed some of this business
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success to the intervention, especially as the rationale behind the change was associated with
improving productivity, quality and lead times.
One measurement tool used consistently during transition period was the Employee Opinion
Survey, which was undertaken on an annual basis within the company. However, this also
had its problems.
6.6.2 The Employee Opinion Survey
To illustrate some of these problems, the following section will focus on the Employee
Opinion Surveys used between 1994 and 1998. Data were collected for the survey from a
sample of approximately fifty per cent of the workforce annually (between 400 and 550
people). However, although there was consistency in the use of the surveys annually, there
was no consistency in their content. Despite assurances at the outset that the items in the
surveys would be kept the same, this did not prove to be the case. This may be attributed in
part at least, to the frequent changes in leadership and the fact that there were four Directors
of Operations in four years, each with a slightly different vision and a slightly different set of
objectives. It is also associated with the fact that the company is one work unit in a large
global organisation, and some of the decisions about the measurement tools came from
corporate headquarters and were outside the remit of the company.
To recap, the original aim in this part of the research was to use the survey data to explore
the relationship between employee satisfaction, team development, human resource
management practices and company performance (following Patterson et al's 1997 work).
The in-house Employee Opinion Survey was an integral feature of this process. This aim
seemed viable at the outset of the change process, given the senior managers' commitment
both to the establishment of self-direction (and the fact they were some way along the road
towards achieving this) and to the evaluation of its impact. However, the combination of
the background of changes in the company, which prevented the collection of meaningful
team performance data, and the many changes to the survey items each year, made this aim
unattainable. Some of the issues associated with the survey are summarised below.
In 1995 and 1996, the same Employee Opinion Surveys was used and comprised 18
questions, which focused on employee satisfaction and organisational commitment. In 1997,
the Employee Opinion Survey was expanded to 50 questions, with the intention of giving
230
senior managers more insight into "the company's effectiveness in creating a work environment that
enables employees to contribute to their full potential". This version included 11 of the 18 questions
from the original survey and a series of thematic questions focusing on team working. The
belief of the senior managers at this time was that the inclusion of thematic questions would
enable them to make comparisons between the years as the teams developed.
The thematic items were categorised into eight areas, as follows:
Table 6. 2 Thematic item categories (1997)
Category Definition
Employees co-operate across organisational boundaries and a "one team"
orientation is encouraged and rewarded.
Employees understand customers' needs and expectations and strive to exceed
them.
Decisions are made at the most appropriate level, and employees are involved
in decision making and have the freedom to act appropriately.
Employees have opportunities for formal and informal learning and
development that enhances their careers and their contribution to the business.
Managers ensure that employees know their job, that they are measured
against defined expectations, and that they are rewarded equitably for bringing
value to the organisation and customer.
Information, processes and resources align to allow employees to do theirjobs
effectively.
A strategic plan is clearly communicated, the actions and behaviours of
leaders support the business plan and vision, and employees understand how
they can contribute to the success of the business
Employees feel Optel Corporation encourages a work environment where they
are valued and individuals are treated with fairness and respect.
Collaboration
Customer Focus
Empowerment
People Development
Performance and Rewards
Management
Productivity Conditions
Strategic Leadership
Valuing People
The Employee Opinion Survey changed once again in 1998. There were still 50 questions.
but there were only 5 questions from the original employee satisfaction/organisational
commitment survey and 10 of the thematic questions from the 1997 survey. Interestingly,
these 10 questions were scored and categorised in a completely different way to the previous
year as a new model for analysing and interpreting the data was introduced along with a new
series of questions. In 1998, the focus was on giving "managers and employees more insight into
specific areas that help create a high performance environment" and a "customised snapshot of employee
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engagement to help managers and teams plan improvements and target actions to optimise business
performance H.
The new scales included were grouped into four categories, as follows:
Table 6.3 The 1998 employee survey categories
Category Definition
Equipping These questions assess whether employees have access to the foundational elements needed to
accomplish work.
These questions assess the level of support and encouragement employees have to achieve
high performance.
These questions assess the level of attachment employees have with each other and with Optel
Corporation.
These questions assess the extent to which employees have opportunities to grow and
improve at work.
Motivating
Connecting
Developing
As this brief summary illustrates, the objectives of the surveys changed from year to year.
The original focus in 1995/1996 was on employee satisfaction/organisational commitment,
moving onto employee potential and team working in 1997 and finally in 1998 the creation
of a high performance work environment and the optimisation of business performance.
These changes reflected the different priorities ofthe different Directors during this period.
There are few conclusions that can be drawn from such incomplete and inconsistent set of
data, and it is not appropriate to carry out an in-depth analysis of the results because of the
limited number of comparable scales across the years. However, the researcher undertook a
very limited analysis to examine whether there was a trend towards increasing job
satisfaction within the company. As such, two figures are shown below, with the relevant
questions and raw scores included in Appendix 6.
Figure 6.3 shows the "Percent Favourable" scores for employee satisfaction/organisational
commitment sections of the Employee Opinion Surveys between 1995 and 1998. "Percent
Favourable" comprises the combination of "Agree" (4) and "Strongly Agree" (5) responses
or the "Satisfied" (4) and "Very Satisfied" (5) responses.
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Figure 6.3 Employee satisfaction/organisational commitment scores (1995-1998)
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Whilst no in-depth analysis of the responses across the years is appropriate because the
number of the same items included year-on-year by 1998 was only five, one striking feature
of the chart is the dip in all but one of the scales in 1996. The senior managers in the
company strongly believe that was related to the radical overhaul of the shift patterns during
this year, which reduced the shift premiums for a large number of staff and created a great
deal of unrest and low morale.
Figure 6.4 shows the "Percent Favourable" scores for some of the questions on the extended
survey of 1997/1998.
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Figure 6.4 Scores on the 1997/1998 extended survey
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Again, no in-depth analysis is appropriate because these scales represent only a small number
of the total included in each year (ten out of approximately thirty-five). In 1998, all the
scales show less favourable responses, and the company attributes this to the huge influx of
new employees and the need to create new teams, which were still at the early stages of
development when the survey was conducted.
This is a somewhat superficial exposure and analysis of the data, but there does not appear
from this to be any evidence from the results that employee satisfaction increased between
1994 and 1998. Yet, the company has maintained throughout the transition period that self-
direction has contributed to an increase in employee satisfaction (e.g. IRS Management
Review, 1997), and the senior management team attributed this increase in employee
satisfaction to team working and linked this to improved company performance.
Analysis of interview data reveals these attributions seem to be based on several different
factors. Firstly, the initiative to create self-direction was an organisation-wide strategy, and
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the senior managers in this company were keen to be successful, and to be seen to be
successful in achieving this goal. Secondly, the senior managers were able to observe team
development across the shopfloor and recognised the team members were becomingly
increasingly responsible for the production process. They also recognised that new teams
created from the huge influx of people from about 1997 onwards developed into effective
teams quickly. The infrastructure and organisational arrangements and systems facilitated
this process. Finally, the senior managers tended to discount any negative evidence from the
surveys. For example, they attributed the decrease in satisfaction across all the survey items
in 1996 to shift pattern changes, rather than any aspects of the team working initiative.
6.7 Discussion
Between 1994 and 1998, Optel Corporation succeeded in creating self-directed work teams
and in aligning its human resource management practices to the new work design. The
change to self-directed team working in Optel Corporation was a revolutionary
transformation, during which the strategies, power, structure and systems were
fundamentally changed overnight. The company made the transition from an individually-
based, hierarchical structure to a team-based, empowered structure. The organisation then
effectively entered an equilibrium period, during which incremental changes were made to
the system and arrangements. These elaborated the structure, systems, controls and
resources of the organisation to achieve the goals embedded in the deep structure.
The case findings contribute to our understanding of revolutionary transformation to self-
direction and the importance of aligning human resource management systems with new
work design practices. The research provides an insight into the types of arrangements that
are appropriate for a team working environment. The case also highlights some of the
difficulties encountered in evaluating the implementation of self-direction in a large and
complex organisation. Each of these issues will be examined in depth in the concluding
chapter of this thesis.
In the final case in this thesis, attention turns to the individuals involved in the change
process and the case considers the operational and change agent roles held by internal
organisational members.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Case Study Four: Nova Cosmetics
7.1 Synopsis
In 1993, this UK-based, brownfield manufacturing company decided to introduce self-
managed team working as part ofa wider work redesign initiative, the objective of which
was to simplify the structure of the organisation to enable better operational problem-solving
and to increase productivity within the manufacturing units.
This case focuses on two key aspects of the implementation of self-managed team working
in the packaging department of this company. Firstly, the case considers the operational
roles, behaviour and actions of individuals at different levels in the organisation who were
involved in the transition to self-management. Secondly, the case focuses on the change-
driver roles individuals adopted during the process of team implementation.
Vice President Manufacturing (1) initiated the work design changes in the packaging area,
formulating a new manufacturing strategy and operational plan which included the
implementation of self-managed work teams. Under his guidance, the senior management
team took many positive steps to introduce self-managed work teams, including
restructuring the area to create a flatter organisation and supporting a company-wide
training programme for supervisors and operators to improve their understanding of
manufacturing processes and the nature of team working.
However, the transition to self-management faltered after eighteen months with the arrival
of Vice President Manufacturing (2) with different operational priorities. The initiative was
resumed again two years later when a third Vice President Manufacturing came into office
and the operational focus was redirected to team working. A key implication in this case
concerns the operational involvement and commitment of senior individuals in this change
process.
Acknowledging that the change process to team working transcends individuals' operational
roles, this case also focuses on the team implementation process and the roles of change-
drivers and different stakeholders and groups of stakeholders. During the long-term change
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initiative to team working, change-drivers and stakeholders adopt multiple roles and
different roles at different times. The actions of the different groups and individuals are not
always consistent or supportive of each other. The findings from the case underline the
nature and importance of different stakeholder and change-driver in this change process.
7.2 Introduction
In Chapter Two of this thesis, the processual approach for investigating the change to self-
managed team working was described, one component of which referred to the politics of
the change process. This case focuses on the internal politics of the change process and the
roles of operational personnel and change agents in effecting a successful change. In this
context, the Congruence Model of Organisational Behaviour (Nadler and Tushman, 1979)
also described in some detail in Chapter Two, is considered. This model conceives of the
organisation as comprising four major components. One component is the task of the
organisation, or the work to be done and its crucial characteristics. Another component
relates to the formal organisational arrangements, including various structures, processes
and systems. The third component is composed of the individuals who are to perform
organisational tasks, and the fourth input is the organisation's strategy, the set of key
decisions about the match of the organisation's resources to the opportunities, constraints
and the demands in the environment within the context of history.
In the transition to self-managed team working, modifications will be made to all the
components and one basic premise of the Congruence Model is that organisations will be
most effective when their major components are congruent with each other. This case will
focus on the congruence between the individuals and the organisation's operations strategy.
In a traditional manufacturing design, there is a clear division of labour, with the supervisors
making the decisions for the group and employees having limited opportunities to bring in
their own ideas and sort out their own problems. A traditional work design does not take
full advantage of the members' expertise, knowledge and common sense. When senior
managers within an organisation take the long-term, strategic decision to create a self-
managing work team environment, the supervisors and managers are no longer expected to
make the decisions, but to take advantage of the team members' talents, skills, abilities,
ideas and experiences. As well as horizontal extension of tasks (multi-skilling), team
members also get former supervisory tasks and are empowered to run the daily business,
within a defined scope but independently.
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In a self-managed work team environment, team members and supervisors have to learn new
ways ofworking. Team tasks are organised around a defined product, service or customer
and team members take more and more responsibility for operational tasks. Team members
need to learn to make decisions and to interact differently within and outside the team.
Supervisors take on the role of coach, facilitator, and counsellor, and management
concentrates on the more strategic aspects of the business. As such therefore, with the
introduction of self-management, the way in which the tasks are to be performed changes.
To create an effective work environment, the style ofleadership and management needs to
change to fit this new way of working.
The Congruence Model also highlights how essential support from individuals and key
players is to the organisational change process in motivating change, shaping the political
dynamics of change and managing the transition. The change to self-management creates a
fundamentally different work environment and senior managers need to provide a clear
vision or strategy for the end-state and firm commitment and support (in terms of
consistency in plans, financial support for training and time, for example) to achieve the
objective. This case will explore the operational and change driver roles adopted by
individuals within the organisation during the transition to self-management.
7.3 Operational Roles
7.3.1 Senior Management
In recent years, senior managers have been increasingly interested in self-managed work
teams because of the perceived benefits of improved productivity, flexibility, quality,
employee commitment and customer satisfaction (e.g. Industrial Society (1995), considered
in Chapter One of this thesis). Senior managers recognise that team-based work designs
may enable quicker responses to changes in business demands and needs. However, the
implementation of self-management is a complex and radical process, affecting all aspects of
the business and, as such, needs to be embedded into a broad, long-term strategy. Senior
managers must match the internal strategic concerns of organisational structure, human
resource policies, management style etc. with the external strategy of markets and products.
For the change to team working to be successful, the role of the senior management in this
process cannot be limited to determining the strategy and operational plans. Models of
change (e.g. Nadler and Tushman, 1979) emphasise the importance of senior management in
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the transition to a new state and how important leader behaviour is in affecting the dynamics
of the organisation. These theoretical models are supported by organisational surveys and
research into the introduction of self-managed work teams.
For example, findings from the Industrial Society survey (1995), described in detail in
Chapter One, indicated that the biggest difficulty in implementing self-managed teams was
the senior management in organisations. Similarly, Knapp et al (1996) found that
introducing team working requires the full commitment of senior management. The
companies that took part in their survey of the Australian automotive industry identified
"strong support from the CEO", "implementation strategy communicated to all employees"
and ''top management play leading role" as three of the most important factors for successful
implementation of production teams.
Research in companies implementing self-management also highlights the key role of senior
managers. Schilder (1992) describes several companies which have introduced team-
working highly successfully and comments that a critical aspect on which the management
teams in Northern Telecom, Steelcase and Johnsonville Foods all agree is that self-managed
work teams need senior management commitment to succeed. In their more recent
research, Whybrow and Parker (1997) conclude that "there is a clear need for leadership
from the top to support the process of team working development" (p.l).
From his extensive case material on managing transitions in organisations, Dawson ( 1994)
concludes that strong support and commitment of senior management is "critical to the
successful management of change in providing a clear, unfettered, encouraging
environment" (p.177). Similarly, Pettigrew (1985) emphasises from his study of change in
ICI ''the importance in managerial terms of strong, persistent, and continuing leadership to
create strategic change" (p. 454). All told, the introduction of a complex and radical
change, such as self-management, not only requires clear links with corporate strategy, but
also senior management's operational commitment is crucial in overcoming opposition and
securing the levels of investment required.
7.3.2 Middle Managers and Supervisors
The move to self-management is frequently perceived as an indication of ineffectiveness in
the middle managers' previous behaviour and as resulting in the reduction of opportunities
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for advancement of managers (Manz and Sims, 1993). Partly as a result of these
perceptions, one of the biggest obstacles to the success of self-managed teams is what
Manz, Keating and Donnellon (1990) call the "middle management brick waIl". Success or
failure is often determined before the teams are put in place as middle managers and
supervisors find it difficult to prepare themselves to conduct business without traditional
management and move themselves beyond managing and supervising to facilitating and
leading. Indeed, it is increasingly being recognised that it ismiddle managers and supervisors
who may offer greatest resistance to the redesign of the organisation from a traditional to a
high involvement structure. Even when their job security isn't threatened, managers and
supervisors still face the challenge of defining new roles for themselves when employees are
striving for maximum autonomy (Manz and Sims, 1993).
The extreme of the traditional approach is for managers and supervisors to control and
instruct the people who work for them. Work designs based on self-management give
workers a high degree of autonomy and control over their immediate behaviour. This
control often includes such traditional management and supervisory prerogatives as who will
work on what machine or work operation, how to address interpersonal difficulties within
the group, how to resolve quality problems and so on.
Although few managers and supervisors operate in practice as restrictively as the traditional
approach suggests, sacrificing the command element of their job with the introduction of
self-management may still be a major challenge for them. The decision to adopt teams and to
move towards a work environment without traditional managers and supervisors requires
the existing people at this level within the organisation to make significant adjustments and
receive appropriate training. Passing of power and control to lower levels in the
organisation can be an intimidating process for both managers and supervisors, stemming
largely from their own sense of loss of status and power (Manz and Sims, 1993). Such
changes to the management and supervisory roles and styles were described in some detail in
Figure 2.5. in Chapter Two.
The behaviour and actions of the managers sets the tone for the introduction of self-
managing teams and largely determines the chances of success. Unwillingness to "let go",
reverting to a "blaming" culture, taking back control at the first sign of difficulties, will all
send unmistakable signals to those who work for them (Manz and Sims, 1993).
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Russ-Eft (1993), in her examination of factors predicting team orientation within
organisations, found that one of the most important predictors was relationships within
organisation-wide management. This study also emphasised the critical role the immediate
manager or supervisor plays in the transition from the traditional organisation to the team-
orientated organisation.
In their study of work groups involved in quality of work life projects, Trist and Dwyer
(1982) found that managers had allowed almost all of the projects to die out despite the
impressive results that had been achieved. In many of the projects, employees perceived
their supervisors as not just disinterested, but negative towards the quality of work life
activities. Managers felt that they could not satisfy simultaneously the two sets of objectives
that that were being communicated to them from their superiors i.e. to get the work groups
functioning and to maintain performance levels. They also felt that they were receiving
neither the moral nor the resource support to address effectively this new set of demands.
Specifically, management were perceived as: unwilling to change roles or policies that
inhibited the more autonomous functioning of groups, slow to respond to suggestions, not
directly involved enough in monitoring the process and helping to solve problems, unclear
on their roles in the new system, insufficiently communicative with other groups, poorly
trained in group process facilitation and conflict management, and generally "going along
with the program" instead of actively trying to make it work.
The corporate managers involved in this study accepted these findings, noting that such a
long-range strategic undertaking requiring a large investment of management time and
energy and a large investment in the training and development of the workforce was a
daunting prospect. It put a strain on other priorities and managers alike, especially as the
current systems of management practice had stood the test of time and both sides knew
where they stood (Trist and Dwyer, 1982)
In addition to these more general managerial roles and responsibilities, leading self-managed
employees calls for new perspectives and strategies which may not come naturally to those
involved (Manz, Keating and Donnellon, 1990). Traditional assumptions about power,
authority and influence are challenged with self-management, with the emphasis being on
participative management and teams managing and leading themselves.
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Also, in the transition to self-management, the horizontal structures in the organisation are
transformed as well as the vertical ones, which again impacts on the middle managers and
supervisors. The complementary design of interdependent teams and organisational
structures imposes greater demands for co-operation between all groups within the
organisation. The self-managing nature of teams involves not only transforming line
management, as supervisors become coaches to self-managing teams, but also reverses the
traditional relationship between direct production and indirect support departments. As
engineering, accounting and personnel functions are devolved to the teams, indirect
departments move into a more supportive relationship.
Direct labourers become responsible for far broader aspects of their work, linemanagers and
supervisors become more concerned with system development and strategic issues, and
traditional specialists (e.g. human resource specialists) are required to work more in
interdisciplinary and interdepartmental teams, often in greater contact with direct production
operations. Indeed for Brandon (1993), it is this necessity for interdisciplinary collaboration
that makes such strategic changes inherently vulnerable to the withdrawal of much needed
support by different functional groups.
As such, the implementation and effectiveness of self-managing teams is affected to a large
extent by the managers' and supervisors' contributions to the change process and the
maintenance of the new work design. Indeed, the conversion to self-managed teams is as
dependent on managerial and supervisory attitude and behaviour change as it is on the
development of the teams themselves (Manz, Keating and Donnellon, 1990). These authors
found that traditional managers and supervisors recognised the need to change, but they did
not always know what new behaviours were expected, nor if they could successfully learn
and apply these new skills. Managers experienced a perceived loss of power and control as
they realised that their subordinates were becoming their own managers, and that their
repertoire of management skills developed over years of experience and struggle were
becoming somewhat obsolete. Indeed, as Schilder (1992) states some managers are not able
to make the transition, with the statistics at Northern Telecom showing that about 25% of
its first-line supervisors left after the adoption of team direction.
7.3.3 The Team Members
The research exploring the attitudes of operators and team members towards team working
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reports two distinctly different types of responses to this type of change initiative. There is
research describing both the resistance and the welcome given by operators to these
changes.
Firstly, with regard to the resistance of operators to the changes Hoerr (1989) notes that the
concept of team working troubles many workers, promising autonomy over their jobs, at the
same time threatening their old ways ofworking. Similarly, Lawler (1992) comments about
many employees "[they] may have long ago decided to find their intrinsic rewards in one of
the many hobbies and activities that are available in the diverse economic and social
environment that exists today" (p. 107). This quote reflects the idea that some employees
who have worked a long time in command and control structures have lost any interest in
the company and only come to work because they need the money.
As a result, when management implement a new system requiring participation, for example,
it is difficult to get the commitment ofall members of the workforce. To some employees,
phrases like flexibility may sound like an euphemism for getting them to take on more tasks
for correspondingly less reward (Neumann et al, 1995). How strong the opposition against
team working practices is, depends on the management style that was in place before the
change. Ifthere was a climate of mistrust, it is more difficult to convince the workforce to
adapt to the new system. Having employees with the right attitude is a major ingredient to
successful team working and the reality is that not every employee wants to be empowered.
Furthermore, some individuals may not possess the characteristics necessary for team
working, that is the aim for growth and responsibility on the job. Similarly, people may lack
the ability to interact with others (Goski and Belfry, 1991) and different expectations may
lead to deadlock in the team development process. For example, there may be different
expectations about pay, with team members considering they should receive extra pay for
increased responsibility and managers considering there should be improvements inbusiness
performance before rewards are provided. Finally, the way inwhich teams are implemented
is an important factor in preventing these problems and gaining the commitment of the
people involved.
There are also start-up problems for team members. For example, Hoerr (1989) cites one
team leader from Mazda who commented that initial training sessions prepared workers for
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unprecedented involvement in shop-floor decisions. When they actually started producing
cars, there was no such thing as teamwork. For example, the team leader connnented that
workers were pressured to keep the assembly line moving even though they were told they
had the right to stop production to solve quality problems. Furthermore, there are
sometimes suspicions among team members that self-management is a way of getting rid of
people. Perhaps more commonly, there is also a belief that self-management is a way of
handing over the stress of added responsibility to the team, for which the supervisors are
paid (Hoerr, 1989).
Conversely, Manz and Sims (1993) provide some examples in which the prospect of real
participation instead of tight supervision seems to be favourable to the workforce. In these
cases, the employees are keen to learn within the organisation. Hoerr (1989) comments that
opponents of co-operation get more press than advocates of participation. In reality, Hoerr
(1989) believes that many people favour participation. This author goes on to quote figures
that show in many plants where participation is not mandatory an average of about 25% of
the workers volunteer to join problem-solving teams, another 70% are passive supporters,
while only 5% remain opposed.
7.4 Process Factors
Team effectiveness depends not only on the form of work design chosen, its fit to the
setting, and the commitment of the individuals involved, but also on the implementation
process. This process may influence the ability to implement the requisite work designs. It
may also influence the impact of the work design on the outcome.
For example, Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin (1997) connnent "despite the claimed
greater commitment of senior management to team-based working, it has not necessarily
resulted in the unambiguous transfer of substantial autonomy to work teams in the vast
majority of cases ..... " (p. 147). These authors go on to say "the change management
process is crucial to successful implementation of human-centred/socio-technical work
redesign projects" (p. 147).
These connnents are supported by wider survey data which indicates that change programs,
including the introduction of team-based working, are not always successful inmeeting their
original aims and objectives. Indeed at a general level, although business leaders view teams
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as an increasingly important factor in their business success, their satisfaction with team
work initiatives is quite low (Towers PerrinlIBM, 1991). More specifically, Waterson et al
(1997) reported between 50 and 60 per cent of the companies they surveyed in the UK were
only moderately satisfied with the effectiveness of team working. Other surveys (e.g.
Walton, 1995: Lawler, 1986) also indicate that team working initiatives are not as successful
as expected, or indeed fail.
There are few models to guide either research or practice in the process of the
organisational change to team working. Manz and Sims (1993) describe the move to self-
managing work teams as a "dramatic new revolution" (p.l) and a "fundamental change from
the traditional organisation" (p. 5). Change processes themselves are complex and political,
involving change to both diverse organisational structures (e.g. Oldham and Hackman,
1980; Badham, Couchman and Buchanan, 1995; Neuman et at, 1995) and individual belief
systems (Parker, Wall and Jackson, 1997). There are many accounts ofwhat sort ofprofile
makes for a successful team (e.g. Beyerlian, 1997). However, there is less information on
exactly how to reach that perfect profile, which may in fact vary across plants, across
departments and even within departments.
Whybrow and Parker (1997) comment that despite the prevalence of team-based working as
a modem manufacturing practice, "the available practitioner guidelines give little flavour of
the developmental processes that traditional manufacturing companies face when making as
fundamental a change as introducing teams" (p. 1). The existing research on the
introduction of teams in manufacturing companies in the UK (e.g. Sprigg, Parker and
Jackson, 1996) provides important recommendations, but little further information on an
appropriate processual framework.
In the change to team working, in contrast to more routine mechanistic types of change,
there is a large degree of uncertainty about what is to be done and how to do it. Objectives
are less clear, resource requirements not so well known, activities more often redirected and
schedules reorganised. As McCalman and Paton (1992) observe, in such conditions it is
difficult to achieve the shared perception of the project's goals and keep the necessary
commitment to provide a solution. Time and effort has to be spent ensuring effective
communication, addressing people's perceptions, encouraging flexibility, and generating and
regenerating involvement in the face of new problems, setbacks and opportunities.
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Indeed, one of the first and most critical steps for managing the transition state is to develop
and communicate a clear image of the future (Beckhard and Harris, 1977). Resistance and
confusion frequently develop during an organisational change because people are unclear
about what the future state will be like. Thus, the goals and the purposes of the change
become blurred, and individual expectations get formed on the basis of information that is
frequently erroneous. In the absence of a clear image of the future, rumours develop, people
design their own fantasies and they act on them. Therefore, as clear an image as possible of
the future state should be developed to serve as a guideline, target, or goal in the transition
to self-management. It is important to communicate information to those involved in the
change, including what the future state will be like, how the transition will come about, why
the change is being implemented, and how the individuals will be affected by the change
(Beckhard and Harris, 1977).
Problems arise from the degree to which organisational actors, culture and structure have to
be transformed for the project to succeed. A change is considered radical if it is central to
the organisation's strategy and survival, and involves modifications throughout the
organisation which are a radical departure from the existing ways of doing things (Badharn,
Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997). The change to self-management is, therefore, radical,
as it fits these considerations, and as such, it is likely to be politically controversial since the
activities and interests of a wide range of different groups may be fundamentally threatened.
There is a likelihood of political disruption and opposition (Badham, Couchman and
McLoughlin, 1997).
Also, the complexity of some changes processes, such as the introduction of team working,
increases their vulnerability. There are a considerable number of unknowns involved in the
introduction of teams. In creating new forms of team work, both management and the
workforce have to overcome traditional distrusts in order to offer rewards, on the one hand,
and both effort and commitment on the other. Yet there are inevitable uncertainties about
how the other side will behave and how far the final result will be either productive for the
firm or rewarding for employees.
In sum, by their nature, the introduction of self-managed work teams tends to cut across
horizontal and vertical boundaries and operational roles within organisations and impinges
on the interests of a broad range of stakeholders who may perceive a variety of threats and
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opportunities. The final nature of the implemented change and its impact on productivity,
working conditions and so on will be crucially influenced by how conflicts and compromises
are managed and resolved during the change process.
The focus of this part of the study is on the drivers of change and the different stakeholders
in the organisational change process. The change process generates differential demands on
individuals at different times. Change-drivers within the organisation are constrained by
historical conditioning and current context and whether they have the appropriate
knowledge and tools to overcome and exploit historical factors and manipulate
contemporary conditions to their advantage (Buchanan and Storey, 1997).
There are multiple change-driving roles that stakeholders and groups of stakeholders can
adopt in the change to team working, and different stakeholders adopt different roles
throughout the process (Buchanan and Storey, 1997). Different individuals, or groups of
individuals, may be expected to play different roles, contributing to the process in discrete
overlapping, identifiable and potentially conflicting ways at different times throughout the
change process. Particular individuals, by virtue of their position in the organisation, their
relationship to the changes in hand, and the nature of their potential contribution, may be
expected to assume multiple roles throughout the change.
The actions of different groups and individuals in the organisation might not be consistent or
indeed supportive of each other over time. The reality of the process of change is therefore
iterative, with much back tracking (Buchanan and Storey, 1997) and the behaviour of the
change drivers throughout the change process is important in shaping both the process and
its outcomes. A central aim of this part of the case is to increase our understanding of the
change process, especially the plurality of roles adopted by internal change-drivers.
There are six groups of change driver roles described by Buchanan and Storey (1997) and
these will be used as a framework to explore the roles and actions of the individuals in this
case. These roles were described in some detail in Chapter Two of this thesis and are
summarised in the following table.
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Table 7.1 Change driver roles
Reviewer,
auditor
critic, progress-chaser, Feeds information back to the stakeholders and holds the threads of
team-based working together.
Involves political activity, bringing groups together and
communicating about team working developments to prevent
uncertainty, suspicion, rumours and worry about e.g. pay,
conditions, leadership etc.
Role Deseri tion
Visionary Gives direction. inspiration and support: traditionally the domain of
the chief executive, or one in similar position.
Analyst, compelling case-builder, risk Assesses the value of the vision in the organisation.
assessor
Team-builder, coalition former, ally
seeker
Implementation planner, action driver,
deliverer
Plans the times of workshops and meetings etc., sets the agenda,
ensures the date, time etc. are communicated.
Fixer, facilitator, wheeler-dealer, Helps others to change and learn.
power broker
According to the processual perspective of change (e.g. Dawson, 1994), the change process
requires interlocking contributions of a multiplicity of drivers. Drivers of change are
unlikely to slot into predefined roles. Rather, individuals adopt different roles, and play
those roles differently throughout the change process, according to the pressures and
demands of events as well as personal preferences and expertise. The manner in which
organisational events then unfold may be explained in part by role taking and switching, and
on the differential levels of competence with which interlocking change drivers conduct
themselves in the organisational change process.
In this case, the focus is on the different change driver roles that were adopted by the
different stakeholders and groups of stakeholders throughout the implementation of self-
managing work teams. Understanding the mechanisms through which a change process to
team working is successful or not will add to current knowledge and understanding in this
area.
7.5 Aims or the Case
In the present case, there are two main aims. Acknowledging work conceptualising the
importance of congruence between different components of an organisation, the first aim of
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this case is to explore the operational roles, behaviour and actions of individuals at all levels
of the organisation, who are involved in the transition to self-management.
When senior managers in an organisation implement a strategy involving self-management,
team tasks become organised around a defined product, service or customer. Team members
are expected to take more responsibility and control for operational tasks. To create an
effective organisation, the change in the way team members complete tasks must be matched
not only by the vision and commitment from senior managers to support the changes, but by
a different approach and style by the managers and supervisors in leading the teams. The
focus in this case is on the impact of individuals' operational roles, behaviour and actions in
the transition to self-management. Qualitative data from an extensive interviewing
programme will be used to explore the roles, behaviours and actions of those involved in the
change process. Lessons can be learned from such a detailed case analysis about the nature
of people's involvement and roles in a long-term change initiative
The second aim of this case is to examine the change driver roles individuals adopt during
the process of team implementation. The success of such a fundamental change as the
transition to self-management depends not only on the form of work design chosen, its fit to
the setting and the commitment of the individuals involved, but also on the implementation
process. The change to self-management is a radical, complex, and vulnerable change which
impinges on the interests of a broad range of stakeholders and depends on the actions and
behaviours of the change-drivers over the long-term.
The change-drivers and stakeholders will critically influence the outcome ofthe change and
its impact on productivity and working conditions. This case will examine insome detail the
roles of the different change drivers, stakeholders and groups of stakeholders in the change
process. The transition to self-management is complex and this information will improve our
understanding ofthe mechanisms through which this long-term change process is successful
or unsuccessful.
7.6 The Design and Methods of the Case
This case was designed as a longitudinal study, investigating the implementation of self-
directed work teams over a five-year period from their infancy in 1993. The researcher took
on the role of observer and data collector and was involved with all key players in the
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change process. Multiple sources of information were used in this case, including
observation and structured interviews with individuals and groups.
7.6.1. Observation
After the negotiations with the company to secure participation in the study, the researcher
initially took on the role of passive observer on the shopfloor. At this stage, there was no
involvement with any of the operators and the idea was to learn about the work environment
before the team working intervention. This short period of observation provided an
opportunity to learn about the work processes and products and to record details of the
physical setting, events and activities.
The researcher took on the participant as observer role throughout the remainder of the
study and spent time on the shopfloor and at meetings, observing the teams and advisers and
their activities, interactions, work patterns etc.
7.6.2 Interviews
The researcher conducted a programme of interviews to collect data on the implementation
of team working. The interviews started in the first year of the intervention in 1993 and
continued bi-monthly for the first three years and then quarterly for the remainder of the
research period. Both one-to-one and group interviews took place, face-to-face and, where
possible, away from the interviewees'lteams' workstations. All interviewees (except
successive Vice Presidents Manufacturing) had a minimum of one year's experience with the
company. The successive Vice Presidents Manufacturing were interviewed as soon as
possible after their arrival in the organisation, both to elicit their support for the research and
to examine their views on team working. Details of the interview programme are included
below in Table 7.2.
7.6.2.1. One-to-One Interviews
The researcher was able to interview all key players in the intervention, including successive
Vice Presidents Manufacturing, Business Unit Leaders, advisers, team members and Human
Resource Management personnel. The one-to-one interviews were used to gather detailed
information about the implementation process and the changing support systems. Interview
protocols were used to record comments.
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7.6.2.2 Group Interviews
Group interviews were conducted, where appropriate, with people who formed natural
work groups and who were involved in the change process. These included group interviews
with Business Unit Leaders and with advisers who carne together for weekly meetings and
tended to work in groups of two or three on particular projects and with team members
working on the same lines.
Table 7.2 Interview Programme: Schedule of Interviews within Nova Cosmetics (numbers of
interviews in brackets)
Pilot Study - 1993 One-to-One Interviews: Vice President
Manufacturing (1); Work Redesign Team (1);
Human Resources Manager (1); Supervisor (I)
Group Interviews: Researcher worked on
Packaging Line for one eight-hour shift (enabling
observation/informal discussion) with one Product
Team
Vice President Manufacturing (1): 1993 - 1995 One-to-One Interviews: Vice President
Manufacturing (1); Work Redesign Team Members
(2- repeat); Business Consultant for World Class
Manufacturing Training (1 ); Human Resources
Manager (6); Business Unit Leaders - 2 repeat
interviews with 3 Business Unit Leaders (6);
Advisers - 3 repeat interviews with 3 Advisers (9);
Team Members - 5 repeat interviews with 6 Team
Members (30)
Group Interviews: Business Unit Leaders (I);
Advisers (3); Product Teams (3)
Vice President Manufacturing (2): 1995 - 1997 One-to-One Interviews: Vice President
Manufacturing (1); Human Resources Manager (3);
Business Unit Leaders - 2 repeat interviews with 2
Business Unit Leaders (4); Advisers/Supervisors-
2 repeat interviews with 2 Advisers/Supervisors
(4); Team Members - 3 repeat interviews with 3
Team Members (9)
Groun Interviews: Advisers (2); Product Teams (1)
Vice President Manufacturing (3): 1997 - 1998 One-to-One Interviews: Vice President
Manufacturing (I); Human Resources Manager (1);
Business Unit Leaders - 2 repeat interviews with 3
Business Unit Leaders (6); Advisers - 2 repeat
interviews 3 Advisers (6); Team Members - 3
repeat interviews with 3 Team Members (9)
Grouo Interviews: Advisers (2); Product Teams (2)
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7.7 Company Background
7.7.1 Company Profile
Nova Cosmetics is based in the South Midlands and was established in 1959 as the first
European manufacturing facility for one of the world's largest manufacturers ofbeauty and
related products. World-wide, the company manufactures cosmetics, fragrances, toiletries,
fashion jewellery and gifts, and with $4.8 billion in annual revenues in 1998, the company
ranked 293rd on the Fortune 500 list of America's largest companies.
At the site in the South Midlands, the company manufactures and packages a wide range of
the cosmetics, fragrances and toiletries. This research was based in the packaging area of
Nova Cosmetics and, at the time of the study, approximately 450 operators worked in this
section. This unit packages high volume, low cost products and fluctuations in demand
create a large amount of unpredictability and variability in the business units.
7.7.2 The Work Environment before Self-Managed Team Working
The decision to implement self-managed work teams was taken in 1993, as part ofa wider
work redesign initiative. Observations and qualitative data from interviews with operators,
supervisors and managers in early 1994 (before any changes were undertaken) reveal that
the work design of the operators at that time was very traditional and the shopfloor was
organised along strict hierarchical lines. There were three packaging business units, divided
into twenty-five packaging lines, and each line was dedicated to a particular product or type
of product (see Figure 7.1 below).
Figure 7.1 The structure of the packaging department
I VICE PRESIDENT MANUFACTURING I
I
I I 1
POWDERS BUSINESS CREAMS BUSINESS LIQUIDS AND PUMPS
UNIT LEADER IINIT LEADER BlJSINESS UNIT LEADER
• Loose Powder (4 lines)
• Pressed Powder(4Iines)
• Single Pans
• Mascaras
• Creams (3 lines)
• Roll-ons
• Miscellaneous Line
• Pot Pourri
• Pumps (3 lines)
• Liquids (3 lines)
• Single Vials
• Lotions
• Miscellaneous Line
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Besides the three operational Business Units (Powders, Creams and Liquids), there were
two main Support Units (Engineering and Transportation) and two much smaller units to
provide support in Finance and Human Resources. Processing and Quality functions were
incorporated into the operational Business Units.
The operators who worked on the lines had very mechanistic jobs, designed according to
Tayloristic principles. The interviews revealed that the operators completed a narrow range
of different tasks, rotating between different jobs on the lines and, at times of high demand,
between different lines. The operators' tasks were largely standardised, fragmented and
specialised, with a low level of task identity. Supervisors and management determined the
work method and work pace and the operators had little control over what they did, and
how and when they did it. The following comment from an interview with an operator
reflected this low level of control and autonomy: "we report for work at 8am, and the supervisors
hold afive-minute group meeting with all the line operators to tell us the work schedule, to allocate jobs/or the
day and report any problems from the previous day".
There was a very clear division of labour in the company. The Business Unit Leaders and
the supervisors were responsible for planning the work, allocating tasks and liaising with
internal and external customers and suppliers. The mechanics in each Business Unit were
responsible for changeovers and machine maintenance, and the porters were responsible for
allmaterial handling. Unlike the operators, the mechanics and the porters were not dedicated
to particular product lines. Rather, both the mechanics and porters worked in groups,
dedicated to each Business Unit, and they responded to the needs of the product lines in
their areas as required.
The interviews revealed that the supervisors had a very traditional view of their role, their
comments reflecting their belief that they "were in charge", they should act like "the boss", that
they should "make all the decisions" and "only give the operators information when necessary". They
did not expect the operators to use their initiative and expected all questions and problems
on the lines to be referred to them. As a consequence, the supervisors played a very reactive
role and were constantly inundated by very simple questions from operators.
Nova Cosmetics has a very loyal workforce and many of the operators have worked on the
lines for over twenty years. They know their jobs "inside out", yet, at this time, they almost
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always sought out the supervisor's opinion on even the most basic problems. Similarly,
some of these same people could also have handled routine changes to the machines and
solved minor technical problems. However, there were clear demarcations between direct
and indirect tasks and these were rigidly adhered to by the operators. Feedback on the lines
was also limited, with operators receiving little or no information about their performance,
whether they had achieved output targets, quality standards etc.
Interviews with the operators clearly revealed a very narrow orientation towards their work,
with many operators having a very fixed and clear view of what was and was not part of
their job. In part, this attitude towards the work was associated with the nature of the
workforce itself A large proportion of the operators were female, particularly selected on
some lines because of the high levels of finger dexterity required for the packaging of small
products and, as noted above, many of these operators had worked in similar jobs on similar
lines for over twenty years. In the interviews, these operators expressed a tremendous
loyalty to the company and were keen to "keep things working the way they had always worked".
Whilst there was little overt resistance to new ideas and change, many of the operators had
firm beliefs about their methods of work and their roles and responsibilities "for historical
reasons". Some of the operators simply found it impossible to conceive of different ways of
doing things, given that they had been doing the same things in the same way for so long.
A narrow, repetitive job, with little control leads to employees "switching off', doing the
minimum they can get away with and feeling apathetic to the organisation (Neuman, Holti
and Standing, 1995). In many mechanistic organisations, employees are discouraged from
being innovative, making improvements and solving problems. Such sentiments were
apparent in the interviews with the operators in this company, with many saying that they
"did their job on 'automatic pilot', but enjoyed coming to work to be with their friends ". Many of the
operators had no interest in whether they achieved their line targets for quantity and quality,
nor did they seem to think about, or make suggestions for, improving their jobs and work
environment. The operators carried out very routine tasks and had limited information
processing and decision-making to do during task performance. There was limited
collaboration between operators on the lines and limited ownership of the production
process.
All to Id, before the change to self-management the packaging lines had a very traditional and
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hierarchical organisation and the amount ofvariety, control and autonomy the operators had
in their jobs was very limited.
7.7.3 The Rationale for Self-Managed Work Teams
In late 1993, Vice President Manufacturing (1) introduced a Work Redesign initiative, the
main objective of which was to simplify the structure of the organisation to ensure that
manufacturing problems could be identified and resolved directly by the Business Units in
which they existed. Vice President Manufacturing (l) created a Work Redesign Team,
comprising six people from a cross-section of functions and grades within Packaging, whose
task it was to explore the underlying problems and make recommendations for new ways of
working to improve performance in this area. After several months of research and
discussion, the Work Redesign Team recommended the introduction of a World Class
Manufacturing Training Programme for all operators to give people the tools to improve
their performance. In conjunction with this, the Work Redesign Tearn believed that the
reorganisation of the shopfloor operators into self-managed work teams designed to fit with
the existing product line configuration would provide an appropriate basis for these changes.
The objective of the Work Redesign Tearn was to make recommendations that would help
improve business performance and the tearn members were well aware of the reported
organisational benefits of self-management. including quicker customer response times.
higher productivity. greater flexibility and innovation, lower costs and higher quality (as
described in Chapter One in the discussion ofthe Industrial Society (1995) survey resuIts}.1t
was also felt that tearn-based working would improve the operators' discretion over their
work. increase job variety. make performance feedback available. etc. and these changes
were expected to help switch employees back on to the organisation, and enhance their well-
being and effectiveness.
Part of the World Class Manufacturing Training was dedicated to the concepts and practices
of team working and the company intended to create self-managing work teams by gradually
enlarging and enriching the operators' jobs and moving along the tearn development
continuum to self-management (e.g. Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997).
7.7.4 The Implementation of Self-Managed Team-Working
The researcher was involved with the company between 1993 and 1998 and the key stages
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of the implementation process and the timing of the different interventions during this phase
are recorded on the time line below.
Figure 7.2 Tbe timing of events in tbe move towards self-management
Vice President Manufacturing (I)
World Class Manufacturing training
Third Vice Presidentprogramme introduced for all
determines to improve performance operators. Integrated Production Manufacturing (3)
in the packaging area and creates the teams I Continuous Improvement arrives: emphasis returns
Work Redesign tearn. teams introduced. Supervisors train to team working.
as advisers. Product teams initiated.
+ + ~Ir ...-...
Work Redesign team
recommends the introduction of
a World Class Manufacturing
programme and self-managed
team working.
Mid 1995
t
Mid 1997Julv 1993 December 1993
t
January 1994
New Vice President Manufacturing (2)
joins the company. World Class
Manufacturing training stops.
Integrated Production and Continuous
Improvement teams stop. Advisers
become supervisors. Product teams
effectively disbanded.
In this case, the change process will be described chronologically and data will be presented
according to the period in office of each Vice President Manufacturing.
7.7.4.1
7.7.4.1.1
Vice President Manufacturing (1) 1993 -1995
The Vice President
In 1993, Vice President Manufacturing (l) decided to simplify the structure of the
packaging unit to improve performance. During the interviews with the researcher, he
revealed that he strongly believed the very traditional, hierarchical structure of the packaging
floor with the rigid demarcations between the different roles was hindering performance and
preventing improvements in productivity and efficiency. He also believed that in the very
competitive market environment in which the company operated this would lead to long-
term problems. Vice President Manufacturing (1) was determined therefore to change the
way of working in packaging to enable the people on the shopfloor to take more control of
their work areas and to respond to the business need for improvements in performance. At
this stage, Vice President Manufacturing (1) did not have a fixed or clear vision of the end-
state of this change and, certainly in the interviews, the term self-management was not used
to describe a possible new work design. However, it was clear from the interviews that the
Vice President Manufacturing had thoughts about:
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• flattening the structure of the shopfloor hierarchy,
• creating a structure which would improve communication within and between product
lines,
• encouraging people to take more responsibility for, and control over, their work areas
and,
• dedicating particular teams of people to product lines, so they would identify more
strongly with their work areas and become experts on the equipment and machinery. This
would enable the operators to identify and solve their own work problems more easily.
In late 1993, the Work Redesign Team recommended to Vice President Manufacturing (1):
• changes to the grading structure,
• the introduction of World Class Manufacturing processes onto the shopfloor with a
training programme specifically designed for the company to be undertaken by all the
personnel in packaging and,
• a self-managed team-based structure with dedicated operators working on particular
machines on particular product lines. The Work Redesign Team made suggestions for
the types of tasks that could be taken on by the operators over a period of about two
years. These included housekeeping, safety, scheduling and planning, quality, continuous
improvement and training.
The Vice President Manufacturing wholeheartedly supported these proposals and action was
taken immediately to implement the changes. The shopfloor hierarchy of general duties
operator, machine operator, supervisor (one for each packaging line), team leader (one team
leader for every four packaging lines), Packaging Manager and Vice President
Manufacturing was replaced by a structure comprising operator, line leader, adviser,
Business Unit Leader and Vice President Manufacturing. These changes to the grading
systems created a more horizontally-orientated, flattened structure and provided a basis for
the introduction of self-managed work teams.
Vice President Manufacturing (1) also put in place systems to provide data and information
about company performance, Business Unit and packaging line targets and absence costs to
the operators and advisers on the packaging lines. Large notice-boards were placed in
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highly visible places in each Business Unit and the information about the relevant lines was
displayed on a daily and weekly basis.
7.7.4.1.2 World Class Manufacturing
A large consultancy firm was commissioned to design and run a World Class Manufacturing
training programme for all the personnel in packaging as a precursor to the implementation
of team working on the shopfloor. The training programme began in 1994 and all the
operators, porters, mechanics and advisers from the packaging lines in each Business Unit
were scheduled to take part in the course. This training was seen as a priority and Business
Unit Leaders and advisers were expected by the Vice President Manufacturing (1) to make
operational arrangements to enable all their staff to attend. At this stage, it was envisaged
that this would be an ongoing programme, and that once all the existing operators were
trained, it would continue to be run internally for new recruits. Indeed, in order to enhance
the participation in, and the ownership of, the World Class Manufacturing concepts, a cross-
section of people from the packaging unit, including members ofthe Work Redesign Team,
supervisors and mechanics, were trained as trainers.
During 1994 and 1995, the programme was delivered to most of the operators in the
Business Units to give people the tools to improve their performance. On the three-day
programme, operators learnt, for example, to focus on activities that reduce non-value
added activities and eliminate waste; there was a strong emphasis on adding value. The
operators also learnt how to read and understand business-related performance data to help
them interpret the efficiency and productivity targets for their work area. They were also
given the opportunity to explore the advantages and disadvantages of working in teams
through various team exercises. All the training was very practical and incorporated
activities specifically related to their product lines and work areas to improve the
transferability of the skills back to the workplace.
Many of the basic concepts from the training were immediately incorporated in day-to-day
production practices. For example, as a direct result of the ideas from the World Class
Manufacturing training, the packaging lines in the Business Units began to develop
Integrated Production Teams and Continuous Improvement Teams.
Integrated Production Teams were introduced to involve the operators on the packaging
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lines in problem-solving in their work areas and to encourage them to take the initiative in,
and more control over, their work tasks and environments. The initial objective of the
Integrated Production Teams was to identify and solve problems that had arisen on the lines
the previous day. The Integrated Production Team for each line met for a maximum of
fifteen minutes each morning to discuss the problems the operators may have experienced
the previous day or identified from the productivity, efficiency and quality data which was
now being supplied to the lines on a daily basis. If it was not possible to resolve the issues
immediately during the meeting, they would be described and kept on the agenda which was
displayed on the notice board for the line, until they were resolved permanently.
Membership of the Integrated Production Teams was rotated amongst the operators on each
line to provide everyone with the opportunity to become involved in the initiative. At the
outset, some of the operators found the concepts behind the idea oflntegrated Production
Teams quite difficult, and during the interviews revealed that they believed "it was the
supervisors' and Business Unit Leaders 'job to do the problem-solving, it was not the responsibility of the line
operators ". Also, some of the operators did not believe that "you could set up a line, so that it did
not to break-down" for example and, as a result, World Class Manufacturing seemed unrealistic
and impractical. Other operators felt that "it was inappropriate for operators to be given jobs that
supervisors were paid for", However, Integrated Production Teams were introduced on all the
product lines, and much of the initial scepticism from the operators disappeared quickly to
be replaced by more positive views of the initiative.
Overall, the Integrated Production Teams were successful in:
• involving the operators in identifying and solving problems affecting their work areas,
• encouraging the operators to take responsibility for, and control over, some of their work
problems, and
• getting the operators to use the business performance data supplied to the lines on a daily
basis.
Through the Integrated Production Teams, the operators became increasingly involved in
information processing, decision-making and scheduling.
Continuous Improvement Teams also started to be introduced as a result of the World Class
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Manufacturing Training. These teams had a wider focus than the Integrated Production
Teams, as their objective was to take a more holistic approach to improving the organisation
and to involve people at all levels in decisions relevant to them Membership of Continuous
Improvement Teams cut across product lines and operators became involved in buying
machines, testing new equipment etc. The Continuous Improvement Teams were
constituted until the particular problems were solved.
Both the Integrated Production Teams and the Continuous Improvement Teams were
important to the development of team-based working in encouraging operators to work co-
operatively and to take responsibility for, and resolve, operational problems (a move away
from the very individual focus of the lines). They also encouraged operators to use their
initiative.
7.7.4.1.3 Supervisors to Advisers
In 1993, prior to the Work Redesign changes, the supervisory role in this company was a
very traditional one. During the interviews with both operators and former supervisors
about the nature of the supervisory role, some commonly used phrases to describe the role
included: "tell people what to do "; "enforce discipline ": "complete lack of trust between supervisors and
operators"; "no sharing of information or knowledge of the areas"; "no training just supervising";
"supervisors give instructions ": "always getting involved in line tasks themselves"; "having a narrowfocus";
"cracking the whip"; "telling people what jobs to do on the line in the morning"; and "dictatorial". The
traditional nature of the supervisory role is very apparent from these descriptions.
In 1994, as part of the structural changes and the introduction ofteam-based working, the
role of supervisor disappeared and the role of adviser was introduced. Whereas previously,
there had been one supervisor for each packaging line, there was now one operations adviser
responsible for all the packaging lines in each Business Unit (there were approximately four
or five lines per business unit; see Figure 7.1). The role ofline leader was introduced at the
same time and there was one line leader for each packaging line. The line leader's role was
designed to take on responsibility for dealing with the everyday, routine panics and
questions from the operators. This freed up the advisers' time and enabled them to move
away from their rather reactive operational role to a more proactive one. The role of adviser
was quite different from the more traditional role of supervisor.
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The advisers reported directly to the Business Unit Leaders and were responsible for
overseeing the production activities of packaging and processing and for advising, coaching
and disciplining all operators within their unit. According to the job description, it was the
adviser's job to motivate the teams to support the objectives of the business unit, encourage
employees to investigate and resolve their own day-to-day problems and to ensure the
smooth running of manufacturing operations. Where necessary, the advisers were expected
to use formal disciplinary procedures, but they were also expected to create an environment
in which peer pressure and self appraisal were key features. The adviser's activities
included: co-ordinating production activities to execute their production plan; motivating,
facilitating and coaching the team to achieve the Business Unit objectives; appraising,
disciplining and measuring performance, including involving all team members in continuous
improvement programmes and helping initiate change; guiding the activities of staff and
being responsible for the team's training, safety, welfare and morale; communicating with the
team about production plans and with outside vendors on production issues; ensuring
efficient use of direct labour and materials; and, encouraging the teams to become more self-
managmg.
The people who took on the new role of adviser were, in fact, mostly former supervisors
and they completed a two-week training course in 1994. The course was run by an external
trainer, but was very practical to enable the participants to transfer the skills learnt back to
the workplace. The course focused strongly on leadership and supervisory style, with the
objective of providing an insight into how to facilitate, guide and coach operators rather
than direct and tell them what to do at work.
The transition to advisers was very difficult for some of the former supervisors. Indeed, for
some of them, this required changing the experiences of over twenty years in a traditional,
hierarchical system. However, during 1994 and 1995, there was a lot of commitment,
support and encouragement from the Business Unit Leaders and the Vice President
Manufacturing to effect this change in style of working.
In early 1995, interviews with advisers and operators about the role of adviser elicited the
following type of statements: "to work alongside the learn "; "to encourage and develop the line leader
10 take away the hassle of constant interruptions and day-to-day concerns to allow greater focus on the
future ''; "to be proactive "; "to encourage the team to gain knowledge about the whole
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manufacturing/packaging process"; "10 encourage the teams to take responsibility for planning and
completing their jobs "; "to provide the team with the information they need to make decisions about their
work"; and "to involve the operators in decisions about the lines".
By early 1995, there was evidence from both observations and interviews that the advisers
were successfully effecting a change in style and many ofthem welcomed their less reactive
role. Many of the advisers put a great deal of effort into providing team members with
information and helping them develop problem-solving skills. The tendency to tell team
members what to do diminished during the 1994 - 1995 period. The advisers seemed to
have learnt from their training, understood the role of adviser and started to trust their
operators and communicate with them in a more open way. The advisers admitted in
interview that at first after the training they felt they knew how they should act but did not
know how to start to put their training into practice i.e. "they knew all the words but not the
actions". They felt it took almost a year to change their advisory style in any significant way.
7.7.4.1.4 The TeamMembers
In 1994, the decision was taken to reconfigure the very traditional assembly lines in the
packaging area to a team-based work design to enable self-management. The change
process started for the operators with the World Class Manufacturing Training Programme
and was supported by the introduction of advisers to act as coaches, guides and facilitators,
and by changes in the structure of the work environment. The structural changes included
efforts to ensure that team members were dedicated to particular lines as far as possible.
Prior 1994, it had been quite usual for operators to move between the lines within each of
the Business Units to respond to the fluctuations in product demand. Itwas considered that
teams dedicated to particular lines would increase the team ethos and spirit. Team size
varied from between two to fifteen team members.
At the outset of these changes in 1994, interviews with operators revealed some negative
reactions with, for example, some operators believing it was not their job to be involved in
problem-solving. However, these feelings did not amount to resistance and were replaced
quite quickly by positive responses to the training, and some enthusiasm for introducing the
Integrated Production Teams and Continuous Improvement Teams on the lines. The
interviews revealed that there was a feeling in some groups that at least now they had the
opportunity "to do something about some of the things that had been bugging them for a long time".
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To break down some of the very traditional demarcation lines between the different
operational groups, dedicated porters and mechanics were incorporated into the teams. Line
leaders and operators started to be trained to take on more responsibility e.g. to schedule
their work, to find the best way to work as a team etc. and porters and operators were
trained to do simple machine set-ups. This was to reduce the time the operators spent
waiting for mechanics and to increase the capacity of the lines. The operators were also
trained to understand performance measures e.g. conformance to plan and accounting
standards.
Interviews and observations revealed that the mechanics felt quite threatened by these
initiatives at the outset and were resistant to training the operators in machine set-ups.
However, their inclusion on the World Class Manufacturing training, and for some training
as trainers on this programme, along with the constant support from the Business Unit
Leaders to develop their new roles, reduced these feelings. The position was also helped by
the severe shortage of mechanics within the company and the problems in recruiting
mechanics, a difficulty faced by many companies in the area during this period. The
demands on the mechanics' time were enormous and there were perceived benefits for all in
the development of teams.
All told, the teams were dedicated to particular areas, so that they would know the
equipment better and they would be more accountable for their performance. The team
members became responsible for controlling and improving their work environment. The
teams were expected to take responsibility for material usage, housekeeping, conformance
to plan, efficiency, rejects, quality, training and productivity.
The Integrated Production Teams and Continuous Improvement Teams generally received
very immediate and positive support from the team members. However, the structural
changes and the devolution ofresponsibility and control for everyday tasks to the lines took
much longer. In the interviews, the advisers and the operators attributed this to "doing too
much at one go". The very constant and pressing operational requirements of a high volume,
low cost production environment, combined with a comprehensive training programme,
espousing new ways of working and a new set of initiatives to introduce on the lines was
seen as very demanding.
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The Vice President Manufacturing and Business Unit Leaders at that time firmly believed
that the transition to self-management was an incremental activity and that a solid
foundation for change was being created by the comprehensive training and the introduction
of the Integrated Production and Continuous Improvement Teams. They also believed that
with their continuing support and guidance, the structural changes on the shopfloor would
be implemented quite quickly. Interviews at this time revealed that the team members were
aware of the very supportive and encouraging attitude of the senior managers. The team
members themselves adopted this very positive approach in trying to assume their new roles.
7.7.4.2
7.7.4.2.1
Vice President Manufacturing (2) 1995-1997
The Vice President
In 1995, Vice President Manufacturing (1) left to take up a job in another part of the
company and was replaced by someone from outside the company who had experience of
managing a team-based manufacturing environment. Almost from the start however, there
was a change in emphasis and direction. There was still a strong commitment to improving
performance, but seemingly much less commitment to achieving this through team-based
working. None of the structural changes made under her predecessor were dissolved, but
the same level of support for team working was not apparent in either the words or actions
of the new Vice President. For instance, there were numerous occasions when operators
were scheduled to attend the World Class Manufucturing training course and were
prevented from going "for operational reasons" i.e. they were required to stay on the lines to
meet production demands. This had rarely happened with the previous Vice President. At
the same time, comments made to the Business Unit Leaders and advisers revealed that the
new Vice President Manufacturing disapproved ofactivities that involved taking operators
off the shopfloor e.g. to work on continuous improvement or team projects.
The advisers came to understand from these actions and comments that under the new Vice
President the emphasis was solely on output and not on training or team development. In
fact in late 1995, once most of the existing operators had completed the World Class
Manufacturing training course, it was stopped completely and new recruits to the company
did not receive this training.
7.7.4.2.2 Advisers to Supervisors
Towards the end of 1995, the changes made by Vice President Manufacturing (1) were
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starting to take effect in the form of new behaviours and actions on the part of the advisers.
However, with the arrival of Vice President Manufacturing (2), a period of confusion began
for the advisers. There was no explicit statement from Vice President Manufacturing (2) or
the Business Unit Leaders to the effect that World Class Manufacturing and self-managed
work teams were no longer operational, but the emphasis in all communications was on
operational performance only, and not on team development and team working.
The decision to stop World Class Manufacturing Training was taken as supporting the belief
that team working was no longer important, as was the lack of encouragement and support
for Integrated Production Teams and Continuous Improvement Teams, which gradually
fizzled out. In the interviews with the researcher, the advisers attributed this, to a very large
extent, to the lack of interest and support from Vice President Manufacturing (2) in the
outcomes ofthese meetings and initiatives. All told, the new Vice President showed little
interest in, or support for, either World Class Manufacturing or team-based working.
During this period, the advisers became increasingly unsure of their role and, in fact, the
interviews and observations revealed that the advisers started to revert back to a supervisory
style in their approach to their teams. For example, instead ofIntegrated Production Team
meetings at the start ofthe working day, the advisers resumed daily meetings to organise
and plan the daily activities on the lines. Indeed, in many ways under this new management,
the advisers started acting like supervisors again. The interviews revealed that the advisers
were not actually told that team-based working was Ha thing of the past", but felt very strongly
that "the initiative had been abandoned".
All told, many of the advances towards team working made by the advisers under the first
Vice President Manufacturing disappeared between 1995 and 1997. At this stage also, the
researcher received much less support for her presence in the company. Observations and
interviews were acceptable, if not too intrusive or disruptive. The new Vice President
Manufacturing made it clear that time away from operational demands was to be restricted.
7.7.4.2.3 The Team Members
With the arrival of Vice President Manufacturing (2) in 1995, much ofthe transfer of control
and responsibility to the team members did not progress and interest in some of the earlier
initiatives started to disappear on the lines. For example, although no official statements
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were made to this effect, there was a strong feeling amongst the team members that the
ideas behind World Class Manufacturing and team working left the company with the
original Vice President.
The team members also believed that with the arrival of the new Vice President, there would
be "a new management/ad". As such, therefore, there was a period of some confusion for the
teams. Many of the teams had been enthused by the ideas behind team working and saw the
logic of this form of work design in their environment, but also understood that it was not
viable to continue with the initiative without the appropriate structural changes and support
from senior management. At the end of the day, it was easier for the team members "to go
back to how they had always worked".
Indeed, this is what started to happen. For instance, with the emphasis now being placed
firmly and solely on operational requirements, team members started to be moved regularly
between packaging lines again, reducing their ability to identify with the responsibilities and
problems of one team and one packaging line. In response to this, many operators
"switched off" from the notion ofteam responsibility and simply accepted problems as they
arose on the lines. They also started to call for mechanics to handle minor technical
problems and changeovers on the lines again. To add to the confusion, they saw the
advisers begin to act like supervisors again and take back responsibility for planning daily
activities. The team members responded with apathy.
On one packaging line in one of the Business Units, some effort was made by the adviser
and the operators to continue with the implementation of teams during this period. In the
main, the adviser and the team members in this section attributed this to the fact that the line
was unique in many ways. Physically, the team was located away from the main shopfloor
in a separate room and the packaging line for the product was small and had never relied on
help from other lines. Hence, the line was inherently quite self-contained. Also, there were
many long-term employees on the line who were very loyal to the company and who
believed that, to a large extent, they already worked as a team. The official transition to
team working, therefore, was seen as a very positive move by many of these team members.
On top of which, the adviser had no experience of working as a supervisor and was selected
specifically to the role ofadviser. In the eyes of many ofthose interviewed, this was seen as
beneficial, as the adviser "brought no history to the job" and "did not have to re-learn the role".
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Within this team, the adviser and Business Unit Leader encouraged the line leaders and team
members to become involved in planning and scheduling work and setting up the lines. They
were trained to understand performance measures and relate these to their targets, and they
were given the responsibility for housekeeping, quality and material usage. In many ways
this team continued to move towards Step 3 of the Badham, Couchman and McLouglin
(1997) levels of team work model, whilst the other teams reverted to a more traditional way
of working at this time.
7.7.4.3 Vice President Manufacturing (3) 1997 -
7.7.4.3.1 The Vice President
In mid-1997, Vice President Manufacturing (2) left the company. The third Vice President
Manufacturing to manage the packaging area during the course of this study took over and
again there was a change in the direction and emphasis ofthe manufacturing initiatives. The
third Vice President Manufacturing strongly believed in team-based working and
encouraged the advisers to resume facilitating and coaching rather than directing and telling
the operators how to do their work. The third Vice President Manufacturing tried to ensure,
as far as possible, that teams were dedicated to particular lines so that the team members
could start to own the packaging process and take responsibility for, and control over, their
work areas. He also started to encourage the newly revitalised teams to become involved
again in problem-solving and continuous improvement, in planning and scheduling the work
on the lines, collecting and collating performance data and handling minor technical
problems.
7.7.4.3.2 Supervisors to Advisers
When the third Vice President Manufacturing arrived in 1997, the company was once again
orientated towards team working and emphasis placed on advisers acting as coaches, guides
and facilitators rather than supervisors. Interviews revealed that, in the first instance, the
advisers were even more confused about what was expected of them and fed up with the
lack of consistency. The third Vice President Manufacturing was keen to reintroduce
Integrated Production Teams and Continuous Improvement Teams to reinforce the
emphasis on team-based problem-solving and to reassign the responsibility for tasks, such as
planning, scheduling and quality, to the teams. The advisers had taken back responsibility
for almost all these things and, according to the interviews, were "wary of putting in the effort,
again, 10 work with the learns, when this might be just another management faa".
267
However, over the course of his first year in office, the Vice President Manufacturing
constantly supported and encouraged the move back to team working, rewarding, through
praise and recognition, actions that were team-oriented. Very gradually, the advisers
responded to this and tried to effect a change in style of working by, for example,
encouraging line leaders and team members to plan and schedule the work and by
responding positively to initiatives and suggestions to change work practices.
7.7.4.3.3 The Team Members
The period of confusion for the team members was also extended further with the arrival of
the third Vice President Manufacturing and another change in direction. Although the
senior management team were now emphasising team work again, there was suspicion
amongst the team members that it would be another "short-lived fad" and that it was
questionable whether it was worth investing any effort into the initiative. These feelings
notwithstanding, all the Business Unit Leaders now began to make the relevant structural
changes and to dedicate teams to particular products on the packaging lines. Many of the
responsibilities mentioned above (in Section 7.7.4.1.4) started to be transferred back to the
teams and the interviews revealed that some of the operators felt that things were picking up
where they had been left two years previously. Teams dedicated to particular lines created
the feeling of ownership and responsibility amongst the team members for specific products
and team members were encouraged and supported in their efforts to resume co-operative
problem-solving. By mid-1998, the team members, although still sceptical about the
longevity of the initiative, were once again becoming part of the team development process
and were taking back responsibility for their daily tasks and activities.
7.8 Discussion
By July 1998, the development of team-based working had returned to the same level as had
been achieved by mid-1995 in Nova Cosmetics. Team members were largely dedicated to
product packaging lines and were able to identify with particular products and teams.
Integrated Production and Continuous Improvement Teams were operational again and
were involving team members in identifying and resolving work-related problems. The
supervisors were resuming the role of advisers and were encouraging the teams to take
responsibility for, and control over, their work environment and activities. They were also
encouraging the team members to use the business performance information supplied to the
lines on a daily basis to identify more closely with their goals and targets and improve team
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performance.
The introduction of team-based working has been a long and difficult process in this
company and most of the teams have not yet reached a level of self-management. By July
1998, in fact, many of the teams were at Step 2 (Job Enrichment) and some were reaching
Step 3 (Group Work) ofBadham, Couchman and McLoughlin's (1997) levels of team work
(described in Chapter 2). This case presents a detailed analysis of, and insight into, the
change to team working in a brownfield manufacturing company, with specific focus on the
operational and change-driver roles. When a change process is managed internally, people
have functional roles at the operational and processuallevels; gaps or blockages in either can
affect the success of the implementation.
The initial desire to effect change was evident from the company's actions. To improve
business performance within the unit, the company embarked on some extensive changes,
including restructuring the unit, redefining roles and responsibilities and a widescale training
programme. This case identifies how, over the initial eighteen-month change period, new
operational roles were defined and successfully enacted by the workforce.
This case also illustrates how fragile these changes were with the loss of certain change
driver roles e.g. in this case, the initial visionary, catalyst and compelling case-builder.
Despite the considerable progress made during the first eighteen months, reversion to
previous, more traditional roles took place quite quickly and team development was not
sustained with the departure of Vice President (1). At the processual level, this case
description emphasises the importance of'identifying the key change-driver or process roles
in the change process. The case also shows that the roles are not played by one person, but
by a number of different groups at the same time to a greater or lesser extent and from
different levels in the hierarchy. If these roles are not recognised and established,
maintaining the momentum for change may be difficult when operational problems arise.
From the findings of this case, it is noted that for the success of internally-driven change
programmes to implement self-managed teams it is not only essential to clarify operational
roles, expected behaviours and actions to reduce uncertainty, but also to identify and clarify
the process roles of key operational players. These issues are explored further in the
concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Discussion and Conclusion
8.1 Introduction
This research explored the major organisational change to self-managing work teams in four
brownfield manufacturing organisations. During the researcher's five-year period of study,
two of the organisations successfully effected a change to a team-based structure, but only
one ofthese, namely the Optel Corporation, achieved the level of self-direction. The other
organisation, Berg Transmissions, successfully implemented lean or Toyota production
teams. Of the remaining two organisations, Nova Cosmetics was still working towards self-
management with some of the teams moving towards Step 2 (Job Enrichment) or Step 3
(Group Work) ofBadham, Couchman and McLoughlin's (1997) levels of team work and
Clearwipe had ceased to implement a team working initiative.
The first section ofthis chapter is dedicated to a detailed discussion of the findings from the
individual cases. These findings increase our insight into the team development process and
the key issues from each case study are highlighted at the end of the individual case
narratives. In the second part ofthis chapter, these key issues are drawn together to provide
the basis for a new theoretical framework for investigating the change to team working.
The framework is presented and discussed in some detail and then, using the structure of
this framework, the many common threads within the cases are summarised in an effort to
clarify further the factors which impact on the success or failure of work design initiatives to
implement team-based working.
8.2 Clearwipe plc
In this case, there were three aims. The first aim was to explore the implications and
practical limitations of implementing self-managed work teams in an existing assembly line
and cell-based lean production environment. The second aim was to examine the
implementation process and the complexities of the people issues in the transition to team
working, and the final aim of this case was to consider whether a pilot study provides an
appropriate implementation strategy in a complex and radical work design initiative.
8.2.1 Team Design and Manufacturing Strategy
In itself, the failure to implement self-managed work teams in a lean production environment
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is unsurprising in view of the recent literature describing the incompatibilities between the
two systems.
As the case analysis shows, the changes implemented by Clearwipe plc created enriched and
enlarged jobs for the operators, as defined by Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin (1997)
and described in Chapter Two of this thesis. This model of levels of team work in
manufacturing settings suggests job enlargement involves job rotation and material handling
within the cell, and job enrichment involves machine set-ups, material handling in and out of
the cell, routine maintenance and quality control and inspection. The teams inClearwipe pIc
certainly achieved these two levels of the Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin (1997)
model, but Steps 3 and 4, group work and autonomous teams, were still a long way from
being achieved. The teams fell significantly short of the objectives of the organisation with
regard to self-management. The case description indicates that the teams were not at the
stage where they were willing and able to take responsibility for innovation and change,
control of people, in terms offor example, absenteeism and evaluation, or control of work,
for example, scheduling or work methods.
The proposition at the beginning of the case, based on recent theoretical frameworks
presented in the literature, was that, in a lean production setting such as at Clearwipe plc, it
is not possible to create self-managed work teams with a high level of autonomy and
independence. Without a fundamental and radical work redesign, Steps 3 and 4 (group work
and autonomous teams) of the Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin (1997) model were not
practical and achievable targets. The findings from this research support this proposition
and this case discussion explores in detail the constraints and practical limitations imposed
on self-managed team working by lean production practices.
The nature of the fit between the lean production systems and self-managed work team
design at Clearwipe plc is explored in more detail in the following table.
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Table 8.1 Comparison of characteristics of lean production system and self-managed work team
design at Clearwipe pic.
Characteristics of Lean Production in Clearwil!e Self-ManaKed Work Team DesiKn
Manufacturin& Oor;anisations I!!£ in Clearwil!e l!lc
Origin Japan - Toyota Pull System, Socio-technical system team design
I960s originating from UK (coal mines,
I940s) and Scandinavia (Volvo
Kalmar, 1970s)
Primary Goals Continuous improvement in Continuous improvement in work
work operations; improvements operations and increases in
in organisational flexibility and productivity, based on the assumption
product quality for competitive that increased autonomy improves
advantage quality of work experience and
employee job satisfaction
Assembly operations High interdependence among The creation of small teams with high
groups of workers autonomy, responsibility and self-
management
Leadership Depends on strong team leader Depends on self-managing group
Task cycles Fragmented, specialised tasks - Teams responsible for more complete
low level of task identity modules of work, increasing task
identity and autonomy
Work method Standardised tasks - exact Teams should have some discretion
standards developed for each over how they achieve results, the
process, the cells/lines have no work pace and methods, increasing
influence over work pace or autonomy and self-management
method
Work organisation CellS/lines, with strong leaders Autonomous teams, with leader chosen
chosen by management by the team
Job rotation Scheduled, workers carry out a Teams organise job rotations
wide range of narrow tasks themselves, to increase autonomy and
self-management
Indirect tasks Responsible for quality control, Responsible for quality control,
problem-solving etc. to reduce problem-solving, routine technical
costs and improve quality tasks etc. to reduce costs, improve
quality, increase autonomy and
increase responsibility
Material Flow Pull system; no buffer stocks; Pull system; no buffer stocks - system
system fits with high conflicts with self-management of
interdependence and strong teams, internal team leadership and
leadership autonomy of teams
Individual work pace Set by management, variations Set by management, some variations
impossible allowed to work pace and method
Links Tightly linked to internal Loose links to other teams; limited
customers - to improve product links to customers - to maintain team
quality autonomy
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The table illustrates some of the problems and incompatibilities between the different
systems manifested in Clearwipe pIc. In many ways, at the outset of the change initiative,
the idea to implement self-management into the existing organisational structure at
Clearwipe pIc seemed a relatively straightforward proposition. The nature of the production
system had created a situation in which operators were already working in groups/cells of
between three and eight people. The transition to self-management seemed a logical step as
it would provide the operators with the opportunity for greater involvement in the work
processes, improve their quality of work life, and at the same time provide a platform for
extending the existing continuous improvement philosophy and increasing productivity.
Clearwipe pIc's stated objectives were that self-managed work teams would have high levels
of autonomy over their movements and would set their own working pace to meet
predetermined targets. The teams would be involved in decisions about the ways in which
they achieved their targets and would influence decisions about their working arrangements.
The team members would be expected to work closely together, share responsibility for the
work, substitute self-management for leadership (by choosing their own team leader within
the team) and co-ordinate their own activities. The emphasis was on increasing the
autonomy and responsibility of the team.
However, over the eighteen-month transition period, the change to self-management met
with only limited success. The characteristics of lean manufacturing, namely flow
production. large interdependence and minimal buffer stocks. presented obstacles to the
achievement of the company's objectives. The production setting allowed little freedom of
movement and work processes were standardised to a large extent. There was little
flexibility for teams to establish their own pace of working and limited opportunities for
teams to influence how to approach their tasks. The team members carried out a narrow
range of tasks with rotation between them being the norm.
The teams were designed according to the principles of sociotechnical systems. The
limitations of the design when superimposed in a lean production environment were not
recognised initially nor acted on by the organisation. The literature has highlighted the
inevitable tensions created by the conflicting assumptions underpinning a lean production
manufacturing strategy and a self-managed team design and these tensions certainly limited
the success of the initiative in this company.
273
For example, the teams became more involved in day-to-day manufacturing decisions and
developed more understanding of the operational systems. Team members were trained to
read plans and schedules for product build. However, because the production process
demands interdependence between the cells/teams in Blade Assembly to build product and
meet customer orders, there was always a need to co-ordinate outside cell/team boundaries
to make planning and scheduling decisions. Certainly, the cell teams increased their
understanding ofthe production processes, but it was difficult for the cells/teams to put into
practice their newly acquired knowledge and skills in planning and scheduling. Each
decision a cell team made about the organisation of their own work had a direct impact on
other cells/teams and required a considerable degree of co-ordination between them. This
mitigated against self-management and autonomy within teams.
Team members' expectations about autonomy also created problems and frustrations. The
principles of self-management were described in some detail to the teams and were central
to team training events. Itwas explained to team members that they would be expected to
take greater control over their work processes, in terms of, for example, increased discretion
over work methods and work pace and responsibility for solving problems in their work
environment. However, within the confines of the assembly operations, there was in fact
limited opportunity for this to happen. For example, teams were learning how to monitor
their own performance, by calculating efficiency figures, relating these to downtime etc., but
there was limited scope for them to alter their work methods to improve their performance.
Teams suggested housekeeping changes and design of equipment changes that were
successfully implemented, but the flow of work and the requirements placed on teams
regarding targets and output to other teams severely limited the scope of their actions.
This tension between team autonomy and team interdependence manifested itself in other
ways too. Reduced in-process inventory, reduced buffers and just-in-time delivery, in line
with lean production practices, required management and co-ordination through strong
leadership. The team design was promoting self-management and autonomy. The resuh was
an unresolved tension between the external managers of the team and the internal team
leaders. The control and interdependence required to operate a lean production system was
not inherent in a sociotechnical system that was emphasising autonomy within teams and
minimising co-ordination outside team boundaries. In this case, there was pressure on the
external team leaders to empower the internally-elected team leaders to make decisions
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about the internal organisation of the team and related production decisions. Whilst, over
time, the internal team leaders began to be comfortable with decisions about the organisation
of the team, the production decisions required an holistic view of the activities of the
relevant work unit and remained outside the scope of the internal team leaders.
Overall, the behaviour of the team members provided evidence of support for the self-
management aspects of self-managed team working, in terms of learning new skills and
taking on new tasks, associated perhaps with the belief that there would be a financial
reward eventually. Their behaviour also provided an indication that there was some
resistance to the team working aspects of self-managed work teams i.e. to sharing
knowledge and responsibilities amongst the team members. For example, some team
members had more technical knowledge (the skills and ability to make routine changes to
machines) than others. This knowledge was not always shared as a matter of course with
other team members, suggesting that perhaps the operators did not see themselves as a team
working interdependently to complete their tasks. Rather, they still considered themselves
to be working as individuals.
This case supports the ideas discussed in recent literature that the introduction of self-
managing work teams into an existing lean production system is fraught with difficulty. The
case provides details of the sort ofpractical constraints encountered. All told, and referring
to Banker, Field, Schroeder and Sinha's (1996) classification of teams discussed earlier,
Clearwipe plc's teams fell far short of self-managing work teams. These authors define self..
managing teams as groups of workers who can self-regulate work on their interdependent
tasks and who have control over the management and execution of an entire set oftasks,
from the supply of materials through the transformation process to the despatch of finished
goods. This includes all support activities, such as quality control and maintenance.
A more appropriate classification for cell teams in Clearwipe plc may be that the company
moved towards lean production teams, which are defined as groups of workers with limited
employee involvement through employee participation in problem-solving group, or
perhaps, that Clearwipe pIc moved some way towards high-performance teams. As defined
by Banker, Field, Schroeder and Sinha (1996), high-performance teams provide the
opportunity for all staff to become involved in organisational activities and to take an active
part in the decision-making process. The ideas behind high-performance teams come from
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sociotechnical job design and other sources, such as just-in-time inventories, total quality
and statistical process control, and entail teams being given the authority and incentive to
pursue continuous improvement (Applebaum and Batt, 1994). Such teams are designed to
have less autonomy than self-managing teams and to have a very specific focus on
continuous improvement. This type of team would seem to fit comfortably with the
organisational structure and systems developed at Clearwipe plc.
It may seem pernickety to be dwelling on this question of terminology and definition.
However, it is fundamental to understanding and orchestrating a successful change process,
both to establish the fit between the design of the team and the design of the production
process and to establish the nature of the end-state. Terms and definitions are important in
orienting the change process and people's expectations, attitudes and actions.
The findings from the case also highlight other options, in terms of team-based work
designs, that are open to the organisation. The first relates to a redefinition ofthe nature of
the teams, for example, the change to high performance teams, as discussed earlier. A
second option involves a more radical restructuring of the work environment, with, for
example, the Blade Assembly area being reorganised to enable self-managed work teams to
take ownership of the blade assembly process from supply to output. In such an approach,
the current cells would be reorganised into larger teams possessing the flexibility to produce
outputs of different product categories (e.g. different lengths of blades) in any particular
period. This reorganisation would involve the creation of a team from a number of cells to
include the line feeders, technicians and indirect support. Multi-skilling would need to be a
key feature of this reorganisation and team members would have significantly greater job
variety. This structure would enable the team to take more responsibility and control of
their work processes and methods. Interdependence would be greater within the team and
less co-ordination required outside team boundaries. Teams could be developed to the point
where they could control their own supply base (plastic, cardboard, rubber etc.) and would
be responsive to customer needs rather than being product driven. Ownership of the
customer-focused process would entail team problem-solving, resource identification,
communication and prioritisation. This reorganisation would promote the ownership of
work processes and self-management, linked to the achievement of targets, and is far more
radical in its approach than the design that was initiated by Clearwipe pIc in 1997.
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On the basis of the findings from this particular case, it is argued that the introduction of
self-managing work teams in the context of a lean production strategy is not feasiblewithout
a more radical work redesign initiative, as described above. The problems and constraints
between the two systems are described in some detail, along with the possibility of
redefining the nature of the teams for a more compatible design. Clearly, at this stage, there
are team-based work design options open to the company, and a decision needs to be made
about whether to adopt a high-performance design to fit in with the production strategy or
whether to embark on a more radical restructuring to pursue the creation of self-managed
work teams.
There is no doubt from the analysis of the findings from the interviews, however, that the
problems in the introduction of self-managing teams in this company were not confined to
the fit between team design and production strategy, but were exacerbated by the small
number of teams introduced compared to the overall size of the workforce and the limited
changes made to the organisational systems. These are summarised below.
8.2.2 The Implementation Process
Indeed, the nature of the implementation process was very important in the changes at
Clearwipe plc and the focus of the second aim of this study. Clearwipe plc certainly tried to
manage key features of the implementation process according to best practice by, for
example, communicating extensively at all levels about the need for the change and the
nature of team working, as well as enabling key players to participate in the implementation
process.
Notwithstanding these attempts to manage the change process, however, the interview data
from Clearwipe plc reflects some of the problems and people issues associated with such
complex changes. As these data reveal, and despite the established implementation plans,
there was a great deal of confusion about the change and uncertainty about how to handle
tasks and situations in the new structure. For example, at the outset, there were a lot of
expectations generated by the term self-management. The team leader immediately started
to playa low-key role in team activities, trying to give team members the scope to exercise
some control over their work and trying to avoid directing their decisions and actions. After
all, they were now a self-managed work team. However, on the basis of only limited
training and with no further guidance at that time, the team was not ready for this approach
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and effectively became immobilised. They were uncertain about what to do and how to do
it. Notwithstanding an implementation plan outlining the tasks and areas the team should
take responsibility for from a given date, the team members did not know how to take
responsibility for some things e.g. turning ideas from team meetings into workable practices.
The removal of traditional work boundaries and demarcation lines was one of the key
features of the change in Clearwipe plc with regard to the role of both the team leaders and
indirect staff. Problems with changing the attitudes and activities of personnel in Clearwipe
plc are illustrated, for instance, by the demarcation between the roles and functions of
technicians and operators. At the outset of the intervention, the technicians seemed quite
positive about the changes and their role in these changes. If operators were able to
complete routine machine changeovers, this would enable the technicians to undertake the
more technical and proactive maintenance work. However, in practice and once the
initiative was underway, the traditional, political, status-oriented demarcations between
technician and operator grade surfaced and the technicians simply did "not make themselves
available" for the training work. This was not only quite significant in slowing the progress
of the change, but frustrating for the team members and team leaders.
Problems of trust and reward were also clearly apparent in Clearwipe pIc. Senior managers
believed the change to self-management would have intrinsic benefits for the team members,
in terms of quality of work life and job satisfaction. From the outset, there was no promise
offinancial rewards in the short-term; team members would only receive financial rewards if
the intervention was successful in the longer-term. Team members, whilst seeing the
intrinsic benefits of the change, remained firm in their belief that if they were doing more
work and had more responsibility, they should be paid more money. There was also the
feeling that if team members took on the responsibilities without financial reward now, the
new way of working would become the norm and they would not receive financial rewards
in the longer-term. Clearly, there were uncertainties felt by both the teams and the
management about the short- and long-term rewards and the benefits of the initiative.
In the pilot team, one influential, but disruptive team member created a source of conflict,
which was heightened in some ways because of the uncertainties induced by the change
process. The elected team leader wanted his technical expertise to be recognised by a
promotion. To make this point and emphasise the importance ofhis role in the team, he
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chose not to share his technical expertise with other team members (hindering the
development of a multi-skilled team), did not attend team meetings and was often
unavailable when the team needed help for changeovers and minor breakdowns. This
contributed further to poor efficiency figures. At this stage, uncertainties in the change
process namely, who had responsibility for what at any given time, led to problems in
resolving the situation. The team leader considered the team should handle some of the
issues, such as attendance at meetings and availability to deal with machine problems,
because these responsibilities were now assigned to them in the team development plan. The
team was clearly not sufficiently mature to do so. In some ways, this was a practical issue
associated with the transition of responsibility, in others it was a question ofpolitical "point-
scoring" and people's willingness to be involved in team working. Ostensibly, this is a
minor issue, but one that proved to be a major stumbling block in the pilot team
development process.
This vulnerability inherent in change projects is also demonstrated in other areas of the
change to self-managed work teams in Clearwipe plc. Despite the clear formulation of
design principles, the definition of project goals and the specification of detailed plans and
timetables for implementation, the ultimate fate of the change differed from what was
intended. Progress was not straightforward and some goals were not achieved. In many
ways, the team leaders were under a lot of pressure, in terms of trying to manage most of
their cells in the traditional, supervisory manner and their self-managed work teams in a
participative, involved way. Although there were implementation plans, the team leaders
work in a busy, demanding situation and were often faced at anyone time with a myriad of
questions and decisions. Even if they had felt the trust necessary to hand over decisions to
the team members, it would have been quite a juggling act to divide themselves in this way.
It was also difficult for the senior managers to stand by and let the team members make
''mistakes''. For example, management stated they would support changes suggested bytbe
teams' continuous improvement projects, providing the teams made a clear business case
when it involved expenditure. This did not always happen, inevitably provoking a negative
reaction from the team members. In one situation, a low-cost suggestion to solve a problem
was turned down, deemed by management before its trial not to work. It was not the
solution the managers were looking for, and rather than letting the team try their idea and
draw their own conclusions about this, management vetoed the idea. On the surface this is a
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small issue, but again it was a major set-back for team members and team development.
In the company, the principles being applied in work redesign were radical enough to expose
conflicts of interest across horizontal and vertical demarcations. The proposed changes,
although their underlying principles, design objectives and implementation plans were
relatively clearly specified, proved neither straightforward nor unproblematic. In particular,
organisational politics and the intricacies of the change process became a key factor in
shaping both process and outcomes as the project developed. It is apparent from this case
that managing these is just as important as specifying objectives and detailing timetabled
plans.
8.2.3 The Introduction of Pilot Teams
As already described, the change to self-managed work teams is a radical and complex
change. In drawing conclusions from the interviews and observations of the change process
at Clearwipe plc, another aspect it is essential to analyse and comment on is the
implementation of pilot teams. From the findings of this case, there is justification perhaps,
in concluding that the complexities of the change process are increased with the use of pilot
teams. It is important to recognise that organisations face a difficult question when
implementing radical and fundamental change initiatives, such as self-managed work teams.
There is the need for companies to balance a test of the proposed structure, to make sure it
works in practice in their environment, with the realisation that such a test in itself may
prove impractical, because of the lack of congruence between the old and the new
organisational systems. In some ways, the introduction of pilot teams may represent caution
and the realistic concern to maintain organisational effectiveness. In the case of self-
managing work teams however. pilot teams may in themselves create too many obstacles to
success and doom the initiative to failure. This is essentially because key figures are
operating in two systems, with two sets of arrangements, policies and procedures and
achieving a workable balance in a changing environment is very difficult. The third aim of
this research was to examine this issue of whether a pilot study is an appropriate
implementation strategy in the context of the introduction of self-managing work teams.
In Clearwipe pic, problems with the experimental nature ofthe pilot initiative were apparent
at all levels. For example, with regard to the people involved in the change, team leaders
were required to adopt two different styles simultaneously and to work as coaches and
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facilitators with some cells and as supervisors with other cells. Technicians were asked to
train some cells to complete technical tasks and to continue handling routine changeovers
and breakdowns for other cells. Team members were asked to take on more responsibility
and control of their work in an environment in which their counterparts carried on as before.
Notwithstanding the people issues, the organisational arrangements were also designed to fit
another system. The reward and appraisal systems were not changed and so people were
being assessed and paid for their old ways of working. The systems were not reinforcing the
work design changes. Pressure to create equilibrium did not work in favour of the change
initiative. The nature of organisations is such that they seek to create a state ofbalance. The
forces against the change in this case outweighed the forces for the change, which were
much more intangible.
In this case, the duality of the roles undertaken by many people in the change process and
the problems created by operating old and new organisational arrangements and systems in
parallel presented obstacles to the success of the self-managed work teams. The findings
support the proposition that in a complex and radical change process involving fundamental
work redesign a pilot study may not provide the most appropriate implementation strategy.
All told, the findings from the Clearwipe plc case contribute to our understanding of the
links between team working, work design and effectiveness. The case builds on recent
research on the incompatibility of self-managed work teams in lean production
environments, exploring in depth the practical limitations of team design characteristics.
The case also examines contextual and organisational factors in the change to team working,
including the importance ofthe informal organisation (power and politics) in complex and
radical change processes and the congruence of organisational arrangements between
existing and new systems. These research findings also support the hypothesis that in a
radical work redesign initiative a pilot study may not be the most appropriate
implementation strategy. Indeed, and as discussed in Chapter Two, punctuated equih"brium
theorists considers that it is the interdependence of interrelated organisational subunits that
may generate resistance to change in an incremental transformation as subunit managers
seek to maintain a complex network of commitments and relationships. As such, the success
of a pilot study may be constrained by the ongoing commitment within the rest of the
organisation to established patterns of activities and relationships.
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As noted in the introductory section to this chapter, the findings from each case make a
contribution to the theoretical framework proposed later in the chapter (Section 8.6). The
key issues surfacing from the Clearwipe plc case include the importance of the compatibility
of the team design and the production environment, the impact of power and politics in
radical and vulnerable change processes, the need for congruence between the new work
design and supporting organisational arrangements and finally the scale of the change, in
particular the problems with an incremental approach to the transition to team working.
These issues will be explored further in the context of the framework and the cross-case
comparisons in the second part of this chapter (Section 8.6 onwards).
8.3 Berg Transmissions
The discussion about the interrelationship between the nature of the production environment
and team design continues in this case analysis, albeit from a rather different perspective.
This case also examines in some depth the problems of team leaders' and team members'
uncertainty about their roles, responsibilities and expectations in such a complex, radical and
vulnerable change as the one to team working and consideration is given to whether team-
related jobs are up-skilled or de-skilled. This case also examines the importance of deep
structure changes and the introduction of new organisational support systems and
arrangements in establishing team working. As such, some of the issues raised in the
Clearwipe plc case analysis are developed further in the context of the findings from Berg
Transmissions.
8.3.1 The Toyota Production System and Team Design
One of the obstacles in this case to the successful development of self-managing work teams
related to the high interdependence and close coupling of teams in ajust-in-time production
environment. In this setting (as indeed in Clearwipe), the production process and teams
were tightly linked and this provided barriers to teams trying to be autonomous and take
control over their work areas. The high mutual dependency between the different stages of
the production process created by the removal of inventory resulted in a situation in which
teams did not know how to disassociate themselves from their production tasks. Given the
interdependent relationships with other process teams, team members did not know, for
example, how to create time and space to focus on improvements or other team
development activities. In fact, team members felt there was pressure on them not to take
time out for continuous improvement activities.
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At this stage, the problems oflack of congruence were exacerbated because of the concept
of self-management and the lack ofleadership on the shopfloor. The structure created by the
senior management team did not give the team leaders responsibility for supervision and, as
such, there was no provision for guiding the teams and giving them the opportunity to
develop collective initiative.
Another factor highlighted in this case relates to the external economic climate and the
difficult financial situation of the company. Buchanan (1994) considers the origins of
different types of team working and points out that the original aims of self-managed work
teams related to improving the quality of life to reduce absenteeism and labour turnover. In
more straitened economic circumstances, team-based work designs are associated with a
way of dealing with their customers and their competitors. As such, their objectives are
strategic rather than operational (Buchanan, 1994). This shift in focus among the senior
management team in this company from self-management to lean production teams was
driven by financial circumstances as well as operational constraints. It seemed to provide
the senior managers with more momentum in the transition process and perhaps reinforces
Bratton's (1991) view of the importance of social choice and the complex configuration of
opportunities and constraints in a change process.
8.3.2 The Transition to Lean Teams: Up-skilling or De-skilling?
The second aim of this case was to explore the characteristics oflean production teams and
consider whether team members' roles and responsibilities were up-skilled or de-skilled in
the transition to lean teams. In this case, one of the key reasons the company changed the
focus of the work design initiative from self-management to lean production teams related to
the fact that the latter provide more prescriptive detail of work arrangements, implicit in
which was a certain amount of de-skilling, However, this enabled the senior management
team to address some of the barriers to the introduction of self-managing work teams e.g.
team members not knowing what to do and when to do it.
During 1997, the senior managers within the company focused onjust-in-time practices and
their actions were guided by an emphasis on discipline, involving the establishment of work
standards, and autonomy, involving the delegation of responsibility to shopfloor personnel.
This autonomy involved such things as material scheduling, data gathering and problem
solving. Other core principles of just-in-time philosophy which had implications for team
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working in this case are total employee involvement, team work, continuous improvement
and simplification. Just-in-time encouraged team-based problem-solving, job enrichment,job
rotation and multi-skilling.
The case analysis reveals that the responsibility for tasks associated with the production
process was effectively delegated to the shopfloor. However, the findings from this case
support those of Delbridge, Lowe and Oliver (2000), in the sense that this delegation did not
increase the autonomy of team members. In fact, team leaders took responsibility for
decision-making, material scheduling, data gathering, problem solving, timing control work
scheduling, performance measurement, and dealing with suppliers regarding schedules,
quality issues and delivery information. The team leaders took on a pivotal role, very much
in line with Benders and van Hootegem's (2000) notion of the focal position of the foreman.
On the other hand, the team members' tasks became largely routine, timed and standardised
and the operators followed a regimented pattern of work. There was increased job rotation,
partly linked to the fact that the standardisation of the operators' tasks enabled them to
move between different roles very easily. There was also an element of job enrichment in
that team members became increasingly involved in problem-solving activities. However,
the information from this case analysis is not altogether supportive of Womack et al's
(1990) assertion that" the truly lean pIant .... transfers the maximum number of tasks and
responsibilities to those workers actually adding value to the car on the line" (p.99). Just-in-
time practices advocate total people involvement, but this was limited in this company.
There was one aspect over which team members had discretion and control namely
improvement activities. In this company, much emphasis was placed on training and
involvement in kaizen activities and there was a shift in the way operators worked fromjust
doing the jobs to solving problems. These findings are in line with those of other
researchers e.g. Delbridge, Lowe and Oliver (2000) who found that shopfloor operators in
lean production teams have a significant role in both quality and process improvements.
These findings are also consistent with the ideas of those who have advocated a
recombination of thinking and doing in manufacturing (e.g. Kenney and Florida, 1993). It is
the dynamic of continuous improvement through the incorporation of workers' ideas and
suggestions that most markedly distinguishes the post-Fordist model of lean production
from the rigid division of labour associated with Taylorist mass production.
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The findings from this case suggest that in some transitions to team-based work designs
there is not a qualitative shift away from the detailed division oflabour noted and critiqued
by Piore and Sabel (1984). Indeed, elements ofthe change described in this case are rather
more in line with Dawson's (1994) view that some changes to team work represent a
reassertion of managerial control. However, it is with respect to the greater inclusion of
knowledge work that there is a significant difference from the Tayloristic model.
Dawson's framework of the organisation and control of work presented in the introduction
to this case in Chapter Five (Section 5.2.2, particularly Figure 5.1) is useful in elaborating
some of the conceptual issues here. Ifthe findings from this study are considered in the light
of this framework, it is this above-mentioned difference that prevents this particular change
process and resulting team development from fitting neatly into a particular quadrant. WIth
regard to the daily production tasks, it is apparent that individual tasks were down- rather
than up-skilled in this case. Control and autonomy remained with the team leader and this
represented managerial control. In this sense, there were Tayloristic aspects in the team
design. However, the change process increased the thinking and problem solving elements
associated with the team members' roles and as such, these roles were up-skilled.
Elements of quadrant A are appropriate to this change, in that collaborative team work
developed, with some elements of supervisory control. Elements of quadrant D are also
important in that operators took on responsibility through just-in-time for continuous
improvement. However, this was at the team level, not the individual level.
This case in line with other recent research on lean production teams (e.g. Delbridge, Lowe
and Oliver, 2000) highlights the need for some reworking of this and other team design and
change process frameworks. The findings from this case suggest that with the transition to
lean production teams it is not solely a question of whether roles and responsibilities are up-
skilled or de-skilled. The changes move the focus from individual tasks to collaborative
team work and from doing to thinking. However, the team leader role becomes pivotal and
the team members' roles and responsibilities more standardised and regimented. Team
design frameworks need to allow for a greater focus on collaborative team work with direct
control through strong team leadership and autonomy limited to some specific areas, such as
continuous improvement. This would seem to fit the emerging pattern for the development
oflean production teams in manufacturing settings in this country.
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8.3.3 Organisational Support Systems and Arrangements
The third aim was to consider the idea that a company must ensure the appropriate
alignment of its human resource management systems for the successful development and
maintenance of collaborative team work. Organisational systems that are congruent with the
new work design are fundamental to a successful transition process. In this case, new
systems and arrangements were required to reinforce the new work design. The systems and
arrangements within the old company structure were based on the individual as the key
organisational unit. For example, the grading structure was a deterrent to operators'
willingness to take on a wider role. New systems were important to reinforce co-operative
team work and group regulation.
In this context, just-in-time practices emphasise flexibility i.e. the need for appropriate
grading structures to allow for expansion of responsibilities, and equality i.e. the need to
recognise the importance of discarding unfair and divisive personnel policies and for
consistent pay structures etc. The personal development of team members is also important
in gaining competitive advantage.
This company made appropriate changes to its organisational systems and arrangements. In
particular, to develop and maintain congruence with the new patterns of working the
company ensured the selection process and reward scheme placed emphasis not only on
technical skills but also on team work. The company also implemented contractual changes
emphasising the role of the team leader, increases in pay to reflect role expansion of team
members, a new grading system focusing on roles rather than jobs, employee development
and training programmes, and an open book policy enabling teams access to company
information. These case findings support Cohen et aI's (1996) view that the strengthening
of these contextual variables is key for organisations embarking on team working.
In terms of the contribution to the theoretical framework presented in Section 8.6, the key
points arising from this case study include the interrelationship between the production
environment and the team design, issues surrounding the politics of the change e.g.
uncertainty about roles, responsibilities and expectations in the transition to team working
and concerns about whether team member's jobs are up-skilled or de-skilled, and finally the
importance of internal contextual factors associated with organisational arrangements and
systems.
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8.4 Optel Corporation
The importance of contextual variables, specifically the congruence between new work
designs and their supporting organisational arrangements and systems, is explored further in
this case discussion. This case starts by considering the scale of the change to team
working, contrasting radical and incremental approaches.
8.4.1 Tbe Scale oftbe Cbange
In relation to the other cases in this research, one unique feature of the transition to team
working in Optel Corporation is associated with the scale of the change process. This was a
revolutionary transformation, during which the strategies, power, structure and systems
were fundamentally changed overnight. The company made the transition from an
individually-based, hierarchical structure to a team-based, empowered structure. The
organisation then effectively entered an equilibrium period, during which incremental
changes were made to the system and arrangements. These elaborated the structure,
systems, controls and resources of the organisation to achieve the goals embedded in the
deep structure.
New systems, arrangements and activity patterns were required to reinforce the new work
design. The systems and arrangements within the old company structure were based on the
individual as the key organisational unit. For example, people were selected for jobs on the
basis of individual skills and abilities with no reference to their ability to work with others,
and people were appraised and rewarded on the basis of individual performance. With the
team-based work design, the organisation needed to facilitate employee interaction and
information exchange, and reward team involvement and team decision-making. The new
organisational systems and arrangements implemented by the company are described in the
next section.
8.4.2 Organisational Systems and Arrangements
The second aim of the case was to explore the development of self- directed work teams
within the company and the alignment of the organisational systems and arrangements. As
the case analysis shows, and according to the definition by Banker et al (1996), the work
design initiative in Optel Corporation did create self-directed work teams by 1998. Many of
the teams in Optel Corporation self-regulated their work on interdependent tasks, managed
and executed an entire set of tasks and took responsibility for support activities.
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The results of this case provide support for Beer, Eisenstat and Spector's (1990) proposition
that "individual behaviour is powerfully shaped by the roles that people play" (p. 99). The
organisation was transformed to self-direction by a revolution and overnight Optel
Corporation created a new organisational context for its employees, with a new structure
and new roles, responsibilities and relationships. These changes required a different way of
working and the development of the teams to the stage of self-direction indicates that team
members took on these new roles, responsibilities and relationships. In many ways, there
was no choice as the old, hierarchical structure was completely removed, and the old ways
of working and the usual points of reference for operators, supervisors etc. disappeared with
it.
As the teams developed and moved towards self-direction, the company began to focus on
its human resource strategies. For Optel Corporation, the notion of utilising their human
resources was central to their strategy. Therefore, their human resource practices became
central to the maintenance and development of team working and the company's
performance. As such, Optel Corporation changed its organisational arrangements and
systems to fit with the new structure and the human resource practices were changed to
support group-based performance. These changes were integral to the maintenance and
development of the intervention.
The team members developed their technical, problem-solving and interpersonal skills and
the organisation changed its human resource practices to facilitate employee interaction and
information exchange and assessed and rewarded team involvement and team decision-
making. The company introduced an element of structure within the teams in the form of
prime roles to facilitate communication within and between the teams and between the teams
and the support functions. A new career development scheme was initiated which
emphasised team-related skills and behaviours and new recruits started to be assessed on
their team working skills, as well as their fit with existing team members. Finally, both the
appraisal and compensation systems were redesigned, with key criteria such as teamwork
and attitude, being included in the assessment process and a proportion of pay increases
being dependent on peer assessment ratings and team performance.
By implementing these changes to its human resource management systems to support the
transition to self-direction, the company reinforced the new deep structure, maintained a
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continuous force for change and established equilibrium within the organisation. The
company created a team working culture and value system (Nadler and Tushman, 1979).
8.4.3 Evaluation of Self-Directed Team Working
Optel Corporation succeeded in creating self-directed work teams and in aligning its human
resource management practices to the new work design. Optel Corporation has experienced
phenomenal business growth since 1997 and believes that self-direction has made a
contribution to this. Yet, there is no quantitative data available from this research to support
this assertion, and certainly no data that supports a causal link between self-direction and
improved company performance.
In 1994 when the researcher first became involved with the company, this initiativewas seen
as an excellent opportunity to evaluate self-direction and its impact on business
performance. The transition to self-direction in this company provided an ideal situation in
which to explore the link between satisfaction, team development and human resource
management practices. This proved impossible and instead what the research has done is
illustrate the problems inherent in measuring the impact of a long-term change initiative in a
large, complex organisation.
These problems include, firstly, a different focus each year in the annual employee
satisfaction survey reflecting the changing emphasis of corporate headquarters, but which
made it impossible to monitor changes consistently at a local level. Secondly, the massive
expansion of the workforce led to the influx ofmany new teams in the production areas, and
this has drawn the production managers' attention away from charting the links between
team development and team efficiency and productivity. Finally, the new human resource
management initiatives to support self-direction were introduced alongside other changes to
the work patterns in the company. For example, the training programme for team members,
the peer assessment system and the shift changes were all introduced in the same year,
making the impact of the different initiatives impossible to separate out and measure
appropriately. However, the senior management team continued to attribute some of the
success of the company to team working. This overriding belief in the team approach has
emerged to be a distinctive feature of this case and emphasises the key role of senior
management in such a change process.
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In future research, it may useful to focus on the consistency in the direction of the change,
and not the lack of consistency in the surveys and the problems with the team metrics.
Although there were frequent changes in personnel, particularly, in terms ofleadership with
four Directors of Operations in four years, the strategy remained constant. Successive senior
managers provided a clear direction for the organisation; there was a clear and constant
strategic plan or map. In Weick's (l985a) words: "The important feature of a cause map
[or any map] is that it leads people to anticipate some order 'out there' ..... Thus, trappings
of rationality such as strategic plans are important largely as binding mechanisms. They
hold events together long enough and tight enough in people's heads so that they do
something in the belief that their action will be influential. The importance ofpresurnptions,
expectations, justifications, and commitments is that they span the breaks in a loosely
coupled system and encourage confident interactions that tighten settings. The conditions of
order and tightness in organisations exist as much in the mind as they do in the field of
action." (pp. 127-128).
Future research, for example, could usefully examine these strategic maps using cognitive
mapping techniques and relate them to company performance data. Techniques such as the
repertory grid could be incorporated into the interview schedules and provide insightful
information about, for example, Youndt, Snell, Dean and Lepak's (1996) proposition that an
organisation's strategic posture either augments or diminishes the impact ofhwnan resource
management practices on performance. Alternatively, interviews with senior managers
could be structured to concentrate on the strategy of the company, as well as the rather
more practical side ofimplementation of self-direction and the ongoing development of the
teams. This would enable the researcher to use content analysis ofthe interview material to
draw conclusions about the strategies and concepts driving the thinking of successive
Directors of Operations and identify, perhaps, why a company's senior managers are so keen
to attribute some of the company's success to team working. All told, this kind of data may
have provided a greater insight into the success ofthe self-directed work teams within Optel
Corporation and why there was this overwhelming beliefin the success of the initiativewhen
there was no hard evidence to this effect.
However, this idea comes with the benefit of hindsight, and the data available from the
interviews was not suitable for this kind of analysis. The interviews were conducted
rigorously following an interview schedule, but for a different purpose altogether. Cognitive
290
mapping techniques may prove a useful analytical tool in future cases. This case emphasises
the problems and difficulties related to measuring and evaluating the transition to self-
direction.
The findings from this case contribute to our understanding of revolutionary transformation
to self-direction and the importance ofaligning human resource management systems with
new work design practices. The research provides an insight into the types ofarrangements
that are appropriate for a team working environment. The case also highlights some of the
difficulties encountered in evaluating the implementation of self-direction in a large and
complex organisation. These three aspects are explored further in the development of the
theoretical framework and the cross-case comparisons in Section 8.6.
8.5 Nova Cosmetics
In the final case in this thesis, attention turned to the individuals involved in the change
process and the operational and change agent roles held by internal organisational members.
The introduction oftearn-based working was a long and difficult process inNova Cosmetics
and most of the teams did not reach a level of self-management. By July 1998, in fact, many
of the teams were at Step 2 (Job Enrichment) and some were reaching Step 3 (Group Work)
of Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin's (1997) levels of team work. The following
examination of the two objectives of this case provides an insight into the problems
encountered in this company.
8.5.1 Operational Roles
In itself, the failure to implement self-managed work teams in this company during the five-
year period of involvement of the researcher is unsurprising, in view of the well-
documented, long-term nature of this change process and the evident lack of support and
commitment to the process by senior management between 1995-1997.
The first aim of this case was to explore the operational roles, behaviours and actions of
individuals at all levels of the organisation who are involved in the transition to self-
management to further our understanding of their impact on the successful implementation
of self-managed work teams. These are considered below.
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8.5.1.1 The Role of the Vice President
The implementation of self-managed work teams is a complex process affecting all aspects
of the business. The implementation process needs to be embedded in the broad, long-term
strategy of the organisation. This was the case in this company at the outset of the process
in 1993. The senior managers defined a clear strategic goal, to improve business
performance by making internal strategic changes to the organisational structure, human
resource policies and management style.
There is considerable emphasis in the literature on the importance of the behaviour of senior
management in the transition process. This case supports the findings from the surveys (e.g.
Industrial Society, 1995: Knapp et al, 1996) that the biggest difficulty in implementing self-
managed work teams is often the senior management. In this case, the first and third Vice
Presidents Manufacturing operationally supported and encouraged the implementation of
teams both explicitly, by providing vision, strategy and commitment as well as financial
support and time for training and implicitly, by providing reward and recognition through
praise etc. for team-oriented actions. There was evidence that these senior managers put in
place the necessary and appropriate operational requirements for this strategic change and
that the teams were developing under their guidance.
This was not the case with the second Vice President Manufacturing. This Vice President
Manufacturing did not make an explicit statement to the effect that the operational strategy
was moving away from team-based working. However, support for the initiative was
withdrawn implicitly. In discussions with advisers and team members, Vice President
Manufacturing (2) continually reinforced the primary importance of meeting operational
demands as a priority. She restricted activities which took team members away from the
packaging lines (e.g. training), and showed no interest in the outcomes from Integrated
Production and Continuous Improvement Teams or other team development activities. In
the terms of Dawson (1994) and Pettigrew (1985), the first and third Vice Presidents
Manufacturing provided clear, strong, persistent and continuing leadership to create
strategic change and there was evidence of success, the second Vice President
Manufacturing did not and the change process faltered. The evidence from this case
supports the survey findings identifying the importance of the operational commitment,
actions and behaviours of senior managers in the successful implementation of self-managed
work teams.
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8.5.1.2 The Advisers
With regard to the managers and the supervisors in this change process, extensive training
was provided to help them make the transition to the new work design. Specifically, and
perhaps most importantly from the operational perspective ofimplementing the change, the
former supervisors were retrained as advisers. They were trained to move away from
directing and telling the operators what to do, to coaching, guiding and facilitating the team
members. There was evidence from the interviews that the advisers took on board the
concepts behind the training and understood the principles of their new role as a facilitator
and coach, not a boss. They also understood that they were now expected to include others
in the decision-making and to share information (Dumaine, 1993). However, it took longer
to put these principles into action. The advisers knew what they should do, but not how to
do it. As Manz, Keating and Donnellon (1990) identified, supervisors may recognise the
need to change but not know how to apply their new behaviours and skills.
In many ways, the World Class Manufacturing training provided a supporting framework,
without which the first steps for the advisers would have been even harder. For example,
the Integrated Production and Continuous Improvement Teams provided a structure for the
team members to become involved with problem-solving and information sharing and helped
move the advisers away from, for example, the morning meetings to plan and schedule the
work. There was also considerable support from the Business Unit Leaders to "let go"
(Manz and Sims, 1993). The systems put in place in the Business Units to pass down
information for the teams (the charts and the notice boards) also provided a useful
framework for the advisers to encourage the teams to respond to, and take responsibility
for, the goals and targets of the production lines.
The case identifies the operational difficulties faced by the advisers in changing their style of
working after long experience as supervisors in a traditional manufacturing environment.
There was no resistance as such, but the advisers simply did not know what to do at first
and how to do it. With the practical and moral support provided by Vice Presidents (1) and
(3) and other managers, the advisers adapted their actions and behaviour quite successfully
to their new roles in the first eighteen months. However, when the direction, guidance and
support from above disappeared, the advisers reverted easily to the traditional supervisory
role and to telling the operators what to do, solving their problems etc.
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Manz and Sims (1993) comment that change programmes will fail where there is a tendency
to take back control at the first sign of difficulties. Without the necessary moral and
resource support, the advisers stopped trying to make the change work and went back to the
old systems and ways, tried and tested over time. These findings were very similar to those
described by Trist and Dwyer (1982) in their study across different organisations. In Nova
Cosmetics, once the support was reinstated, the advisers started to resume their new roles
and styles of working. All told, the advisers had a key operational role in this transition and
their reversion to a supervisory style during the transition process had serious knock-on
effects on the behaviour and morale of the team members.
8.5.1.3 The Team Members
The change process generated a wide range of responses amongst the operators initially.
Some operators expressed the concern that they were being asked to take on supervisor's
work without any associated changes to their benefits but, in the main, there was no overt
resistance. There was apathy, some employees "switched off' (Neuman, Holti and
Standing, 1995) and there was a feeling from this that people had been doing the job in the
same way for so long, there was only one way to do the job. However, in this case, as in the
study by Hoerr (1989), there were volunteers from the outset for the problem-solving teams
and for people to train as trainers for the World Class Manufacturing programme. Few of
the interviews revealed direct opposition to the changes and most team members were
passive towards the change process initially.
The change in the advisers' behaviour and the introduction of new ways of working, such as
the Integrated Production and Continuous Improvement teams, provided support and
guidance for the team members to take on a different role and to start to control the
production process. The changes were designed to create an incremental approach to team
development (Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997), but were overwhelming for the
team members at some points of the transition. The training, the involvement in problem-
solving, the responsibility for housekeeping, planning, scheduling and simply being part ofa
team and not working as an individual were very radical changes for many of the team
members to take on board and act on simultaneously. The operational support and guidance
from the advisers was essential in meeting operational demands and managing team
development.
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Between 1995 and 1997, the confusion felt by the advisers was passed on to the team
members, and the team members lost the impetus for change. Like the advisers, the team
members reverted to their traditional role and became quite "switched off" and apathetic
towards their operational roles. They ignored problems on the lines and waited to be told
what to do and when to do it.
When the advisers reinstated their moral support and guidance for team working, and the
context was changed to make teams viable e.g. dedicating teams on product lines and re-
introducing problem-solving teams, team development began again. In fact, some of the
teams progressed quite quickly to Step 3 of Badham, Couchman and McLouglin's (1997)
levels of team work, taking control of their work scheduling, work methods, performance
measurement and continuous improvement, as well as responsibility for evaluating hours of
work, the impact of absenteeism etc. This transition was made easier because the
operational roles were well defined. Continuous support from the advisers was essential in
the maintenance of the new operational practices and ways of working adopted by the team
members.
During the initial stages of the change process, the groups amongst the team members who
faced some of the greatest difficulties in adapting to the new structures and systems were the
porters and mechanics. In essence, the traditional demarcations between skilled and
unskilled workers (e.g. Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997) were the main source
of the problem. As part ofthe team development process, the mechanics were required to
pass on to the operators/team members some of the more specialist skills e.g. responsibility
for machine set-ups and for handling minor technical problems. The mechanics felt
threatened by up-skilling the team members and were uncertain about the nature of their
new role. They were concerned about what they would do if the reactive and very
demanding part of their job became the responsibility of the team. Their concerns largely
disappeared as the teams developed and the mechanics were enabled to take on a more
proactive (and interesting) technical role e.g. involvement inthe purchase of new machinery.
This situation identifies another key operational feature of the change to team working,
namely that it is essential to clarify the operational roles and responsibilities before, or as
soon as possible after, the change, especially where there are additional sensitivities involved
in crossing demarcation lines.
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8.5.2 Process Roles
The second aim of this case was to outline the change-driver roles adopted and discarded by
different stakeholders and groups of stakeholders throughout the development process. The
change-driver roles described by Buchanan and Storey (1997) will be used to structure this
discussion in the context of the organisational change. There are six groups of roles, each of
which will be considered in tum along with those who adopted those roles and their actions.
The stakeholder groups were: the Vice Presidents Manufacturing, Business Unit Leaders,
Work Redesign Team. Human Resources function, external trainers, advisers, and team
members. The key findings in this context are summarised in the table below with the more
detailed discussion in the following section.
Table 8.2 Cbange driver roles in Nova Cosmetics
Role Stakeholder
Visionary, catalyst, "mover
and shaker"
Between 1993 and 1995,Vice President (I) provided vision and acted as a
catalyst. The Work Redesign Team provided definition. Between 1995 and
1997, no-one adopted this role and team development ceased. From 1997,
Vice President (3) provided inspiration to move to the vision.
Analyst, compelling case-
builder, risk assessor
The Work Redesign Team adopted the role of analyst and Vice Presidents (I)
and (3) adopted the role of compelling case builder. This latter role was
neglected between 1995 and 1997.
Team-builder, coalition
former, ally seeker
In 1993, this role was adopted by the Work Redesign Team and in 1994/5 by
the advisers. The role was neglected between 1995 and 1997 and adopted
again by the advisers in 1997.
Implementation planner,
action driver, deliverer
This role was adopted by the Work Redesign Team initially and then by
Human Resources and the Business Unit Leaders.
Fixer, facilitator, wheeler-
dealer, power broker
Vice President (I) supported by the Work Redesign Team took on this role.
The role was neglected after 1995.
Reviewer, critic, progress-
chaser, auditor
This role was neglected throughout the change process.
8.5.2.1 Visionary, catalyst, "mover and shaker"
The visionary role is primarily one of giving direction, inspiration and support, and is
traditionally seen as the domain of the chief executive, or one in similar position (Williams,
Dobson and Walters, 1993). In this case, the first Vice President Manufacturing provided
the vision for change and acted as a catalyst in initiating the change process. The Work
Redesign Team. in conjunction with the Vice President Manufacturing, clarified the vision
and provided direction. The Work Redesign Team defined the required change and provided
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an understanding of how to achieve that change. The third Vice President Manufacturing
also provided direction, inspiration and support, to restart the change process, and sought to
explore possibilities from all the stakeholder groups, so as not to limit participation and
ideas. Many of the advisers and team members initially lacked confidence to contnbute their
thoughts and ideas, maybe because of the stop-start nature of the initiative up to that point.
The second Vice President Manufacturing did not support her predecessor's vision, nor did
she provide direction and inspiration to pursue a new vision. During her time in this role,
the change process lost momentum and there was considerable confusion amongst the
employees about how they should be working. The company did not immediately address
this issue, despite the resulting confusion. Team working was not a company-wide
initiative, however. Rather, it was specific to this unit, and hence the detail of the situation
may not have been immediately apparent to those more senior to the Vice President
Manufacturing who were making the decisions. During this phase, between 1995 and 1997,
no-one adopted the visionary role, and the unit as a whole lacked direction. This created
confusion amongst the employees.
8.5.2.2 Analyst, compelling case-builder, risk assessor
There is no clear definition of the role of analyst, case builder or risk assessor (Whybrow
and Parker, 1997); however, as the names imply, this role is taken to be assessing the value
of the vision in the organisation in question. The Work Redesign Team played this role,
along with those involved in developing team-based working on the shopfloor (e.g. the
advisers). These people assessed the possibility and plausibility of different ways of
working. The basic principles for team working were the same across the packaging lines,
but there were minor variations because of the size of units and teams etc. At the outset of
the process, many advisers and team members initially lacked confidence and were not
comfortable in contributing their thoughts and ideas.
The first and third Vice Presidents Manufacturing adopted part ofthis role, the compelling
case builder, clarifying why there should be the change to team working, the value of this
change and the benefits for the packaging department. The second Vice President
Manufacturing neglected this part of the role, and did not define and clarify the reasons and
benefits for her choice of actions, which reinforced perhaps, the lack of direction at this
time.
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8.5.2.3 Team-builder, coalition former, ally seeker
This role is one of political activity, bringing groups together and canvassing support for the
change among different stakeholders. Initially, the Work Redesign Team adopted the role of
team-builder and coalition former, to bring the different stakeholders and groups of
stakeholders together to work towards a common goal. The World Class Manufacturing
training workshops played a role in this, too. Part of their function was to facilitate team-
based working development and bring together different stakeholder groups to share
information and adopt different relationships to the ones they were used to, whilst working
towards the common goal of improving business performance.
The advisers' group also adopted this role, essentially because of their regular, weekly
meetings and because their responsibilities spanned the workforce and work area. For the
first time, they worked collaboratively and shared information across the production lines.
This communication channel was a significant way of bringing groups together.
When the World Class Manufacturing training ceased in 1995 and the advisers stopped
meeting regularly to focus on the operational performance, this role was neglected. This
contributed to the cessation of team development. The stakeholder groups reverted to the
tried and tested ways of working in traditional manufacturing units and, for example,
stopped sharing information and working to jointly resolve problems.
It was the advisers who resumed this role in 1997, communicating with Vice President
Manufacturing and the Business Unit Leaders across product lines and between tearns.
8.5.2.4 Implementation planner, action driver, deliverer
Planning/driving was another major role that the Work Redesign Team adopted initially: co-
ordinating the external trainers for the World Class Manufacturing training; planning the
times ofthe workshops; organising the training schedule and ensuring the participants knew
the dates/times etc. The Work Redesign team members were really responsible for
implementing and delivering the vision, through the training on World Class Manufacturing
and Work Redesign, by applying guidelines and by using their knowledge of their work
areas to discuss and develop the tearns. When the Work Redesign Team was disbanded,
part of this role i.e. co-ordinating the training workshops, was absorbed by Human
Resources. There was a problem in the timing of this, in that the transfer of responsibility for
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co-ordinating the people and the training times from the Work Redesign Team to the Human
Resources function coincided with the arrival of the second Vice President Manufacturing.
It became increasingly hard to release people for training and there was no-one with the
appropriate power to influence this and continue to drive the transition forwards.
This role was neglected completely between 1995 and 1997 and this is, perhaps, another key
reason that team development faltered despite the considerable progress made prior to this
date. Continuous effort is required in this role and there were no stakeholders or group of
stakeholders to drive the change forward. The role is now being filled by the Human
Resources (co-ordinating training, for example), the Business Unit Leaders (rolling out
continuous development plans) and advisers (planning and implementing team
development).
8.5.2.5 Fixer, facilitator, wheeler-dealer, power broker
The facilitator is involved throughout the change process in helping others to change and to
learn (Williams et al., 1993). Members of the Work Redesign Team took on this role also,
as they had developed experience and knowledge of team working and team development.
Their role in liasing with external consultants, for example, allowed them access to ideas and
processes others within the organisation might not have had. Working closely with Vice
President Manufacturing (l), the Work Redesign Team also had the power to do things e.g.
they kick-started the process of team development by bringing in the external trainers to run
the World Class Manufacturing training. When the Work Redesign Team was disbanded, no
stakeholder or group of stakeholders took on the role of facilitator, or had the power to
facilitate or encourage further training or to question the second Vice President's
perspective.
8.5.2.6 Reviewer, critic, progress-chaser, auditor
This role was neglected throughout the change process, with no stakeholders or groups of
stakeholders taking an evaluative perspective. In an internally-driven change process,
someone is required to hold the threads of team-based working developments together,
whilst others take on the demanding tasks required by these roles (Whybrow and Parker,
1997). For example, stakeholders and groups of stakeholders within the company needed to
take on the roles outlined above to successfully implement team working. The fact that this
role was not filled was perhaps significant, in that the company did not continuously
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evaluate its needs and how the operational actions and change processes could be improved
along the route to team working.
In this company during the first two years of the initiative, the transition to team working
had progressed quite a long way along the team development continuum. During this time,
the operational roles had become progressively more defined and the skills, actions and
behaviours of all of those involved in the change process had become more focused on
successful team development. This was an internally-driven change process; however, the
change-driver or process roles were not recognised as such. The emphasis or focus was on
the operational roles and their development. If the change-driver roles had been defined and
established, then it is possible that the momentum for the change to team working would
have sustained the initiative during the senior management changes. No stakeholders or
groups of stakeholders were driving the change process and, as a result, when faced with
problems or difficulties, historical conditioning took over and key players reverted to more
historical, traditional ways of working.
At the processuallevel, this case description identifies the importance of the key process
roles and shows that the roles are not played by one person, but by a number of different
groups at the same time to a greater or lesser extent and from different levels in the
hierarchy. This supports the work ofBadham, Couchman and Buchanan (1995) who argue
that the sociotechnical change process ismore appropriately viewed as an integrated circuit
rather than the traditional cascade model of change. These authors suggest that in
sociotechnical change it is important to recognise and address the key problems or
blockages in this circuit; this is supported by this case, in which the strong focus on the
operational roles and development overshadowed the process or change-driver roles. When
a change process ismanaged internally, people have functional roles at the operational and
processuallevels; gaps or blockages in either can affect the success of the implementation.
The findings from this case contribute an insight into the importance of both operational and
change-driver roles in the transition to team working and these are discussed further in the
next section in the context of the politics of the change process.
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8.6 A New Theoretical Framework for Investigating the Change to Team Working
This section of the chapter utilises the theoretical discussions from Chapters One and Two
and the findings from the individual case discussions as a basis for developing a new
theoretical framework for investigating the change to team working. Indeed, this
framework pulls together the different elements of the team implementation and
development process highlighted by each case.
One of the central arguments presented in Chapter Two of this thesis highlighted the
limitations of perceiving the transition to self-management in terms of a linear process.
Models representing the large-scale organisational change to self-managed team working as
a step-by-step process do not take into account the reality of this transition process, which
involves disruption to both diverse organisational structures and individual belief systems.
The findings from the cases outlined above support the idea that in the transition to self-
management there may be an organisationally defined beginning and end-point, but the
intervening period is often muddled, confused and difficult to understand. For example, in
Nova Cosmetics the transitional period was very confusing for all concerned, with the lack
of senior management commitment creating uncertainty about the direction of the change
and the nature of individuals' roles. Effectively, during the transitional period, the company
lost its momentum for change; team development ceased and key players resumed traditional
ways of working. Similarly, in Clearwipe, the political tensions surrounding the pilot team
leader's role and the demarcation issues associated with non-technical team members
assuming technical tasks created confusion and barriers to team development. As such, this
complex, intervening period does not centre on managing logical sequences of events which
step-by-step models tend to suggest, but, rather, on managing a composite and non-linear
series of transitional tasks.
Indeed, this research confirms that the change to self-managed team working is an
unfolding, non-linear, dynamic process in which individuals and actions are never clearly
defined. During the implementation process there are often unforeseen contingencies which
necessitate a modification ofintended pathways and stated objectives. For example, inBerg
Transmissions, problems associated with the production setting and the unwillingness of
team members to take on responsibility for production tasks resulted in senior managers
modifying their original objectives and creating a different outcome (i.e. lean production
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teams) to the one intended (i.e. self-managing work teams). As Dawson (1994) suggests,
the need to revise strategies to meet the demands of unpredictable events may form part of a
predefined task of evaluation and appraisal, or it may result from the response of individuals
or groups to problems arising from the transition process. Whether these tasks are part of a
blueprint for change or evolve over time, their management is critical to the successful
establishment of new organisational arrangements. Indeed, the fact that the senior managers
within Berg Transmissions took on the roles of "reviewer, critic, progress-chaser and
auditor" (Buchanan and Storey, 1997) contributed to the successful implementation of a
team-based work structure.
The significance of these tasks centres on the ability of key players to maintain an overview
of the multiple and changing routes to organisational transition and their actions in creating,
displacing, redefining and directing the ongoing development of change programmes. In
part, the complexity and untidy nature oflarge-scale transitions to team working stem from
the timeframe associated with the change (in this research, not uncommonly for the
transition to self-management, the change processes lasted four or five years). The change
to self-management is also complex given the large degree of uncertainty about what is to be
done and how to do it and radical because it involves modification throughout the
organisation and a major departure from existing ways of doing things. This research
indicated that even very detailed plans for change, such as those provided by Clearwipe
where there were training plans and matrices, new role definitions, team briefings and
meetings etc, do not remove the uncertainty or necessarily clarify the timing of events to key
individuals.
On the basis of the results of these case analyses and their implications for organisations
embarking on the transition to self-managing team work, it would seem both appropriate
and essential to develop existing theoretical frameworks of team development to explicitly
include key elements of the process of managing the change. As such, a new framework is
presented below to highlight the key team development and change process issues in the
transition to self-managed team working. This framework has a solid basis in previous work
in this area and builds on the key findings from the individual case discussions in this
research.
Chapters One and Two of this thesis described numerous attempts to codify researchers'
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and practitioners' experiences in work design. Several main theoretical frameworks have
contributed to the body of knowledge on work design, such as the Job Characteristics
Model and the sociotechnical systems approach (described in Chapter One). The published
research endorsing these frameworks typically reveals consideration of one or more other
factors seen as elaborating on these frameworks, setting conditions for their applicability and
explaining their effects. These span additional levels of explanation ranging from
organisational contingencies to individual processes.
The framework proposed here builds on this earlier research and describes some of the
characteristics that determine effectiveness of the implementation and development oftearn
working over time in organisations. In particular, the framework builds on ideas proposed
by Jackson (1997) and the processual approach presented by Dawson (1994; 1997) and both
of these sources are adapted for use here. This proposed framework supports the notion
that linear team development models are inadequate in explaining fully the change to team
working and that there must be an appropriate emphasis on the process of change. Indeed,
this framework is designed to increase understanding of the key factors in the organisational
change process to team working and the barriers to successful implementation of team
working initiatives in organisations. As noted earlier, many team working initiatives do not
yield the expected results. This framework and research are not just focused on the
theoretical significance of this issue, but also on the practical importance, because it will help
clarify the conditions under which approaches to team working are more or less likely to
achieve benefits.
The framework is described below and then elaborated further in the following section
through more comparative discussion of the case findings.
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Figure 8.1 Framework for investigating tbe change to team working
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The above framework is proposed as the basis for understanding team forms of work design
and the nature of the organisational change to team working. This framework emphasises
the dynamic nature of change in an attempt to understand the process and context of the
change to team working as it unfolds within an organisation. Previous theories (discussed
in Chapter Two e.g. linear models of change or contingency approaches) have tended to
underplay aspects such as the political dimensions, or the iterative nature, of change
processes. This framework incorporates these ideas and may be interpreted as follows.
The complex process of the change to team working is set within three broad timeframes;
the conception of the need to change; the transition period and the post-transitional or
operational period. Broadly speaking, this temporal approach is based on Dawson's (1994:
1997) processual model of change and during each of these timeframes a series of tasks,
activities and decisions will be made by individuals and groups. These decision-making
activities may be influenced by external agencies e.g. government or trade union policies, or
internal factors e.g. management views and expectations or individuals who facilitate or
inhibit the change process. There is not a definitive list of tasks, activities and decisions
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associated with each stage of the process, and it is proposed in the process of the change to
team working an organisation may move back and forth between the different timeframes.
Indeed, there are two-directional arrows linking the "Conception: The Need to Change",
"Transition: Tasks, Activities and Decisions" and "Post Transitional Period: New
Operational Arrangements" sections of this framework. The idea of the "life cycle" of teams
is discussed by Buchanan (2000: 37), who proposes a rather evolutionary view of the team
development process, and suggests that teams may be "adopted, adapted, developed and
disbanded". As such, changing organisational circumstances and management perceptions
may influence senior managers within an organisation to constantly re-evaluate the
organisational design.
The factors associated with the transition stage of the change process are displayed in
groups in Figure 8.1, but should not be treated as representing a series of sequential stages
in the implementation and development of team working. Rather, this representation is
analytically useful to separate out the different factors and to identify key tasks, activities
and decisions. In reality, the process is likely to be iterative and involve much back-
tracking. As a result, the factors presented in Figure 8.1 will change in their significance as
shapers and determinants of change during different time periods in the process of the
transition to team working. In this context, Clark et al (1988) noted "the processual
approach sensitises us to the fact that there are no fixed outcomes of change under a given
..... system, simply outcomes at particular moments in time." (p. 222).
This is not meant to imply that there is no order to the change process. Indeed, it is likely
that as the change to team working progresses, there will be a shift in focus from external to
internal factors, with external factors constantly being monitored. For example, in the
transition to team working, the initial conceptualisation of a need to change and the strategic
decisions on the scale of the change will be taken at senior management level. These
decisions will be influenced by management's strategic objectives, the state of the business
market and the applicability of this work design in the context of the company's current
operating systems. During the planning and implementation of the change, the internal
contextual variables, including work patterns and relationships, training, timescale, budgets
etc. will become the main focus of attention. Further into the transition period, these factors
may decline in significance, as team leader's and member's concerns increase in importance
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and the politics of the change process becomes more significant. There is also likely to be
increasing emphasis on the establishment of organisational systems and arrangements
congruent with the new way ofworking and a consolidation of the new working practices.
All told, however, nor is this meant to imply that there is a rigid order to transition period
and the way in which the variables take on importance. There is a certain logic to the way in
which such a change process progresses (the focus on external factors switching to an
emphasis on more internal factors), and this was reflected generally in the case discussions.
However, this should not be taken as prescriptive. Different factors will be important at
different times in different organisations in this change process, and these are contingent
upon the organisation's circumstances and management perceptions. Also, as noted above
(and highlighted in the case discussions) the process is likely to be iterative and involve
backtracking. To reflect these issues, the arrows from the boxes in Figure 8.1 are drawn to
indicate that the different factors may impact on the change process at more than one stage.
Through combining the three timeframes of change with this classification offactors shaping
the process of the transition to team working (i.e. the scale, the context and the politics of
the change), a processual framework of the change to team working is presented. This
framework is intended to clarify and explain the process of managing the transition to team
working and is intended to convey the interconnectedness and complexity of the dynamic
processes underlying this change. The framework is intended to help identify, analyse and
explain factors which shape outcomes at different moments or periods during the transition
to team working.
The aim of this research was to explore the factors critical to the successful transition to
team working in manufacturing companies. The cases in this study describe the change
process from the conception of a need to change to the establishment of new operational
arrangements and the findings from the individual cases studies have been utilised in the
development of this new framework for examining the change to team working.
The three broad time frames and the associated tasks, activities and decisions which make up
this framework will be explored in more detail below. Each section will begin with a general
explanation of the framework for investigating the change to team working and then the
findings from the cross-case comparisons will be introduced to elaborate further on the key
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variables in this framework and the factors which impact on the success or failure of team-
based work designs. The discussion is structured according to the key factors depicted in
this framework and suggestions for the direction offuture research are included under each
heading; indeed, the framework provides a sound theoretical structure and focus for
subsequent research.
8.7 The Conception of a Need to Change: The Initiative
At the outset of the transition process, there is a period of initial awareness and the
conception of the need for change within the organisations. This may either be a reactive
response to external or internal pressures for change or through a proactive belief in the
need for change to meet competitive pressures. In the context of the change to team
working, the conception of the need to change may be influenced by factors external to the
organisation e.g. management reports on the success of team working in other organisations
or the perception of a management fashion or fad towards team working, or by factors
internal to the organisation e.g. operational inefficiencies.
This conception of a need to change will be constantly re-evaluated by senior managers
within the organisation throughout the change process. Buchanan (2000) notes that team
work is a process in context, an organisational form which evolves, and in many cases,
regresses to a more conventional working and managing style. Organisational circumstances
and management perceptions change and work design initiatives may be discontinued
accordingly. As such, it is a two-directional arrow linking the "Conception: The Need to
Change" and "Transition: Tasks, Activities and Decisions" sections of the framework. The
findings from the Clearwipe plc case provide an example of senior management re-
evaluating the need for change and a move back to an earlier stage in the change process.
The four organisations included as cases in this study were committed to the implementation
and development of self-managing teams at the outset ofthe change process. However, the
drive to make this change was inspired by different external and internal factors for each
organisation.
For example, within Clearwipe pic a combination of both internal and external factors came
together to provide the impetus for change. Clearwipe plc operates in a high volume, low
cost environment and fluctuations in product demand create unpredictability in the
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production units. There is constant pressure on all the companies within the group to
maintain market share (as Bosch, for instance are close competitors). As such, senior
managers within the company are constantly evaluating the need to change work processes
and practices to meet these competitive pressures. Alongside these market pressures,
Clearwipe plc's manufacturing plant is based in South Wales and there is a great deal of
competition for shopfloor personnel. Initiatives within the organisation, particularly those
which provide potential employees with a more positive view of the work and organisation
and differentiate them from other local manufacturing sites on factors other than pay, are
perceived as significant in attracting new recruits. As such, securing commitment from
employees by the provision of more interesting and challenging work in a team environment
was seen as a contribution towards ensuring the company's long-term future. The
combination of these two external factors with the internal pressure to change working
practices because of operational inefficiencies on the shopfloor influenced senior
management within the organisation towards the introduction of self-managed team
working.
In Berg Transmissions, a long history of intense competitive pressures influenced the
conception of a need to change. Over a number of years, external pressures on Berg
Transmissions have included the oil crisis, the influx of Japanese suppliers, problems in the
motor industry e.g. British Leyland in the 1970s, and changes in technology with the
introduction of new transmission systems. For most of the 1990s, Berg Transmissions has
operated in adverse trading conditions. In this organisation, the move to team working was
also influenced by other companies within the corporation (particularly in North America)
beginning the team implementation process. Faced with enormous economic pressures,
there was a considerable need within Berg Transmissions to reduce operational problems
and to improve quality and efficiency. As such, there were both external and internal factors
issues providing the impetus for the change to team working in this organisation also.
On the other hand, Optel Corporation made the transition to team working to meet the
demands of a booming economic environment. During the period of this research, there
was phenomenal growth in the demand for Optel Corporation's products. Within this
context, the organisation considered it essential to empower people to make their own
decisions and to take responsibility for their actions, in order to maximise results in the
production area in terms of productivity, quality and lead times. Essentially, Optel required
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the flexibility and speed inherent in team working practices to meet the growth and demand
in the product market. Also, Optel Corporation was in a similar position to Berg
Transmission, in that several other organisations within the group in North America and
Canada were beginning the team implementation process. Management perception within
the corporation as a whole considered this to be a very positive initiative. As such, there
was pressure on successive Directors of Operations within Optel Corporation to make the
transition to team working.
Finally, the conception of the need to change within Nova Cosmetics was also associated
with both internal and external factors. For example, the senior managers and the Work
Redesign Team were influenced by the reports of the success of team working in other
organisations and its impact on business performance, At the same time, there was
considerable emphasis on internal factors and a determination to rationalise the structure of
the shopfloor to reduce inefficiencies, increase operator's involvement in the work processes
and enhance their well-being.
All told, different reasons inspired the organisations studied in this research to set out on the
same journey. As the case narratives indicated however, they ended up with very different
results. In some ways, this research illustrates the fragility of work design initiatives to
implement and develop self-managed work teams in brownfield manufacturing
organisations. The individual case discussions illustrated how the force of technology, the
context and politics of the change and the management of the transition process itself
affected the reality of the change. Each of the case studies brought into the foreground
different aspects of the change to self-managed team working. These issues are elaborated
further below from the more integrative perspective of a cross-case analysis.
8.8 The Transition: Tasks, Activities and Decisions
During the transition period, the focus moves to the complex, non-linear process of change,
which comprises a range of different tasks, activities and decisions for individuals and
groups within the organisation. Based on the findings from the individual case discussions in
this research in the transition to team working this period includes a range of variables key
to a successful change process. These variables are clarified below.
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8.8.1 The Scale of the Change
The senior managers in an organisation may have clarified the need to change to team
working, for example, to enhance competitive advantage. They then have further decisions
to make about the constituents of change. One such decision refers to the scale of the
change and whether to take an incremental or radical approach. The case discussions
highlight the use of both approaches in the context of this work redesign initiative, and also
that an understanding of the techniques and organisational processes associated with the
different approaches is a prerequisite to a successful outcome. The incremental and radical
approaches to change have different characteristics, which enable or constrain the options
open to management during the change process.
Advocates of the former view (e.g. Quinn, 1980; 1982) see change as being a process
whereby individual parts of an organisation deal incrementally and separately with one
problem and one goal at a time. Change takes place through successive, limited and
negotiated shifts. Pre-eminent exemplars of incremental change have been the Japanese
companies (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989). Advocates of radical change (e.g. Gersick, 1991),
on the other hand, depict organisations evolving through relatively long periods of stability
(equilibrium periods) in their basic patterns of activity that are punctuated by relatively short
bursts of fundamental change (revolutionary periods). Revolutionary periods substantively
disrupt established activity patterns and install the basis for new equilibrium periods.
The findings from the cases in this research provide support for both the incremental and
radical approaches to the transition to team-based working. Support for the incremental
approach comes from the successful transition to lean production teams in Berg
Transmissions. Over the four-year research period, the company made a series of
incremental strategic and structural adjustments including the gradual shift in responsibility
to team members for problem-solving, training initiatives, reductions in the hierarchy,
revised contracts and associated changes to the selection, grading and reward systems. The
company dealt separately with one problem at a time and change took place through
successive and limited shifts. As such, the transition evolved through a cascading adaptation
in related parts of the organisation.
In the context of Hamel and Prahalad's (1989) comment that pre-eminent exemplars of
incremental change have been the Japanese companies, it is interesting to note that Berg
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Transmissions effectively implemented Japanese-style teams in a Japanese-style production
setting through a philosophy of continuous improvement. As such, the success of the
change may relate to the philosophy and practice of the transition process and the new
working arrangements being in harmony.
Support for the radical approach to the change to self-management comes from the findings
in the Optel Corporation case. These findings suggest that the transition to self-management
may be accomplished successfully through a period of rapid and fundamental
change. Indeed, the Optel Corporation switched overnight to self-directed team working,
sweeping away the traditional shopfloor hierarchy and replacing it with a team-based
structure. The change involved most of the key domains of organisational activity. In line
with punctuated equilibrium theory, the organisation then created a new deep structure.
Within the context of this research however, the problems associated with the pilot study in
Clearwipe plc demonstrate some of the difficulties inherent in the incremental approach to
change. In this case, these difficulties were associated with the inter-relatedness of the
different components of the organisational systems. Non-revolutionary or incremental views
of organisational transformation emphasise the relative independence of organisational
subunits. Punctuational equilibrium theorists stress the interdependence of organisational
subunits and the need to ensure complementary alignment among structural variables.
Interdependent relationships and patterns of working constrain organisations to an ongoing
commitment to established activities. Gersick (1991) described organisational deep
structure as a system of interrelated organisational parts which is maintained by mutual
dependencies among the parts. According to this view, the result of interdependence is not
cascading adaptation over related organisational subunits, but rather resistance to change as
subunit managers seek to maintain a complex network of commitments and relationships.
This interdependence between organisational systems was one source of the problems within
Clearwipe. Indeed, Clearwipe adopted an incremental approach to the change to self-
management and decided to test the water, first with the introduction ofa pilot team, and
then by introducing teams into one part of a larger unit. In this process, Clearwipe made
changes to some key structural variables by designating teams, identifying and transferring
responsibility for some work tasks and encouraging team problem-solving activities, but did
not make fundamental changes to the associated organisational arrangements and support
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systems. Changes to one part of the system e.g. devolving problem solving to the teams
created difficulties in other parts of the organisational system e.g. the reward system. The
team members considered some kind of benefit was appropriate for taking on more
responsibility. In some ways therefore, Clearwipe's efforts to make incremental changes to
establish self-management were prevented by deep structure inertia.
The activity patterns ofa system's deep structure reinforce the system as a whole through
mutual feedback loops. By not changing components of the deep structure Clearwipe
generated a strong inertia, first by preventing the system from generating alternatives outside
its own boundaries, then by pulling deviations that did occur back into line. In this case, the
interdependence between the different systems created a resistance to the change and there
was pressure to retain the status quo.
One key outcome from this research is the finding that both incremental and radical
approaches are appropriate in the change to team working. In this context however, and
perhaps of equal significance, is the finding that it is not whether the scale of the change is
incremental or radical that is important, but that associated changes to the organisation's
deep structure are a pre-requisite to the successful change to team working. Congruence
between different elements of the organisational systems is essential. This was achieved in
both the Optel Corporation and Berg Transmissions, but not in Clearwipe. An additional
implication is that where senior mangers decide to implement pilot schemes as a means of
testing the viability of the team structure in their organisations, these need to be supported
by appropriate organisational arrangements and systems to eliminate a potential stumbling
block to their success.
In this context, further research is important to determine the factors that result in the
incremental or radical approach to change in the context of the transition to team-based
working. There are a wide range of factors that may be of significance, such as the
economic climate surrounding the company (in this research the Optel Corporation was in a
strong financial position, whereas Berg Transmissions faced adverse trading conditions), the
timing of the decision in association with the level of maturity or the life-cycle stage of the
organisation, the nature of the leader or cultural artefacts of the change (whether a Japanese
or Western-style team-based structure is proposed). These factors could usefully be
clarified by further studies.
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8.8.2 Team Design Characteristics
The team design characteristics refer to the distinctions between the different types of team
design e.g. lean production, high performance or self-managing teams. Each type of team
design has unique characteristics and requirements, which must be considered in the context
of the production environment.
In the first chapter of this thesis, attention was drawn to the distinctions between the
different types of teams that exist within organisations and the unique characteristics and
requirements inherent in these team designs. For example, at the core of sociotechnical
systems team design is autonomy, the need for challenging work and the wholeness of work.
Attention is paid to work content. Workers have autonomy over their movements, to a
certain extent they can set their own working pace and they are comparatively free to decide
the way in which results are achieved. Essentially, they are given autonomy over work pace
and work methods. Self-management is seen as a substitute for leadership and the
traditional role of supervisors becomes more that offacilitator and coach. Regulatory tasks,
such as administrative and other duties, become an integrated part of the job. Co-ordination
between groups is minimised, and the autonomy of the group is maximised.
On the other hand, lean production is characterised by flow production and interdependence.
The leading co-ordination principle is the standardisation of work processes, resulting in a
situation in which workers are physically bound to their workplace and have limited freedom
of movement. Each worker is expected to deliver a certain amount of work within an
appointed timespan and the team, as such, has no influence over work pace or work method.
The team aspect oflean production is governed by the process, rather than by the pursuit of
autonomy and operative decision-making through self-management. Team leaders are
traditional-style supervisors who, from their hierarchical position, command the team. In
lean production settings. group boundaries are not clearly defined and it is the process which
relates the products to the teams. Lean production expects workers to be capable of
carrying out a wide range of narrow tasks with employees being rotated not only within
teams but also between teams.
As such, different work settings favour different type of team design. The individual case
discussions highlighted the need for congruence between team design and production setting
and the importance of understanding the distinctions between the different team types at an
313
operational level. All the organisations in this study set out to implement self-managing
work teams; however, constraints of the production settings in Clearwipe and Berg
Transmissions were such that that this became an unsuccessful endeavour.
To set this issue in context and underline the importance of the congruence between the
work setting and the team type, the case findings will be examined further in the detailed
consideration of the production environment in the following section about the context of
the change.
8.8.3 The Context of Change
The context of the change is taken to refer to external and internal operating environments
as well as the influence offuture projections and expectations on current operating practice
(Dawson. 1994). In this way, the context of the change can be divided into the context
pertaining to the environment in which the organisation operates and the internal
organisational context. In a sense, external and internal factors similar to those described in
relation to the Conception of a Need to Change section above continue to influence the
change process during the Transition Period. The external contextual factors might include
changes in competitor's strategies, technological innovation and changes in the level of
business activity. During the Transition Period, senior managers will continue to evaluate
these factors and they will influence the change process and the way it unfolds overtime and
in context. For example, in relation to the cases reported in this research, the external
factors driving this work redesign initiative included both particularly adverse trading
conditions (Berg Transmissions) and particularly good trading conditions (Optel
Corporation). The adverse trading conditions surrounding Berg Transmission provided
momentum to the change process and influenced the way in which the teams evolved during
the change process. The teams in this company were developed to fit in with tight financial,
as well as the operating, constraints. As such, these case findings indicate that external
contextual factors influence the way in which the change process unfolded.
Internal contextual factors comprise the nature of the production environment and the
organisational arrangements and systems. The production environment refers to the plant,
machinery and tools and the associated philosophy and system of work organisation which
blend together in the production of goods. Internal operational inefficienciesassociated with
the production setting are a key feature in placing an emphasis on team working in many
314
organisations. In this research, this was apparent in both Clearwipe pIc and Nova
Cosmetics. The nature of the proposed team design and its compatibility with existing
production arrangements will be a key factor in determining the outcome of the transition
process (as indicated by the case discussions on Clearwipe plc and Berg Transmissions).
Another key internal contextual variable relates to the organisational arrangements and
systems, which comprise the formalised lines of communication, established working
procedures, the allocation of tasks and the design of jobs and work structures, the
managerial hierarchies and the reward systems. In the transition to team working, the
organisational arrangements and systems are all transformed.
As indicated by the case discussions, a change in work design necessitates a change in the
organisational arrangements and systems. If this does not occur, it provides a barrier to the
successful change process. For example, in Clearwipe plc, the change to team working
established new work relations and patterns of work behaviour, but there were no
concomitant changes in the supporting systems and arrangements. This created a blockage
in the change process. On the other hand, in both the Optel Corporation and Berg
Transmissions, the changes to the pattern of working were supported by changes to the
organisational arrangements and systems and no such blockages were apparent.
8.8.3.1 External Contextual Issues
In the introduction to this section (Section 8.8.3), it was noted that the external and internal
factors influencing the conception of the need to change also impact on the transition
process, in the sense that senior managers will be monitoring the organisation's internal and
external environments on an ongoing basis in order to evaluate the outcomes of the change
process.
The case findings in this research indicate that such external contextual issues influence the
direction and outcomes of the change process. In particular, the external economic climate
in which Berg Transmissions was operating created a difficult financial situation for the
company. This relates to Buchanan's (1994) consideration of the origins of different types
of team working. This author points out that the original aims of self-managed work teams
related to improving the quality of life to reduce absenteeism and labour turnover. In more
straitened economic circumstances, team-based work designs are associated with a way of
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dealing with their customers and their competitors. As such, their objectives are strategic
rather than operational (Buchanan, 1994). In Berg Transmissions, the shift in focus among
the senior management team from self-management to lean production teams was driven by
the difficult financial circumstances as well as operational constraints. These circumstances
provided senior managers with more momentum in the transition process and certainly
influenced the final outcome of the transition process with their impact on the nature of the
team design and the switch from self-managed to lean production teams, enabling a more
defined focus on continuous improvement, quality and efficiency.
On the other hand, in Optel Corporation, some of the impetus to drive the change to self-
management was provided by the very positive views of this initiative from other companies
within the corporation. This management perception was sustained throughout the research
period within the corporation as a whole and the change to team working became associated
with success. Senior managers firmly believed that the team working initiative was one of
the enabling factors in a phase of phenomenal business growth. There was no causal data to
substantiate this firmly-held belief in the success of the team working initiative, but senior
management conviction was a driving force in the team implementation process, providing
well-defined expectations and the drive to surmount difficulties.
8.8.3.2 Production Environment
Jackson, Parker and Sprigg (2000) note that one of the basic reasons for the lack of success
in the implementation of team working "may be that the setting within which team working
implementation is attempted is inappropriate" (p. 84). This is likely to be the case for
production settings where work designs are influenced to a large degree by features of the
technology and structural aspects of the production process (Slocum and Sims, 1980).
Introducing self-management will only be successful if there is a good fit between the
initiative and the characteristics of the work setting. One example of such a contingency is
identified by Wall and Jackson (1995) as production uncertainty. An uncertain production
process is one where there are many unpredictable events and uncertainties brought about
by, for example, frequent changes of product design, unreliable machines and rapidly
changing customer requirements. Based on sociotechnical systems principles, uncertain
processes can be managed most effectively by devolving responsibility to those closest to the
source of the uncertainty; in other words, by enriching operators' jobs and allowing them to
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solve local problems by themselves (Jackson, Sprigg and Parker, 2000). With the rigid
standardisation of work processes in a lean production environment, this production
uncertainty is largely eliminated.
In the Optel Corporation, the team members were able to establish, to a large extent, their
own methods and work pace to achieve production targets. In doing this, they became
responsible for resolving any associated difficulties and problems. In Berg Transmissions,
uncertainty associated with the production process was removed with the introduction of the
Toyota Production System. Team members became involved in a limited and prescribed
way with problem solving through kaizen activities. As such, the scale and control
associated with problem solving in the Optel Corporation was considerably greater than in
Berg Transmissions and provided more scope for the teams to become self-directing.
Another contingency factor that has been identified as an important characteristic of the
work setting in relation to team-based forms of work design is the degree of
interdependence in the production process. According to Jackson, Sprigg and Parker
(2000), interdependence refers to the degree to which both physical layout and
manufacturing tasks give opportunity for team members to work collaboratively in order to
complete their work as a team. For example, some define self-managed work teams as an
interdependent collection of individuals, each of whom shares responsibility for
organisational outcomes (Hackman and Oldham, 1980). In the context of self-management,
interdependence is found within the group.
Within the Optel Corporation, the production setting enabled the members of each team to
work collaboratively to complete their work. The boundaries between teams and autonomy
within the teams were maximised and co-ordination between the teams minimised. This was
not the case in Berg Transmissions where the interdependence was sequential and team
boundaries were not clearly defined. Indeed, job rotation practices meant that team
members rotated not only within their teams, but also between teams and between
production groups. Similar problems were encountered in Clearwipe where the so-called
autonomous teams found it almost impossible to take responsibility for resolving their own
production problems because of the interdependence and co-ordination required between the
teams demanded by the production process.
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Other facets of different team-based work systems include aspects of autonomy i.e. task
control and role breadth at the individual and collective level and work demands. The
nature of the production setting in the lean production environments in Clearwipe and Berg
Transmissions meant that team members could not achieve control over aspects of work
timing and method. In both Clearwipe and Berg Transmissions, work processes were
standardised and team members expected to operate at a fixed pace. The strict control of
work processes prevented the teams exercising control within the production process. Job
enlargement occurred by job rotation. As such, task control was limited and team members
carried out a wide range ofnarrow tasks. In the Optel Corporation, increased responsibility
for the production process enabled team members' jobs to be broadened vertically rather
than horizontally. Job enlargement occurred within the boundaries of the teams and the
relative autonomy within the groups enabled team members to control the allocation of
work.
The interdependence inherent in the lean production settings in Clearwipe and Berg
Transmissions also necessitated strong team leaders. However, in Clearwipe, the teams
were established along the lines of sociotechnical systems teams with internal, elected team
leaders. The demands of the production process for co-ordination across the team
boundaries were a major stumbling block to team development. Effectively, the self-
managing work teams could not establish control over their part of the work process. In
Berg Transmissions the final result i.e. lean production teams did have strong hierarchical
team leaders in whom much of the responsibility devolved to the shopfloor rested. This had
an impact on the success of the team initiative and did allow for lean team development
within the constraints of the production setting. However, this did result, to a large extent,
inde-skilling team members as authority and responsibility were invested in the team leader
not the team members. All told, the requirement for strong leadership to manage across
team boundaries inherent in lean production settings provides an impediment to the
implementation of self-managed work teams.
Another problem presented by the lack of strong leadership between the teams in Clearwipe
related to the question of problem solving. In Clearwipe, one of the responsibilities of the
newly designed teams was to resolve their own production-related problems. However, the
interdependent nature of the production process made problem solving as a team activity
quite impossible as any suggestions invariably crossed team boundaries andwent beyond the
318
scope of the self-managing teams. Unlike in Berg Transmissions, where the strong
leadership provided the necessary co-ordination, the internally elected team leaders in
Clearwipe did not consider it within their role or appropriate to pursue ideas between teams.
As such, the problem solving activities of the teams within Clearwipe were limited and there
was minimal expansion of cognitive elements of the team members' roles.
These comments notwithstanding, problem solving was the one area in which there was
some similarity across the different production settings in the Optel Corporation and Berg
Transmissions. In Optel, the team design and production process was such that
independent, co-operative working reinforced the teams working together to solve
production problems; indeed the abolition of the structure on the shopfloor necessitated
team problem solving. In Berg Transmissions, the teams' involvement in kaizen and
collective problem-solving activities proved to be one of the few areas in which their roles
were up-skilled and the major distinguishing factor from the more traditional Tayloristic
forms of work design. As such, therefore, the cognitive elements of the team members'
roles were increased in both companies.
In summary, this research suggests that self-managed forms of team design are appropriate
in certain work settings. These include situations in which the production setting enables
high interdependence within the team and low interdependence between different teams.
Where the production process demands high interdependence between teams, alternative
team designs e.g. lean production teams may be more appropriate. Other factors in the
production setting and team design that require congruence include opportunity to establish
autonomy over work pace and methods and control over problem solving activities relevant
to the production process.
This research supports Jackson, Sprigg and Parker's (2000) view that far from team
working being the solution to an organisation's competitiveness problems the wrong team
design adds more layers of difficulty and this adds stress and strain to the workforce.
Problems associated with the fit between the team design and the production setting were
evident in two of the cases in this research (i.e. Clearwipe and Berg Transmissions) and
these findings highlight the need for organisations to place more emphasis on diagnosing the
context in which they intend to implement self-management. There are no universalistic
solutions in the team design process: gains can be achieved only when work design choices
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result from a prior audit of production process characteristics (Jackson, Sprigg and Parker,
2000).
Further research in this area could usefully focus on the issue of the viability of developing
self-managed work teams in a lean production area and consider the work design
implications of, for example, enlarging the team boundaries within the lean production
environment to enable the teams to take greater control of their work processes. Such
research may also be useful in exploring whether it is possible to progress from lean
production teams, in which the team roles are relatively de-skilled, to self-managed teams, as
proposed by Berg Transmissions in their longer-term strategy.
8.8.3.3 Organisational Arrangements and Systems
The internal contextual factors of organisational arrangements and human resource systems
are particularly pertinent to the transition to self-management, in the sense that there needs
to be congruence between these systems and the new working patterns in order to reinforce
the change process. The change to self-management creates the need for different skillsand
attributes in employees. Appropriate recruitment, assessment and training programmes that
emphasise attracting and developing individuals with appropriate technical, problem-solving
and interpersonal skills are essential and become instrumental in achieving the strategic goals
of these interventions. Employee interaction and information exchange must also be
facilitated through appropriate structural and appraisal and reward systems changes to
promote a high degree of interdependence and group problem solving.
The findings from the cases in this research support the results of the Industrial Society
(1995) survey in which it was highlighted that if too many of the old controls stay in place
the change to team working will not be successful. This statement is particularly relevant to
Clearwipe and relates to problems encountered both in their pilot study and the wider
implementation of team-based working. Senior managers in Clearwipe considered that
changes to organisational arrangements and systems to support the structural changes were
inappropriate without establishing, in the first instance, some evidence of the success of the
team working initiative. However, by not making such changes, the company seemed to be
limiting the success of the change initiative - creating rather a chicken and egg situation.
Indeed, data from interviews in Clearwipe revealed that issues surrounding more pay for
more responsibility, for example, became a key concern for team members in this company.
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Team members considered there should be a reward for taking on more responsibility and
control of the production process. This became another stumbling block to the successful
implementation of team working.
The findings from the Berg Transmissions and Optel Corporation cases confirm Cohen et
aI's (1996) view of the importance the relationship between the organisational context and
team effectiveness. Indeed, the organisational arrangements and support systems in these
companies emerged as one of the most significant factors in the successful implementation
and development of team-based working. The congruence between the new work design
and the supporting frameworks was pivotal to the success of these team working initiatives.
Berg Transmissions introduced an open-book policy, revised contracts for process
operators, role re-definitions, training and employee development activities and streamlined
the selection, grading and reward systems. The Optel Corporation established a resource
support team to help resolve team-related problems, prime roles to provide links with
support functions, a new career development structure, team-oriented recruitment and
selection procedures and team-based assessment and rewards systems.
Acknowledging there was a difference in that Berg Transmissions established these new
arrangements and systems to support lean production and the Optel Corporation to support
self-directed work teams, nevertheless, both types of team design represented collaborative
working and a fundamental shift away from traditional. individual systems. In both cases.
these new arrangements were essential in crystallising the new deep structure and preventing
slippage back to old patterns of working and old ways of doing things. The new
organisational systems and arrangements implemented in Berg Transmissions and the Optel
Corporation supported the transition to team-based working and reinforced the change and
new patterns of behaviour. The new deep structure maintained a continuous force for
change and established equilibrium within the organisations.
Indeed. this change to the organisational arrangements and organisational systems was one
of the unifying features of the transitions in Berg Transmissions and the Optel Corporation.
Both companies were successful in their transition to team-based working; however, Berg
Transmissions adopted an incremental approach to develop lean production teams and the
Optel Corporation adopted a radical approach to create self-directed work teams. The
findings from the cases suggest that, at least in part, this success was related to both
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companies reinforcing the transition to team working with appropriate deep structure
changes and creating congruence between the interdependent components of organisational
structures and systems.
The findings from this research demonstrate the importance in the change to team-based
work designs of congruence between the new structure and supporting systems. The
implication is that even in organisations embarking on small-scale changes to team systems,
e.g. pilot studies, changes within one group or department in an organisation, as well as
those contemplating a major organisational change, should be prepared to adopt
arrangements appropriate to collective working.
In this context, further research in Nova Cosmetics will be useful to follow the progress of
team working and to explore any of the associated changes to the organisational
arrangements implemented to sustain team development.
8.8.4 The Politics of Change
The politics of the change process are taken to refer to the political activity of consultation,
negotiation, conflict and resistance, which occurs at various levels during the process of
managing change (Dawson, 1994). This political activity may take the form of negotiations
between different organisational groups and between and within managerial, supervisory and
team member groups. These individuals or groups can influence decision-making and the
setting of agendas at critical junctures during the transition to team working. The change
process can be influenced by factors such as variations in commitment and differing vested
interests between different management levels or different functions. Indeed, the Industrial
Society (1995) survey highlighted several issues relevant in this context, namely problems
with senior/intermediate managers and teams rejecting responsibility/authority. The effects
of political activity on the change to team working were particularly apparent in the
Clearwipe pIc and Nova Cosmetics case discussions. The findings from these cases indicate
that senior managers had a huge impact on the viability of the team working initiatives, not
only in operational terms, but also by adopting, or perhaps more importantly, by not
adopting relevant internal change agent roles.
8.8.4.1 Operational Roles
As well as survey data to this effect, studies examining implementation inadequacies as a
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reason for the lack of success of team working often cite low senior management
commitment. Indeed, Marchington (2000) states " senior management support and
commitment is considered essential for team working to have any chance of success" (p.
73). If employees see little evidence of this, it is understandable that their interest and
commitment is likely to be minimal, and any initiative treated with disdain. This situation is
often exacerbated in organisations by the frequent turnover of senior managers/champions of
initiatives and their replacement by new managers with a different set of priorities
(Marchington et aI, 1993). In this context Geary (1993), in his study of team working at
two electronics plants in Ireland, noted that a lack of managerial commitment seemed to
have been the primary factor in explaining the limited success of quality circles.
The findings in this research also confirm the key role of senior managers in the change to
self-managed team working. In Nova Cosmetics, one of the main reasons for the
interruption to the team development process related to the reduction in commitment from
senior personnel in the Manufacturing Unit. In this case there were frequent changes of
manager with different operational strategies and priorities. The findings from Berg
Transmissions and the Optel Corporation also support this finding, although from a
substantially different perspective. In both these companies, senior managers demonstrated
sustained commitment to team-based working. In the Optel Corporation, there were also
frequent changes to senior management; however, successive managers shared the vision
and commitment to team working.
The case analyses also provide evidence that even when new operational roles and
responsibilities are well-defined it is not always apparent to those involved in the change
how they are supposed to act in these new roles. For example, the interview data from
Nova Cosmetics indicated that despite extensive training prior to the change the advisers
knew what they were supposed to do, but not how to do it. Similarly, in Berg
Transmissions, the team members failed to act in their new roles despite appropriate training
and support. In effect, organisations need to provide more than new role definitions and
training for new operational roles; they also need to help individuals operationalise their new
roles.
The findings from the cases in this thesis, especially Clearwipe and Nova Cosmetics, also
support the work by Manz and Sims (1993) which suggests that reverting to a blaming
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culture and taking back control when faced with difficulties sends signals to those who work
for them. For example, in Nova Cosmetics, with the arrival of Vice President Manufacturing
(2) the team members perceived the signals of confusion from the advisers very quickly, on
the basis ofwhich they reverted to more traditional ways of working. Additional operational
pressures highlighted by team leaders and advisers in Nova Cosmetics and Clearwipe
indicated, as Trist and Dwyer (1982) have previously suggested, that it was a severe strain
to try to develop team-based working at the same time as maintaining high levels of
productivity and efficiency.
The political issues associated with self-management crossing vertical and horizontal
boundaries within organisations were also demonstrated in this research, particularly in
relation to the skilled/semi-skilled nature of the technician's role compared to the team
member's role. In Clearwipe, the technicians withdrew their support of the initiative by
avoiding training team members on routine maintenance and changeovers, despite the
perceived benefits of moving away from the routine, reactive work to more challenging
technical problems. Similar problems were encountered in Nova Cosmetics with the
mechanics and their concerns about role demarcation.
With regard to the different groups of team members in this research, the findings from the
case analyses support the results of the Industrial Society (1995) survey, which indicated
that a key problem in the implementation of self-managed work teams related to team
members rejecting authority and responsibility. Certainly, in Clearwipe and Berg
Transmissions data revealed that team members received training in their new roles and
responsibilities but did not change their work behaviour. This continued in Berg
Transmissions until the team members were contractually obliged to do so. Similarly, in
Nova cosmetics, the team members were trained through World Class Manufacturing but
again had difficulties putting these ideas into practice. In this case, structural changes and
the introduction ofIntegrated Production and Continuous Improvement teams provided the
impetus for new work patterns. In the Optel Corporation, new behaviours on the part of the
team members were forced by the radical nature of the change and the abolition of old ways
of working. In all however, in three of the four cases in this research, team members were
initially unwilling to take on the responsibilities and tasks associated with team working.
All told, in the transition to self-management, this research confirms the integral nature of
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senior management commitment to the change process. This study also highlights the
importance of defining in detail the new roles of key players in the change process, as well as
helping individuals operationalise these new roles. Attention also needs to be paid to
political tensions and perceived threats associated with changes to traditional role
demarcations, with, perhaps, more emphasis placed during the change process on the
benefits of adopting new roles and a clearer definition of these roles.
8.8.4.2 Change Agent Roles
The case findings also highlighted that it is not just operational roles that were significant in
the context of this change, but that it was also important for key players to adopt
appropriate change driver roles. Indeed, this research confirms that the successful
implementation and development of team working in organisations depends not only on
individuals making the necessary transition to new operational roles, but also on the roles
played during the change process. To effect a successful internally driven change, different
change-driver roles need to be filled appropriately at different times in the change process. If
this does not happen, and the change process encounters problems, it may be derailed. The
contrast between the more and less successful change programmes in this research
demonstrates this point. In the successful transitions in both Berg Transmissions and the
Optel Corporation, the different change driver roles were effectively assumed at different
times by the various stakeholders and groups of stakeholders. For example, in the Optel
Corporation successive Directors of Operations undertook the visionary and the compelling
case-builder roles. Members of the resource support team acted in many different roles
including as analysts, team builders, coalition formers, ally seekers, implementation planners
action drivers, deliverers and fixers and facilitators. The Production Managers and
Controllers also took on aspects of these roles at different times, and along with the
resource support team members, reviewed and criticised the process. All told, in the Optel
Corporation, different stakeholders and groups of stakeholders adopted the change driver
roles to successfully manage the change process.
The change process was managed less successfully within Nova Cosmetics. In particular,
the team development process was interrupted by the loss after eighteen months of the
visionary and compelling case builder. Also, with the roles of reviewer, critic, progress-
chaser and auditor unfilled, there was no-one to feed information back to the stakeholders,
to hold the threads of team working together and to accomplish the pre-defined task of
325
evaluation so crucial to long and complex changes.
The findings from the cases included in this research suggest that for the successful
implementation of team working it is not only essential to clarify operational roles and
expected behaviours and actions to reduce uncertainty, but also to identify and clarify the
process roles of operational personnel. Further research in this area would be useful to
clarify these roles in the context ofthis particular change process and to discern the levels
and characteristics appropriate to individuals undertaking them.
8.9 Post-Transitional Period: New Operational Arrangement
The final section of Figure 8.1 reflects the post-transitional period of operation and the
emergence of new operational arrangements and new patterns of working. In the context of
this research, this refers to the successful implementation and development of team working
and identifiable improvements in performance, satisfaction and commitment. Such findings
were discussed in the context of the Optel Corporation and Berg Transmissions cases. The
findings from this research confirm the problems highlighted in Chapter One of this thesis
associated with evaluation of the impact of self-management on business performance.
Even with the co-operation of senior managers within the Optel Corporation, the researcher
struggled to determine the link between the organisational change to team working and
improved performance. The researcher attempted to adopt the holistic approach, following
Patterson et al (1997), but was thwarted by no consistent use of the same questionnaire. On
top ofwhich, the many contextual changes, such as frequent changes in senior personnel, an
extraordinary increase in the shopfloor workforce resulting in teams at different stages of
development, and the introduction of different practices and policies at the same time, made
it impossible to separate out the different effects on the change process. The senior
managers believed that team working contributed to improved business performance.
Evidence of causality did not seem significant to the senior managers in the context of this
company, maybe because it was experiencing a time of significant business growth and
expansion. In many ways, the findings from this case confirm reliance on anecdotal evidence
in evaluating self-managed team working.
On the other hand, Berg Transmissions, in a period of adverse trading conditions, worked
hard to evaluate the impact of the change to a team-based work design. Berg Transmissions
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was able to provide hard business data indicating improved business performance in several
areas, which related these improvements to the impact of new working practices. Given the
contrasting economic situations of the Optel Corporation and Berg Transmissions, it was,
perhaps, more significant for Berg Transmissions to establish improved performance.
Perhaps also, the historical context of the different team-based systems is important in terms
of evaluation. Historically, the transition to self-management has been associated with
quality of working life initiatives and not to business strategies for increasing competitive
advantage. On the other hand, the philosophy behind lean production relates to increasing
profit by reducing cost. As such, a focus on quantifiable data is inherent in lean production
work designs.
These findings are in line with Miller's (1975) argument that the social system of the self-
managing team was inflexible in the face of extreme environmental demands. This debate
has been rehearsed more recently in the context of the dispute concerning the respective
merits of Japanese and Scandinavian motor car manufacturing methods (e.g. Womack et at,
1990). The implications of these findings for organisations considering the implementation
of team-based systems reinforce the idea and importance of diagnosing both the external and
internal context of the change.
All told, this research confirms the complexities of trying to measure the outcomes of the
introduction of self-management. Such problems may be expected by organisations
measuring the outcomes of long-term initiatives, such as the transition to team working,
because of the difficulties inherent in trying to separate out the effects of the different
changes made simultaneously in the organisation. However, an interesting avenue for further
research would be to examine why some managers maintain their commitment to the change
process in the face of no hard evidence and how they maintain the momentum and
consistency in the direction of this change. In this context, techniques such as the repertory
grid could be utilised to increase awareness of senior managers' constructs associated with
team development and the change process and determine factors associated with establishing
commitment and consistency. This research has confirmed the importance of senior
management commitment in a successful transition to team working and such cognitive
maps may prove invaluable in increasing the number of companies achieving a successful
outcome.
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8.10 Limitations of this Research
No empirical work is perfect in every respect and researchers endeavour to strive for more
facts to increase understanding of any phenomenon close to its reality. This research was
based on the use of qualitative research techniques in a longitudinal case study design. In
Chapter Three, the researcher argued for the use of a qualitative approach to enable her to
build a complex holistic picture of the change process and identify key contextual and
processual factors inherent in the self-managed work team development process. Such an
approach also enabled the researcher to seek to explain the interconnected and dynamic
processes inherent in everyday life and, as such, to avoid a static snapshot view of social life
which may be a characteristic of quantitative research. Longitudinal research was
appropriate in this context as its continuity allowed the researcher to follow the
organisational changes and team development in the four companies for periods of between
eighteen months and four-and-a-halfyears. Relatively few in-depth cases focusing on this
work design initiative exist and the aim was to increase understanding of the self-managed
work team implementation and development process through longitudinal research.
However, despite the appropriateness of qualitative techniques in investigating this research
topic, the present study has the shortcomings associated with the application of only one
approach. Case study methodology was chosen, at least in part, to enable a multi-method
approach and observational and interview techniques were effectively combined in this
research to create a complex and holistic description of the change process to self-managed
team working. In future research, the use of quantitative data would serve as a supplement
to the qualitative data. Quantitative methods, for example, questionnaire data focusing on
specific factors that affect the team development process, e.g. the political dimensions of the
implementation and development of self-managed work teams, would add to our knowledge
in this area and would enable more causal hypotheses to be examined and inferences to be
made.
Having said this however, the researcher did attempt to use quantitative data in the form ofa
questionnaire in a repeated measures design within the Optel Corporation, but this was
largely unsuccessful because of organisational constraints and senior management's decision
to use different questionnaires each year. In fact, the problems associated with the
questionnaire data in this study reflect wider issues in the context of research in applied
settings. Whereas the researcher in the laboratory can exert considerable control over their
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research design, researchers in applied settings cannot control the design to the same extent.
Indeed, to identify accurately the contextual variables that affect organisational processes,
the researcher has to relinquish such control and work within the constraints of the
organisation.
Also with respect to the methodology, the researcher did not subject the interview data and
analysis of the transcripts to independent scrutiny to confirm whether others would
categorize the data in the same way. To a large extent, the decision not to take this step
related to the very factual nature of the interview data, especially the responses to the
questions from the interview protocols. Little judgement was required on the part of the
researcher to assess the answers to the questions because of the concrete nature of the data
and because the researcher was able to cross-check the information with data from other
interviews within the same organisation and from her own observations. Similarly, it may
have been appropriate to subject the descriptive coding undertaken by the researcher with
respect to the stories and examples from the interviews to independent scrutiny, but again
the very factual and concrete nature of the data meant the requirement to make fine
judgments about the information was limited.
The researcher chose a multi-method approach, combining observational and interview
techniques, to establish an understanding of the change to team working. Other methods
e.g. diary methods, may have contributed to the data collection process. However, they
were not included in the research design for several reasons. Diary methods comprise a very
intensive methodology and provide a detailed snapshot of parts of a process. They are,
perhaps, not particularly suitable for longitudinal studies in busy production environments.
Certainly, in the high volume environments ofClearwipe plc and Nova Cosmetics, in which
production demands were constantly pressing for the team members, it was not a viable
option to ask them to complete diaries and, had they done so, it may have resulted in only
very extreme events being recorded, for example. Over the long period the researcher was
involved with the organisations, it may also have been problematic sustaining the team
member's enthusiasm for completing the diaries. It may be that in future research diary
methods could be incorporated and playa useful role in eliciting information as part of a
multi-method approach e.g. in exploring the politics of change and by asking team members
to record when and/or why they feel uncertain about new tasks, activities and expected
behaviours.
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In terms of the nature of the organisations studied in this research, the main unifying feature
related to the original, explicitly stated goal of each of these organisations to implement self-
managed work teams. The outcomes of the cases illustrate the fragility ofself-management
and, indeed, from the same starting point in the journey, the four organisations each reached
different destinations. If the researcher were to start another study into the implementation
and development of self-managing teams, additional criteria would be considered in the
selection of the organisations to be included in the research. For example, with the benefit of
hindsight, the researcher would consider carefully whether to include organisations inwhich
production strategies are designed on the principles oflean production. The findings in this
research identify key variables in such production settings which prevent the successful
development of self-managed work teams and it would be self-limiting to incorporate lean
production environments in similar studies of the implementation and development of self-
managing work teams.
Also, with regard to the generalisability of the findings from this research, it may be valuable
in future research to chart the transition to self-management within organisations from the
same industry sector. The outcomes from this study appear, at a broad level, to be
generalisable to other brownfield manufacturing organisations, but more specific
recommendations would be possible from research based in same sector organisations.
Similarly, caution must be applied in generalising these findings on a wider basis, for
example, to service organisations.
8.11 Learning Outcomes
The discussion of this thesis would be incomplete without an overview of the learning
process involved in carrying out this applied research. This overview provides additional
insights into the research process.
Perhaps one of the main challenges for the researcher in this study was associated with the
practical problems of maintaining intense working relationships with the large number of
people involved in the change process and team development in each of the four
organisations, especially as the organisations were located in four entirely different parts of
the country. Close relationships were needed to ensure continuity in observing and charting
the change processes and as such the researcher spent a lot of time in each organisation.
The fact that the organisations were located so far apart added to the pressures on the
330
researcher's time.
On a more positive note, the researcher was genuinely impressed by the warmth and
friendliness displayed by ahnost everyone encountered during this period of research. The
vast majority of senior managers, supervisors, team members, mechanics and technicians
involved in the change processes within the companies were willing to become involved in
the research. Indeed, the researcher established close, informal relationships with many of
the key people and received an overwhelming welcome, unstinting co-operation, and over
time, increasingly uninhibited responses to questions and comments. Very few people
within the organisations were either apprehensive about the research or reluctant to become
involved, but when this reaction was encountered it was, to a large extent, minimised
through building rapport. The researcher's knowledge about manufacturing organisations
and their processes and patterns of work grew enormously through involvement with these
four organisations and through participation in shopfloor and training activities and social
gatherings. This knowledge effectively increased the researcher's understanding and insights
about the organisations and helped provide a sound basis from which to interpret
observational and interview data.
8.12 Conclusion
The aim of this research was to examine the team development and organisational change
processes in the large-scale transition to self-managed team working in brownfield
manufacturing sites using empirical evidence drawn from a detailed knowledge of case study
data collected over a period of almost five years in four organisations. The findings from the
research confirm Buchanan's (2000) observation that "teamwork (however defined) should
be regarded as more appropriate in some settings that in others" (p. 35).
The outcomes of this research confirm that the change to self-managed team working is an
unfolding, non-linear, dynamic process in which individuals and actions are never clearly
defined. As such, team development models describing the change as a linear, step-by-step
process are simplistic and misleading. Rather, those managing such a change should
consider the process as a composite and non-linear series of transitional tasks. Indeed, the
transitional tasks involved between the conception of the need to change and the emergence
of new work practices and procedures associated with team working overlap, occur
simultaneously, stop and start, and are part of the initial and later phases of major change
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programmes. A considerable body of data emerged from the four cases in this research and
was used to document these dynamic processes in the change to team working.
The findings included support for both incremental and radical approaches to the transition
to team-based working. This research also confirmed that different work settings favour
different types of team design and illustrated the importance of understanding the
distinctions between the different team types at an operational level. Specifically, this
research suggested that self-managed forms of team design are appropriate in certain work
settings. Factors that need to be considered in establishing congruence between production
settings and different team designs include interdependence, opportunity to establish
autonomy over work pace and methods and control over problem solving activities relevant
to the production process.
The findings from this research also demonstrated the importance in the change to team-
based work systems of congruence between the new work design and supporting systems.
The implication is that organisations embarking on both major and small-scale changes to
team systems should be prepared to adopt arrangements appropriate to collective working.
This research also confirms the integral nature of senior management commitment to the
change process and establishes the importance of defining in detail the new roles of key
players in the change process, as well as helping individuals operationalise these roles. The
cases highlight the importance ofpaying attention to political tensions and perceived threats
associated with changes to traditional role demarcations, and indicated that it is important
for key players to adopt appropriate change driver roles. Finally, this research confirms the
complexities of trying to measure the outcomes of the introduction of self-management.
In many ways, this research illustrates the fragility of the implementation and development
of self-managed work teams in brownfield manufacturing organisations. This research also
confirms the relevance to the team development process of the quotation which appeared at
the beginning of this thesis, namely "The road to success is always under construction"
(Miller, cited in Williams, 1998). Indeed, the findings from this research demonstrate how
the context and politics of the change process impact on the success of this long-term
initiative and that team development is a constantly adapting and evolving in specific
organisational contexts. As such, the prescriptive linear models of team development are
unlikely to be useful tools for organisations to planning to implement and develop team
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working. These models are likely to be useful only ifthey are considered within the context
of the process factors described in this research.
The outcomes of this research support Buchanan's (2000) view that forms of team work
differ significantly from one setting to another and that it is difficult to establish commonly
agreed benchmarks or shared definitions to facilitate systematic contrasts and comparisons.
Team development must be seen as a process in context and as an organisational form which
adapts and evolves over time in specific organisational settings. In the continuing
enthusiasm for implementing and developing self-managing work teams in modem
production conditions for economic reasons (e.g. Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin,
1997), there is little emphasis on the potential costs and risks or limits and liabilities
incurred, nor the situations in which they are more or less likely to succeed and make a
successful contribution to overall organisational effectiveness.
This research indicates that self-managed work teams are difficult to implement and shows
the enormous variety of responses to the same initiative, the different problems faced by
organisations and how important it is to adapt the intervention to the organisation.
Essentially, this research, by increasing understanding of the change process to team
working, may help reduce the difficulties faced by organisations making this transition.
333
REFERENCES
Adler, P. S. (1988). Managing flexible automation. California Management Review, 30, 3,
34-56.
Adler, P. (1992). The learning bureaucracy: New United Motors Manufacturing Inc. In
Staw, B. and Cummings, L. (Eds.). Research in Organisational Behaviour. Greenwich: JAI
Press.
Adler, P. S. (1993). Time and motion regained. Harvard Business Review,
January/F ebruary.
Applebaum, E. and Batt, R. (1994). The new American workplace: Transforming work
systems in the United States. New York: ILR Press.
Atherton, C. R. (1993). Empiricists versus social constructionists: Time for a cease-fire.
Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Human Services. December, 617-624.
Badham, R., Couchman, P. and Buchanan, D. (1995). The new management of
sociotechnical change: Change roles in an integrated circuit of change agency. Outline of
workshop results, reprints available from the authors.
Badham, R., Couchman, P. and McLoughlin, I. (1997). Implementing vulnerable
sociotechnical change projects. In McLoughlin, I. and Harris, M. (Eds.). Innovation.
organisational change and technology. London: International Thomson Business Press.
Badham, R. and Naschold, F. (1994). New technology policy concepts. In Technology
Policy: Towards an Integration of Social and Ecological Concerns. Aich-Holzer, G. and
Schienstock, G. (Eds.). Berlin: De Gruyter.
Banker, R. D., Field, 1. M., Schroeder, R. G. and Sinha, K. K. (1996). Impact of work
teams on manufacturing performance. Academy of Management Journal, 39, 4, 867-890.
334
Bartunek, J. M. (1984). Changing interpretive schemes and organisational restructuring: The
example ofa religious order. Administrative Science Quarterly, 29, 355-372.
Beckhard, R. and Harris, R. (1977). Organisational Transitions. Reading, Massachusetts:
Addison- Wesley.
Beer, M., Eisenstat, R. and Spector, B. (1990). Why change programs don't produce
change. Harvard Business Review, November-December, 158-166.
Benders, J. and van Hootegem, G. (2000). How the Japanese got teams. In Procter, S. and
Mueller, F. (Eds.). Teamworking. London: Macmillan Business.
Berggren, C. (1993). The Volvo experience: Alternatives to lean production in the Swedish
Auto industry. Basingstoke: Macmillan
Best, M. H. (1990). The new competition: Institutions of industrial restructuring.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beyerlian, M. (1997). Transformations to team-based organisations: research at the Centre
for the Study of Work Teams. Paper presented at the Institute of Work Psychology,
University 0f Sheffield.
Bicheno, J. (1991). Implementing JIT. IFS Publications.
Boddy, D. and Buchanan, D. A. (1986). Managing new technology. Oxford: Gower.
Boddy, D. and Buchanan, D. (1992). The expertise of the change agent: Public performance
and backstage activity. Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall International UK.
Brandon, J. (1993). On the vulnerability ofinterdisciplinary programmes of strategic change
to functional interests: A case study. Journal of Strategic Change, 2, 1, 151-156.
Bratton, J. (1991). Japanization at work: The case of engineering plants in Leeds. Work,
Employment and Society, 5, 3, 613-635.
335
Breaugh, J. (1985). The measurement of work autonomy. Human Relations. 38, 6, 551-570.
British Psychological Society (1991). Code of conduct. ethical principles and guidelines.
Leicester: BPS
Bromley, D. B. (1986). The case study method in psychology and related disciplines.
Chichester: John Wiley.
Bryman, A. (1988). Quantity and quality in social research. London: Unwin Hyman.
Buchanan, D. A. (1994). Principles and practice in work design. In Sisson, K. (Ed.)
Personnel management: A comprehensive guide to theory and practice in Britain (2nd ed.).
Oxford: Blackwell
Buchanan, D. (2000). An eager and enduring embrace: The ongoing rediscovery of
teamworking as a management idea. In Procter, S. and Mueller, F. (Eds.). Teamworking.
London: Macmillan Business.
Buchanan, D. Boddy, D. and McCallman, J. (1998). Getting in, getting out and getting
back. In Bryman, A. (Ed.). Doing research in organisations. London: Routledge.
Buchanan, D. and Boddy, D. (Eds.) (1983). Organisations in the computer age:
Technological imperatives and strategic choice. Aldershot: Gower.
Buchanan, D. A. and McCalman, 1. (1989). High performance work systems: The Digital
experience. London: Routledge.
Buchanan, D. A. and Preston, D. (1994). Life in the cell: Supervision and teamwork in a
"manufacturing systems engineering" environment. Human Resource Management JoYJ:Dal
2,4,55-76.
Buchanan, D. and Storey, 1. (1997). Role-taking and role-switching in organisational
change: The four pluralities. In I. McLoughlin and M. Harris (Eds.). Innovation.
organisational change and technology. London: International Thomson Business Press.
336
Burnes. B. (2000). Managing Change: A strategic approach to organisational dynamics. (3n!
ed.). Harlow, England: Pearson Education.
Calder, B. (1977). Focus groups and the nature of qualitative marketing research. Journal of
Marketing Research. 14,3,353-364.
Campbell, D. T. (1984). Can we be scientific in applied social science? Evaluation Studies
Review Annual. 9, 26-48.
Campion, M. A. (1996). Reinventing work: A new area of 110 research and practice.
Presidential address to the Eleventh Annual Conference of Society of Industrial and
Orgnaisational Psychology, San Diego.
Cassell, C. and Fitter, M. (1992). Responding to a changing environment: An action
research case study. In Hosking, D. M. and Anderson, N. (Eds.). Organisational change and
innovation: Psychological perspectives and practices in Europe. London: Routledge.
Cassell, C. and Symon, G. (1994). Qualitative methods in organisational research: A
practical guide. London: Sage.
Caudron, S. (1993). Are self-directed teams right for your company? Personnel Journal,
December, 76-84.
Cherns, A. (1976). The principles of sociotechnical design. Human Relations, 29, 8, 783-
792.
Cherns, A. (1987). Principles of sociotechnical design revisited. Human Relations, 40, 3,
153-162.
Clark, 1., McLoughlin, I., Rose, H. and King, R. (1988). The process of technological
change: New technology and social choice in the workplace. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
337
Cohen, S. G., Ledford, G. E. and Spreitzer, G. M. (1996). A predictive model of self-
managing work team effectiveness. Human Relations, 49 5, 643-676.
Cohen, L. and Manion, L. (1989). Research methods in education (2nd ed.). London:
Routledge.
Cole, R. (1971). Japanese blue collar: The changing tradition. Berkeley/Los
AngelesILondon: University of California Press.
Cook. J. D. and Wall, T. D. (1980). New work attitude measures of trust, organisational
commitment and personal needs non-fulfilment. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 53, 39-
52.
Coombs, G. and Gomez-Meija, L. R. (1991). Cross-functional compensation strategies in
high technology firms. Compensation Review, 23, 40-49.
Cordery, J. L. (1996). Autonomous work groups and quality circles. In West, M. A. (Ed.)
Handbook of work group psychology. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
Cordery, J. L., Mueller, W. S. and Smith, L. M. (1991). Attitudinal and behavioural effects
of autonomous group working: A longitudinal field study. Academy of Management
Jo~ 34, 2, 464-476.
Cordery, 1. L., Wright, B. M. and Wall, T. D. (1997). Towards a more comprehensive and
integrated approach to work design: Production uncertainty and self-managing work team
performance. Paper presented at the 1th Annual SlOP Conference, St Louis, Aprilll-13.
Cresswell. 1. W. (1998). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five
traditions. California: Sage Publications, Inc.
Cummings, T. and Blumberg, M. (1987). Advanced Manufacturing Technology and Work
Design. In Wall, T. D., Clegg, C. W. and Kemp, N. J. (Eds.) The Human Side of Advanced
Manufacturing Technology. John Wiley and Sons Ltd.
338
Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J., Nitta, M., Barrett, B., Belhedi, N., Bullard, J., Coutchie, c., Inaba,
T., Ishino, I., Lee, S., Lin, W-J., Mothersell, W., Rabine, S., Ramanand, S., Strolle, M. and
Wheaton, A. (1994). Japanese team-based work systems in North America; Explaining the
diversity. California Management Review, 37, 1,42-64.
Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G. (1963). A behavioural theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ, USA: Prentice Hall.
Dawson, P. (1994). Organisational change: A processual approach. London: Paul Chapman
Publishing Ltd.
Dawson, P. (1997). Advanced technology and the development of new forms of work
organisation. In McLoughlin, I.and Harris, M. (Eds.) Innovation. organisational change and
technology. London: International Thomson Business Press.
Dawson, P. and Webb, J. (1989). New production arrangements: The totally flexible cage?
Work, Employment and Society, 3, 2, 221-238.
Dean, J. W. and Snell, S. A. (1991). Integrated manufacturing and job design: Moderating
effects of organisational inertia. Academy of Management Journal, 4, 4, 774-804.
Delbridge, R. and Kirkpatrick, I. (1994). Theory and practice ofparticipant observation. In
Wass, V. and Wells, P. (Eds.). Principles and practice in business and management research.
Aldershot: Dartmouth.
Delbridge, R., Lowe, J. and Oliver, N. (2000). Worker autonomy in lean teams: Evidence
from the world automotive industry. In Procter, S. and Mueller, F. (Eds.) Teamworking.
London: Macmillan Business.
Denning, J. D. and Verschelden, C. (1993). Using the focus group in assessing training
need empowering child welfare workers. Child Welfare. 72, 569-579.
Denzin, N. K. (1983). Interpretive interactionism. In Morgan, G. (Ed.). Beyond method:
Strategies for social research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
339
Dore, R. (1973). British factory - Japanese factory. London: Allen and Unwin.
Dumaine, B. (1990). Who needs a boss? Fortune, May, 40-47.
Dumaine, B. (1993). The new non-manager managers. Fortune, February, 38-42.
Dumaine, B. (1994). The trouble with teams. Fortune, September, 76-82.
Dunphy, D. and Bryant, B. (1996). Teams: Panaceas or prescriptions for improved
performance? Human Relations, 49, 5, 677-699.
Dunphy, D. and Stace, D. (1992). Under new management: Australian organisations in
transition. Sydney: McGraw-Hill.
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. and Lowe, A. (1991). Management research: An
introduction. London: Sage.
Eccles, R. G. (1991). The performance measurement manifesto. Harvard Business Review,
January-February, 131-137.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Making fast strategic decisions in high velocity environments.
Academy of Management Journal. 32, 543-576.
Ellegard, K., Jonsson, D., Engstrom, T., Johansson, M. I., Medbo, L. and Johansson, B.
(1992). Reflective production in the final assembly of motor vehicles -An emerging Swedish
challenge. International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 12, 7/8, 117-
133.
Emery, F. E. (1959). Characteristics ofsocio-technical systems: A critical review of theories
and facts about the effects of technological change on the internal structure of work
organisations; with special reference to the effects of higher mechanisation and automation.
Tavistock Institute Report.
340
Findlay, P., McKinlay, A., Marks, A. and Thompson, P. (2000). Flexible when it suits them:
The use and abuse ofteamwork skills. In Procter, S. and Mueller, F. (Eds.) Teamworking,
London, Macmillan Business.
Flanagan, J. C. (1954). The critical incident technique. Psychological Bulletin, 51,327-358.
Florida, R. and Kenney, M. (1991). Transplanted organisations: The transfer of Japanese
industrial organisations to the U.S. American Sociological Review, 56, 381-398.
Forza, C. (1996). Work organisation in lean production and traditional plants: What are the
differences? International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 16,2,42-62.
Frame, J. (1994). The new project management: Tools for an age ofrapid change. corporate
reengineering and other business realities. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass.
Fried, Y. and Ferris, G. R. (1987). The validity of the job characteristics model: A review
and meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology, 40, 287-322.
Friedman, A. (1977). Industry and labour: Class struggle as work and monopoly capitalism
London: Macmillan.
Fucini, J. J. and Fucini, S. (1995). Working for the Japanese. New York: Free Press.
Gandz, J. (1990). The employee empowerment era. Business Quarterly, 55, 2.
Geary, J. (1993). New forms of work organisation and employee involvement in two case
study sites: Plural, mixed and protean. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 14, 511-534.
Gerhardt, F. and Milkovich, G. T. (1993). Employee compensation: Research and practice.
In Dunnette, M. D. and Hough, L. M. (Eds.). Handbook of industrial and organisational
psychology. Vol. 3,481-569. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Gersick, C. J. G. (1991). Revolutionary change theories: A multilevel exploration of the
punctuated equilibrium paradigm Academy of Management Review, 16, 1, 10-36.
341
Gladstein, D. L. (1984). Groups in context: A model of task group effectiveness.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 29, 499-517.
Glaser, B. and Strauss, A. L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for
qualitative research. Chicago: Aldine.
Gold, R. L. (1958). Roles in sociological field observations. Social Forces, 36,217-223.
Goodman, P. S. (1979). Assessing organisational change: The Rushton quality of work
experiment. New York: Wiley.
Goodman, P. S. and Dean, J. W., Jr. (1982). Creating long-term organisational change. In
Goodman, P. S. (Ed.) Designing effective work groups. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Goodman, P. S., Devadas, R. and Griffith Hughson, T. L. (1988). Groups and productivity:
Analysing the effectiveness of self-managing teams. In Campbell, J. P. and Campbell, R. J.
(Eds.) Productivity in organisations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R. and Balkin, D. B. (1992). Compensation, organisational strategy and
firm performance. Cincinnati: South-Western
Goski, K. L. and Belfry, M. (1991). Achieving competitive advantage through employee
empowerment. Employee Relations Today, 18,213-220.
Graham, L. (1995). On the line at Subaru-Isuzu. Ithaca: ILR Press.
Grey, S. M. and Corlett, E. N. (1989). Creating effective operating teams. In Wild,R. (Ed.)
International Handbook of Production and Operations Management. London: Cassell.
Guth, W. D. and MacMillan, I. C. (1989). Strategy implementation versus middle
management self-interest. In Asch, D. and Bowman, C. (Eds.). Readings in strategic
management. London: Macmillan.
342
Guzzo, R. A. and Shea, G. P. (1992). Group performance and intergroup relations in
organisations. In Dunnette, M. D. and Hough, L. M. (Eds.). Handbook ofIndustrial and
Organisational Psychology. (2nd ed.). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Hackman, 1. R. (1975). Is job enrichment just a fad? Harvard Business Review, Sept/Oct.,
pp. 129-134.
Hackman, J. R. (1976). Group influences on individuals. In Dunnette, M. D. (Ed.).
Handbook of industrial and organisational psychology. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Hackman,1. R. (1977). Work design. In Hackman, 1.R. and Suttle, J. (Eds.). Improving life
at work. Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear.
Hackman, J. R. (1978). The design of self-managing work groups. In Biking, S., Streufert,
S. and Fiedler, F. E. (Eds.). Managerial control and organisational democracy. New York:
John Wiley.
Hackman, 1.R. (1988). The design of work teams. In Lorsch, J. W. (Ed.). The Handbook
of organisational behaviour. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Hackman, J. R. (1990). Groups that work (and those that don't): Creating conditions for
effective teamwork. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
Hackman, 1. R. (1992). The psychology of self-management in organisations. In Glaser, R.
(Ed.). Classic readings on self-managing team work. King of Prussia, PA: Organisation
Design and Development.
Hackman, J. R. and Lawler, E. E. (1971). Employee reactions to job characteristics. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 55, 259-286.
Hackman, J. R. and Oldham, G. R. (1975). Development of the Job Diagnostic Survey.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 60, 2, 159-170.
343
Hackman, J. and Oldham, G. (1976). Motivation through the design of work: Test ofa
theory. Organisational Behaviour and Human Performance, 16,250-279.
Hackman, J. R. and Oldham, G. R. (1980). Work Redesign. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley
Hamel, G. and Prahalad, C. K. (1989). Strategic intent. Harvard Business Review, May-
June, 63-76.
Hammersley, M. and Atkinson, P. (1983). Ethnography principles in practice. London:
Tavistock.
Hartley, J. F. (1994). Case studies in organisational research. In Cassell, C. and Symon, G.
(Eds.). Qualitative methods in organisational research: A practical guide. London: Sage.
Hartman, A. (1990). Editorial: Many ways of knowing. Social Work, 35, 3-4.
Harvey, N. and von Behr, M. (1994). Group work in the American and German
nonautomotive metal manufacturing industry. International Journal of Human Factors in
Manufacturing, 4, 4, 345-360.
Healey, M. J. (1991). Obtaining information from businesses. In Healey, M. J. (Ed.).
Economic activity and land use. Harlow: Longman.
Hoerr, J. (1989). The payoff from teamwork. Business Week, July, 56-62.
Holpp, L. (1993). Self-directed work teams are great, but they are not easy. Journal of
Quality and Participation, December, 65.
Iaffaldano, M. T. and Muchinsky, P. M. (1985). Job satisfaction and job performance: A
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin. 97,251-273.
Incomes Data Services (1984). Group working and greenfield sites. IDS Study 314, May.
344
Industrial Society (1995). Self-managed teams, Managing Best Practice 11. London:
Industrial Society.
Ingersoll Engineers (1990) Competitive manufacturing: The guiet revolution. London
IRS (1996). Rewarding employees in the 1990s, IRS Management Review 3, October.
IRS (1997). Self-directed team working, IRS Management Review 7, October.
Jackson, P. R. (1997). Group forms of work design. Unpublished Working Paper, 24thJuly.
Jackson, P. R., Sprigg, C. A. and Parker, S. K. (2000). Interdependence as a key
requirement for the successful introduction ofteamworking: A case study. In Procter, S. and
Mueller, F. (Eds.) Teamworking. London: Macmillan Business.
Johnson, J. M. (1975). Doing field work. New York: Free Press.
Johnson, S. (1999). The horrors of scientific research. The Psychologist. 12,4, 186-189.
Jurgens, U., Malsch, T. and Dohse, K. (1993). Breaking from Taylorism: Changing forms of
work in the automobile industry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kahn, R. and Cannell, C. (1957). The dynamics of interviewing: Theory. technigue and
cases. New York and London: John Wiley,
Karasek, R. A. (1979). Job demands.job decision latitude and mental strain: Implications for
job redesign. Administrative Science Quarterly. 24, 283-308.
Katz, H., Kochan, T. A. and Keefe, J. (1988). Industrial relations and productivity in the
U.S. automobile industry. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 3, 685-715.
Katzenbach, 1. R. and Smith, D. K. (1993). The wisdom of teams: Creating the high-
performance organisation. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
345
Kelly, D. and Amburgey, T. L. (1991). Organisational inertia and momentum: A dynamic
model of strategic change. Academy of Management Journal. 34,3,591-612.
Kenney, M. and Florida, R. (1993). Beyond mass production: The Japanese system and its
transfer to the US. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kerr, S. (1975). On the folly of rewarding A while hoping for B. Academy of Management
Journal. December, 769-783.
Kessler, I (1994). Performance pay. In Sisson, K. Personnel management: A comprehensive
guide to theory and practice in Britain (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
Kitzinger, 1. (1994). The methodology of focus groups: The importance of interactions
between research participants. Sociology of Health and Illness, 16, 103-121.
Kitzinger, J. (1995). Introducing focus groups. British Medical Journal, 311, 299-302.
Knapp, K., Erwin, P., Park, R. and Ieronimo, N. (1996). Tearns in Australia's automotive
industry: Characteristics and future challenges. Paper to the 1996 Employment Research
Unit Annual Conference, Cardiff Business School.
Knell, J. (1999). Partnership at Work. Industrial Society: Employment Relations Research,
Series No.7.
Krepchin, I. P. (1990). The human touch in automobile assembly. Modem Materials
Handling, November, 52-55.
Krueger, R. A. (1994). Focus groups: A practical guide for applied research. (2nd ed.).
London: Sage.
Kulisch, T. and Banner, D. K. (1993a). Self-managed tearns: An update. Leadership and
Organisation JoY!1ml,14,2,25-29.
346
Kulisch, T. and Banner, D. K. (1993b). Current trends in self-managed work teams. In
Beyerlein, M., Teal, L., Rust, G. and Bullock, M. (2nd ed.). Proceedings from the 1993
International Conference on Self-Managed Work Teams.
Lawler, E. E. and Rhode, J. G. (1976). Information and control in organisations. Santa
Monica, California: Goodyear.
Lawler, E. E. (1981). Pay and organisational development. Reading, Massachusetts:
Addison- Wesley.
Lawler, E. E. (1982). Increasing worker involvement to enhance organisational
effectiveness. In Goodman, P. S. (Ed.), Change in organisations: New perspectives on
theory, research and practice. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Lawler, E. E. (1986). High involvement management: Participative strategies for improving
organisational performance. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
Lawler, E. E. (1991). The new plant approach: A second generation approach.
Organisational Dynamics, Summer, 20, 3, 5-14.
Lawler, E. E. (1992). The Ultimate Advantage. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Lawler, E. E., Mohrman, S. A. and Ledford, G. E. Jr. (1992). Employee involvement and
total Quality management: Practices and results in Fortune 1000 companies. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass,
Levine, D. and Tyson, L. D. (1990). Participation, productivity and the firm's environment.
In Blinder, A. S. (Ed.). Paying for productivity. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institute.
Lewin, K. (1947). Frontiers in group dynamics. Human Relations, 1, 5-42.
Lewin, K. (1951). Field theory in social science. New York: Harper and Row.
347
Lloyd, C. and Newell, H. (2000). Selling teams to the salesforce: Teamworking in the UK
pharmaceutical industry. In Procter, S. and Mueller, F. (Eds.) Teamworking. London,
Macmillan Business.
Loye, D. and Eisler, R. (1987). Chaos and transformation: Implications of nonequilibrium
theory for social science and society. Behavioural Science, 32, 53-65.
Macduffie, J. P. (1995). Human resource bundles and manufacturing performance:
Organisational logic and flexible production systems in the world auto industry. Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, 48, 2, 197-221.
Manz, C. C. and Angle, H. L. (1986). Can group self-management mean a loss of personal
control: Triangulating on a paradox. Group and Organisation Studies. 11,309-334.
Manz, C. c., Keating, D. E. and Donnellon, A. (1990). Preparing for an organisational
change to employee self-management: The managerial transition. Organisational Dynamics.
19, 15-26.
Manz, C. C. (1992). Self-leading work teams: Moving beyond self-management myths.
Human Relations, 45, 11, 1119-1140.
Manz, C. C. and Angle, H. L. (1993). The illusion of self-management: Using teams to
disempower. In Manz, C. C. and Sims, H. P. Businesses without bosses: How self-
managing teams are building high-performing companies. New York: Wiley.
Manz, C. C. and Sims, H. P. (1993). Businesses without bosses: How self-managing teams
are building high-performing companies. New York: Wiley.
Marchington, M. (2000). Teamworking and employee involvement: A terminology,
evaluation and context. In Procter, S. and Mueller. F. (Eds.) Teamworking. London,
Macmillan Business.
348
Marchington, M., Wilkinson, A., Ackers, P. and Goodman, 1. (1993). The influences of
managerial relations on waves of employee involvement, British Journal of Industrial
Relations, 31, 4, 553-576.
Marshall, C. and Rossman, G. B. (1989). Designing qualitative research. Newbury Park,
CA: Sage.
Mathews, J. (1989). Tools of change: New technology and the democratisation of work.
Sydney: Pluto Press.
Mayon-White, W. M. (1984). Managing major change. Cardiff: Engineering Industry
Training Board.
Mays, N. and Pope, C. (1995). Rigour and qualitative research. British Medical Journal,
311, 109-112.
McCalman, 1. and Paton, R. (1992). Change management: A guide to effective
implementation. London: Paul Chapman.
McLoughlin, I., Rose, H. and Clark, 1. (1985). Managing the introduction of new
technology. Omega. 13,4,251-262.
Miles, M. B. and Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded source
book. (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
Miller, E. J. (1975). Socio-technical systems in weaving, 1953-1970: A follow-up study.
Human Relations, 28, 4, 349-386.
Miller, D. and Friesen, P. (1984). Organisations: A quantum view. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Mintzberg, H. (1978). Patterns in strategy formation. Management Science, 24, 9, 934-48.
Minzberg, H. (1979). The structure of organisations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Prentice
Hall.
349
Mohrman, S. A., Ledford, G. E. and Mohrman, A. M. (1990). Conclusion: What we have
learned about large-scale organisational change. In Mohrman, A. M., Mohrman, S. A.
Ledford, G. E., Cummings, T. G. and Lawler, E. E. (Eds.). Large-scale organisational
change. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Mohrman, S. A. and Novelli, L. (1985). Beyond testimonials: Learning from a quality circles
program. Journal of Occupational Behaviour. 6, 93-110.
Morgan, D. L. (1988). Focus groups as qualitative research. Newbury Park, CA.: Sage
Mueller, F. (1994). Teams between hierarchy and commitment: Change strategies and the
"internal environment", Journal of Management Studies, 31,3, 383-403.
Nadler, D. A. (1977). Feedback and organisational development: Using data based methods.
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
Nadler, D. A. (1979). A Congruence Model for Diagnosing Organisational Behaviour. In
Kolb, D., Rubin, I.and McIntyre, 1. Organisational Psychology: A Book of Readings. (3rd
ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N. 1.: Prentice-Hall.
Nadler, D. A. and Tichy, N. M. (1980). The limitations of traditional intervention
technology in health care organisations. In Margulies, N. and Adams, 1. (Eds.) Organisation
development in health care organisations. Reading, Mass: AddisonWesley.
Nadler, D. A. and Tushman, M. L. (1979). A congruence model for diagnosing
organisational behaviour. In Kolb, D., Rubin, I.and McIntyre, J. Organisation psychology:
A book of readings. (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N. 1.: Prentice Hall.
Neuman, 1. E., Hohi, R. and Standing, H. (1995). Change everything at once! The
Tavistock Institute's guide to developing teamwork in manufacturing. Didcot, Oxford:
Management Books 2000 Ltd.
350
Niepce, W. and Molleman, E. (1996). A case study: Characteristics of work organisation in
lean production and sociotechnical systems. International Journal of Operations and
Production Management, 16,2, 77-90.
Oldham, G. R. and Hackman, J. R. (1980). Work design in the organisational context. In
Staw, B. and Cummings, L. L. (Eds.) Research in Organisational Behaviour, Volume 2,
Greenwich, Conn.: JA! Press, pp. 247-78.
Osterman, P. (1994). How common is workplace transformation and who adopts it?
Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 47, 2, 173-188.
Parker, S. K. and Jackson, P. R. (1994). Facilitating new shopfloor roles within modem
manufacturing. In Kidd, P. T. and Karwowski, W. Advances in agile manufacturing. lOS
Press.
Parker, S. K., Jackson, P. R. and Wall, T. D. (1993). Autonomous group working within
integrated manufacturing: A longitudinal investigation of employee role orientations. In
Salvendy, G. and Smith, M. J. (Eds.) Human-Computer Interaction: Application and Case
Studies. Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishers.
Parker, S. K., Myers, C. and Wall, T. D. (1995). The effects of a manufacturing initiative
on employee jobs and strain. In Robertson, S. A. (Ed.). Contemporary Ergonomics 1995.
(pp. 37-42). London: Taylor and Francis.
Parker, S. K. and Sprigg, C. A. (1998). A move backwards? The introduction of a moving
assembly line. In the Book of Proceedings of the British Psychological Society Occupational
Psychology Conference. (pp. 136-143). Eastbourne, 6-8 January.
Parker, S. K. and Wall, T. D. (1996). Job design and modem manufacturing. In Warr, P.
(Ed.) Psychology at work (4th ed.). Harmondsworth: Penguin
Parker, S. K., Wall, T. D. and Jackson, P. R. (1997). "That's not my job: Developing
flexible employee work orientations." Academy of Management JoYr.ill!l.40,4,899-929.
351
Patterson. M. G., West, M. A., Lawthorn, R. and Nickell, S. (1997). Impact of People
Management Practices on Business Performance, Issues in People Management, No. 22,
Institute of Personnel and Development.
Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative evaluation and research methods. (2nd ed.). Newbury
Park, CA: Sage.
Pearce, J. L (1987). Why merit pay doesn't work: Implications from organisational theory.
In Balkin, D. B and Gomez-Meija, L. R. (Eds.). New perspectives on compensation.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Pearce, 1. A. and Ravlin, E. C. (1987). The design and activation of self-regulating work
groups. Human Relations, 40, 11, 751-782.
Perrow, C. (1983). The organisational context ofhuman factors engineering. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 28, 521-541.
Pettigrew, A. M. (1985). The awakening giant: Continuity and change in Imperial Chemical
Industries Oxford: Blackwell.
Pettigrew, A. M., Ferlie, E. and McKee, L. (1992). Shaping stmtegic change: Making
change in large organisations - the case of the National Health Service. London: Sage.
Pfeifer, J. (1994). Competitive advantage through people: Unleashing the power of the
workforce. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Piczak, M. W. and Hauser, R. Z. (1996). Self-directed work teams: A guide to
implementation. Quality Progress, May, 81-87.
Piore, M. and Sabel. C. (1984). The second industrial divide: Possibilities for prosperity.
New York: Business Books.
Porter, L. W., Lawler, E. E. and Hackman, J. R. (1975). Behaviour in organisations. New
York: McGraw Hill.
352
Procter, S. and Mueller, F. (2000). Teamworking: Strategy, structure, systems and culture.
In Procter, S. and Mueller, F. (Eds.). Teamworking. London: Macmillan Business.
Pullen, R. D. (1976). A survey of cellular manufacturing cells. Production Engineer, 55,
451-454.
Quinn, J. B. (1980). Strategies for change: Logical incrementalism. Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin.
Quinn, J. B. (1982). Managing strategies incrementally. Omega, 10,6,613-627.
Quinn, J. B. (1993). Managing strategic change. In Mabey, C. and Mayon- White, B. (Eds.).
Managing change (2nd ed.). London: The Open UniversitylPaul Chapman Publishing.
Ragin, C. C. (1987). The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative
strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Rehder, R. (1994). Saturn, Uddevalla and the Japanese lean systems: Paradoxical prototypes
for the twenty- first century. International Journal of Human Resource Management. 5, 1, 1-
31.
Robbins, S. P. (1998). Organisational Behaviour: Concepts, Controversies, Applications.
rs" ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Roberts, K. H. and Glick, W. (1981). The job characteristics approach to task design: A
critical review. Journal of Applied Psychology, 66, 193-217.
Robson, C. (1993). Real world research: A resource for social scientists and practitioner
researchers. Oxford: Blackwell.
Romanelli, E. and Tushrnan, M. L. (1986). Inertia, environments and strategic choice: A
quasi-experimental design for comparative-longitudinal research. Management Science, 32,
608-621.
353
Romanelli, E. and Tushman, M. L. (1994). Organisation transformation as punctuated
equilibrium: An empirical test. Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 37, No.5, 1141-
1166.
Rose, M. (1975). Industrial behaviour. Harmondsworth: Penguin
Runkel, P. 1. (1990). Casting nets and testing specunens: Two grand methods of
psychology. New York: Praeger.
Russ-Eft, D. (1993). Predicting organisational orientation toward teams. Human Resource
Development Quarterly, 4, 2, Summer, 125-134.
Salas, E., Dickinson, T. L., Converse, S. A. and Tannenbaum, S. I. (1992). Toward an
understanding of team performance and training. In Swezey, R. W. and Salas, R. (Eds.).
Teams: Their training and performance. Norwood, NJ: Abex Publishing.
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (1997). Research methods for business students.
London: Pitman Publishing.
Schilder, J. (1992). Work teams boost productivity. Personnel Journal, February, 67-71.
Sexton, C. (1994). Self-managed work teams: TQM technology at the employee level.
Journal of Organisational Change Management, 7,2,45-52.
Simon, H. A. (1976). Administrative behaviour (3rded.). New York: Free Press.
Silverman, D. (1985). Qualitative methodology and sociology. Aldershot: Gower.
Silverman, D. (1993). Interpreting qualitative data: Methods for analysing talk, text and
interaction. London: Sage.
Silverstein, A. (1988). An Aristotelian resolution of the ideographic versus nomothetic
tension. American Psychologist, 43, 6, 425-430.
354
Slack, N., Chambers, S., Harland, C., Harrison, A and Johnston, R. (1995). Operations
Management. London: Pitman Publishing.
Slocum, J. and Sims, H. (1980). A typology of technology and job design. Human Relations,
33, 193-212.
Snell, S. A and Dean, J. W. (1992). Integrated manufacturing and human resource
management: A human capital perspective. Academy of Management Jo~ 35, 467-504.
Snell, S. A and Dean, J. W. (1994). Strategic compensation for integrated manufacturing:
The moderating effects of jobs and organisational inertia. Academy of Management JoYrlli!l,
37,5, 1109-1140.
Sprigg, C. A, Parker, S. K. and Jackson, P. R. (1996). Effective implementation of team
working on the shopfloor. Paper presented at the Second International Conference on
Managing Integrated Manufacturing: Strategic, Organisation and Social Change, Leicester.
Steyaert , C. and Bouwen, R. (1994). Group methods of organisational analysis. In Cassell,
C. and Symon, G. (Eds.). Qualitative methods in organisational research: A practical guide.
London: Sage.
Strauss, A L. and Schatzman, L. (1973). Field research: Strategies for a natural sociology.
Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall.
Sykes, W. (1991). Taking stock: Some issues from the literature in validity and reliability in
qualitative research. JournaI of Market Research Society, 33, 3-12.
Taylor, S. J. and Bogdan, R. (1984). Introduction to qualitative research methods: The
search for meanings. New York: Wiley.
Thompson, P. (1990). Crawling from the wreckage: The labour process and the politics of
production. In Knights, D. and Wilmott, H. (Eds.). Labour Process Theory. London:
Macmillan.
355
Towers PerrinlIBM (1991). Workforce 2000 today: A bottom-line concern. Towers
PerrinlIBM.
Trist, E. L. and Bamforth, K. W. (1951). Some social and psychological consequences of
long-wall methods of coal getting. Human Relations, 4, 3-38.
Trist, E. and Dwyer, C. (1982). The limits of laissez-faire as a sociotechnical change
strategy. In Zager, R. and Rosow, M. P. (Eds.) The innovative organisation: Productivity
programs in action. Elmsford, N. Y.: Pergamon Press.
Tuckman, B. (1965). Developmental sequences in small groups. Psychological Bulletm, 63,
384-389.
Turnbull, P. J. (1988). The limits to "Japanisation" - Just-in-time, labour relations and the
UK automotive industry. New Technology. Work and Employment, 3, 7-20.
Tushman, M. L., Newman, W. H. and Romanelli, E. (1986). Convergence and upheaval:
Managing the unsteady pace of organisational evolution. California Management Review,
29, I, 29-44.
Tushman, M. and Romanelli, E. (1985). Organisational evolution: A metamorphosis model
of convergence and reorientation. In Cummings, L. L. and Staw, B. M. (Eds.). Research in
Organisational Behaviour. 7: 171-222. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Ulrich, D. and Lake, D. (1991). Organisational capability: Creating competitive advantage.
Academy of Management Executive. 5, 1, 77-92.
Van Amelsvoort, P. and Benders, J. (1996). Team time: A model for developing self-
directed work teams. International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 16,
159 - 170.
Van der Meer, R. and Gudim, M. (1996). The role of group working in assembly
organisation. International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 16, 2, 119-
140.
356
Voss, C. A. (1987) in Voss, C. A. (Ed.). Just-in-time manufacture. IFS/Springer Verlag.
Wagner, J. A., Rubin, P. A. and Callahan, T. J. (1988). Incentive payment and
nonmanagerial productivity: An interrupted time series analysis of magnitude and trend.
Organisational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 42, 47-74.
Wall, T. D., Corbett, J. M., Clegg, C. W., Jackson, P. R. and Martin, R. (1990). Advanced
manufacturing technology and work design: Towards a theoretical framework. Journal of
Organisational Behaviour, 11,201-219.
Wall, T. D., Corbett, J. M., Martin, R., Clegg, C.W. and Jackson, P. R. (1990). Advanced
manufacturing technology, work design and performance: A change study. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 75, 6, 691-697.
Wall, T. D. and Jackson, P. R. (1995). New manufacturing initiatives and shopfloor job
design. In Howard, A. (Ed.) The Changing Nature of Work. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Wall, T. D., Kemp, N. J., Jackson, P. R. and Clegg, C.W. (1986). Outcomes of
autonomous workgroups: A long-term field experiment. Academy of Management Jo~
29, 2, 280-304.
Walton, R. E. (1972). How to counter alienation in the plant. Harvard Business Review,
November-December, 70-81.
Walton, R. E. (1982). The Topeka work system: Optimistic visions, pessimistic hypotheses,
and reality. In Zager, R. and Rosow, M. P. (Eds.) The innovative organisation: Productivity
programs in action. Elmsford, N. Y.: Pergamon Press.
Walton, R. E. (1985). From control to commitment in the workplace. Harvard Business
Review, March/April, 77-84.
Warr, P. B., Cook, J. D. and Wall, T. D. (1979). Scales for the measurement of some work
attitudes and aspects ofpsychological well-being. Journal ofOccupationaI Psychology, 52,
285-294.
357
Waterson, P. E., Clegg, C. W., Bolden, R., Pepper, K., Warr, P. B. and Wall, T. D. (1997).
The use and effectiveness of modern manufacturing practices in the United Kingdom ESRC
Centre for Organisation and Innovation, Institute of Work Psychology, University of
Sheffield.
Watts, M. and Ebbutt, D. (1987). More than the sum of the parts: Research methods in
group interviewing. British Educational Research Journal, 13, 1, 25-34.
Webster, J. (1992). Chicken or egg? The interaction between manufacturing technologies
and paradigms of work organisation. In Badharn, R. (Ed.) Systems, networks and
configurations: Inside the implementation process. Special edition ofInternational Journal of
Human Factors in Manufacturing.
Wedgewood, M. (1995). Regional Officellnstitute of Work Psychology Session, 5th July.
Unpublished article.
Weick, K. E. (1985a). Sources of order in underorganised systems: Themes in recent
organisational theory. In Lincoln, Y. S. (Ed.), Organisational Theory and Inquiry. Beverley
Hills, CA: Sage.
Weick, K. E. (1985). The significance of corporate culture. In Frost, P. S (Ed.)
Organisational culture. Sage Publications.
Weir, M. and Mills, S. (1973). The supervisor as a change catalyst. Industrial Relations
Journal, 4, 4, 1-69.
Wellins, R. (1992). Building self-directed teams. Technical and Skills Training, May-June.
Wellins, R. S., Byham, W. C. and Dixon, G. (1994). Inside teams: How 20 world-class
organisations are winning through teamwork. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Wellins, R.S., Byham, w.e. and Wilson, J.M. (1991). Empowered teams: Creating self-
directed work groups that improve quality, productivity and participation. San Francisco:
Jossey- Bass.
358
Wells, P. (1994). Ethics in business and management research. In Wass, V. J. and Wells, P.
E. (Eds.). Principles and practice in business management research. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
West, M. A (1994). Effective teamwork. Leicester: British Psychological Society.
West, M. A and Slater, J. A. (1995). Teamwork: myths, realities and research. The
Occupational Psychologist, No 24, April.
Whybrow, A C. and Parker, S. K. (1997). Potholes, subsidence and shifting horizons on the
road to teamworking: The case of a steel making company. Paper presented at the
International Workshop on Teamworking, University of Nottingham, U.K., September.
Whybrow, A C. and Parker, S. K. (2000). Introducing teamworking: Managing the process
of change. In Procter, S. and Mueller, F. (Eds.) Teamworking, London, Macmillan
Business.
Whyte, W. F. (1976). Research methods for the study of conflict and co-operation.
American Sociologist, 11, 4, 208-216.
Whyte, W. F. (1984). Learning from the field. California: Sage.
Wickens, P. (1987). The road to Nissan. Basingstoke: Macmillan
Wickens, P. (1993). Steering the middle road to car production. Personnel Management,
June, 34-38.
Wilkinson, B. (1983). The shop floor politics of new technology. London: Heinemann.
Williams, D. (1998). 1000 great quotations for business, management and training. GNP
Ltd.
Williams, A, Dobson, P. and Walters, M. (1993). Changing culture: New organisational
approaches (2nd ed.). London: Institute of Personnel Management.
359
Womack, 1. P., Jones, D. T. and Roos, D. (1990). The machine that changed the world.
New York: Rawson Associates.
Wood, S. (1991). A reappraisal of the contingency approach to organisation. Journal of
Management Studies, 16, 334-354.
Wood. S. (1990). Japanization and/or Toyotaism. Working Paper, London: London School
of Economics.
Wright, P. M.• Smart, D. and McMahan, G. C. (1995). Matches between human resources
and strategy among NCAA basketball teams. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 1052-
1074.
Yin. R. K. (1989). Case study research: Design and methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Yin. R. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods. (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
Youndt, M. A., Snell, S. A., Dean, 1. W. and Lepak, D. P. (1996). Human resource
management, manufacturing strategy and firm performance. Academy of Management
Journal. 39. 4. 836-866.
Zikmund. W. G. (1994). Business research methods. Fort Worth: Dryden Press.
360
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 - SAMPLE INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
(Team development schedule relevant for team members.)
This is a sample of the type of interview schedule used during the research. This is a
condensed version: spaces underneath questions have been removed to reduce length.
Date/Time:
Organisation:
Team:
(Note: size of team, location etc.)
Team Member:
(Briefly remind the respondent about the purpose of the interview, the researcher's role
and confirm anonymity and confidentiality.)
History /Backgrou nd
Could you please tell me a little bit about your team? (e.g. when/why was it first formed,
how was it put together, and how were team members prepared for working on the
team?)
Characteristics of the Work EnvironmentlWork Tasks
Could you please describe the nature of the production process?
How do you/your team fit into this? (Probe: Links to other teams? Style of leadership
within/across teams? Work standardisation? Control?)
What is your team's primary task or tasks?
Who do you see as your team's customers and suppliers?
What types of training have you received? (Probe: Technical? Teamwork training?)
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Team Empowerment (Probe in the following areas - in all cases, if the following
aspects are not the team's responsibility, who does do these things?)
Housekeeping
Does the team decide on the physical layout of its work area?
Does the team maintain the tidiness/cleanliness of its work area?
Safety
Does the team ensure its work area is safe?
Does the team take on responsibility for Health and Safety standards in its work area?
Maintenance
Is the team involved in the day-to-day maintenance of machinery?
Is the team involved in solving minor breakdowns?
Is the team involved in solving major breakdowns?
Is the team involved in setting up machines?
Meeting the Schedule
Does the team receive information on scheduling?
Does the team decide how to get its work done?
Does the team decide on the order in which work is done?
Does the team decide when to start a piece of work?
Does the team decide when to finish a piece of work?
Does the team decide its own pace of working?
Can the team control how much it produces or does?
Can the team vary how it does its work?
Can the team choose the methods to use in carrying out its work?
Can team members decide on the amount of work to be done at any given time?
Do the team members make most job-related decisions?
Quality
Does the team control the quality of what it produces?
Does the team ensure quality standards are maintained?
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Is the team involved in solving quality problems?
Communications
Are all team members willing to share information between themselves about their work?
Do team members feel they receive sufficient information to do their jobs properly?
Do team members present information from their team to other teams?
Do team members find it easy to talk to teams in other departments?
Are team members kept informed about what is going on in their teams/other teams in
their department/other teams in other departments?
Do team members present information from their team to senior colleagues?
Are people in the team asked for their views when decisions are being made about the
job?
Time Management
Do team members decide on rest breaks?
Do team members decide on holidays?
Do team member decide on flexi-time arrangements?
New Product Introduction
Are team members involved in decisions about new product introduction?
Training
Are team members involved in training newcomers?
Are team members involved in training team mates in new skills?
Employee Flexibility
Is the team as a whole responsible for performing a variety of tasks?
Can team members influence the way jobs are divided up among themselves?
Can all team members perform a range of tasks?
Do team members have the skills to do each other's jobs?
Are team members willing to do each other's jobs?
Do team members have complementary skills and abilities?
Are team members confident in the technical skills of team mates?
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Team Maturity
Do team members understand the duties and responsibilities of the team?
Do team members understand the goals and objectives of the team?
Do team members understand how the team's work relates to the overall aims of the
department?
Do team members understand how the team goes about getting its work done?
Do team members solve disputes in the team?
Do team members suggest new ways of doing things?
Do team members discuss problems with other teams?
Are the team's tasks highly dependent on outside factors/other team's efforts on an
ongoing basis?
Do team members get on with their work without being asked to or waiting for other
team members to do it?
Can team members rely on each other to help out when they are overloaded with work?
Do team members trust each other?
Do team members co-operate with each other to get the work done?
Do team members co-operate with members of other teams to get work done?
Is there competition between teams in the same department?
Knowledge of Customer Requirements/Needs
Do team members understand who the customers are?
Do team members have any contact with customers/suppliers?
Do team members participate in dealing with customer queries/problems?
Production Scheduling
Does the team plan its own work?
Continuous Improvement
Are team members responsible for problem solving in their teams?
Discipline
Are team members involved in disciplining other team members?
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Performance Appraisal
Do team members understand how to improve the team's work performance?
Do team members understand how team performance is assessed?
Do team members give feedback to colleagues on performance?
Do team members receive (enough) feedback on how well the team is doing?
Compensation
Do you feel you are fairly compensated for your work in the team?
If you feel you are unfairly compensated, why is this? Have you done anything to
overcome the problem
Budgeting
Does the team have its own budget?
Does the team decide how to spend its budget?
Overtime Approval
Are team members involved in making decisions about overtime requirements?
Selecting New Team Members
Are team members regularly involved in the selection of new members?
Setting Future Targets/Goals
Does the team set its own short-term production targets/goals?
Does the team have any input/participation in decisions about longer-term production
goals?
Does the team have any input/participation in decisions about overall targets/goals of the
work unit?
Is the team involved in making long-term plans for the team?
Is the team involved in making long-term plans for the department?
Is the team involved in making long-term plans for the company?
Team Procedures
Does one or a few team members dominate team decision making, or does everyone
have a say in the decisions made by the team? (If dominate, what effect does this have on
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the team's performance?)
Do team members tend to avoid making suggestions that might conflict with those
already made by another team member (If yes, what consequences does this have for
team performance?)
Do you feel that your team can make better decisions about its work than management?
(Probe for an example to illustrate this.)
Responsibilities of Managers
What are the responsibilities of first-line management with regard to your team?
What are the responsibilities of middle- and upper-level management with regard to your
team?
What kinds of things does management do that help your team in decision making and
getting the job done?
What kinds of things does management do that hinder your team in decision making and
getting the job done?
How often does management step in and make decisions for the team that were
supposed to be made by the team? What sorts of decisions are these?
Does management generally support your team's decisions, once made?
The Change to Team Working
Do you have any comments (specific or general) on the company's change to team
working? (Probe: Their role? Knowledge about process? Particular influences?)
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APPENDIX 2 - SAMPLE OBSERVATION PROTOCOLS
Notes during periods of observation were recorded by two methods (in the main). In more
formal situations, such as observations of team briefings, the researcher used prepared
protocols; there is an example of one of these below. In more informal situations, such as
the observation of team member activities on the shopfloor, the researcher tended to write
descriptive notes without the use of such a protocol. An example of a passage from these
observation notes is also presented below to illustrate the type ofinfonnation recorded using
this method.
Sample Observational Protocol
Activity: Morning Operator Briefing Session (Nova Cosmetics: Creams Business Unit:
Mascaras Line)
Date: January 1994
Length of Activity: J 0 minutes
Descriptive Notes Reflective Notes
General: 8am operator briefing by Debbie
(supervisor). Operators, porters and
mechanics gathered round adviser's desk.
All standing; adviser perched on desk.
At exactly 8am, Debbie starts the meeting Quiet concentration, no comments. Perhaps
and starts by describing work schedules for associated with Debbie's "telling" voice.
the day - noting production runs, product
changes, timings etc.
Debbie moves on to allocating roles/tasks on Very detailed - no comment/feedback from
the line for the day - tells each person what group.
they will start by doing.
Debbie asks for questions - some discussion Friendly rapport - comment about material
about the order of the production runs and availability seemed welcome.
material availability. Porters asked to
confirm some of the details on a particular
product.
By 8.05am Debbie turns to the previous Tone less friendly - more in "telling" mode
day's problems on the line. Feeds back again. Quite authoritative.
comments from manager about the excessive
number of seemingly empty boxes around
the line. Gives the task of tidying up these
boxes to a porter - as his first priority
(Health and Safety issue).
By 8.06am the meeting is over, group Chat/discussion amongst group members
members disperse to jobs. increases as meeting finishes; group
disperses quickly.
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Narrative observation notes
Description
After morning coffee break, M who has been working on the labelling machine all morning
approaches the supervisor's (G) desk and comments that the machine keeps jamming. G
immediately leaves paperwork and goes to the machine with M. Everybody watching and
slowing down. M restarts machine, seems OK for a few minutes and then problem recurs. G
asks M what she thinks the problems is, M suggests altering the speed of the machine and
with G watching, does so. M resumes labelling: no problems apparent in the next few
minutes. G returns to paperwork.
Reflective Notes
Question to self-if M knew what the problem was, why did she leave the machine, go to
the G and involve him in the problem? Why did she not just alter the speed of the machine
and carry on? Check out at interview stage.
(January 1994 - 10.40am - Pumps Line)
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APPENDIX 3 - INTERVIEW ANALYSIS
The following interview extracts are from the four case companies involved in this
research. They are included here to demonstrate the process undertaken in the analysis
of the interview data.
1. Extracts from interviews at Clearwipe with Pilot Team member (MJ - 5.3.97
and 16.4.97)
These interviews were repeat interviews with the same team member and extracts are
presented here to show how the interview questions and responses were used in repeat
interviews to chart team development. This extract focuses on the development of
"Team Empowerment", particularly "Maintenance" issues. As the extracts illustrates,
the answers to the questions are very concrete and not really open to a wide degree of
interpretation. This information contributed to the case narrative by defining areas of
training and aspects key to the development of a multi-skilled team, highlighting the
problems of the interface with team leaders/managers in other sections and physical
barriers to all aspect of multi-skilling in the team (height). The comments also
highlighted the need for the researcher to follow up this issue of the seeming reluctance
of people outside the team to become involved.
Interview - 5.3.97
JT: Has the team become involved in setting up the Bradman-Lake?
MJ: No - there were markings on the machine to help set up the Bradman but these
have worn off over time. It's still only done by SP or a technician at the moment
but the team want SP to put these marks back on the machine to help other
people when they are being trained in this process.
JT: So at the moment SP is the only team member involved in machine set-ups?
MJ: That's right. We talked about this on the machine the other day and might ask
AT to ask GA to train a few of the team.
Interview - 16.4.97
JT: Has the team become involved in setting up the Bradman-Lake?
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MJ: Well, we are supposed to be doing it now, but we have been discussing with GA
him coming on the Bradman-Lake now for four weeks «frustrated tone,
exasperation)) to show me, MF, SP and MP how to set it up. A date as yet
hasn't been given to the team. IfGA is too busy then he could organise
somebody else to show the team as they are compiling some points/concerns they
need advice on. «Pause - smile.))
The female members of the team are continuing to get involved in some of the
setting issues. Some of us are too short to reach into parts of the machine «note
MJ is about 5'; SP for example is over 6')) and do it all, but we are beginning to
share it now.
2. Extract from an interview at Berg Transmissions with Plant Manager (JH -
9.4.1999)
This is an extract from an interview with the Plant Manager when the organisation was
focusing on the development of Toyota Production Teams and is presented here to
illustrate the semi-structured nature of the interviews. In this example, the researcher
was following up a key issue in this context, namely how the company has encouraged
operators to become involved in kaizen. The Plant Manager gives a useful example to
reinforce his point and the use of words is interesting i.e. their contract says they will do
it now, they are obliged to do so etc. Again, the response was used descriptively to
understand the pattern and influences in team development.
JT: You mentioned a moment ago that most process operators are now «emphasis
on this word)) involved in kaizen activities. Kaizen activities have been a key
facet of team working in BT since 1997, what is different about this now?
JH: In all this time the biggest concern of team members has related to their fear for
jobs through kaizen, and that workers were being exploited. An example -
people still fear that if overtime falls below a certain level, their wages will be
reduced. A difficult situation, if you reduce overtime by improving productivity
somehow, then you need to reward people not punish them through a pay cut.
So you need to share out rewards from the gains. The company's aim is to drive
out waste not people.
JT: So how have you got the operators involved in kaizen?
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JH: Their contract says they will do it now «emphasis on this word)) - they signed a
contract saying that they will be active in the participation in continuous
improvement, including kaizen activities. «Pause in interview to get copy of new
contract, promises to copy.)) We did try to get volunteers, but there were
problems with perception of this training. Now 100 or so operators so far have
been involved in the training/activities - obliged to do so «emphasised)) by their
contract.
This is key to performance improvements. Kaizen is a team approach, a
structured way of solving problems. If you apply the procedures they will work.
The kaizen training is important in making team work more concrete. Do not
abandon ideas if they don't work - rethink.
IT: Anything else?
JH: People are now on the same pay rate - the same status norms makes teams better
and partnership with the union continues, all are helping team work. Help with
team spirit and kaizen.
3. Extracts from interviews at Optel Corporation with Resource Support Team
Members (BF and AD - May 1997)
These examples were provided during interviews with Resource Support Team Members
in May 1997. They were elicited during introductory, general discussions about team
development, rather than in response to specific interview questions. As such, they were
more open to the researcher's interpretation and judgement.
a. Extract A
BF: I have been working with the night shift tearns for the past several weeks. A
different perspective in that there are very few managers (of any type) about and
it tends to be quiet. Normally, «long-ish pause)), but there was a difficult
incident last week - an injury at work. For some reason, a shoe was thrown by
fL"V\M t:~ P :. one of the team and injured somebody. We're not sure why it was thrown, or
5" r
T€I\N pe-o: whether it was aiming for the injured person. The team clammed up, difficult to
c. o~ know exactly what happened. «Pause - a long time.))
JT: Have you spoken to the team?
BF: Not about this issue, it is specifically a Health and Safety issue.
JT: Do you think this says something about team development?
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BF:
l~v\ eeo ~
-rf..v~T
If the team won't talk tell people what happened, and are not open, then it
suggest a lack of trust. Perhaps that is the real problem.
CA1~ oTHfYZ t)·k-T,,\ R.i..
(QA_.) (I \ seLIE .s:
b. Extract B
AD: I am moving from the RST to Training. Time to move on, develop new skills.
Some things bother me that I am leaving undone, or for others to do - especially
those I've been most involved in.
IT: Such as?
AD: The peer review -implemented to help generate team spirit, but identifying good
and poor performers at intervals seems to compromise team spirit in some teams.
Cl-Cif PQo ~oever is reported as poor performer, knows the rest of the team has done
W( this. Linked to pay, so it is a big issue for the team members. Not enough is
done to help the poor performer and the team is left to deal with the issues and
tension. It's divisive, blocks the progression of team work.
IT: Is there anything else?
AD: Not really, that says it all. Not sorted out yet from manager's end either.
Managers review individual attendance - no-one penalised for poor attendance
last year. This has upset some of the teams too. So there are wider issues here
to sort - which is why it seems undone still.
4. Extracts from interviews with Supervisors/Advisers at Nova Cosmetics (April
1994, April 1995 and November 1996)
The following extracts are examples elicited from supervisors/advisers within Nova
Cosmetics outside the more formal interview programme e.g. when the researcher was
on the shopfloor observing the team working, whilst waiting to start a group interview
and in the canteen. These examples were coded, descriptively initially and then, in the
longer-term, interpretively, in the context of the unfolding story of team development
within Nova Cosmetics. As such, these stories made a meaningful contribution to the
case narrative, describing team members starting to move towards taking more
responsibility and initiative for their tasks and activities and then moving away from this
agam.
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3. Extract A (April 1994 - SP)
Line 21 has started IPTs, but it is hard work. Lots of things identified as problems, but
not much happening. Housekeeping a big issue at the moment, especially as we are at
the end and have the walkway next to us. The operators keep talking about the empty
..-:; n boxes left on the line and how they get knocked across over towards the tape. But that
l~ eA.\r ~
HK is all. They have even noted the H&S issue and others comments.
b. Extract B (April 1995 - DD)
The girls on labelling were fed-up, more and more so in fact, with having to label by
hand. There has been a problem with base labels which has meant hand labelling, and
base the labels on mascara bottles are very small, which makes it worse. Identified in the
morning meetings, and they set up a visit from the supplier (through me, but asked for by
1CY\N\ b'Vl-\P; them). The supplier saw the problem and is changing the material. It was a real boost
;:>e.og ~LV for something to happen, made everybody feel good.
c. Extract C (Novem ber 1996 - GJ)
I am still not happy with the way the place looks. Had the Housekeeping Team down-
but the team have not taken on board what they said. I have told them the standards for
-r~ S\-tp ...the Unit, highlighted the problems specifically. They should do all this, not wait to be
~~ told all the time - it is their responsibility to keep the area clean and tidy.
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APPENDIX 4 - FURTHER EXAMPLES OF CODE CATEGORIES
CODE CATEGORY EXAMPLE
TEAM EMPOWERMENT (TEAM EMP)
Housekeeping (HK) "Housekeeping is a big issue at the moment, especially as
we are at the end and have the walkway next to us. The
operators keep talking about the empty boxes left on the
line and how they get knocked across and over towards the
tape" (Nova Cosmetics - Adviser)
Safety (SAF) "For some reason, a shoe was thrown by one of the team
and injured somebody" (Optel Corporation - Resource
Support Team Member)
Meeting the Schedule (SCHED) "The tearn agreed to start rotating one person forward at a
time from Monday 12 March - but rather than rotate every
hour the team decided to leave the decision to each
individual - if you want to sit down ask somebody in the
group to swap with you" (Clearwipe pic - Team Member)
"The tearn decided to ask about which products are to be
built on which days. Asked Tearn Leader for a list of
customer deadline days so they know what is happening
and what has to be completed when." (Clearwipe pic -
Team Member)
Quality (QUAL) "The big issue for me is the issue of quality - it might
sound odd but never thought of it in the sarne way as before
- don't pass on a reject to the next person." (Nova
Cosmetics - Team Member)
Communications (COMM) "There is something else - we need to be congratulated as
teams, or individuals - there needs to be more positive
communication going on with regard to teams." (Berg
Transmissions - Tearn Leader)
Training (TRNG) "It would be best ifthe tearn trainers were trained - they
might know the skills on the machine, but they may not be
so good at training people" (Clearwipe pic - Team
Member)
Problem Solving (PROB SOLV) "The girls on labelling were fed-up .... with having to label
by hand. There has been a problem with base labels which
has meant hand labelling, and the base labels on mascara
bottles are very small, which makes it worse. Identified in
morning meetings and they set up a visit from the
supplier." (Nova Cosmetics - Adviser)
Continuous Improvement (CONT IMP) "We have been quite fearful for our jobs through kaizen
- maybe it exploits the worker, or maybe we share the
benefits." (Berg Transmissions - Team Member)
Discipline (DISC) "Sorry, Iarn late Ihave been dealing with a problem in
one of the tearns - someone not following instructions.
The tearn leaders are different to facilitators but do not
have disciplinary powers" (Berg Transmissions - Group
Leader)
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Compensation (CaMP) "Things are going well generally - having made changes
to contracts, people are more equal ... There are no
payment differentials for team leaders." (Berg
Transmissions - Plant Manager)
Overtime Approval (OVER APP) "All overtime has to be approved by the Production
Manager" (Clearwipe plc - Training Manager)
TEAM PROCESSES (TEAM PRO)
Cohesiveness (COH) "The team clammed up .." (Optel Corporation-
Resource Support Team Member)
Trust (TRUST) "If the team won't talk, tell people what happened, and
are not open, then it suggests a lack of trust" (Optel
Corporation Resource Support Team Member)
CHANGE PROCESS (CHGE PRO)
Roles (ROL) "I feel more comfortable now - my role is clear. This
last set of changes has got rid of the uncertainty for me."
(Berg Transmissions - Team Member)
Knowledge (KNOW) "I am against any more changes - I am happy with what
I am doing already. I am making a contribution already -
no-one tells us that." (Berg Transmissions - Team
Member)
Barriers (BARR) "If teams improve productivity, which reduces overtime,
they are worse off. Need to make sure they are rewarded
for changing, that there are no barriers to moving from one
way of doing things to another." (Berg Transmissions -
Plant Manager)
"Whoever is reported as a poor performer knows the rest of
the team has done this. Linked to pay, so it is a big issue
for the team members. Not enough is done to help the poor
performer and the tam is left to deal with the issues and
tensions. It's divisive. blocks the progression of team
work" (Optel Corporation - Resource Support Team
Member
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APPENDIX 5 - EXAMPLES OF TYPES OF DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED
BY THE ORGANISATIONS
The following six documents are examples of the type of paperwork provided by the
organisations for the researcher. Such documentation was invaluable in enhancing the
researcher's understanding of the change process and ensuring continuity in charting its
progress.
The documents included here are minutes of team meetings and were provided by
Clearwipe.
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SELF MANAGED BRADMAN TEAM
Date ofmeeting 12 March 1997
Present
Steph Watkins
Lisa Wilks
Coleen Pinney
Sue James
Liz Mutlow
Martin Beven
Mark Fever
Martin Parson
Marcia Jenkins
Absent
Shane Palmer
1. Reviewed last weeks meeting notes:
a. The team agreed to start rotating one person forward at a time from Monday 12
March.
b. Rather than rotate every hour as it was suggested last week the team decided to leave
this decision to each individual in that if you want to sit down ask somebody in the
group to swap with you.
c. It was agreed that everybody is still giving 100% effort to the team and therefore this
is no longer an issue at present.
2. At the last meeting there was a concern that the reserves can easily be left out of the
day to day running of the team. Itwas suggested that the reserves (Lisa and Liz)
should get together with Coleen and Sue and approach Mike for any thoughts or
concerns he has if the team decides to rotate with the reserves. This sub-group could
also think of any other possible solutions to this problem and report this information
back to the team at the next meeting. On request on the team Debbie has attached a
rota for this rotation.
3. Lisa volunteered to submit to the next meeting a list of all the people who the team .
could contact in case of problems. Angela can then put contact names and phone
numbers to this list.
4. There was markinc= !~~!l~machine to aid changing the bradman over but over time
these have worn off. As Shane is the person carrying out these changeovers presently,
it was suggested that he put these marks back 011 the machine, This will help the other
members of the team wu ..a t1~;yare ~Ieingtrained ID this process.
5. It was agreed that another meeting take place on Thursday 13 March at 0700am for
the sole reason to review the training package Debbie has made. Debbie will not
attend this meeting but she will make herself available at this time if the team need
her.
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6. Itwould be beneficial for the team if Debbie gives some sort of training to the trainer
(Shane). Although at present Shane knows all the skills on the machine, he may not
necessarily know the skills to train people. Debbie will have this information for the
next meeting.
7. The team raised a concern that they did not know what product had to be build on
what day. To solve this Angela will give the team a list of customer dead line days so
the team understand what product has to completed by what day. This information
will be given to the team by next meeting.
8. Debbie suggested that at present Shane has a lot of responsibility and the role of a
leader on top of this may be to much. The team needs to think about this and next
meeting decide whether it is going to be Shane or somebody else. When this is
decided Debbie will train them in leadership skills.
9. A problem was suggested for the team and that is Efficiency. This is a big subject so
the action plan so far is;
Sue and Steph to record the efficiency every day and record all the problems the team
had. All this information can then be presented to the team at the next meeting.
To be able to write these issues down the whole team must be involved and so it was
agreed that 5-10 minutes every day should be spent solely looking at the problems of
the day. A point was made that at this point the team should not try to solve these
problems but just collect the infonnation.
a.
The next meeting is on the 18 March 1997 at 0700-0800.
Thank-you all for your contribution to the above.
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4.
3.
1.
11.
iii.
IV.
v.
vi.
b.
c.
1.
ii.
iii.
d.
e.
r.
SELF MAl'TAGED BRADMAN TEAl\'!
Date Qlmeeting 25 March 1997
Present
Steph Watkins
Lisa Wilks
Coleen Pinney
Sue James
Liz Mutlow
Martin Beven
Shane Palmer
Marcia Jenkins
Debbie Clayden
Angela Thomas
Mark Fever
Martin Parson
1. The team will start to rotating every hour for a trail of one week starting on 25-03-97.
Debbie is training Shane and Marcia on leadership skills on Friday 4 April at 1200
unti11700hrs. Debbie will put out a memo nearer the time.
2.
3. Efficiency
Colleen will continue to calculate it.a.
Daily Efficiency Problems. These were grouped together and are as follows;
Cartons
Falling in (8 cases and 2 days of continual problems)
Not folding and ripping (2 cases)
Marking ( 1 cases)
Bending (1case)
waiting (1 case)
Punctured (1 case)
Tape Machine
Not sticking to the base and they had to be resealed (2 cases and continual issue for 1
day)
Labels
Mazda labels not coming off'tamrod properly and making rejects (1 case)
Not feeding (1 case).
Running out of labels and ribbons on long runs.
Bar-co.le
Rejecting work as crinkle in ribbon and bar code not being printed properly (4 cases)
Weight Check.
Rejecting and all had to be weighed again.
Timing out
Called Mike Warren who didn't come on one occasion and Shane fixed on another
occasion.
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g.
h.
Push rod bend (1 case)
AirofoiIs coming off (1 case)
Ho~s.ekeeping. Had to stop so photos could be taken. (1 case)
WaIting parts (1 case)
C~ange overs. 14 in one day and 9 in another. Each change over takes a 1
nuns to complete. pprox. 0
i.
j.
k.
5. The team decided to take the biggest problem which were with cartons. We then took
the first carton related problem and asked why.
1. Problem: Cartons falling in.
WHY
a. Not enough on the magazine WHY End ofrun so not filling up
Run out of cartons
Wrong cartons
Time
b. Not adjusted WHY Forgot
Variation in carton size
Ran OK. before
c. Not tilted Properly WHY Moved position
Rushing
Can't reach
d. Weight not on WHY Magazine full
Told not to use it
e. - Soft Cartons WHY Storage (damp)
Suppliers
Quality of Material (recycle)
Quantity (to many in a box)
Transport (Damage during)
f.
Packaging (not finn enough)
Arm Jamming WHY Cartons falling inmaking it jam.Take cartons off'm/c still running
Needs adjusting
g. Operator Error WHY Rushing
left run to low
Lack of training
6. The team then took the first problem;
. Problem: Cartons falling in.
WHY
a. Not enough on the magazine WHY End of run so notfilling up
and suggested some possible solutions to the problem. These Me as follows
._Stop the machine to take the cartons off.
The team decided that they should all remind each other to stop the machine as
a quick fix solution until more information is obtained on the sensors
11. Have a sensor or alarm when cartons run low.
Marcia will obtain all the information she can by next meeting on a sensor that
will alarm when the cartons are getting to low.
iii. Sensor to recognise rejects and adjust the clock as is necessarJ.
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The team decided that Colleen and Shane will talk to Brian Gay who is
already looking at this issue and have all the relevant information by next
meeting.
h. Not enough on the magazine WHY Run out of cartons
Linefeeder to check all the materials are their before the job is started.
Martin is going to recheck this and the team will review this at the next
meeting.
11. Re-location of these materials.
Martin volunteered to look at relocating these materials as the boxes of cartons
have to be passed under the conveyor or carried over the conveyor via the
stairs.
7. There were many other issues that the team need to cover. These will be taken up at
the next few meetings. Steph will write down all the occasions when the cartons have
fallen into the machine. She will also write down all other issues that are being raised
in the teams 10 minutes efficiency meetings which must continue. This information
can then be used to show a difference the team is making.
8. The team then set a target of 60 % efficiency for the time they are running. This will
then be reviewed at the next meeting.
9. A side issue was raised that the productions sheets are not suited enough for the
Bradman Lake so all the team will review this and all the information written down
and presented to the team at the next meeting.
10. A scrap bin is needed to collect the rejects and Angela will organise this for the team
to have this week.
ADDITIONAL POINTS IQ BE COVERED AT NEXT MEETINGS
11. It was agreed that every idea or problem that is encountered will be written down by
Marcia who will present it to the team at the next meeting. This should continue.
12. Marcia has timed the machine a few times last week and will present this to the team
at the next meeting.
13. As Debbie is not solely aware of all the issues on the bradman machine it was
suggested she spend some time observing. Debbie will contact Angela for a suitable
time to do this.
14. Ear Plugs are being found allover the floor near the Bradman Lake. Debbie will
.: ontac all relevant areas and ask they tell there employees to dispose of t.!'~se
correctly. The team should also monitor this situation and see who is dropping them.
15 The next meeting is on Friday 28 March 1997 at 0700-0800. As all overtime has to
be authorised by Andrew Bonthron, Angela will inform the team if this day and time
is not possible.
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Thank-you all for your contribution to the above.
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SELF MANAGED BRADMAt'f TEAM
Date Q/meeting 4 April 1997
Present
Steph Watkins
Lisa Wilks
Coleen Pinney
Sue James
Liz Mutlow
Martin Beven
Marcia Jenkins
Debbie Clayden
Angela Thomas
Mark Fever
Martin Parson
Absent
Shane Palmer
ss: Debbie Clayden, Andrew Thomas, Angela Thomas, Andrew Bonthron, Collin
Williams, Jane Tapsell.
ACTION
1. Shane and Marcia will be informed of the date that leadership training will Debbie
- start
2. Brain Gay was contacted and he has a sensor which could be used for when Colleen!
the cartons are running low. To attach an alarm to this will cost approx. £5. Shane!
Marcia
Colleen!
Shane!
Marcia
4. The materials have to be checked before the start of a run. Martin B
5. The inner cartons should be relocated to the opposite side of the conveyor to Martin B
save the operators carrying large boxes over the conveyor or pushing them 4-04-97
under the conveyor.
6. The team were achieving approx. 57% efficiency last week so it was Team
suggested that the team plot two efficiencies, one for the overall and
for the actual hours worked (Minus the down time). Itwas agreed that
the team write this on their production sheets for a record to be kept.
7. The production sheets were explained by Debbie and Angela and the Team
importance that the information on them were correct. It was also discussed start daily
that the down time and the amount of packs produced should both equal to 04-04-97
8.5 hours. It was agreed that the team double check this is happening to
clarify the problems to be addressed.
3. Brain Gay was also contacted with reference to the sensor to allow for the
rejects. This needs to be followed up.
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8. Collin submitted a graph to the team that shows the main problem
according to the information on the last 3 week's production sheets is
maintenance issues. When you read the back of these sheets clearly
maintenance is not the real issue but cartons falling into the machine is.
Debbie went through the downtime codes with the team and discussed what
could be adjusted but Angela needs to clarify this with Andrew Bonthron.
9. Debbie put to the team that a matrix could be made to show the amount per
hour of every product that is produced. This could then be a visual aid for
the team to use as a source of information. Debbie did suggest the team
should not think that just because the machine have run at a particular speed
it should remain at that speed.
10. It was suggested that Gareth Armstrong could train a few team members on
the set up of the machine. This will highlight any deviations in the manuals
and would be a good opportunity for training of these operators.
Angela!
Team
Team
Angela!
Shanel
Colleen
11. Debbie suggested that the weight should be used and the progress monitored Team
by the team to see ifit makes a difference
With reference to point number 8, a number of downtime codes have been suggested, they are
as follows;
Change over
Setting Problems
Waiting Material - Direct
- Indirect
Material fault
Machine maintenance
Team brief
Rework.
The next meeting will take place on Thursday 10 April 1997 at 0700hrs.
\
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SELF MANAGED BRADMAN TEAL"'!
Date Qlmeeting IQ April 1997
Present
Steph Watkins
Colleen Pinney
Sue James
Liz Mutlow
Martin Beven
Marcia Jenkins
Debbie Clayden
Angela Thomas
Mark Fever
Martin Parsons
Shane Palmer
Nigel Gillett
Andrew Bonthron
Absent
Lisa Wilks
.c&.. Debbie Clayden, Andrew Thomas, Angela Thomas, Andrew Bonthron, Collin
Williams, Jane Tapsell.
ACTION
-
1. - Colleen and Angela had a meeting with Glen who is trying to organise a Angela
blade build of approx. 45k. This will enable the team to slot jobs into the Colleen
daily plan to try and reduce the amount of time spent on changeovers. The
plan should be made available for the team today but Angela will follow it
up if she hasn't received it.
2. Debbie has now given the group a copy of the new production sheets the Debbie
team has agreed it is more accurate and it now needs a quality number as
soon as the audit is completed.
3. Leadership has now been arranged for Friday 18 April at I200hrs. The
people to attend this training are Shane, Marcia and Colleen.
Debbie
4. The sensor for the carton feed has know been fitted and will be fitted to
the machine today Angela and Nigel will ensure this is completed.
Angela
Nigel
5. The sensor to monitor the rejects has now been fitted and the team agreed
that they have less disruption towards the end of each job.
6. The team will continue to monitor the amount of time they stopped for Team
materials which was outside their control.
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7. The team have started to show a matrix of product verses the quantity Marcia
produced. this seems to be going quite slow so it was suggested that at
least 3 different products should be added to the matrix every week.
8. Gareth Armstrong is due to come out on cell today to show Shane, Angela
Marcia, Mark and Martin how to set up the Bradman. Ifhe is too busy
Angela will contact Gareth for a date when this can happen.
9. Last week Debbie raised a concern that the female members of the team Team
should get more involved with the setting issues. This week the team
reported that they have attempted a lot of setting issues themselves
(Friday) and are continuing to 'have a go' at some of the issues.
10. The weight on the carton feed is being continued to used. Team
11. Last weeks minutes stated that one of the leaders responsibilities is to Marcia
photocopy all the graphs and charts the team produce and give it to
Debbie who will send it to Jane. This is necessary to keep them informed
of what progress the team is making. This was not carried out last week
so Marcia now has the responsibility of ensuring Debbie receives
this information.
12.- Two efficiency are still being plotted (with and without downtime) and Team
this must continue. Last week the team discussed many people issues
and from the information the team provided efficiency still has not
improved a great deal. The team made various suggestions which they
think: may increase there efficiency.
a. Down time is not being recorded accurately by each end of the machine. Team
The team suggested that each end keep a record of the down time and
compare it at the end of the shift to ensure it is correct. This was agreed
and it should start Today.
b. As not all members of the team have a watch it was suggested that a clock Angela
be purchased and placed on the pillar so everyone can record the correct Nigel
down time.
c. Itwas suggested that the works orders be put into a rack so the team Angela
know the next job. The jobs are still recorded on the board but only 5
at a time so their is no chance of miss-understanding.
d. An observation the team made was that the checked OK. labels take a lot Nigel
of time and use up an extra person on the end of the line.
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e.
£
13.
The first offs are sometimes not being completed. The team agreed this
must change. Inorder for the team to reduce the changeover downtime
the first offs must be completed before the job starts. This is the
responsibility of the two indirect people. The first 5 first offs should be
be completed within the first hour of running. The team said that it only
takes approx. 5 mins to complete one so 25 mins should complete the 5.
If this cannot be done then the indirect person must tell the team who
will try and organise for them to be done temporally until the indirect
can continue with them.
The team have also observed that there seem to be a bottle neck for
waiting for blades that have to be pinned and clipped, graphiting and
airofoiling.
Inorder to reduce the danger of when Shane is off there is nobody to
cover him the team decided that Martin Bevan was to stop pre-kitting
on Monday and spend all week with Shane on training.
14. It was then decided that either Mark, Martin or Marcia will pre-kit for
the time that Martin is training. When there are issues with materials
Angela should be informed straight away in order to support the team and
keep the machine running.
Indirect
operators
Nigel
Shane
Martin
-
15~ The team also highlighted a problem with other people using the printer Team
and leaving a mess. This could be monitored on who is using it and why.
16. The team should also stick to listedjobs on the board and if they are Team
wrong they should be changed.
17. The next meeting is on Thursday 24 April1997 at 0700.
18. Jane Tapsel will be on site on Friday 25 April to give the team the information on the
question sheets that you completed.
N.B. After the training Colleen, Marcia and Shane attended of Friday afternoon it
came to light that the efficiencies are being calculated wrongfor the operator
efficiency. Debbie spend some time on the training course and explained how to
calculate them. This should then be rectified on theproduction sheet starting from
Monday 21 April 1997. The team are approx. 80-99% operator efficient (minus
downtime).
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SELF MAl'fAGED BRADMAN TEM!
Date a/meeting -It) Apt i1 1991 23 Ftp ~ /q f
Present
Steph Watkins
Colleen Pinney
Sue James
Liz Mutlow
Martin Beven
Marcia Jenkins
fP_!b~ieS:eIayden} ;,
"Angela Thomas (
Mark Fever
Martin Parsons
Absent
Lisa Wilks
Shane Palmer
Apolo.gies
Angela Thomas
~ Debbie Clayden, Andrew Thomas, Angela Thomas, Andrew Bontbron, Collin
Williams, Jane Tapsell, Gareth Armstrong, Glen Harris.
ACTION
-
L Colleen and Angela had a meeting with Glen he said he would organise
a guide for a blade build. This could be organised better if Colleen,
Angela and Shane saw Andrew Wilks as Andrew can organise a schedule
for the Bradman-Lake
Angela
Shme
Colleen
2. The Bradman lake production sheet is now completed but is awaiting a Debbie
Q.A. number.
3. The leadership training is now completed Debbie
4. The sensor on the carton feed is now fitted but there are a few Angela
adjustments that need to be made. Debbie spoke to Angela who will
look at this if it has not yet been completed.
5. A problem was raised 2 weeks ago about jobs that run out of materials Team
which was not the fault of the team. Itwas stated that these were one
off instances but these one off instances seem to be increasing.
6. The team agreed last week that at least 3 products should be plotted On Shane
a matrix to show how many blades should be produced per product type. Angela
It was also agreed that Shane should be the allocated person to alter the Marcia
speed dial. This must happen this week, if Shane is not available to
adjust the dial then Angela must be informed.
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7. This has been the fourth week that the team has discussed Gareth
Armstrong coming on the Bradman-Lake and showing Marcia, Mark,
Shane and Martin how to set up the machine. A date as yet still haven't
been given to the team. If Gareth is too busy then could he organise
somebody else to show the team as they are compiling some points/
concerns they need advice on.
ACTION
Gareth
Angela
Team
Marcia
Angela
lOa As the team had no graph paper for one week the team have not been
plotting their efficiency until yesterday.
b. The team suggested a clock be placed on the pillar but agreed in the Team
week that they would use stopwatch. These have to be ordered but in
the meantime the team can use Andrew Bonthron's
c. The team suggested that the works orders be put ina rack but this Angela
hasn't yet been ordered as Angela isn't sure whether a rack is what
the team want. Angela needs to obtain clarification from the team for
this issue to be resolved.
d. A point was made last week that OK labels take a long time to put onto Nigel
certain jobs. The team has had no feedback from Nigel if there is anything Angela
he can do.
e. It was agreed last week that the 1st offs take approx. 5 mins and the first Shane
5 should be completed within the first hour of running in the morning. Angela
It was given the responsibility ofShaneIMartin or the indirect person
to do this task. This must be completed regularly by these indirect people.
If the indirect cannot complete the 1st off then they MUST inform the team.
before the job starts .
f.
8. The female members of the team are continuing to get involved with
some of the setting issues.
Angela
Nigel
11. Last weeks meeting the team, Angela and Nigel agreed that from Monday Angela
21 April Martin Bevan would spend the week with Shane in order to learn Martin
how to deal with the setting issues. Unfortunately this training hasn't started
yet as Martin Bevan has to show Martin how to pre-kit and line feed before
he is able to train with Shane,
9. Marcia is responsible for copying all relevant information for Debbie
but this hasn't happened this week due to her waiting for the information
off Angela Angela has explained the delay this week but it is important
that Debbie is kept up to date
The team made an observation at last weeks meeting that there is a
bottle neck on pinning, clipping etc.. Although 2 extra people have
been put on this jobs there are certain jobs that these extra people still
hasn't alleviated the problem.
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l2. A concern raised last week was that other people are using the printer Steph
and leaving a mess and there are occasions when the Bradman team need
to use the printer and they cannot because other people are on it. Steph will
monitor this and write down who is using it and when and this list must then
be submitted Debbie weekly.
13. The team are still unsure of the method of calculating the efficiencies minus
the scrap so if Angela can arrange cover Debbie can go through this with
each of the team. It should only take 10mins each.
Debbie
Angela
14. A concern arose last week that Shane should go to break with the team. Shane
This started to take place but has stopped. Shane should go with the team Angela
for break but if something needs adjusting or changeovers then Shane should
go later. Whatever the case the whole team should know why Shane is
going to a later break and what he is doing while they are at break. At
present this do not seem to be the case.
15. The team raised a concern. that they had a lot of problems with the tape
machine. Gareth Armstrong contacted the supplier who talked Shane
through adjusting/cleaning these cutters.
Team
-16. The next meeting is on Thursday 1 May 1997 at 9700.
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DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR THE SELF MANAGED
TEAMS
Technical Skills Team working Problem Solving Techniques
Techniques
Clipping Tool - Date Training Techniques e.g. Brainstorming
Stamp Training Matrix
.Centre Location Change Leadership Skills Monitoring Efficiency
on Harness - with and without Downtime
Slide-on Change of Length Facilitation Skills Monitoring Scrap Costs
Slide-on Change of Track Meeting Skills Planning Works Orders and
Arrears
Harness Change of Length Team Development Skills
Harness Change Details OrganisingIPlanning Skills
Fault Finding and Decision Making Skills
Adjustments
Guards and Safety
(IOL First Harness)
(IOL One Hit Wonder)
,_, ~-
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APPENDIX6
OPTEL CORPORATION MANUFACTURING SURVEY COMPARISON RAW DATA (1995 1998)
ESAT OUESTION PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
FAVOURABLE FAVOURABLE- FAVOURABLE FAVOURABLE
-1995 1996 -1997 -1998
I. I like the kind of work I do. 75 65 72 702. My work gives me a feeling of personal
accomplishment. 62 53
3. I am satisfied with the fairness and
respect I receive on the job. 50 41
4. 1am satisfied with the training I receive
for my present job. 53 41 555. I am satisfied with the recognition I
receive for doing a good job. 32 25 25
6. I am satisfied with my involvement in
decisions that affect my work 45 35 39
7.My immediate Supervisor/manager helps
me to be an effi:ctive employee. 35 33
8. Optel Corporation has a sincere interest
in the satisfaction and well-being of its
employees. 54 37 51
9. I would recommend Optel Corporation
as a good place to work. 74 59 72 80
10.Conditions at Optel Corporation allow
me to be about as productive as I can be. 55 47 50 52
II. At the present time, I am (not) seriously
considering leaving Optel Corporation. 78 64 85 71
12.From what I hear, our pay is as good as
or better that the pay in other companies. 59 44
13.Overall, our customers are satisfied
doing business with Optel Corporation. 55 57
14.I would recommend Optel Corporation
as a supplier of telecommunications
products and services. 77 72
15.Our processes are improving to ensure
our customers' needs are met. 77 68
16.1believe actions have been put in place
to address some of the issues raised by
employees in the last survey. 45 33 54
17.Considering everything, I am satisfied
with Optel Corporation at the present time. 66 50 56 73
18. Overalll I am satisfied with ml':job. 71 55 61
EXTENDED SURVEY RAW DATA-(l997/1998)
% 0/.
OUESTION FAVOURABLE FAVOURABLE
1997 1998
I. I bave enougb iDformadon to do my job_II (PC)-69 (EQ)-71
2. I feel eocouraged to come up witb DewaDd better ways of doing tbiogs (EMP)-4S (MO) SI
3. I CIDdearly uplaiD to otben tbe 10Dgterm bu.iDes8ltrategy ofOptel (SL)-27 (CO)-28
COl1lOradoD
4. I blve tbe autbority to mallt decisioDI tblt improve tbe quality of my work (EMP)-3S (EQ) -47
S. I feel valued all ID employee of Optel CorpondoD (VP)-4S (MIS)-47
6. Processes IDd procedures allow me to effectively meet customer Deeds (PC)-46 (EQ) -49
7. I feel free to tallt iDformed risks ia geldDg my work dooe (EMP)-39 (MO)-47
8. Tbe people ia my work group speak opeoly aod booestly eveo wIleo opiDloas COL)-68 (MO)-70
differ
9. My team gets tbe co-opendoa It oeeds from otber work groups to acbieve (COL)-46 (EQ) -48
our buslDels objectives
10.1 receive OO-gOIDgfeedback tIlat belps me to improve my performaDee (PRM)-J5 (EQ) -42
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